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ABSTRACT
THE EUROPEANIZATION OF THE SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP:
THE FUTURE OF NEO-CORPORATISM IN AUSTRIA AND GERMANY

FEBRUARY
PAUL

S.

ADAMS,
M.A.,

Ph.D.,

B.A.,

2008

GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Eric

The impact of European

integration and the

governance within the European Union have begun
of governance

in

many European

states.

S.

emergence of a multi-level system of
to

subsumed by

economy. Much

the enormity of the

governance. However,

challenge the pre-existing systems

There has been a prevalent belief that the new

modes of governance have been supplanting domestic
the areas of political

Einhom

literature

political structures especially in

argued that neo-corporatism was being

European Union and

its

new mechanisms of

this research illustrates that the results

of the Europeanization of

neo-corporatist social partnerships are far from uniform and monolithic. There exists a

tremendous diversity and differentiation amongst the methods,

European integration allowing considerable necessity
areas. Further, in using previously

discovered that such models

and differentiation

results,

and preferences of

for specific cases studies in policy

developed models of Europeanization

fail to

that exists in the

it

has been

accurately and fully explain the pattern of diversity

Europeanization process. The cases of German and

Austrian social partnership illustrate such differentiation and continuing challenges and
are the focal points of this research.
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CHAPTER

1

EUROPEANIZATION & THE SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP
Introduction

This research endeavors to uncover, measure, and analyze the impact of European
integration and governance

collectively

known

upon domestic neo-corporatist

as the social partnership, in Austria

political structures,

and Germany. During the

decades, scholars have documented a remarkable decline in the efficacy and

last

utility

two

of

neo-corporatist structures of policymaking and governance throughout Europe. (Streeck

and Schnutter 1991; Crepaz 1992; Goebyn 1993)
integration and

its

It

has been suggested that European

resulting particularistic and multi-level patterns of governance and

policymaking have been significant contributors

to this decline in neo-corporatism.

(Streeck 1991; Streeck and Schmitter 1991)

The
governance

results

is

of this research will demonstrate that European integration and

having a number of measurable impacts on the social partnership

in both

Austria and Germany, though with significant variation between and within the cases.

However, given other endogenous and exogenous pressures including globalization,
structural

economic change, post-materialism, and domestic

political

changes, the overall

impact of Europeanization on neo-corporatist policymaking regimes has actually been
modest. This research shall demonstrate that while there has been significant structural

change

in the

German

somewhat haphazard

social partnership since the 1980s, Europeanization has

had a

role in such change. Conversely, while Austria has seen only

intermediate structural change to

its

system of social partnership,

been more greatly influenced, though

still at

relatively

modest

this

levels,

transformation has

by Europeanization.

This

is

not to say that important changes have not taken place.

While the structures and

processes of the social partnerships have seen only modest alteration by Europeanization,
the net impact and utility of such structures has certainly undergone significant change.

With the increased

intensity, scope,

governance since the 1980s, domestic

and progress of European integration and

political structures

have become

far

more

susceptible to the forces of Europeanization. National neo-corporatist structures are no

exception. However, the impact of such Europeanization has been decidedly differential

amongst the

EU member states.

(Schmidt 2006; Hertier 2001; Falkner 2004; Dyson 2003;

Hix and Goetz 2001; Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001
variations in the impact and responses to

)

It

will

be herein argued that

European integration and governance

lie in

specific institutionalization of the social partnership in each state's policymaking

governance
structural

patterns. Neo-corporatist systems, while generally in decline

change since the 1980s, may continue

to survive, influence the

the

and

and undergoing
policymaking

process, and provide effective governance within their domestic political systems, and

potentially at the

European

level,

compatibility vis-a-vis European

provided that they exhibit adaptability and

modes of governance.

This research endeavors to understand and explain the impact of European
integration and governance

upon neo-corporatism within

the context of the scholarship of

Europeanization. The bulk of the Europeanization literature seeks to comprehend

European integration transforms, or
institutions, processes, or structures.

specific institutional

and

fails to

how

transform, domestic political policies,

This research will comparatively analyze the

political characteristics

partnerships so as to understand and explain

if,

2

of the

German and

when, how, and

to

Austrian social

what extent European

integration and governance

causing domestic structural change or continuity. The

is

conclusions uncovered show a decidedly inconsistent and variable pattern of influence

and impact

in the

German and

fundamental weaknesses

Austria cases. This

in the

utilized

suggest significant and

models of Europeanization developed so

European Integration
In

may

&

Europeanization

most Europeanization research, European integration and governance are

and defined as a source of pressure upon national neo-corporatist

structures, in essence

it

is

interested in

how member

states adapt to the

European public sphere”. (Schmidt 2006) The term Europeanization
to the

approach and

literature that studies the types

down” emphasis on how
impinge upon,

alter,

level.

generally applied

it

is

a very

much

“top-

processes, policies, and pressures from the supranational level

(Borzel and Risse 2003)

like the

term globalization, Europeanization

is

more properly

complex multi-level process and regime of interactions. rather than

single level or unidirectional force.

many

“evolving

or transform processes, institutions, actors, and structures at the

However, much
descriptive of a

is

political

and methods of change or continuity

brought forth though the process of European integration. Hence

domestic

far.

a

(Dyson 2003; Schuppert 2006; Schmidt 2006) While

think of globalization as something that happens to states, societies, and actors

the international system,

it

is

much

both global and domestic forces

in

better defined as the product of interaction

between

shaping the international order. Globalization

merely an international phenomenon that happens

to states, cultures,

in

and people.

is

not

It is

also

the constitutive process of actors responding to the pressures of globalism, such as those

favoring global free trade, global telecommunications and media connectivity.

3

)

recognition of global environmental and health threats, and universal

human

rights,

within their domestic political, social, and economic institutions while simultaneously

attempting to affect the globalization process through political organizations, regimes and

norms of behavior. (Adams 2001, 2002, 2007)
construed as a unidirectional process. Nor can

In

it

eseence, globalization cannot be

be assumed to have a teleological

conclusion.

Europeanization should be conceptualized

and institutionalization of European integration
constitutive and interactive process

in a

similar vein.

It is

not only the force

that creates Europeanization.

It is

also a

between the European-levels of governance with

domestic-level actors, institutions, and processes seeking to shape the European order.

(Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006; Schuppert 2006) Notably, Europeanization
globalization in that

it

differs

from

has a more advanced level of institutionalization through the rules,

regulations, agencies, and institutions of the

European Union (EU). While the World

Trade Organization (WTO), United Nations (UN), International Criminal Court (ICC),

World Bank, and

International

Monetary Fund (IMF) seem

to

provide some institutional

organization to the forces of global integration, in comparison to the supranational
authority vested in the European Union, globalization falls far behind the level of

supranationalism found

w ithin

the

EU. (Hennis 2001 Weber 2001
;

4

The member

states

of the European Union have ceded unparalleled levels of

authority to the supranational institution,

international organizations.

members (and

potential

policymaking,

politics,

through

its

institutional

The

EU

drawn

a

international relations

it

far

more autonomous than most other

fundamentally shapes not

members and

just the policies

economic, and social organization within

and

of its

neighbors), but can also shape the very nature of

legal authority.

Understanding the scope, process,
integration has

making

its

member

(Schmidt 2006)

institutions,

and structures of European

tremendous bounty of scholarly and policy attention

and comparative

states

politics.

in

The Europeanization approach

one such approach within the scholarship of European integration. Yet

it

is

both

is

a fast

only

growing

approach. The majority of European integration analysis has been traditionally dominated

by the overarching goal of understanding how and why
process. (Hix and Goetz 2000; Schmidt 2006) This

is

states

engage

in the integration

a decidedly interstate

and purely

intergovernmental level of analysis that seeks to assess integration in terms of the
negotiation, compromise, debate, preferences, and interests of the states taking part in the

process. (Deutsch 1957, 1967; Dinan 1994;

Tsoukalis 1997) There

is

also significant scholarship focused

design and framework by which the
supranational organization with

itself

Keohane and Hoffmann 1991; Pinder 1998;

EU

many

operates.

As both an

institutional

international and

state-like characteristics

has become synonymous with European integration and

in its explanation.

upon the

and functions, the

is

EU

often the central variable

(Cram 1997; Hix 2005; Nugent 2001 2006)

While these two approaches

,

to studying

European integration are valuable they do

tend to discount the transformational impact of European integration upon political

5

systems, processes, institutions, and structures within

is

member

states.

(Lodge 2000) This

not to say that the specific content and institutionalization of integration policy have

been ignored. Quite
influential

regional

to the contrary, there

works on the process and

economic

have been a number of important and

effects

of European integration upon national and

sectors and policy outputs. (Button, Haynes, and Stough 1998;

Eliassen and Sjovaag 1999; Fennell 1997; Gardner 1996; Grant, 1997; Knill and

Lenschow 1998; Kurzer 1993; McCormick 2001 ) These

studies of integration tend to

focus upon quantifiable and tangible regulatory, policy, and market effects of

EU

policymaking.

Yet scholarship has only recently begun

to

encompass an under-appreciated

aspect of European integration, the impact upon national political processes and

structures. This

growing Europeanization scholarship

Europe and the

creation, administration,

and

political

institutions

is

addressing

how

the integration of

and expansion of a European level of economic

governance fundamentally challenges or modifies existing norms,

and processes, or

Eliassen 1993;

structures, at the state level. (Alter 2001;

political

Andersen and

Hooghe 1996; Sbragia 1992; Lodge 2000; Schuppert 2006; Dyson 2003;

Knill 2001; Schmidt 2006)

Structure implies far

structures are regularized

more than policy outputs and

and patterned relationships

preferences. Domestic

that are stable over time. This

encompasses not just policy but also the formal and informal

norms and

beliefs

upon which such

institutions

(Schmidt 2006) The social partnership

in

because of their traditional structural role

both

in

institutions, as well as the

and policymaking processes

Germany and

rely.

Austria are notable precisely

policymaking and governance within

6

their

political systems.

The

structure of social partnership includes not just specific agencies,

commissions, and other formal

institutions, but also the informal patterns

of behavior,

norms, expectations, and regularized processes that legitimate and underlie the systems.

The Europeanization scholarship has generally encapsulated
approach seeking

to

a domestic structural

understand and explain the supranational sources of domestic change

or continuity. This genre of integration studies also includes the creation, growth, and

maintenance of a multi-tiered system of governance (supranational, regional, national,
sub-national) amongst the

member

states

and the EU. This

is

often collectively classified

under the banner of multi-level governance within integration scholarship. (Goetz and

Hix 2001; Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998; Hooghe 1996; Hooghe and Marks 2001;

Kmll 2001; Streeck 1991; Schuppert 2006; Dyson 2003)

The

creation of a multi-tiered system of governance

is

one of the notable

transformational impacts of European integration. Neo-corporatist institutions and

processes

at the

national level

may be

subject to such transformational influence.

corporatist institutions and processes have been integral features of the postwar

and

political systems,

and successes, of many

states,

Neo-

economic

including the cases of this research,

Austria and Germany. Yet the Europeanization of national political systems could

challenge the persistence and efficacy of neo-corporatism

at the

national level.

Some

scholars initially believed that neo-corporatist institutions and structures at the European-

level

might supplant those

at the state-level.

(Gorges 1996)

However, the creation of salient European

level neo-corporatism has failed to

materialize and the vast majority of integration scholarship tends to discount this as likely

in the current

context of

EU

policymaking

institutions

7

and

structures. (Streeck

and

Schmitter 1991; Sargent 1985; Greenwood 2003a; Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998;
Streeck 1991

)

As Hix and Goetz

posit, Brussels is

more

like

Washington

in its “richness,

complexity, pluralism, and openness of the ‘policy community' than any other national
capital in Europe”. (2000, 8) EU-level

corporatism

in its social

dialogue and

duplication of national structures

governance does have some semblances of neo-

common

at the

agricultural policy, yet

it

is

far

from a

supranational level. (Berger 1981; Sargent 1985;

Compston and Greenwood 2001; Greenwood 2003a; Dyson 2003) Perhaps policymaking
at the

European governance has even heralded an

does not

fit

entirely

new form of governance

that

well into the preexisting models. (Falkner 2000; Pelinka 1999; Schuppert

2006; Schmidt 2006) As Dyson suggests, the interweaving of EU and domestic levels and

forms of governance has created a new
a

compound policymaking system

somewhat

irregular.

in

political

dynamic. (2003) Schmidt sees the

which governance

is

highly dispersed and

Hence, the EU-level of policymaking diverges from most national

patterns suggesting adaptation pressures for almost

2006; Hertier and Knill 2001; Falkner 2000) This

all

forms of governance. (Schmidt

may have

specific implications for the

future of neo-corporatism at both the national and supranational levels.

future exigencies

in

EU as

and opportunities for neo-corporatism

at

the

EU

The current and

level will be discussed

both chapters three and eight.

The Europeanization
institutions, processes,

political

literature seeks to assess

and actors adapt

governance. In essence,

correlates to or causes domestic

it

to the forces

if,

how, and when

state-level

of European-level economic and

seeks to determine

how European

integration

change or continuity. For Hix and Goetz,

Europeanization has two types of impacts upon domestic actors and institutions:

8

European
outcomes constrain domestic
choice, reinforce certain policy and institutional developments,
and provide a catalyst for change in others; and
(

1

)

the delegation of policy competences to the

level

and the resulting

(2) the establishment

political

of a higher level of governance

institutions provides

new

constraints, either to

promote certain

opportunities to exit from domestic
policies, or to veto others,

or to secure informational advantages. (2000, 8)

To

paraphrase, existing domestic institutions’ choices are

limited by the capabilities of the European

procedural changes

In addition, actors

in the

and

Ehuon

that

now more

may

lead to structural and

domestic institutions themselves. (Lodge 2000; Schmidt 2006)

interests in

domestic political systems have

bypass national policymaking institutions and proceed directly

of the EU. As Schmidt

greatly shaped or

posits, “the focus

new

conduits to

to the supranational level

of interest access and influence has moved from

national capitals to Brussels” as once-domestically oriented and organized social,

economic, and

civil society

groups become “enmeshed

in

an

EU

policy-formulation

process which involves a vast array of actors in a highly complex set of interactions with
multiple points of entry”. (2006)

The primary

theoretical

models of this work

rest in the scholarship

of Simon Mix,

Klaus Goetz, Adrienne Heritier, Vivien A. Schmidt, Christoph Knill, Thomas Risse-

Kappen, Maria Green Cowles, and James Caporaso, as well as others, who have provided
valuable scholarship and frameworks by which to analyze the impacts of Europeanization

upon formal and informal

institutions

and structures

at the state level.

(Hix and Goetz

2000; Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001; Kmll 2001; Heritier 2001; Schmidt

2006) This

literature

and the framework

detail in later chapters

it

provides will be explored in

of this research

9

much

greater

In essence, the

member

Europeanization framework seeks to explain variation amongst
process of European integration since the results show

states' adaptation to the

“neither wholesale convergence nor continuing divergence of national policy structures,

institutions,

and other patterned relationships." Rather, the evidence tends

to support the

conclusion that national institutions and features do matter and tend to result

“domestic

in

adaptation with national colors'’. (Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001,

1

)

The

impacts of Europeanization upon domestic structures are inconsistent and variable.

(Schmidt 2006)

In

some

cases, the existing political structures at the national level are

generally compatible with the requirements and forces of Europeanization. These

preexisting structures “fit” and

work within

national institutions and structures

integration.

EU

Spain, the United

Germany

new Europeanized

or those with existent devolutionary processes such as in

Kingdom, and

Italy.

(Borzel 1999, 2001, 2002; Hix and Goetz 2000)

institutions

the domestic structures the greater the transformational force,

call

some

helped reinforce preexisting regional

However, the greater the misfit between European

Caporaso

order. In fact,

be reinforced and empowered by European

may have

regional policies

authority in states like

may

the

and processes and

what Risse, Cowles, and

adapational pressure and Hix and Goetz label as catalyst. (Risse-Kappen.

Cowles, and Caporaso 2001; Hix and Goetz 2000; Schmidt 2006) Yet domestic structural

change does not uniformly

result

from increased adapational pressures of

Europeanization. (Lodge 2000; Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006; Heritier and Knill 2001)

While the framework assesses how Europeanization places adaptational pressure on
states to

to

converge with European standards,

such pressures

is

it

additionally addresses the states' response

dependent upon the presence or absence of particular domestic

10

These may include specific mediating factors

characteristics.

at the state-level:

multiple

veto points, facilitating formal institutions, organizational and policymaking cultures,

differential

empowerment of domestic

Caporaso 2001,

2) For

domestic actors,

actors,

Hix and Goetz, the likelihood of domestic change increases when

institutions, or processes

level in three areas:

and learning. (Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and

new

exit

pathways,

have increased opportunities

new

at the

European

veto powers, and gaining informational

advantage. (2000, 13) All of these measurements and criteria will be discussed in greater
detail in chapters

two and

eight.

These frameworks provide a reasonably elegant rubric

for assessing the

Europeanization upon the neo-corporatist structures of the Austrian and
systems. Both social partnerships are influenced to

and governance, as

will

be demonstrated

in

some

impact of

German

political

extent by European integration

subsequent chapters. However, as

much of

the Europeanization scholarship suggests, the necessity to adapt can only be discerned by

analyzing

how

European

integration. Essentially, misfit

is

well the social partnership

a necessary precondition for

fits

or misfits the institutions and processes of

between

EU

and national modes of governance

domestic structural change. (Schmidt 2006; Borzel and

Risse 2003; Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001

)

Hence Europeanization

will cause

significant adaptational pressure on systems that exhibit strong misfit as might occur in

national patterns of social partnership.

However, the

results

of this misfit and increased adaptational pressures are neither

automatic nor consistent across
the

member

dominance of differential responses

states.

Europeanization has generally discovered

to similar pressures

institutional features of the national systems. (Risse,

II

based upon the specific

Cowles, and Caporaso 2001;

Schmidt 2006) Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso argue

European

level adaptational pressures

from

that the variable

state to state are

responses to

explained by the presence or

absence of the mediating factors. Hence the Europeanization framework suggested by
Risse, Cowles,

and Caporaso should provide,

if

accurate, a regularized or predictable

pattern of domestic structural change in neo-corporatism

stemming from

the

adapatational pressures of Europeanization filtered through the mediating factors of

domestic institutionalization. (2001)

The

would provide context from

results, if successful,

the

German and

cases for assessing the impact of Europeanization on Dutch, Danish,

Irish,

Austrian

Belgian,

Spanish, Swedish, Swiss social partnerships and neo-corporatist structures. The results,

if

supporting and reaffirming the Europeanization framework, would also suggest broader
applicability of the

model

to other

pressures from Europeanization.

Austrian and

German

domestic structures that

Hence

It

;

be under adaptational

only an analysis and study of the

social partnerships but also a test of the applicability

of the Europeanization frameworks

and Caporaso 2001

this is not

may

that

it

Borzel and Risse 2003; Schmidt 2006)

should be noted that the Europeanization frameworks have tended

is in

fact not truly

by creating new

social,

European integration

economic, and

political

and Euro-skeptical preferences and ideologies
divisions. (Hix

it

to define

seems clear

independent from the impact of the very state-level institutions

that are being analyzed in this research.

effect

viability

have been previously developed. (Risse. Cowles,

European integration and governance as independent variables. However,
that

and

and Goetz 2000,

1

1;

itself

has had an indirect

schisms based upon pro-European

that cut across traditional left-right

Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Dyson 2003; Paterson
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2003) In addition, the neo-corporatist structures and actors
to

have some measurable influence over the

in

European

state's integration interests

states are likely

and

policies.

(Schmidt, 2006)

It is

herein recognized that disaggregating the supranational level of the European

Union from

the domestic level of the

unsolvable. European integration

European

member

may

integration. This system

is

states is both problematic

and potentially

beget domestic change that begets changes to

one

that has

feedback and readjustments occurring

on both sides of the equation. (Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006) However, by delimiting
European integration and

German and

its

Europeanizing effects upon the social partnership

Austrian systems, perhaps

mechanism of the European

we can glimpse an

in the

important and transformational

integration process that will be useful in better understanding

the totality of the relationship

between the European Union and

its

member

states.

This

debate over the “top-down” versus “bottom-up” Europeanization will be revisited in the

concluding chapter, as
viability

it

is

an important element in assessing the applicability and

of the dominant Europeanization frameworks.
Theoretical Considerations: Corporatism and Neo-Corporatism

The

social partnerships in Austria

interest representation,

in

and Germany are forms of neo-corporatist

policymaking, and governance. Neo-corporatism and corporatism,

both theory and practice, will be explored in greater detail in later chapters. However, a

cursory introduction seems warranted at this point. Corporatism

is

both a theoretical

concept and an institutional method of organizing interest group activity and behavior.

While there are debates over numerous and varying

definitions, corporatism

limited or regulated interest group representation and organization.
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is

a

form of

Most
interest

corporatist systems are typified

by

economic, or other forms of

social,

groups being granted, licensed, or endowed with a representative monopoly over

a specific sector of social, economic, or labor activity

position in the policymaking process.

and a guaranteed or even veto,

(Cawson 1986; Lehmbruch 1982; Chalmers 1985;

Collier and Collier 1979; Wiarda 1997) Additionally, in

often

empowered

some systems

these groups are

or tasked to perform quasi-regulatory and direct administrative

functions over their

membership

as well as in areas of

economic

policy, vocational

education, social insurance, labor-capital relations, and labor market governance.

(Katzenstein 1987; O’Sullivan 1988; Williamson 1985;

Cox 1988)

The primary competing theory of interest group organization and
pluralism.

The

distinctions

between pluralism and corporatism

politics is

will be further explored in

chapter three. Primarily the distinctions are of participatory openness and the role of the

state.

Corporatism, and

its

more modem democratic form found

regulates or coordinates interest group activity by limiting the

in

neo-corporatism,

number of participants,

narrowing the range of policy options, and usually relying upon the

state to play

an

important role in intermediating, negotiating, or directing the policymaking process.

(Wiarda 1997; Cox 1988) This
restrictions

is

most dissimilar from pluralism which places few

on either the numbers or

However, many have argued
disparities that belie

its

supposed

activities

of interest groups

in the political system.

that pluralism often creates large inequalities

liberal

and

and democratic emphasis. (Lowi 1979; Olson

1965) Importantly, pluralism also tends to envision the state playing a less interventionist
role in the

policymaking process. (Zeigler 1988; Wiarda 1997; Williamson 1989)

Though, as

will

be demonstrated

in later chapters, in
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some eases

the decline of neo-

corporatism has resulted in greater reliance upon a direct state role in the policymaking

and governance processes commensurate with the decline of the other
actors. (Vail 2003; Falkner

ma jor

corporatist

and Talos 1994)

While pluralism has often been associated with liberalism and democracy,
corporatism has often been linked with authoritarianism especially

Southern Europe and Latin America, and perhaps rightfully

so. (Field

Wiarda 1968; Grayson 1998) The regimes of Benito Mussolini
in Spain,

Antonio Salazar

in Portugal,

Getulio Vargas

Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI)
corporatist

in

in the cases

in Brazil,

of

1938; Sarti 1971;

in Italy,

Francisco Franco

Lazaro Cardenas and the

Mexico, and Juan Peron

in

Argentina used

frameworks and ideology as important tools of state power and dictatorship.

(Wiarda 1981, 1997; Malloy 1977; Adams 2004)
Yet the association of corporatism with authoritarianism ignores a large number
of cases

in free

and democratic societies especially

in

Europe. Hence the term neo-

corporatism has been regularly used to differentiate between authoritarian and democratic
variants of corporatism. Neo-corporatism describes democratic or non-authoritarian

versions of corporatist institutions that emerged primarily in Western Europe, including

Germany,

Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland,

Denmark, Sweden,

and Norway, during the early and mid-twentieth century. (Adams 2004; Chalmers 1985;
Williamson 1985; Williamson 1989) These neo-corporatist arrangements have been more

commonly

labeled as the “social partnership” in

corporatist terminology and

more accessible

label for

its

mass

many

states,

eschewing use of the

perceived authoritarian stigma, as well as to provide a

political

consumption. Nonetheless, they share many of

the fundamanetal and essential characteristics of corporatism.

15

This research will attempt to address a fundamental question regarding change

and neo-corporatism

many have

that has not

been adequately addressed by the scholarship. While

theorized about the factors and features underlying the creation and

maintenance of corporatist and neo-corporatist
a dearth

institutions

and processes, there has been

of persuasive theory and argument regarding the potential

change or transformation. Much of the existing work assumes
corporatism will necessarily result

in the creation

for neo-corporatist

that the decline

of neo-

of more neo-liberal and pluralist

and regimes. (Crepaz 1994; Gerlich 1992; Gobeyn 1993; Streeck 1991;

institutions

Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Schmidt 2006) However, corporatism and neo-corporatism

may be

far

more than mere steppingstones on

pluralist future.

The very challenges

the path to the inevitable neo-liberal and

to the existing neo-corporatist order

may

be the

building blocks of future iterations of social partnership. (Wiarda 1997)

While neo-corporatism may not universally

fit

into the processes

and structures of

European multi-level governance, some neo-corporatist structures may very well
adapt to the

new European environment.

fit

or

(Falkner 1997, 2000, 2001, Falkner and Leiber

2004; Heinisch 2000; Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006) The results could encompass anything

between minor

institutional

and technocratic reforms with relatively few long-term

implications or wholesale transformation of neo-corporatist structures that permanently

impact the efficacy and viability of the social partnership altogether. Hence
shall necessarily

endeavor

to analyze the compatibility or

European modes of governance.
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fit

this research

of neo-corporatism and

The underlying

theoretical, social,

economic, and

may themselves

corporatism and neo-corporatism

political foundations

of

suggest a high level of susceptibility to

pressures from European integration and governance. Put simply, neo-corporatism

have some

critical

and foundational characteristics

that

make

it

less than fully

may

compatible

with the process of European integration and multi-level governance. (Streeck and

Schmitter 1991

However,

)

it

may

multilevel governance and there

structures to adapt

and thrive

in

also have

is

some

characteristics that are

always the opportunity for

amenable

institutions, actors,

to

and

changed environments. (Katzenstein 2003; Falkner 2000,

2001; Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006)
This research shall explore to what extent neo-corporatism meshes with the
process of European integration and governance through a review of the relevant theories

and

literature

of corporatism and neo-corporatism starting with

major premises and assumptions, and empirical
will

uncover and analyze

fitting into the

to

its

historical results

philosophical roots,

of

its

implementation

what extent corporatism and neo-corporatism are capable of

context of European

modes of supranational and

While many elements of corporatism appear

multi-level governance.

to be antithetical to these trends, they

are not exhaustively so. Hence, while the essential underpinnings of corporatism

corporatism

may

create

It

some

misfit

between

European integration and governance, the

their

and neo-

domestic structures and the process of

results are not absolute

and are significantly

dependent upon particularistic structural and institutional responses by the domestic
systems. (Schmidt 2006) In Europeanization tenns, neo-corporatism
or even

good

fit

with the current

modes of European governance but
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may

not be a perfect

the eventual

outcomes of that

misfit are quite variable. (Risse,

Cowles, and Caporaso 2001; Hertier

and Kmll 2001; Schmidt 2006)

As noted

earlier, not all

elements of neo-corporatism are necessarily divergent

with institutions and practices of governance

still

debates over

how

others suggest, the

w ith

to categorize the

EU may

at the

European

level.

To

begin, there are

European policymaking model. As Falkner and

be an entirely

new form of governance

any preexisting models of policymaking whether

(Falkner 2000; Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006) Hence

it

that fails to

fit

well

pluralist, corporatist, or statist.

should not be surprising that the

Europeanization scholarship generally argues that there are few cases of absolute

divergence or convergence. (Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001; Lodge 2000)

However, there are degrees of convergence and divergence based on national
variables.

As

will be illustrated

and argued

in

institutional

chapter three, there seems to be sufficient

divergence between neo-corporatism and European multi-level governance to suggest

least

some

misfit and therefore heighten adaptational pressures

upon national structures

of social partnership. (Falkner 1997, 2001; Falkner and Leiber 2004; Dyson 2003)
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at

Even those

that suggest a relative

between neo-corporatism and

fit

EU modes

of

policymaking and governance admit to important misfits and misalignments on a number

of fronts and

in a

number of sectors. Schmidt 2006) The
(

conditions elemental to corporatism and neo-corporatism
those of European

organizations, ideals, and

may sometimes

modes of governance. However, even with increased

run counter to

adaptational

pressure placed upon neo-corporatist structures by European integration and governance,

adoption of domestic political structural change

institutionalization

is

not uniform. Variations in the national

of neo-corporatism through the social partnership

in

each

state

should

determine the scope and pace of structural change or of continuity.

Cases: The Social Partnership in Austria and

Corporatism and neo-corporatism are found
social partnerships are just

in

Germany

almost infinite varieties and the

some forms amongst many. (Williamson 1985; Cawson

1985,

1986) Just as amongst democracies, institutional and political distinctions amongst neocorporatist regimes often matter a great deal.

known

neo-corporatist regimes are broadly

as Sozialpartnerschaft or social partnership in

institutions

and the

Many

and processes between major business

state

were developed

in several

European

which consensual policymaking

interests,

states

organized labor, agriculture,

beginning

in the

early twentieth

century. While there are similarities between the social partnerships of Germany and

Austria there are also critical differences. (Heimsch 2000)

social partnerships can be based

and

political

on

cultural,

economic,

The

variation

amongst the

social, historical, institutional,

developments. While Germany and Austria are facing similar challenges to

their social partnerships

from a number of forces including European modes of
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governance, the impacts, consequences

of,

and responses

to

such forces

may

vary. This

research will provide a comparative analysis of the preconditions, development,

institutions, functions,

and structures of the social partnership

assessment of how such distinctions

in the social

fundamental question

is,

of course,

both states as well as an

partnership have impacted their

development and changes since the end of World War

A

in

II.

why does

structural transformation

of the

social partnership matter in these, or any, cases? In essence, a possible response to the

pressures and transformation of state-level social partnerships very well might be “so

what”. The political, social, cultural institutionalization of the social partnership

European
is

The

social partnership

economic prosperity and

Germany,
and

is

often given significant credit for contributing to both

political stability during the

postwar era

Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium,

in states

such as

Sweden, Denmark, Norway,

others.

While the amount of credit
is

and sober analysis of its potential transformation

states suggests that a careful

justified.

in

to

which

it

is

entitled

is

subject to

some

debate, there

general acceptance as well as meaningful evidence that the social partnership

made

a

tangible contribution in providing the basis for remarkable levels of both economic

growth and

political stability in these states. (Katzenstein 1978, 1984, 1985, 1987;

Pekkarinen

et al.

1992; Scholten 1987)

representation and policymaking,

it

is

By

establishing a consensual system of interest

often argued that the postwar miracles of Germany,

Austria, Switzerland, Scandinavia, and the Netherlands were even

economic and

political terms.
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more miraculous

in

By

the 1990s,

was

partnership

Gobeyn 1993;

many

scholars, analysts,

in decline or

perhaps even

and policymakers suggested

at the

that the social

brink of extinction. (Gerlich 1992;

Streeck 1991; Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Schmitter and Grote 1997)

However, most analysis has not tended

to suggest that the social partnership

and neo-

corporatism are disappearing or being abandoned rather they are becoming less

many European

features of

state’s political systems.

Arend Lijphardt argued “the efficacy

of corporatist structures and the frequency of their use has decreased, not
structures themselves

of Europeanization

have disappeared or are being dismantled”. (1999,

in the overall

critical

decline of neo-corporatism

is

that these

I

73)

The impact

rather contested. (Streeck

and Schmitter 1991; Streeck 2001; Falkner 2000; Falkner and Leiber 2004; Schmidt
2006) Nonetheless, the bulk of the analyses of the past twenty years have pointed to some
significant marginalization or decline in the social partnership

structures in

many

states including

Germany and

and other neo-corporatist

Austria and the role of Europeanization

has often been prominent.

The

social partnerships

of postwar Germany and Austria do indeed seem

been structurally transformed, or are

economic,
levels.

social,

and

political

still

phenomena occurring

political identities, the

at

the domestic, regional,

and global

era of industrialism to post-industrialism,

economic and

political integration

of Europe,

and the globalization of domestic economies have put pressure upon the postwar
partnerships in

While

all

European

this research will

governance,

it

does not

have

undergoing transformation, by numerous

The transformation of Europe from an

changing social and

to

states, not just the states that are the subject

social

of this research.

focus upon the forces from European integration and

in

any way discount or
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fail to

recognize the specific national or

global social, economic, and political forces that are also potentially influencing and

transforming domestic political institutions within European
transformation of the social partnership

is

linked to

states.

phenomena

likely that the

It is

at all levels, national,

regional, and global. (Falkner and Leiber 2004) Disaggregating these forces

and perhaps impossible. (Haverland 2005; Schmidt 2006) However, due

EU

supranational character of the

limit or

is difficult,

to the

and the increasing power of its modes of governance

transform national institutions and policymaking,

it

to

seems reasonable and

profitable to limit this research endeavor to attempt to evaluate the specific impact of

European integration and governance upon the social partnership. This would have
inherent scholarly value for future research assessing the impact of other national,

regional, and global forces potentially challenging the social partnership as well as in

assessing to what extent Europeanization might transform other domestic political

structures.

This research shall assess and analyze the Austrian and

German

social

partnerships within the context of Europeanization framework established by Risse,

Cowles, and Caporaso, amongst others. While both German and Austrian neo-corporatist
structures

may be

structural

change should vary.

facing adaptational pressure, the likelihood and types of domestic

only such variances but what

According

to the

A

is

key question and analytical focus

is in

explaining not

likely to contribute to such variances.

framework, the German and Austrian

states’

responses to

pressures of Europeanization are dependent upon the presence or absence of five

mediating factors; multiple veto points, facilitating formal institutions, organizational and

policymaking cultures,

differential

empowerment of domestic

actors,

and learning.

(Risse, Cowles,

throughout

and Caporaso 2001

this research,

)

In addition,

and as will be integrated into and

Hix and Goetz identify several related factors

explain domestic institutional change:

new

exit

pathways,

new

that

would

also

veto powers, and gaining

informational advantages. (2000)

Risse,

Cowles and Caporaso and Hix and Goetz argue

that

it

is

these specific

domestic institutional features of the social partnership and their relevant policy actors
that are primarily deterministic

new European economic,

of how each will structurally adapts to the pressures of the

social,

and

political

environment. Logically, neo-corporatist

regimes that are characterized by adaptability and
integration

more

flexibility

towards modes of European

and governance may very well survive and maintain efficacy, even

limited form.

The adaptive

qualities of the social partnership, correlating to the

eight overall mediating factors, are therefore central in understanding

ability to

if in a

and analyzing

its

meet the challenges of European integration and governance. (Risse, Cowles,

and Caporaso 2001; Hix and Goetz 2000)
Within the context of Europeanization, responsiveness and

tlexibility

of the social

partnership would be necessary for such structures to adapt to the integrated European

environment. Less flexible and more
likely to undertake

static

regimes and actors would potentially be

domestic political structural change, leaving structures

potentially lack efficacy, effectiveness, and salience. This

is

that

less

would

one of the most

fundamentally intriguing aspects of the Europeanization of the social partnership due

no small

part to the longstanding

precisely because of

its

argument

that the social partnership

was successful

inherent flexibility and responsiveness to changes in the

international and regional

economic environment. (Katzenstein 19X4, 1985)
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in

The primary argument made by many, most notably
that the social partnership

international

era.

The

allowed greater national

economy, allowing these

states’

flexibility

economies

social partnership provided institutions

articulated

and responsiveness

and the Scandinavian

European

states

polities

is

to the

postwar

to flourish during the

and processes that allowed expedient

implementation of national economic policy. Katzenstein argues that
typified by the smaller

by Katzenstein,

this

was

best

such as the Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland,

which faced “less than advantageous conditions”

in the

global economic environment of the postwar world. (Katzenstein 1984, 19) Smaller

states' abilities to

compete and

precarious than larger states,

thrive in the international marketplace

whose

were

far

more

market size and strength provided

internal

comparative advantages. For Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian
states, the neo-corporatist solution

their foreign

economic policy

of the social partnership was strongly connected with

strategies of ensuring survival in a

growing global

economy. (Katzenstein 1978, 1980, 1984, 1985, 1987)
Given

and

the scale of their state

concern of the postwar German republic.

German economy dwarfed

that

of

its

its

economy,

Upon

this

reconstruction,

German

political

economy looks

Katzenstein argues that the

German

industrial state to the logic

by which

organized”. (Katzenstein 1985, 3

1

)

no small

feat in itself, the

smaller neighbors and established itself amongst the

dominant European and global economies. Yet, despite
the

should not have been a primary

its

economic

size

and

capability,

similar those across their Austrian frontiers.

political

economy “comes

political life in the small

The trauma of the war and

closer than any other large

European

the scope of reconstruction

required a national consensus on a range of economic and social issues.
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states is

It

also resulted in

a state that

ceded regulatory, quasi-govemmental, and direct economic governance roles

to the social partners representing business, labor,

and agriculture. Even

immediate

after

reconstruction, the maintenance of the social partnership and the state’s “semi-

sovereignty” continued to be a fundamental feature of German political and economic
success. (Katzenstein 1987)

Hence
policy;

it

was

the social partnership

was more than

also a product of ideological

characteristics

and

a

mere product of foreign economic

political choice. Katzenstein’s defining

of democratic corporatism include not only the institutions of consensus

but also “an ideology of social partnership expressed the national level”.

Austria,

Germany, and other

states

particular political, economic,

(

1984, 27)

adopted the social partnership not merely

to address

and social dilemmas of the postwar world, but also

because they possessed what might be called an “elective affinity” for neo-corporatist

policymaking institutions and procedures. (Schmitter 1979) The pillarization of Dutch
society into

its

Calvinist, Catholic,

and Socialist components, the longstanding and

unsettled conflict between the conservative right and social democratic

and the social necessity for rebuilding an inclusive,
in the

rubble of World

War

II

all

stable,

left in

Austria,

and democratic German

state

placed extraordinary social and cultural emphasis upon

creation of political institutions and structures that promoted

accommodation and

consensus over division and competition. Bischof and Pelinka 1996; Katzenstein 1987;
(

Lijphart 1968; Schmidt 2006)

Hence, while the social partnership
institutional events

it

was

is

a product

of economic and political

also backed by political cultural and ideological ideals of the

postwar Austrian and German

societies.

The debates over
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the institutional and political

of neo-corporatism and the social partnership will be explored

cultural bases

in

much

greater detail in chapters three, four, and five. Nonetheless, the social partnership reflects

more than an

economic dilemmas facing

institutional solution to political

states;

it

also

often represents a cultural and historical tradition of accommodative politics.

(Katzenstein 1985; Lijphart 1975, 1999)

In addition to

its

and reinforces a stable
parties,

and the

economic impacts, the

political relationship

institutions

dependent upon a high

level

major socio-economic and
willingness to

political

of the

state.

social partnership also requires, promotes,

between the major

The functions of the

interest groups, political

social partnership are

of coordination, compromise, and collectivity between the

political actors in the system.

It

necessitates a prerequisite

work consensually and within an accepted narrow range of possible

maneuvers and policy processes. The

ability to consensually formulate

and

expediently implement economic policy must be based on mutually accepted and agreed

upon

political institutions

and procedures. Hence, “economic

political stability”. (Katzenstein 1984, 85)

efforts to block or veto the

Lack of political

flexibility is contingent

stability,

on

such as public

policymaking process by major economic actors, labor

groups, political parties, or other major political actors would undermine consensus-

driven institutions. Therefore, as the social partnership

is

built

upon the foundations of

consensus, the ability for the social partnership to maintain efficacy, effectiveness, and

salience

is

difficult to

dependent upon

political stability.

Without such

manufacture and the neo-corporatist institutions

stability,

fail to

consensus becomes

achieve their primary

tasks. (Katzenstein 1984, 1985, 1987; Lijphart 1975, 1999; Scholten 1987;

Gold 2000)
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Casey and

between business and labor was of paramount importance during the

Stability

postwar

era. Stability

was necessary

reconstruction, to construct

in

which European

states

new

political

and social

institutions,

and

to face a

new world

States

and the

vigorously competed for their respective

still

debate and conflict was contained, or incorporated, under the auspices of the

state’s neo-corporatist institutions rather than in the public realm.

were responsible
the entire state.

corporatism

efficient

would be economically eclipsed by the United

Soviet Union. While business and labor

interests, the

and

to fully execute an effective

for

An

managing

The

social partnerships

labor-capital conflict so as to generate results beneficial to

important underlying element of the social partnership, and neo-

in general, is a

conception of a national economic interest that underlies the

rationale for consensual capital-state-labor relations. This solidarity to a greater national

good

is

a necessary

element for the social partnership to function properly. (Katzenstein

1984, 1987; Pelinka 1999)

As Austrian and German economies have become more
European and global economies,
states have,

to

sectors, firms,

by necessity, reconstituted

environment. In earlier eras,

and able

all

and labor organizations within both

their interests in relation to the

German and

commit themselves

Austrian interests

to the ideals

was both

However,

more

in the

a necessity

new

all

of the postwar era and a

era of globally

new economic

may have been

both willing

of solidarity and consensus within the social

partnership. Striving to achieve results that benefited

societies

integrated into the

of German and Austrian

political

and philosophical choice.

and regionally integrated economies, firms are

far

susceptible to foreign competition and dependence upon foreign markets for

profitability while unions struggle to hold

on

to the
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remaining manufacturing jobs not

exported overseas. This has undermined the commitment to the social partnership by

many of the
both

states.

interests

who

constituted the backbone of the postwar social partnerships in

(Adams 2002a; Greenwood 2003;

mechanisms and consequences

will

Streeck 1996; Schmidt 2006) These

be explored more

fully in later chapters

of this

research.

Labor-business stability was paralleled by extraordinary political stability
states during the

postwar

era.

in

both

While there were electoral changes, the scale of such

change was often small. While

electoral fortunes

changed the balance

in favor

of one

party or coalition to another, the results of electoral change did not necessarily beget

major policy changes

in the

area of the social partnership. In

the Christian Democratic Party/Christian Socialist Party

only

in the late

(OVP) had governed

(CDU/CSU) was

(SPO) and

interrupted

the Austrian People's

together in a grand coalition during seven of the thirteen terms

since 1945. Smaller third parties such as the Free Democratic Party

and the Freedom Party (FPO)
one of the larger
“facilitated

dominance of

the

1960s and the emergence of a grand coalition with the Social Democratic

Party (SDP). In Austria, the Socialist Party of Austria

Party

Germany,

in

in

in

Germany

Austria often acted as kingmaker coalition partners with

parties. Nonetheless, the

smooth changes

(FDP)

system showed remarkable continuity

government and precluded

that has

radical policy shifts”. (Vail

2003; Katzenstein 1987; Pelinka 1998)

This required that political parties, while

still

democratically competitive amongst

one another, must actively engage and marshal the consensus-making process even when
their

own

electoral or parliamentary fortunes provide

electoral results

might periodically

shift the

them with

a majority.

Hence while

balance between parties or coalitions, the end
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results

of the election process are

far less transformational than those in

more

pluralist

systems. (Daalder 1987; Lijphart 1975; Muller 1996; Pulzer 1974; Scholten 1987; Sully

1981; Katzenstein 1987)

The

majoritarian policy shifts that

social partnership requires that parties refrain

would endanger

and processes. Thomandl and Fuerboeck note

from radical

the broader consensus-building institutions

that in Austria the social partnership

brought not only “virtually complete freedom from strikes and lockouts” but “internal
stability in party politics” as well. (1986, vii)

At issue

is

whether the social partnership,

post-Maastricht, and post-Uruguay

in the

post-Cold War, post-industrial

Rounds global environment, remains

as flexible as

Katzenstein and others suggest. The very flexibility of the social partnership

understanding

how

well such domestic institutions

and forces of Europeanization. However, the
been ascribed

to

its

Gobeyn

social partnership will

international, regional,

In the

adapt to pressures

of the social partnership has generally

th

and early 2U' centuries. (The Economist 2003; Crepaz 1995;

1993; Heinisch 2000)

depend upon

its

The

future survival and efficacy of the

flexibility to adjust

and adapt

language of Europeanization,

how

changing

well does the social partnership adapt to

is

emblematic of an integrated

European Union? As Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse argue, the
institutions to adapt into a

institution’s success

to

and domestic atmospheres.

the multi-level governance and policymaking process that

fluidic,

in

inherent inflexibility of the social partnerships to adjust to the

challenges of thelate 20

Gerlich 1992;

crisis

may respond and

is critical

wider European context

and survival. (2001) Hence,

of domestic

highly deterministic of the

if social

and adaptive, neo-corporatism may be able
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is

ability

partnerships are flexible,

to integrate itself into the institutions

of multi-level European governance or

may

at least

be more capable of cohabitating and

complementing with the new environment of multi-level governance. However,

if the

domestic institutions of the social partnership are not nearly as responsive, reactive, and
adaptive as has once been argued, they will face growing challenges in maintaining
legitimacy, effectiveness, and efficacy in the policymaking and governance process.

(Falkner 2001; Heinisch 2000; Dyson 2003)
actors and interests see

institutions

enough

As Hix and Goetz

strategic value in bypassing the national institutions for

and policymaking processes

at the

supranational level of the

and efficacy of such domestic structures would

Over

the past

is

likely steadily diminish.

EU,

the viability

(2000)

two decades there has been growing evidence and analysis

suggesting the social partnership

perhaps

postulate, if domestic

is

in

an increasingly severe state of decline or

an “institutional dinosaur” nearing extinction. (Crepaz 1995;

crisis

Gobeyn

and

1993,

1993a; Streeck 1991; Streeck and Schmitter 1991) Economically, prosperity and high

levels

of annual growth have been replaced by increased structural unemployment and

glacially

slow

GDP

growth especially in Austria and Germany. This has also been met

with greater business-labor unrest. But more importantly,

social partnership

is

many have suggested

that the

a critical factor contributing to these states being less economically

competitive and responsive to European and global economic challenges. (Pelinka 1998,
1999; Heinisch 2000; The Economist 2003) While Katzenstein and others have argued

that the social partnership

German and

was

critical to increasing flexibility

Austrian economic policies,

reversed this conclusion. (Crepaz 1995;

many

in the

current critiques and analyses have

Gobeyn

1993; Streeck and Schmitter 1991;

Streeck 1991; Rose 2000; Schmitter and Grote 1997)
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and responsiveness

The current trends

scholarship and public accounts tend to view the

in corporatist

and acting as a brake on

social partnership as stoically inflexible

economic policymaking. At

this point a peculiar

the increasing instability of political and

efficient

economies and

chicken and egg question emerges. Has

economic actors contributed

to the

demise of

effective social partnerships, or have less effective social partnerships led to diminishing

solidarity

and increasing conflict amongst

political

and economic actors?

has posited that European integration and governance

social partnerships in

Germany and

are being pressured by

Austria.

is

Much

a substantial force

Hence one answer

European integration and governance

is

in a

research

upon the

that social partnerships

mutually reinforcing

pattern that both lessens the efficacy of the domestic neo-corporatist structures while

simultaneously providing conduits for national-level social and economic interests to

bypass domestic institutions for those

at the

European

level.

(Hix and Goetz 2000; Dyson

2003; Schmidt 2006) While one can speculate that the increasing pace of European
integration that began in the

mid 1980s

impossible to distinguish which force
pattern of adapational pressure

signifies the “starting line”,

came

first.

The

it

final result has

is

been a cyclical

and catalysts upon the domestic structures of the

partnership by European integration and governance. (Haverland 2005;

variation in response and adaptation by the social partnership

and analyzed

in this

research and

framework argues, each

perhaps

is

is

what

therefore of primary concern.

state’s specific institutionalization

As

is

social

Dyson 2003) The
being measured

the Europeanization

of the social partnership

is

deterministic of how well neo-corporatist structures will continue to thrive and survive in

an ever-European economic and political atmosphere.
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Results:

The Future of the Social Partnership

For Austria and Germany, the postwar social partnership reflected the social,

economic, and

political cleavages

social partnership

of the

state,

th

and

was designed and implemented

those decades, and to a great extent

addressing the

late 19

demand

it

first

half of the 20

to address the issues

was successful

in rebuilding

th

centuries.

The

and dilemmas of

postwar economies,

for increased social stability, dramatically increasing the welfare

and boosting economic competitiveness and overall prosperity. The social

partnership

is in

many ways

Pelinka 1998, 1999)

a victim

By transforming

of its own successes. (Luther and Muller
its

postwar social partnerships were perhaps

new problems of affluence,

political

left

and economic systems so

the current ones.

partnership

collective

brilliantly, the

social peace, post-materialism, globalization,

or even an institutionalized strategy to win the last

The “exhausting grind of consensus” now

was once an expedient and

effective

may have
war

rather than

often ascribed to the social

method of manufacturing consensual and

economic policy and governance. The Economist 2003)
(

Interestingly, the lack of flexibility

one of its

992;

without salience and efficacy to address the

Europeanization, and post-industrialism. The postwar social partnership

become anachronistic

1

credits

and

deficits.

and

fluidity in the social partnership is both

Important socio-economic interests could not be easily

marginalized from the policymaking process, which

made

legitimate and successful

consensus not only possible but also necessary. (Bischof and Pelinka 1996; Gobeyn
1993; Hancock 1989; Katzenstein 1978; Lijphart 1968)

On

the other hand, the overall

success of the model has led to significant social and economic change that brought about

high levels of affluence, peace, and prosperity that brought European integration, and
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economic expansion

demand

for the

that beget globalization, all

of which have altered the underlying

postwar institutions of the social partnerships

there are fundamental challenges from

in the first place.

While

European integration and governance, as well as

from other forces such as post-industrialism, post-materialism, and globalization,
traditional

postwar model of social partnership

in

Austria and

Germany

this

to the

does not

necessary lead to the conclusion that the result will be extinction. While the postwar
social partnerships

have perhaps become somewhat incompatible

post-Maastricht, and globalized economies and polities of

to the post-industrial,

Germany and

neo-corporatist policymaking and interest representation structures

to possess effectiveness

and efficacy

in the

may

Austria, evolved

possibly continue

policymaking and governance of the

state.

(Heinisch 2000) As Schmitter has suggested, neo-corporatism possesses a “dynastic
continuity punctuated by periodic demise and subsequent resurrection”.

(

1989, 72;

Schmitter and Grote 1997)

As
political,

will be

demonstrated

in later chapters, the

underlying economic, cultural,

and social characteristics of Austria and Germany

still

elective affinity for consensual processes of interest articulation

And w hile

the postwar social partnerships

efficacy, their adaptation or evolution

postindustrial

may have

lost

seem

to possess

an

and policy formation.

some of their

utility

and

from industrialized, state-oriented fixtures

to

and Europeanized structures could bolster the overall effectiveness,

efficacy, and salience of social partnerships in addressing the social, economic, and

political divisions

of the twenty-first century rather than the twentieth. (Schmitter and

Grote 1997) Wiarda argues as the “industrial phase of corporatist
is

fading,

new

tripartite relationships

postindustrial issues (education, healthcare, welfare, the environment.
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others) are

coming

to the fore”. (1997, 175)

adapt or evolve to this

new European,

failure

of social partnerships to

global, and postindustrial atmosphere could have

important and lasting consequences for

As

However, the

its

future viability.

will be assessed in subsequent chapters, the results for the

German and

Austrian cases are mixed and remain unsettled. Both states’ social partnerships are facing

some

adaptational pressures from Europeanization as well as other forces and have

undergone measurable

structural transformation.

(Crepaz 1995; Kitschelt and Streeck

2004; Rose 2000; Vail 2003; Heinisch 2000; Falkner 2001; Dyson 2003) Yet the

development, meaning, scope, and implications of these transformations have been
differentiated

between the Austrian and German models because of the divergent

institutionalization

exogenous

and structures of social partnership as well as other endogenous and

forces. (Heinisch

challenges from forces

at the

primarily concerned with

fail to

2000) The social partnership

is

facing innumerable

domestic, regional, and global level. This research

how and why

national political structures

fit

is

or misfit, adapt or

adapt, converge or diverge, to the pressures of European integration and

governance. While Europeanization
Austria and Germany,

it

is

is

having some impact on social partnership

a differentiated

in

and unequal one.

This research also has a larger goal of illuminating and assessing the impact of

European integration and governance upon domestic
the existing Europeanization frameworks.

institutions, processes

political structures

and the

The Europeanization of domestic

utility

political

and structures has emerged as an important and notable

consequence of the development of European integration and governance. The past
twenty-five years have seen an unparalleled widening and deepening of the
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EU

and

its

of

supranational policy authority and influence over

its

growing number of member

states.

(Dinan 1994; Hooghe 2001; Kourvetaris and Moschonas 1996; McCormick 2004;

Nugent 2001; Peterson and Bomberg 1999; Scharpf 1996; Stone Sweet, Sandholtz, and
Fligstein 2001

)

The Europeanization of policy and policymaking processes has

potentially critical implications for the

operate

in their

ways

in

which national actors and

day-to-day duties of governance. (Lodge 2000; Knill 2001

institutions

;

Dyson 2003;

Schmidt 2006)

The transformational power of European

integration and governance has been

generally under-appreciated by integration scholarship until the last decade; this research

hopes

to

question

add

to the

growing demand

many of the

for such studies.

The

results do,

however, bring into

assumptions, processes, and applications of the existing

Europeanization framework and the top-down tendencies of the models that have

dominated the

misfit, adaptational pressures,

and

failings.

These

will

and mediating

structural

framework such

as the

in

chapter eight. However, the

of Europeanization

between and even within member

is

German

so extraordinarily

states, that a

one created by Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso

formal

is

and explaining the universe of forces, counterforces, multi-level

constitution, and interaction that

domestic

that the process

differentiated both

insufficient in capturing

institutional factors has significant deficits

be more fully explored

and Austrian cases demonstrate

complex and

The Europeanization framework of fit and

literature for the past decade.

political structures.

is

taking place between the

EU

The dominant top-down approach

to accurately or fully represent the true nature

and complexity

and

its

members

states’

to Europeanization fails

that

abounds within the

process of European-domestic interactions. (Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001; Hix and
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Goetz 2000; Borzel and Risse 2003) As many scholars have begun

down approach

to suggest, a top-

only illuminates part of the Europeanization process.

An

effective and

accurate approach must include dynamics that are top-down, bottom-up, or both.

(Schmidt 2006; Radaelli 2003; Featherstone 2003; Hertier and Knill 2001; Falkner 1997,
2000; Falkner and Feiber 2004)
In conclusion, this research seeks to illuminate

and empirical data regarding the

crisis

and add to the existing theories

of neo-corporatism and the social partnership,

why, and

what extent such systems

within an analytical context that helps explain

if,

might be more or

such as Europeanization (Adams 2002b;

less susceptible to pressures

to

Einhom and Fogue 2004; Verdier and Breen 2001; Weber 2001 Wiarda 2001 While
)

;

tenor of most neo-corporatist literature has been decidedly pessimistic for at least the

two decades,
in

this research also

which neo-corporatism and

Hence, there

is

hopes

to

shed

light

more

likely to thrive

a normative bias in this research towards the appreciation

prosperity, and political stability to so

that social partnership deserves,

many

and will

at

and survive.

and support of

bringing social peace, economic

states for so long.

likely achieve,
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last

upon the conditions and environments

the social partnership are

such regimes as those that have been successful

the

There

more than

a

is

an inherent belief

mere

epitaph.

CHAPTER

2

THE EUROPEANIZATION OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
Definimz Europeanization

European integration has been a dynamic topic
relations

and comparative

politics since the

for

many

scholars of international

immediate postwar period of the

1

940s and

1950s. (Mitrany 1943; Haas 1958) However, as brought forth in the introductory chapter

of this research, much of the scholarship

that

emerged since

its

inception adopted

decidedly interstate and intergovernmental perspectives that rest on a primary assumption
that integration is

dominantly the

result

of sovereign states and their negotiation,

compromise, and cooperation. (Keohane and Hoffmann 1991; Moravcsik 1998; Hix and

Goetz 2000)

To

date,

much of the

scholarship

still

rests

upon

state-centric

assumptions and

envisages the integration of Europe as purely interstate and intergovernmental

phenomenon. The process of policymaking and governance of the European Union

outcome of bargaining amongst

states

is

the

and can be explained as serving "the ultimate goals

of national governments.” (Hooghe and Marks 2001, 2) The state-centric approaches

to

integration espouse limited agency to the integration and governance of the

European

Union

instituting

itself.

While

states

must decide

important changes, hence no state

wants” since

states are sovereign

numerous conduits of EU

is

jointly, they

always can abstain from

“forced into deeper collaboration than

it

really

and capable of defending national interests through

structures

and bargaining. (Hooghe and Marks 2001, 3)
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)

mean

This does not

the domestic political arena

that all state-centric

upon each

approaches have ignored the effects of

state's bargaining position

and

interests in the

process of European integration. The functionalist and neo-functionalist approaches

encompass domestic

interests, elites,

and national

political parties as important variables

rather than viewing states as monolithic unitary actors. (Mitrany 1943;

and Goetz 2000) Nonetheless neo-functionalism, as well as

Haas 1958; Hix

liberal institutionalism,

continues to view the integration process as a bottom-up, state-level to Europe-level

affair.

While governments are limited by domestic considerations, these national

governments monopolize the integration process. Yet, the view of states as the only
agents of change and force in European integration seems decidedly barren

in

helping to

understand the complexity and impact of policymaking and governance inside the

European Union.
While

this state

of affairs

may have been

tenable and perhaps understandable

given the proclivities of international relations and comparative politics as distinct
the position

is

fields,

hardly sustainable given the development of a “multi-level European

polity” and the “increasingly porous” nature of the boundary separating comparative

politics

and international relations

(Hix and Goetz 2000,

2;

in

explaining and understanding European integration.

Schuppert 2006; Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006) While traditional

and explain how and why

states

pursued and

affected the process of European integration, Hix and Goetz suggest

much

less effort

integration literature sought to understand

gone “into thinking about the reverse

effect:

European integration as an explanatory

factor in domestic political continuity or change”. (2000,
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1

has

This research squarely

falls into a

traditional state-centric, neo-functionalist,

growing and important divergence from the
and intergovernmental approaches. The

Europeanization approach combines elements of international relations and comparative

politics,

much

policies,

and structures which usually

also

like the

encompasses the

identity,

European Union

effects

fall

under the bailiwick of comparative

fall

Hence, the Europeanization approach

politics,

it

under the aegis of international

is

not only illuminating an oft neglected

and yet expanding element of European integration scholarship;
partially bridge the

institutions,

of supranational and international forces upon power,

and sovereignty which would likely

relations.

While focusing upon domestic

itself.

it

is

also attempting to

gap between comparative politics and international

relations.

Broadly, the term Europeanization has often been interchangeable with European
integration. Yet, Europeanization

is

more properly applied

to the types

and methods of

domestic change or continuity brought forth though the process of European integration.

As Kevin Featherstone

suggests, Europeanization

is

“most often associated with domestic

EU

membership”.

best thought of as

one of several

adaptation to the pressures emanating directly or indirectly from

(Featherstone, 2003, 7) Hence, Europeanization

is

and understanding the process and implications of European

approaches

to explaining

integration.

These include not only the previously mentioned approaches

interstate

and intergovernmental aspects of integration, but also others

that focus

that focus

upon

upon

the

supranational institutional and organizational features of the European Union. (Dinan

1994;

McCormick 2004; Nugent 2006) Yet

differentiated by

European

its

the Europeanization literature

is

primary focus upon the domestic implications and consequences of

integration.
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The
“a process

simplistic definition of Europeanization utilized

in

which

states adopt

EU

to

measure and

classify the likelihood

and form

of adoption of European Union rules by the Central and Eastern European states

acceded

in

2004 and 2007,

Croatia and Turkey.

is

(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, 7)

rules”.

Schimmelfennig's research was designed

by Frank Schimmelfennig

that

and current candidates for membership

as well as future

The adoption of the acquis communautaire by member

like

states is

amongst the most notable and impressive forms of Europeanization. Members must
integrate

and adopt over 80,000 pages of EU regulations,

into their domestic political

and

rearrangement of bureaucratic,
institutions

up

to

legal

legal,

and rules

and systems. This often requires reorganization and

and economic policymaking processes and

and including constitutional amendments. Adoption of the acquis

notably transformational of

new and pending members'

and Sedelmeier 2005, 2) Aligning ones national

European Union

legislation, findings,

is

no small

legal

feat often requiring years

implementation especially for states that are

still in

institutions.

and

political

is

(Schimmelfennig

system

to that

of the

of negotiation followed by years of

the process of institutionalizing

democratic political institutions and market-based economies. (Hix and Goetz 2000)

Schimmelfennig's definition and research does not necessarily
state-centric

model of European

integration scholarship by defining states

interests as the important variables

importance of the

EU

and

fall

outside the

and national

of rule adoption. But his research does also stress the

NATO as institutions and actors in the process of seeking

compliance and reform by the candidate and member

states, so

it

perhaps

falls into

both

the state-centric and Europeanization categories of scholarship. (Schimmelfennig 2003;

Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005) However,
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his definition

of Europeanization seems

far too

narrow considering the wider

integration. Europeanization

is

far

social, political,

and economic impacts of European

more than mere likelihood and form of rule adoption;

European integration may fundamentally
behavior and institutions of states and

alter the social, political, cultural,

polities.

and economic

Defining Europeanization as mere rule

adoption, even allowing for national variation to pace and form, marginalizes the overall
force that European integration and governance

may

place upon national political

systems.

First are the

obvious sector-specific economic consequences of integration. The

Europeanization of national monetary,

fiscal, transportation,

telecommunications,

and financial markets may

agricultural, energy, mining, industrial, banking, insurance,

often fundamentally transform the relationship between the state, national markets, firms,

subnational governments, interest groups, and other actors. (Button, Haynes, and Stough
1998; Fennell 1997; Kurzer 1993;

state-level policy being

is

may

)

subsumed and made subservient

while these are primarily changes
adaptation, there

McCormick 2001 These

in policy, best

effects

European-level policy. But

described as harmonization or

also be concurrent changes to the states' political structures. There

tremendous variation from sector

European integration

to

are the consequences of

project. In

to sector

some

and amongst policy areas within the

areas such as agriculture and trade policy, the

of integration for state-level policy have been long institutionalized, while

areas such as education, immigration, and

home

European Union upon the policy area

developing. (Dyson 2003)

still
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affairs, the role

and impact of the

in

some

Again, harmonizing ones' policies to that of the

EU

is

no small

feat

and again

often requires years of negotiation followed by decades of implementation for candidates

and longstanding members

alike.

But more importantly, the process by which states and

their institutions adapt, or fail to adapt, to the

research.

While

EU

limitations Dutch,

may change what

policy

German,

British, Irish

new European environment

is

central in this

kinds of subsidies, regulations, and

and Greek parliaments and bureaucracies may

place upon certain sectors or elements of the economy, these studies do not necessarily

uncover any change

in the

fundamental structures of organization or operation of

parliaments, bureaucracies, or other institutions

oriented and focused upon

the

member

how

states. In essence,

at the state-level.

It

is

primarily output

Europeanization affects the policy choices and actions of

while

much of Europeanization

focused upon the effects of European integration on

member

scholarship has been

states’ transportation,

telecommunication, agricultural, immigration, trade, and monetary policies,

less

emphasis has been placed how the creation of a European-level of governance
fundamentally changes patterns of the policymaking processes as well as the competency

and efficacy of state-level

institutions such as legal systems, parliaments, bureaucracies,

and other formal and informal

structures.

(Hix and Goetz 2000; Dyson 2003; Schmidt

2006)

The process of European
governance

may

integration and the operation of an EU-level of

place extraordinary force upon state-level institutions, processes, and

structures to transform not only the eventual policies each state

manners, methods,

institutions,

may

adopt but also the

and processes of state-level policymaking

(Schmidt, 2006) Europeanization

is

itself.

not just about alignment and harmonization of rules,
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laws, and policy but about the potential of European integration to alter or transform the

political structures at the state level.

(Schuppert 2006; Dyson 2003) As Christopher Knill

suggests:

EU policies put pressure on national administrations because
of the structural requirements they tend to imply... a regulation
may

call for the creation

of new structures

(e.g.,

an environmental

agency), the centralisation or decentralisation of regulatory

processes

(e.g.,

by introducing uniform reporting requirements

a central authority), or

change

(e.g.,

it

may demand

to

horizontal organizational

by requiring the co-ordination of previously

distinct

administrative tasks). (2001, 3)

Additionally, the effects of Europeanization can be both direct and indirect. Direct

impacts require institutional and structural reform or change to conform to EU-level

norms and standards. Examples such
jurisdiction,

in

the

EMU,

Stability

and Growth Pact, ECJ

and many elements of the single market regime tend

universal implications for

even

at

member

states.

to

have rather

strict

and

(Hix and Goetz 2000; Dyson 2003) However,

these cases there are allowable or perceivable variances from

EU

standards

suggesting a far more “soft” approach to Europeanization. (Falkner 2000; Falkner and

Leiber 2004; Dyson 2003)

More

interesting and perhaps

integration and governance.

more important

These are

formally or directly challenged by

EU

effects

are the indirect effects of European

on policy

styles

and norms

that

while not

directives or action are nonetheless influential in

reshaping and altering existing national patterns of political behavior. European

integration

and governance has created new divisions within member

parties, interest associations, social groups,

alter the types

and other

states' electorates,

actors. Europeanization

may

also

of issues and priorities of issues within domestic political contexts.

Further, the constant and repetitive constitution of EU-national relations creates a pattern
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of expectations and behavior

that national actors socially learn

(Risse 2001; Borzel and Risse 2003; Schuppert 2006;

Europeanization

is

and begin

Dyson 2003) Hence

not limited to the formal and strictly institutional,

nonnative and structural change

in

to replicate.

it

is

also a source or

domestic political systems. (Hix and Goetz 2000;

Schuppert 2006; Dyson 2003)

Hix and Goetz concisely enumerate why European integration has become
impossible to ignore as a relevant source of domestic political change.

powers once exclusively found

in

domestic level

delegated to the supranational level. Nearly

distribution,

80%

and exchange of goods, services,

are under the aegis of the

political institutions

First,

policy

have been

of all rules governing the production,

capital,

and labor

in the

European market

European Union. (Hix and Goetz 2000, 4) The

restrictions

placed upon national governments to harmonize to Europe-wide standards are significant.

Second, the European Union does have direct redistributional capacity so as
compliance. While

its

overall budget

is

rather small at

as agriculture and regional development, the

1

.27% of GDP,

EU’s budgetary power

is

in

to

engender

key areas such

more

significant.

(Hix and Goetz 2000, 5) Third, the operation of a single-currency by the European
Central

Bank (ECB)

national budgeting.

gives the

The

EU

EU

a powerful role in

Growth and

macro-economic

stabilization

and

Stability Pact constricts sovereign budgetary

discretion under the ever-vigilant eyes of the

ECB

and

and the Council of Economic and

Finance Ministers. This constant surveillance and regulation forces states to continually
align and justify national budget processes within a broader

Goetz 2000, 5-6) Fourth,

states

European context. (Hix and

have begun, especially since the Single European Act of

1985 and the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, to delegate greater competencies to the
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EU

in

the areas of judicial, interior, and

home

affairs,

defense policies. (Dyson 2003) Hence the
regulation. Fifth,

research,

is

is

widening

that the

new

policy environment of the

at the

institutionalization

existing national structures has

themselves. While the

member

European

its

efficacy

beyond market

this

and other Europeanization

EU

has been paralleled by the creation

and perhaps most importantly for

of a new level of governance

The

EU

immigration and asylum, and foreign and

level.

(Hix and Goetz 2000, 6)

and empowerment of EU-level structures on top of

enormous implications

for the national political systems

states set long-term policy

agendas and the formal

delegation of the powers to the EU, EU-level institutions have important authority and

discretion in the use of such powers.

The European Commission

is

rather

monopolistically responsible for legislative initiatives in regulation and budget

expenditures.

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has adopted supremacy over domestic

law when there

is

a conflict

between the two

levels.

The creation of a European-level

has more subtly discemable implications on the policymaking process by creating a

arena and environment in which interests, public and private,

may choose

represent their causes. (Hix and Goetz 2000, 6-9; Borzel and Risse 2003;

As Hix and Goetz

posit,

to

Dyson 2003)

domestic institutions and private and public actors;

level

of policy competences to the European

and the resulting

political

outcomes constrain domestic

choice, reinforce certain policy and institutional developments,

and provide

a catalyst for

(4) the establishment

change

of a higher

in others;

level

institutions provides

new

constraints, either to

promote certain

and

of governance

opportunities to exit from domestic
policies, or to veto others,

or to secure informational advantages. (2000, 10)
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new

promote and

Europeanization has two types of potential impact upon

(3) the delegation

also

.

The dispute over
scholarship and

its

the differential

However, there are always such disagreements amongst

application.

scholars and Europeanization

meanings of “Europeanization” challenges the

is

not

immune. Perhaps Europeanization can

best defined

as the “domestic adaptation to the pressures emanating directly or indirectly” from

European

more complex,

integration. (Featherstone 2003, 7) Perhaps

yet also valuable,

the definition of Europeanization as “the process of influence deriving

is

from European

decisions and impacting... policies and political and administrative structures”. (Heritier

1999, 3)

In this context, Europeanization

emerges as a

distinct analytical focus stressing

and highlighting key issues and phenomena of European integration:

.

.

.adaptation of institutional settings in the broadest sense

(of rules, procedures, norms, practices)

at different political

dynamics of integration.
of
new,
cross-national
policy networks and
emergence
communities., .nature of policy mimicry and transfer
between states and subnational authorities... shifts in
cognition, discourse, and identity affecting policy in response
to European developments. .restructuring the strategic
opportunities available to domestic actors, as EU commitments,
having a differential impact on such actors, may serve as a source of
levels in response to the

.

.

leverage. (Featherstone 2003, 19-20)

As Featherstone
creates

new and

suggests, this

new

focus upon integration's impact upon the domestic

challenging research questions that reinvigorate and add to the European

integration scholarship. Europeanization literature can go

beyond asking under what

conditions European states choose to integrate but asks questions that reverse the thinking

from

state to

Europe

to

Europe

to state:
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How

does Europeanization affect the interest and ideas,

European Union? What
is the impact of the European Union on policy processes?
Why does adaptational pressure lead to policy convergence

actors and institutions within the

between

states in

some

sectors, but not in others?

(Featherstone 2003, 20)

While most Europeanization

literature

outlook and theoretical underpinnings,

social

and

political patterns

it

is

has been primarily institutional

not exclusively so.

It

may

in its

also include

many

of behavior including identity. Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso

argue that Europeanization encompasses structures such as “formal and informal rules,

norms, regulations, procedures, and practices” which go beyond formal institutions and
organizations of governance. (2001, 6) While encompassing a broad range of forces and

effects,

from mere policy harmonization

does distinguish Europeanization

to

literature

wholesale structural change,

this definition

from the neo-functionalist and

intergovernmental scholarship as well as delimit the focus to the effects of European

integration

upon

state or subnational

The Europeanization

governance.

literature treats

European integration

as the independent

variable and state-level political institutions and processes as the dependent variables

Clearly in reality, the relationship

is

cyclical

and interdependent. (Dyson 2003; Schmidt

2006) This may be a significant weakness of the Europeanization framework and much
of the core of the existing scholarship and
eight.

However,

at this stage,

it

is

will be

addressed in greater detail

chapter

important to intellectually disaggregate the ways in

which European integration and governance impacts domestic
potentially learn

in

how such impacts may

lead to
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political structures so as to

change or continuity.

One

important potential impact

process between the

EU

is

the creation of a multi-level policymaking

and national levels of governance. This may

strategically operate within both national

alter

game

in

actors

and supranational environments. (Hix and

Goetz 2000; Dyson 2003) The existence of “two-level” or multi-level
explored and analyzed

how

strategies has

been

theory and rational choice literature as well as case

studies of specific diplomatic engagements. (Rosenau 1969;

Putnam 1988) The

entanglement of domestic and international politics has led to numerous opportunities

which the
This

is

politics at

one

found notably

level

of analysis might impact and shape decisions

in the scholarship

in

at another.

of domestic sources of foreign policy and,

probably most notably, the impact of internal politics upon foreign economic policy.
(Gourevitch 1978; Katzenstein 1978) The creation and existence of multi-level

governance amongst the

may

can and

states

and

institutions

likely adopt two-level strategies

significantly impacting the efficacy

of the European Union suggests

that actors

towards the policymaking process,

and effectiveness, as well as the policy outputs, of

domestic level structures.

The domestic impact of European

integration can be

or subnational level. While this specific research

is

measured

at either the state

focused upon state-level neo-

corporatist institutions and processes, the impact of integration can also be

upon subnational structures of governance such

measured

as regional or local assemblies, councils,

parliaments, courts, and other policymaking or consultative institutions. (Borzel 2002;

Goldsmith 2003; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006) European
integration also obviously influences candidate and potential candidate states through

conditionality requirements. (Schimmelfennig 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier
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2005) Hence Europeanization

The

integration of

Europe

against membership.

Norway,

is

is

not limited to current

even influential

Non-member

in

members of the European Union

transforming states that have opted

states' political structures,

are strongly interdependent

such as in Switzerland and

upon EU-trade, transportation, communication,

energy, and immigration networks and

may

therefore also be shaped by forces of

European integration despite the lack of formal membership or candidacy. In 2006,
instance,

the

EU

treaties

EU

rules

banning numerous

also are enforceable in

air carriers

from Africa and Asia from operating

Norway and Switzerland under

and arrangements. (Associated Press 2006) While

Norwegian

transport policy, what

Norwegian policymaking,

in a

may

for

be more important

existing transportation

this clearly affects

is

in

Swiss and

the fact that Swiss and

wide range of issue areas, must account

for

and adapt

to

European-level governance. (Dupont and Sciarim 2001; Fischer, Nicolet, and Sciarmi

2002;

Kux and Sverdrup 2000; Hix and Goetz 2000)
Europeanization

is

differentiated

from most other European integration

scholarship by attempting to understand and explain

European integration and governance leads
structures

and

institutions. In

to

Hence

how, when, and

change or continuity

in

Hix and Goetz’ terms, Europeanization

“European integration as an explanatory factor
change”. (2000,

if,

in

domestic

to

what extent

domestic level

is

focused upon

political continuity or

1)

the Europeanization approach has been dominantly a

that seeks to explain the

“top-down" approach

impact of supranational patterns and structures of policymaking,

governance, and action upon domestic structures and patterns. (Lodge 2006)
early Europeanization literature

assumed

a hierarchical relationship
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Much of the

between the

EU

and

member

states

directives and

and tended

norms or

to

emphasize the process of national adjustment

to

EU-level

patterns of policymaking. (Streeck and Schmitter 1999) Yet this

dominance may be waning.
Europeanization has also become more focused on the “bottom-up” means

which European integration and governance

member

differential responses of

states

and

is

constituted. This has focused

their structures to

in

on the

European integration and

governance and the interplay and penetration of top-down and bottom-up dynamics.

(Dyson 2003; Schuppert 2006; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Schmidt 1996, 2006; Hix
and Goetz 2000, 2001; Lodge 2006) The true measure and complexity of
Europeanization

is

the mutually constituted, ever-evolving

compromise, bargaining,

model of negotiation,

interaction, bureaucratization, legislation, administration,

adjudication, and interpenetration of the subnational, national, and supranational

institutions

and actors

that

encompass the

totality

of the European

political system.

(Schuppert 2006; Lodge 2006; Dyson 2003)

While
Caporaso

this research will

to understand

corporatist structures in

approach

may have

use the Europeanization framework of Cowles, Risse, and

and explain the impact of European integration upon neo-

Germany and

Austria, there

is

recognition that their top-down

significant limitations. Hence, in chapter eight, this research will also

assess the applicability and viability of their framework and will conclude to what extent

their

approach succeeds or

fails in

capturing the Europeanization process of the

and Austrian social partnerships.
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German

The Scope of Europeanization
Measuring the impact and consequences of European integration upon
political

systems and structures

would be inaccurate
measure. While

is at

the core of Europeanization scholarship. Yet

to say that there is

many have sought

states adapt institutions

always an impact of European integration

to discover

and processes

to

it

to

and explain cases of isomorphism, when

an identical and uniform Europeanized model,

Lodge

these are extraordinarily rare. Martin

Europeanisation

states’

posited:

implies a seemingly unavoidable,

itself

common (European) practice away
from traditionally diverse national public policies.
irresistible shift

toward a

(2000, 89)

The isomorphism of state
and

lies at the heart

uncovered

The

results

that “the

and processes

of Europeanization scholarship

understand the wide variation

integration.

institutions

in

that is

is

actually quite

uncommon

attempting to explain and

response and adaptation to the forces of European

of the scholarship show

little

isomorphism, rather

domestic impact of European politics

and consistent picture”. (Knill 2001,

3)

The

effects

is

it

has

not characterized by a clear

of integration

result in “neither

wholesale convergence nor continuing divergence of national policy structures,

institutions,

2001,

1

)

and other patterned relationships”.

Hence

differential responses

(

Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso

and adaptation

to

European integration

is

the

primary question that Europeanization hopes to explain and understand. (Lodge 2000;

Schmidt 2006)

We

not only observe administrative convergence, but

also (and to a similar extent) divergence

or persistence

of administrative differences across member states”
(Kmll 2001, 3)

51

Europeanization does not always lead to state-level structural change. In

may have

areas, Europeanization

circumstances, the

EU

little

or no bearing. (Schmidt 2006) In

forgoes establishing supranational policy

The concept of subsidiarity

subnational governance.

The Maastricht Treaty

is

many

some

of state-level or

in lieu

most notable. As Tiersky

states:

established the principle of

subsidiarity, a concept that attempts to define

which

decisions are to be taken at which levels. Issues of

primary local importance are

to

be taken as close to

was introduced

the citizen as possible. Subsidiarity
part as a response to fears

of powers

in Brussels.”

(2004, 44)

Paradoxically, while subsidiarity

was designed

to protect the

many

persistence and efficacy of state and local governance on

a

Europeanizing impact

in

in the creation

continued

issues,

it

has actually had

increasing the role and prominence of subnational

governments and governance
even

in

of excessive centralization

in states

where subnational power was

historically

weak

or

of transnational regional governance. (Borzel 2001, 2002; Loughlin

1996; Schmidt 2006) So, even in circumstances where the European Union defers from

supranational regulatory authority, the

increasing importance

may have

governance. Therefore,

beyond

it

manner

which

tangible impacts

fruitful to think

is

in

upon

state

explicit institutionalization at the supranational level.

institutions, yet

forces.

defers and

it

may

just as often

its

overall

and subnational structures of

of Europeanization as a process

European integration may often stem directly from
and

it

stem from
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The implications of

explicit European-level

indirect, implicit,

(Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006; Schuppert 2006)

that exists

policymaking

and ideational

)

Even when European
to

integration explicitly calls

upon

states to

conform or comply

EU-level structures of governance, some state-level structures require

change

to operate within the

new European

context.

Many

compatible and even reinforced by European-level policy,

and processes

“fit” (Heritier 1999,

Nonetheless,

do not necessarily

Even

is

fit

essence, these institutions

do not

fit

of state-level structures.

and face significant pressure from

to adapt, change, or transform, there is

remarkable variation

whether and how adaptation takes place. The changes

take place are not necessarily isomorphic; they have national flavor and variety.

while there

end

may

result is

may

Hence

almost never isomorphic convergence. (Falkner and Leiber 2004; Lodge

and features do matter and

result in

Europeanization
resulting

is

to

support the conclusion that national institutions

“domestic adaptation with national colors” to

integration. (Risse-Kappen.

phenomena

that

be significant pressure towards and implementation of convergence, the

2000; Schmidt 2006) The results tend

European

be

important to recognize that the forces of Europeanization

if state-level structures

institutions as to

may

will be discussed in later sections of

result in significant transformation

European integration

amongst

it

state-level structures

in

no

to

2001; Hix and Goetz 2000; Risse-Kappen, Cowles,

and Caporaso 2001; Schmidt 2006). Measuring
this chapter.

little

Cowles, and Caporaso 2001,

1

a rather broad range of political, economic,

and

from the impact of European-level governance upon

governance. The range can include the rather pedestrian but

still

social

state-level

Herculean task of

administrative and bureaucratic harmonization with the acquis communautaire to
,

significant limitations on executive, bureaucratic, parliamentary, or other institutional

policy choice and action over issue areas, to the
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more

significant structural

change of

economic,

them
this

all:

social,

and

political institutions

and processes. Europeanization encompasses

policy, process, and polities. (Schmidt 2006)

broad range of political phenomena

is

that

each

is

The common

links that connect

impacted, to some extent, by

European-level patterns and structures of integration and governance.

Measurinu Europeanization

As

stated above, the effects

of Europeanization are rarely isomorphic. (Lodge

2000; Schmidt 2006) State-level institutions, actors, and structures respond and react

myriad of manners

to pressures created

by European integration and governance. The

fundamental thesis of most Europeanization

how, when, why, and

to

in a

literature is trying to explain

and understand

what extent such variation takes place. (Heritier 1999; Knill

2001; Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001; Schmidt 2006) This research will
assess

if,

how, when, and

to

what extent neo-corporatist structures are being transformed

by European integration but will also explain the variation
partnerships in

Some
analyzed

in

Germany and

response between the social

Austria.

corporatist and neo-corporatist literature,

much

in

which

greater detail in chapter three, does touch

will be discussed

and

upon the issues of

Europeanization (Gorges 1996; Compston and Greenwood 2001; Sargent 1985)

However, most of these analyses are
European policymaking
integration

interested in

how

interest

groups interact with the

institutions rather than explaining the implications

of European

and the European policymaking process upon the domestic neo-corporatist

structures. In addition,

some scholarship has been dedicated

to investigation the

compatibility and adaptation of specific actors, such as unions, business associations, and
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)

fanning interests to Europeanization. (Cowles 2001; Greenwood 2003; Greenwood

2003a) Yet there has been

little

analysis of the impact of Europeanization on neo-

corporatism and social partnerships as structures of governance
Streeck and Schnntter

and patterns

at the

European

made an important

level

where neo-corporatism has been

hegemonic

in the area

assumption that there
rise

in

member

leap by suggesting that the structures

would eclipse those

at the

national level, especially

traditionally dominant. Their

work has been

of study and has led most resulting scholarship

is

a link

states.

to

rather

begin with the

between the decline of national neo-corporatism and the

of transnational pluralism within the EU. (Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Streeck 1991

However, as some other recent scholars have argued, there may be significant Haws
their supposition.

(Compston 1998; Falkner and Leiber 2004)

of policymaking and governance may not be particularly
a

new model of governance

First, the

pluralist

in

European model

and may

in actuality

that exhibits pluralist, statist, corporatist, consociational,

other features simultaneously. (Falkner and Leiber 2004; Borzel 1999;

Cram

be

and

1997;

Sbragia 1992; Schuppert 2006; Dyson 2003) Second, the decline of neo-corporatism,

while generally occurring, has been rather differentiated amongst and even within

member

states suggesting

more

variables at play. (Heiniseh 2000;

EU

Compston 1998;

Schuppert 2006; Schmidt 2006) Third, the decline in neo-corporatism in some states

have

less to

do with the growth of EU-level models or patterns of policymaking and

governance and

may

be linked far more strongly to other exogenous or endogenous

variables.
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may

Hence, measuring the impact of European integration upon these
corporatist structures will be of critical interest.

addressed

is to

whether each

state is

The

first

neo-

states'

primary question that must be

under identical or equal pressures from European

models of governance and policymaking. This

is

rather difficult to assess given the nature

of the European Union's fragmented policymaking and governance patterns and the
differences amongst the states themselves. (Schmidt 2006) There have been

instances

where

states

numerous

have been treated differently by the European Union and

its

policymaking and governance patterns. The differential cases of German and Portuguese

Growth and

violations of the

Stability Pact, the non-adoption

Denmark, and the UK, and the

(CAP)
such as

are

British rebate

Common

Agricultural Policy

EU regulations,

most notable. As Hix and Goetz and others observe, many

in areas

of workers’

rights,

interpret the rules in the process

4;

from the

of the Euro by Sweden,

allow a “high degree of freedom for

of transposing

EU

member

law into domestic legislation". (2000,

Scharpf 1996; Schmidt 2006) European-level integration and policymaking

negotiated and compromised affair, hence there

EU

is

how and when

rules

states. (Hertier

2001; Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006)

and policies of the

states to

some measurable

are applied to or adopted

Importantly, European integration and governance

may

level

is

often a

of variation

in

by the member

affect national patterns

of

neo-corporatism in several different ways through competency shifting and
implementation.
partnership

European

is

One primary way

by

shifting issues

level. In

policy sector and

doing

that Europeanization

can impact domestic social

and policies out of the national

political arena to the

so, the social partnership loses influence in both in the specific

more broadly

as an actor inside the political system.
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The policymaking

process

at the

EU

level

may

allow some continued role for social partners to play, but

these are usually weaker or purely advisory roles hence the loss of domestic influence

is

not offset by increased authority at other levels.

The second primary way
is

the

that

Europeanization affects domestic social partnership

method of implementation of EU

explicit conditions

detract

directives

of implementation by

member

and policy.
states that

EU

may

directives

may

set

enhance or

either

from domestic social partnership and partners. These include a range of options.

First directives

policies

may

explicitly call

on states to use

and reforms. Second, provisions

to use existing social partners or

their social partners to

in the directives

implement new

may encourage member

states

even create new social partners to accomplish

implementation. These include a growing number of directives suggesting that the “best
practice” of implementation of directives in

partnership.

Finally,

EU

directives

may

uniform applicability of new rules that
differentiation

amongst

Europeanization

policy areas be through social

set specific

may

conditions that require

full

or

contradict national patterns of variation and

(Falkner and Leiber 2004; Schmidt 2006) Hence,

social partners.

may have

some

both negative and positive implications for the continued

efficacy and necessity of social partnership and social partners.

Another important feature
partnership

is

in the

Europeanization scholarship regarding social

case selection so as to provide sufficient control over variables.

Haverland suggests, the problem of case selection and methodology
research has been problematic and a

Austria and

Germany meets

bit

in

As

Europeanization

haphazard. (2005) This research's selection of

several important criteria and perhaps misses on others. First,

Haverland suggests the use of non-EU

member
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states so as to

produce a control so as

to

suggest or prove causality. (2005) This might have been possible by selecting a

member

Norway. Or one

that utilizes neo-corporatist structures such as Switzerland or

could choose

member

states that

create control and test cases.

members such

as

EU

have and have not adopted particular

However, there are

non-EU

regimes

limitations to this strategy. First,

to

non-EU

Norway and Switzerland may be broadly impacted by European

integration even without

membership, up

an including domestic political structural

to

changes. Plus, as Haverland notes, with such a small universe of potential cases, this

strategy

may

be impractical.

A

second suggestion

is

through the use of counterfactual or

imaginary cases. (Haverland 2005; Schmitter 1999) This surely increases the case
universe but also seems impractical, as

it

tends to require an incredible imaginary

construction to complete and operationalize.

One

additional problem

Germany has been
the

a

is

the differential

member of the EU and

European Coal and Steel Community

joining only in 1995.

Hence

Austria,

it

its

membership periods of states. While

proto-organizations since

in 1951,

Austria

could be argued,

and revolutionary adaptational pressures than the other

Germany

is

a long-standing

member

in

comparison

is

is

its

a rather recent

facing

states.

inception as

member

much more immediate

Conversely, while

to Austria, the

scope and pace of

European integration has been increasingly notably since the mid-1980s and the adoption
of the Single European Act

in

1985 and the Maastricht Treaty in 1991

.

Hence

the

gap

between German and Austrian membership may not be as large as one might suspect.

However, there might certainly be some additional adapational pressure on Austria, and
its

institutions

and

actors,

due to a more compressed timeframe for
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full

adoption and

incorporation of

in the

EU

laws and procedures. (Heinisch 2000) This will be discussed further

chapters on Austria as well

in the

assessment and conclusion.

Nonetheless, while differential responses of state-level institutions and structures

to

European integration

implementation,

domestic level

it

is

sometimes linked

is

more often

to specific variances in

the result of the characteristics

and

EU

standards and

institutions at the

that explain the differential response. Therefore, variation

social partnerships response to

European integration and multi-level governance

likely attributable to variation at the

differentiation by the

EU

and

amongst

its

the

is

most

domestic level rather than by any significant

policies towards the

German and

Austrian systems. This

focuses the attention of this research upon the domestic institutionalization of the social

partnership

is

Germany and

Austria.

The

variation

amongst

social partnerships

becomes

the primary variable in explaining and understanding the differential responses to

European integration and governance.

Hence

this research will

German and Austrian

begin by attempting to measure the compatibility of the

social partnerships to the

European modes of multi-level

governance and integration. Measuring compatibility of domestic structures
European-level or multi-level

Europeanization

institutions

the

literature.

mode governance

This

is

to that

of the

has been a critical feature of

an attempt to assess the “goodness of fit” between the

and processes of European integration and the institutions and processes

German and Austrian

state levels. (Borzel

at

and Risse 2003; Heritier 1999, 2001;

Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001; Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006)
Risse, Cowles, and

Caporaso

label this as “adaptational pressure”

define as “the extent to which domestic institutions
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would have

to

change

which they
in order to

comply with European
pressure

new

is

known

institutional

rules

and

policies”. (2001, 6)

as “catalyst” in

forms”

For Hix and Goetz, adaptational

which European-level governance

at the state-level.

(Goetz 2000,

1

1

)

This

fit

acts to

“produce

not only applies to

policy output but to institutions and other policymaking and formulating structures as

well.

European-level governance

may

impact domestic structures by providing a new

“structure of opportunities” for domestic actors. Domestic actors

may

seek the use the

very existence of EU-level of governance to bypass, reinforce, or otherwise alter their
participation and solidarity to state-level structures. (Hix and

do

this

when

First, actors

there

may

is

advantage to do

exit the

so.

first,

may

actors

may

domestic arena for the European level when they are blocked
at the

domestic one. Second, and related

use the European level to gain an informational advantage in the domestic arena by

operating

at

the

EU

more

likely

when

and knowledge of European-

actors or institutions calculate that

level provides opportunities unavailable at the

does not mean that such interests will cease operating

national level structures must necessarily

However,

it

certainly does

succumb

domestic level alone.

at the national level or that

to European-level governance.

change the manner and methods by which actors and

institutions operate, as well as the very nature

The

to

governance. (Hix and Goetz 2000, 12-13)
All three instances are

It

to

seek to use the European level to veto domestic actions. Third, actors

framing debates and agendas due to greater conformity
level

will

Hix and Goetz suggest three such instances.

from achieving a desired policy or outcome
the

Goetz 2000, 12) Actors

of the actors and institutions themselves.

potential lure of regularly taking issues to the European-level diminishes the absolute
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and monopolistic power of state-level

would

likely create

may once

institutions to function as they

even greater impetus for

interests

and actors

at

in

which

interests

eschew

to potentially

the

more

state-level structures for European-level institutions or at least to create a far

complex system of multi-level governance

have. This

and actors regularly operate

both state and supranational levels in the policymaking process. (Hix and Goetz 2000,

12;

Hooghe and Marks 2001; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998; Dyson 2003; Schmidt

2006)

Hence Hix and Goetz
approaches
political

to

are using a

melding of institutional and rational choice

measure and analyze the impact of European integration upon domestic

systems and actors. The catalyst for change or continuity

is

derived from the

calculations of actors as to whether or not to bypass the domestic level for the European

one. (Hix and Goetz 2000, 14) This

fits

well within the nested

game framework of

“rational choice institutionalism” such as that of Tsebelis, Scharpf, and others

the

is

emergence of a two-level game

new

which domestic structures adapt or

fail

multi-level and European environment and consequently alter, or

more compatible with

rules, procedures, processes,

and functions

European

(Hix and Goetz 2000; Schmidt 2006)

political universe.

that are

For Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso measuring Europeanization

emblematic of rational choice institutionalism and
First, Risse,

see

for actors. (Scharpf 1985, 1993; Tsebelis 1990) But

also a form of institutional learning in

to the

who

is

is

fail

the

it

to adapt

to alter,

new

far less

best described as structuralism.

Cowles, and Caporaso have a broader understanding and usage of

institutions to also include structural characteristics

and phenomena such as

culture, identity, state-society relations, as well as formal institutions
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and

political

actors.

Hence,

it

includes both formal and informal political and social institutions and arrangements,

which they widely term

as structure.

The framework distinguishes between and

encapsulates what they term policy structures and system-wide domestic structures.
for policy structures, they express interest in not only

changes

in

As

“policy subject matter”

but also in the “political legal, and administrative structures that interpret and carry out

policy”

at the

domestic

level.

Mode

broadly, they also encompass system-wide domestic

structures such as national legal systems, national administrative traditions, territorial

structures, interest association

and

identity.

interests, but

and intermediation, and collective understandings of state

Second, the intervening variables are less tied

more attuned

to actors'

and

to actors’ preferences

institutions' practices

and

and norms as explanations

of domestic structural change. (Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001, 6) Hence while there
is

considerable overlap between Hix and Goetz and Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso, there

are important differences in measuring

what variables are important

in the

Europeanization of domestic political systems and structures.
Risse, Cowles,

and Caporaso

utilize a three-step

approach

Europeanization and domestic structural change. As seen below

in

to

analyzing

Figure

1,

the

model

attempts to explain domestic structural change as a product of the forces of

Europeanization within the context of two sets of intervening variables, adaptational
pressures and mediating practices. Adaptational pressures are defined as the “goodness of

fit”

between European and national processes,

settings, rules,

and practices. (Risse-

Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001, 6) Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso distinguish two
casual pathways in which Europeanization

structures. First, European-level policy

may

may

exert adaptational pressure on domestic

lead to a misfit between EU-level rules and
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domestic-level regulations. These circumstances would place adaptational pressure upon

domestic

political

institutions

and administrative

and governments

to

make

structures, especially

upon formal domestic

specific policy changes. Second, European-level

governance may exert strong adaptational pressures on embedded domestic structures
that include national styles

identity

and

of governance and even deeply rooted understandings of

political behavior.

These circumstances place adaptational pressure upon

national norms, routines, state-society relations, and other structural features. (Risse-

Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001,

Figure

1.

8)

Model of Europeanization

Thus, European-level and multi-level governance tends to create different degrees

of adaptational pressure dependent upon the goodness of tit between domestic and

European

levels

of governance and structure. (Hertier 2001

pressure are therefore hardly isomorphic.

little

or no adaptational pressure; hence

Some

little

)

State-level responses to such

state-level structures

may

tit

and face

transformation or change would be

necessary or likely. (Schmidt 2006) Institutions would be likely to adopt minor changes
that are strongly

compatible with the existing modes and principles of operation.

However, even when adaptational pressure
change

is

is

perhaps only moderate, the likelihood of

not purely reliant upon the mere existence of such pressures.
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The

variation

)

amongst similar

)

structures in states facing similar adaptational pressures does not

necessarily result in convergence to a single form or pattern. This has been illustrated by

cases where there

meaningful adaptational pressure from European integration and

is

institutions that challenge existing national structures.

Heritier 2001

;

(Lodge 2000; Borzel 2002;

Knill 2001; Schmidt 2006) In these cases, there

is

wide variation

in

response amongst states and their structures to the adaptational pressures. In some cases,
national institutions, policies, and structures are defended at great cost by seeking

variance from European-level rules, changing existing European-level laws or

competencies, or the creation of a stalemate between European and domestic levels of
governance. In other cases, however, domestic structures were adjusted despite high costs

in

monetary,

political, or cultural terms. (Sbragia

2001

the focus of the third step in the Risse, Cowles, and

)

Accounting

for such variation

is

Caporaso model of Europeanization:

mediating factors. (2001
In cases of strong adaptational pressures due to misfits between

European and

domestic levels of governance, the presence or absence of mediating factors which are
critical in

assessing

According
is

when domestic

to Risse,

structural

Cowles, and Caporaso,

dependent upon five mediating

institutions, organizational

change or continuity should be expected.

state-level responses to adaptational pressure

factors: multiple veto points, facilitating formal

and policymaking

cultures, differential

empowerment of

domestic actors, and learning. (2001

The existence of multiple veto
structural adaptation

more

points in a given state-level structure impedes

by decentralizing power across the

actors to have a say in political decision making.
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political

system and allowing

The more power

is

dispersed, the

more

difficult

it

to create a

is

domestic coalition

to introduce

and implement changes

necessary to reduce the adaptational pressures of European-level governance. (Risse-

Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001, 9) Scharpf and Heritier have argued
decentralized features of the

German and

Italian political

that certain

systems and policymaking

process have slowed or blocked implementation of structural adjustment to European-

level pressures in

Hence, systems

decision-making and transport policy. (Heritier 2001; Scharpf 1985)

that institutionalize

powerful and multiple veto points might be

(Dyson 2003; Schmidt

particularly susceptible to stalemates that inhibit structural reform.

2006)

The existence of mediating formal

institutions

works

opposite manner of

in the

multiple veto points in allowing actors to introduce and matriculate structural change

the domestic level. (Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and

Caporaso 2001,

domestic judicial systems, some existing national courts were able
to the

Most notable

9)

and court hierarchy was already institutionalized

2001; Conant 2001
structural

)

However,

change may find adaptation

Political

far

in that the

at the national level.

states that lack institutions that

in

to rather easily adapt

primary ruling mechanism and the European Court of Justice

referral

at

system of
(Alter

can introduce and manage

more problematic.

and organizational cultures refer

to the “prevailing collective

understandings of appropriate behavior” often based upon informal, normative, social,

and

political cultural structures that

guide and constrain political action. (Risse-Kappen,

Cowles, and Caporaso 2001, 10) These can be assessed and measured

in the

formal and

informal mechanisms of the policymaking and implementation process. Most notable are
the systems of consensual or cooperative decision-making cultures found in
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Germany,

Austria, Scandinavia, and the Netherlands, the historically confrontational relationships

between the regions and the central governments

in

Spain and

centralization of France, the social democratic solidarity of

Italy, the statist

Sweden, the strong church-

and adherence of direct democracy

state ties in Ireland, the history

populist nationalism in Poland. (Borzel 2002;

in

Sw itzerland, and

Einhom 2002; Katzenstein

1984; Lijphart

1975; Streeck 1996; Zeigler 1993; Schmidt 2006) These features of states' political
cultures, norms,

and collective understandings play an important role

appropriateness of some actions versus others. Hence,

of European integration

may

fail to

conflict with existing political

is

Because

and organizational cultures

politically acceptable

structural

change

structural

actors

is

adaptational pressures

that consider

such reforms,

antithetical to national identities

and ideals and

and appropriate.

will likely lead to a redistribution

political capabilities in a state system, the relevant actors

empowerment of such

determining the

be translated into change precisely due to their sharp

even under strong adaptational pressure,

beyond what

some of the

in

also influential

and the

and reorganization of

differential

upon the direction and

change or continuity. (Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001,

some have argued

that

European integration has led

to greater

of

intensity

1

1

)

While

autonomy of national

executives over other domestic actors in areas of European policy, Europeanization can
lead to a redistribution of powers amongst a variety of actors including national

executives, legislatures, courts, bureaucracies, regional governments, interest

associations, and firms. (Goetz 2000; Moravcsik 1998;

Dyson 2003) Hence Europeanization may change
and the

state.

the

(Cowles 2001; Kitschelt 1986) Similar
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Schmidt 1996; Schuppert 2006;

power

relationship

between actors

to the rational institutional

arguments of Hix and Goetz, actors or groups of actors may seek structural change
increase their net political

for

power

at the

expense of others

obvious rationale. Hence Europeanization

the supranantional

political

systems

The

fifth

upon

in the

and

is

who

likely

to

oppose such reform

not merely focused upon the impact of

the national level but also of the internal mechanations of the

engagement of the Europeanization process.

final

mediating factor for Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso

is

learning.

Rather than merely reflecting given empowerment and preferential interests of actors and
institutions ate the

domestic

level,

Europeanization

may

also lead to transformations of

the actors’ interests and identities. (Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001, 12)

effects

of Europeanization upon citizenship, identity, and interests may

fall far

The

more

into

the social constructivist and social learning literature of international relations but there

are important implications of such

European integration
fundamentally

itself

may

alter existing

institutional roles.

change upon domestic structures of governance.

lead to

new

political, social,

domestic structures

that rely

and economic

upon

static actor

identities that

and

(Checkel 2001; Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Risse-Kappen 2001)

The most notable examples might be

the Europeanization of business interests.

Firms once grounded and co-opted into national economic interests and policymaking
structures,

have become far more European

in outlook,

market penetration, foreign

investment, logistics, production, distribution, and have often adopted a

identity in the stead of a national one.

more European

(Coen and Dannreuther 2003) While these firms

pursue and promote an ever more European identity with multinational interests and
goals towards freer regional trade, other firms and business interests, such as farmers,

small businesses, partially state-owned or heavily subsidized firms,
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may pursue even

more protection from competition. European

integration itself may cause a split

amongst

existing firms, interests, and associations along integrationist and Euroskepticist lines.

(Marks and Steenbergen 2004) Hence Europeanization
supranational but

and

interests that

is

is

not merely a process of the

also a source of domestic contestation

may

utilize

and conflict amongst actors

Europeanization for specific self-interested rationale.

Despite their differences, the models espoused by Hix and Goetz and Risse,

Cowles, and Caporaso essentially are measuring the same phenomena. Both are
attempting to understand and explain

in the face

to assess

is

more

when and why change

likely in

two

instances,

when

is

more

when

likely than continuity.

in

rational choice literature, or as labeled

is

far

more

of casual relationships

strategies. (2000)

approach while the second

by Tsebelis, Scharpf and

institutionalism. (Scharpf 1993; Tsebelis 1990)

framework

The

Cowles, and Caporaso 2001

)

is

delegated to

1). It

The

first

nested primarily in

others, rational

Risse, Cowles,

structured and concise (see figure

that lead to

is

and informational incentives are present for

European or multi-level

dominantly institutional

For Hix and Goetz, change

the locus of a particular policy area

exit, veto,

actors or institutions to pursue

is

or continuity exists

of forces of European integration. Both models also have created a framework

the European-level and

instance

when and why domestic change

and Caporaso

proposes a three-step flow

domestic structural change or continuity. (Risse,

While dominantly

historical institutional in approach, there

are also strong elements of rational choice and, especially in Risse, social learning and

constructivism. (Risse 2001)
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While clearly not the

of Europeanization scholarship, the efforts

entire universe

by Hix and Goetz and Risse. Cowles, and Caporaso are emblematic of the most
determined efforts to clarify and bind the disparate threads of Europeanization
In addition, they

provide a framework to analyze the impact and implications of

European integration upon domestic neo-corporatist structures such as the
partnerships of Austria and

Germany. As

frameworks of Hix and Goetz and Risse,
useful in such a role.

Hence

Cow les,

it

is

in the

social

proceeding sections, the

and Caporaso may be compatible and

use these models as the basis of

this research will

corporatist structures in Austria

models as much as

be discussed

will

investigation and analysis of the impact of

their

literature.

European integration upon domestic neo-

and Germany. Hence

it

shall also

an assessment of Austrian and

be a

German

test

of the

utility

of

social partnerships.

Assessing Europeanization as a Framework
Utilization of the

seems appropriate

Hix and Goetz and Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso frameworks

in attempting to assess the

impact of European integration upon

domestic neo-corporatist structures for numerous reasons. However,
that the

Europeanization literature

is

model. While “Europeanisation has

Kmll 2001; Hertier 2001) As

Caporaso, there

is

must also be noted

not specifically a single theoretical approach or

all

the hallmarks of an

systematic study of Europeanisation effects

15;

it

illustrated

is still in its

emergent

field

of inquiry... the

infancy”. (Hix and Goetz 2000.

by Hix and Goetz and Risse, Cowles, and

no one standard of terminology or even an overarching agreement as

defining Europeanization

itself.
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to

In addition, there

is

substantive analytical and methodological diversity within the

Europeanization approach. While

Hix and Goetz take

a far

more

it

is

dominantly

institutional,

it

is

not exclusively so.

rational choice direction in explaining Europeanization

while studies such as those by Tarrow and Risse follow a

far

more

social constructivist

course by focusing upon the effects of Europeanization upon national identity,

civil

society relationships, and norms. (Borzel and Risse 2003; Checkel 2001; Risse-Kappen

2001; Tarrow 1995; Schuppert 2006) While some scholars has focused upon the
Europeanization of specific formal legislative, executive, judicial, and bureaucratic

institutions,

many

more broadly understood

also have

institutions to also include the

norms, processes, procedures, and other informal features of national

which along with the formal

institutions

may

political

systems

be best defined as structure. Hence,

Europeanization as an approach encompasses a wide range of formal and informal
institutions, processes, actors,

It

and other phenomenon. (Featherstone 2003)

should be noted that the Europeanization scholarship discussed previously tends

highly emphasize the concept of misfit. For almost

misfit or incongruence

is

the

first

all

the scholars, the assessment of

stage of research in explaining the impact of

Europeanization on domestic political systems and structures. Hence misfit has become a
necessary condition

level.

in

explaining European-initiated structural change

at the

domestic

(Borzel and Risse 2003; Schmidt 2006) However, as will be explored in later

chapters, assessing misfit

is

actually quite difficult and there

is

tremendous variation and

diversity across states even with similar patterns of policymaking, such as neo-

corporatism, or even within single

in the

concluding chapter, that

member

this first step

states themselves. This research shall suggest

may
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be somewhat inappropriate and

impossible to regularize

in

any meaningful way. The misfit of a particular

institution,

policy, or structure while suggested to be an a priori condition actually appears to be far

more of after

the fact conclusion regarding the adaptation or reform process.

suggest that misfit has

little

from Europeanization and

or nothing to do with specific structural changes

change and continuity

that

particularistic national, sectoral, or policy

and Knill 2001

states. (Hertier

)

The

final

Europeanization framework will appear

Some even
stemming

rest entirely within the

environments and institutions of the
assessment of the

in the

utility

member

and applicability of the

concluding chapter.

Because Europeanization broadly encompasses

bits

and pieces from several

approaches including new institutionalism, rational choice, social constructivism, and
political culture this

However,

its

may tempt one

to criticize

may be found

primary strength

Europeanization for lack of rigor.

in the adaptability

and

flexibility

of the

approach to coalesce disparate but interrelated concepts and phenomena of European
integration and provide a

more

satisfactory

and explanatory understanding of the

consequences of Europeanization. As a toolbox, the Europeanization approach provides a
variety of levers, wrenches, pliers,

which

to assess

structures.

and analyze the

The proper

bureaucracies

may

hammers, screwdrivers, and other implements by

effects

of European-level governance upon state-level

tool to assess the effects

of Europeanization upon national

not always be the correct one to understand the effects

upon public

opinion, interest groups, or regional identities.

This

The very

is

why

flexibility

the Europeanization approach

seems strongly suited

to this research.

of the Europeanization approach allows one to assess the impact of

European integration upon a domestic

political structure
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such as neo-corporatism that

exists not only as a formal institution but also as a normative

element of the society. Neo-corporatism, as will be discussed

merely a

set

of formal

institutions

and procedures.

Many

and

political cultural

in the

next chapter,

is

not

elements of neo-corporatist

regimes are implicit, informal, and nonnative rather than explicitly institutionalized by
the state. Hence, merely an institutional or rational choice approach to analyzing the

impact of European integration upon the formal institutions and procedures of the social
partnership

would

yield

some

results, but not necessarily

an accurate or

and understanding of the wider effects upon the underlying

social,

full

explanation

economic, and

political basis for neo-corporatism.

Conversely, a purely social learning or constructivist approach would omit
important institutional and procedural elements that complete and compliment the
analysis of European integration’s effects

upon domestic

structures of neo-corporatism.

(Falkner and Leiber 2004) Intergovernmental, interstate, and neo-functional analyses

have yielded results

that help explain

how

neo-corporatist institutions and actors have

driven or opposed European integration within the policymaking institutions of the

(Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Moravcsik 1998; Scharpf 1996; Hertier 2001
say

little

given this research’s interest

in

institutions, actors,

and structures themselves. In

understanding and explaining the manners in which

European integration and governance may transform domestic neo-corporatist
the

Yet, these

about the forces that European integration and governance play in potentially

changing or transforming the domestic
all,

)

state.

frameworks of Hix and Goetz and Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso seem

appropriate.
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structures,

initially

)

Measuring the Europeanization of the Social Partnership
This research will explore and explain

if,

how, when, and

modes of integration and governance transform domestic
the social partnership in Austria and

to

what extent European

neo-corporatist structures like

Germany. This research

will use the

frameworks

provided by Hix and Goetz and Risse, Cowles, and C'aporaso to assess and explain the

consequences of European integration upon neo-corporatist structures. The
the

framework

for

change

in

is

to determine the extent to

first

which European integration creates

domestic neo-corporatist structures. As Hix and Goetz

step of

catalyst

posit:

The delegation of policy competences to the European
level and the resulting political outcomes constrain domestic
choice, reinforce certain policy and institutional developments,

and provide a catalyst
(

This

w

model

ill

2000 10
,

change

in others;

)

also incorporate the

that assesses the

for

first

and second step of the Risse,

Cow les, and Caporaso

goodness of fit of domestic neo-corporatist structures

in the

context of European and multi-level governance. (2001

As

will

be discussed

in later chapters,

neo-corporatist institutions

may

be

susceptible to Europeanization precisely because of their monopolistic and rather rigid

interest intermediation structures.

governance

that exhibits a far

These may not

fit

well with the European-level of

more mixed, novel, and perhaps

representation, intermediation, and governance. (Hix and

Greenwood 2003; Streeck and Schmitter 1991 As
)

Europeanization process

may

will

threaten neo-corporatism.

pluralist

form of

interest

Goetz 2000; Falkner 2000;

be explored

in

chapter three, the

The neo-corporatist

institutional

raison d’etre of seeking and implementing national forms of economic interest
intermediation, policymaking, and governance
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may

be fundamentally eroded by the

creation of supranational European levels of economic and political governance. Hence,

as will be argued in later chapters, European integration has the potential to

fundamentally challenge national neo-corporatist models and

Adams

2002, 2004; Falkner 2000; Streeck 1991

)

In the

ideals. (Hertier

2001;

terminology of Hix and Goetz,

the creation of European levels of governance constrains the effectiveness and efficacy of

domestic neo-corporatist structures and
seek change or continuity. (2000,

corporatism

European

may

1

1)

elicits catalyst for

domestic interests and actors to

In Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso’s terms, neo-

provide a misfit with the existence and patterns of governance

level thereby placing strong adaptational pressure

upon such

at the

structures to be

transformed. (2001)

European integration and governance may provide a source of adaptational
pressure and catalyst upon neo-corporatist structures that were explicitly designed to
structure and limit the representation

They
and,

relied

if

upon

a

and intermediation of

monopoly of sovereignty,

authority,

and

interests at the state level.

state

power

to

implement

necessary, coerce domestic actors to abide by such consensus-building structures.

(Crepaz 1994; Crepaz and Lijphart 1995; Encamacion 1999; Gobeyn 1993; Lijphart
1969; Lijphart 1984; Streeck and Schmitter 1991)
multi-level governance

corporatism

in

may undermine some of the fundamental

bases of neo-

theory and practice, producing strong adaptational pressure and catalyst.

The second

task of assessment in this research will attempt to use the

Goetz and Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso models
the Austrian and

The

The creation of European-level or

German

institutionalization

to explain the variations in response

social partnerships to these adaptational forces

and social commitment
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Hix and

to

neo-corporatism result

and

of

catalysts.

in differential

responses to the forces of European integration in
neither isomorphic convergence nor divergence

German and

Germany and

amongst the

Austria systems towards a single European

representation and intermediation.

differential structures

The

institutional

Austria. Hence, there

social partnerships of the

manner

or

model of

and normative variations

of opportunities and mediating factors from state to

while forces of European integration are pressuring social partnerships

structures react differentially

due

to

Germany

will

result in

state.

Hence,

both states, the

)

A

comparative analysis of the

development, and structures of social partnership in Austria and

be explored in greater detail

Using Hix and Goetz’ model,
what conditions actors and
corporatist institutions.

institutions

When

in

subsequent chapters.

this research will assess

may

and explain why and under

seek to alter or abandon domestic neo-

European-level governance provides

informational advantages unavailable

more

in

interest

unique institutional features. (Hix and Goetz 2000;

Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001; Hertier 2001
institutionalization,

is

at

exits, vetoes, or

the domestic level, actors and institutions will be

likely to alter strategies, procedures, or identities that

may fundamentally

erode or

transform other domestic structures. For example, multinational firms (which likely have
both national and multinational interests) that are constrained by domestic peak
associations or neo-corporatist institutions and processes

seek

relief, veto,

environmental groups,
local

governments,

sought action

at

individually, or as a group,

or protection at the supranational level. (Coen and Dannreuther 2003;

Hayward 1995; Schmidt 2006) This

and

may

the

human

is

not strictly limited to multinational firms. Unions,

rights organizations, linguistic

political parties,

European

level

and ethnic

entities, regional

and innumerable other domestic actors

on a wide range of policy
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issues.

all

have

(Greenwood 2003;

Sbragia 1992; Streeck 2005; Hix and Goetz 2000; Hertier 2001; Schmidt 2006) In the

terms of Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso, structural change becomes more or less likely due
to the existence or absence

of the five mediating factors; multiple veto points,

formal institutions, organizational and policymaking cultures, differential

of domestic actors, and learning. (2001) The differential

facilitating

empowerment

institutional aspects

of neo-

corporatist social partnerships, that will be detailed in chapters four through seven,

exhibit differential structural opportunities and institutional features and are the primary

explanatory variables, using the Europeanization framework, in understanding and
explaining the variations in response to adaptational pressures amongst the Austrian and

German

social partnerships.

Under force from European
social partnerships

integration, the continuity

and change found

in the

of Austria and Germany may be explained by using the frameworks

provided by Hix and Goetz and Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso. This research will use
these frameworks to explain and understand

if

and when European integration and

governance provide adaptational pressure and catalyst
structures but also if and

why

there

is

variation

to

domestic neo-corporatist

amongst the

social partnerships in their

response to such pressures. The end results will assess to what extent Europeanization
the direct source of structural political changes to the social partnerships in

is

Germany and

Austria as well as what types of changes result from such these pressures. Further,

it

will

assess to what extent the Europeanization framework has been useful and viable in this

endeavor.
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In the case

of the social partnerships, there will be a meaningful range

in

adaptational pressure and catalyst as well as mediating factors and structural

opportunities amongst the

German and Austrian

cases.

While both are under some

adaptational pressure and catalyst for change, there are variations. Austria, due to

more

recent accession and need to adjust in a short period of time

slightly

more adaptational pressure

foundation. Additionally,

is far

more

likely to

that

Germany due

Germany,

member

to its political clout

be able to drive and influence

recently admitted Austria.

a

EU

is

in the

probably under

EU

since

its

and influence within the

policy than the

(Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006)

its

much

EU

smaller and

In essence, the misfit

between

domestic structures, including neo-corporatism, and European integration and governance

is

predicted to be higher in the Austrian case. (Crepaz 1995; Gerlich, Grande, and Muller

1988; Pelinka 1999; Heinisch 2000)

This leads to the second

preeminent argument

implement

is

that

set

of conclusions regarding change and continuity. The

German and Austrian systems have been slow

structural change.

adopt and

(The Economist 2003; Bischof and Pelinka 1996; Crepaz

1994; Kittel 2000; Rose 2000; Streeck 1996; Turner 1998; Vail 2003)

argued

to

that the specific institutional, cultural,

It

will

be herein

and structural opportunities of the Austrian

and German social partnerships provide the basis of this structural change or continuity.
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Yet the Europeanization frameworks provided by Hix and Goetz and Risse,
Cowles, and Caporaso may prove

to

be of limited

utility in

the Europeanization of neo-corporatism in Austria and

explaining and understanding

Germany. The previous

mentioned limitations and weaknesses of the framework including

down

its

dominantly top-

approach, determinism of measuring misfit, and overall sequencing seem to

fully explain

and encompass the

totality

of the Europeanization process

in the area

social partnership. This will be further explored in the concluding chapter.
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fail to

of

CHAPTER

3

CORPORATISM AND NEO-CORPORATISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE
Introduction

This chapter has two goals. The

first is to

introduce, analyze, and assess

corporatism and neo-corporatism as theoretical concepts and empirical political, social,

and economic phenomenon. This

will

encompass

a brief history of corporatism

corporatism within the field of comparative politics through a survey of

its

and neo-

major

developments, scholars, and studies. As will be discussed, corporatism and neocorporatism, while

relative terms,

somewhat

have had

this chapter will

recently adopted as an approach in comparative politics in

their fair share

of controversy. In addition and more importantly,

enumerate the major underlying philosophical and

political

and assumptions of the theories of corporatism and neo-corporatism.

arguments

In essence, this

chapter will illustrate through a review of literature and scholarship upon what

fundamental assumptions corporatist and neo-corporatist systems are
will

built

and

thrive.

It

be herein argued, and more so in chapters six through eight, that the conditions upon

which corporatism and neo-corporatism were founded and operate are potentially
challenged by several economic, social, and political trends, including an ever

Europeanizing

political, social,

and economic environment.

Corporatism and neo-corporatism are not particularly new concepts or

phenomena. Quite

to the contrary, corporatism predates

many

other

modem

political

ideologies

and regimes such as liberalism or socialism. Yet as a concept and approach within
comparative

politics,

corporatism and neo-corporatism coherently emerged only within

the last forty years. (Wiarda 1997; Schmitter 1979)
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By

the late 1960s and early 1970s, the

failure to either solve or adequately explain the continuing

political

underperformance

to seek alternatives to that

in the

dilemmas of economic and

developing world led scholars of comparative politics

of the development approach. The

military crises in Southeast Asia

and the Middle East, the

political,

series

economic and

of military-authoritarian

takeovers in Latin America, and the continuing poverty and civil

strife in

Africa

illuminated serious analytical and empirical deficiencies of the development model that

had become the paradigmatic roadmap

(Chalmers 1985;
First

to

democratic peace and neo-liberal prosperity.

Adams 2004)

and foremost was the normative

link

between

political

development as an

approach and assumed universal inevitability and applicability of pluralism and neoliberalism.

Underlying the development approach was a fundamental and ethnocentric

belief that developing states should follow in the footsteps of the

Western experience. (Rostow 1960) This included an inherent

Anglo-American or

faith in neo-liberalism

pluralism as both a cure of the developing states’ economic and political
buttress against the rising tide of Marxist-Leninism.

a

and as

a

As Samuel Huntington has

suggested, American foreign policy was “handicapped by

was

ills

and

its

happy history”

in that there

dogmatic and determinist belief that economic development would beget

democratic development and political

stability.

(

1968) In such efforts, American foreign

policy sought to engage in state building by promoting both neo-liberal economies and

pluralist political structures.

The widespread
inability

failure

of the development approach related

of developing states to achieve sustained economic and

and democracy, despite an influx of billions of dollars
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in aid

to

more than

political

the

development

and loans from the United

States,

Western Europe, and international organizations. The development approach also

failed to adequately explain a

wide range of phenomena

that fell outside

conceptions of state, society, and political process. Scholars,
dissatisfied with

pluralist

disillusioned and

development’s universalism, ethnocentrism, and failings starting

accreting towards

approaches

who were

of the

new

in the late

alternatives such as corporatist, dependency, and world systems

Adams 2004)

1960s and early 1970s. (Chalmers 1985;

Corporatism was attractive to many
offered a divergent explanation to

in

many of the

comparative politics precisely because
historic,

economic, and

it

political

assumptions of the pluralist model. (Zeigler 1988; Willimason 1989; Cawson 1986)

However,
like that

the historical association or corporatism with authoritarian

of Mussolini

in Italy in the

and

fascist regimes,

1920s and 1930s, proved, and often continues to

prove, a major stumbling block to acceptance into the mainstream. (Sarti 1971

)

Despite

the pejorative connotation, corporatism has proven to be a valuable analytical tool in

understanding and explaining a wide range of state-society relations that remained
ignored or under-appreciated by the development approach and

its

pluralist blinders.

(Chalmers 1985)

While one approach

to

corporatism emerged primarily out of the disillusionment

with development theory and specific case studies

in Latin

America, another approach,

arrived at quite independently, arose out of studies of Western Europe. (Schmitter 1971;

Wiarda 1981

)

In

numerous Latin American

states, the traditional socio-cultural political

arrangements between the Catholic Church, the armed forces, and oligarchic landowners
survived the end of Spanish and Portuguese colonialism and were codified into the

modem

regimes of the region. (Wiarda 1981; Schmitter 1971
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)

In Europe, corporatism

had been a popular ideology

and

fascist experiences

its

many regimes of the

interwar era but, in light of the Nazi

and the subsequent Axis defeat, had been discredited. Once

rivaling both liberalism and

to

in

Marxism, corporatism was mostly viewed with suspicion due

association with corruption, authoritarianism, fascism, and perceived backwardness.

(Adams 2004) These

early sources of corporatist ideology will be assessed later in this

chapter.

But several scholars began observing that while Europeans avoided the use of the
term, a

number of states were

1956, 1965; Eckstein 1958;

still

practicing a form of disguised corporatism. (Beer

Rokkan 1965; Diamant 1959, 1960; Heisler 1973;

LaPalombara 1964; Lijphart 1969) As Beer

.

.

.there

posited,

remains a system of ‘quasi-corporatism’ which

leaves no important organized interest group without a
in the making of
The main substance of the system is continual

channel of influence and a real share
decisions.

day-to-day contacts between public bureaucrats in
government departments and private bureaucrats in the
offices of the great pressure groups. (1956)

The
a

tripartite relationships

and institutions between business, labor, and the

number of Western European

states exhibited the telltale traits

state

found

in

of corporatism despite

using pseudonyms such as concordance, communitarianism, social pact, or social
partnership. (Shonfield 1958, 1966)

Hence, the resurrection of corporatism as a concept and approach flowed from

two

distinct directions, Latin

America and

socio-cultural foundations, and Western

the developing world with an emphasis

Europe where an

economy foundations dominated. (Wiarda

1997;

institutional

and

Adams 2004) These two

on

political

independent

currents of corporatism and their respective origins aid in explaining the differences that
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would emerge surrounding
politics.

And

the concept and the utilization of corporatism in comparative

while the controversy surrounding corporatism as both a term and an

approach has never

of the controversy has faded over the past

fully subsided, the intensity

four decades, allowing one to argue that most elements of the corporatist approach have

been absorbed into mainstream comparative

politics.

While

it

can also be argued that

corporatism never attained the broad level of acceptance as a theoretical approach or

methodology of the development model,

argument can be applied

this

to all

of the post-

development schools of thought, including dependency theory, new institutionalism,
rational choice, political

in

economy, and

(Adams 2004) Corporatism became

others.

useful

explaining and analyzing a wide range of political behavior and institutions that other

approaches tended to ignore. (Chalmers 1985)

In

way of looking

of things to look

at

things” as well as “a

new

set

essence corporatism provided "a

at”.

new

(Williamson 1989)

Corporatism has therefore made a significant contribution as an enduring alternative
perspective in comparative politics.

Defining Corporatism and

The term corporatism has been used
and empirical

political

Its

Types

to describe a variety

of ideological, research,

phenomenon. (Chalmers 1985; Adams 2002) Because of its broad

usage, corporatism connotes a certain level of ambiguity, though no more so than terms

such as pluralism or democracy. Corporatism
political

descriptive of a historical approach,

and social ideology, and empirical institutions of governance. While

utilizations

a short

is

of corporatism are interrelated, and will be discussed throughout

working definition would be

helpful.

One of the
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all

these

this chapter,

inherent problems in defining

corporatism

is in

trying to escape

under Mussolini.

(

been demanding,

it

its

Sarti 1971; Field

association with fascist regimes such as that of Italy

1938) While escaping this pejorative connotation has

does not diminish the

utility

of corporatism

in explaining

and

understanding a range of state-society relations that diverge from pluralist or Marxist

models. (Zeigler 1988;Cawson 1986; Williamson 1989)
Philippe C. Sehmitter’s definition of corporatism, while not the only one,

amongst

the

most commonly

is

cited:

Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest
representation in which the constituent units are organized
into a limited

number of singular compulsory,

noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally
differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created)

by the

state

and granted a deliberate representational

monopoly within

their respective categories in

for observing certain controls

articulation of

Due

in part to its

One common

widespread

critique

is

demands and

on

exchange
of leaders and

their selection

supports. (1979)

utilization, this definition has also

the definition’s constrictive focus

been intensely

criticized.

on authoritarian regimes,

excluding varieties of democratic corporatist regimes and structures. The primary
research on Brazil and Portugal

may have

heavily influenced Schmitter and limited his

conceptualization of corporatism. (Schmitter 1971, 1975)

cultural lines

who viewed
power

and suggested universality, drawing the
corporatism as a useful approach

in others.

(Chalmers 1985)

84

in

ire

The

definition also cut across

of many

in

comparative politics

some cases but with

less

explanatory

While the Schmitter definition
suggested a less complex

is

deliberately complicated,

Howard

J.

Wiarda

of three distinguishing characteristics:

list

1.

a strong directing state,

2.

restrictions

3.

incorporation of interest groups into and as part of the

on interest-group freedom and

activity,

and

state system, responsible both for representing

members’

and to the state and for helping the
administer and carry out policies. (1997)

state

interests in

While these definitions do vary

in

language and precision, they do share a

common

conception of the corporatist relationship between the state and interest groups.
Corporatism, unlike pluralism, organizes societal groups’ relationships to the state as part

of a limited system of

interest representation; interest

governance structures and processes of the
regulation in which an infinite

state.

Pluralism

is

defined by

number of groups compete with

autonomous from

direction; interest groups are

groups are incorporated into the

little

its

lack

of

or no government

the state. (Zeigler 1988;

Wiarda 1997;

Adams 2004)
Another corporatist distinction from pluralism
government. In the

pluralist

model the

struggle but not try to control

it”.

is in

state’s role is to

the activist role of the central

“umpire and referee the group

(Wiarda 1997) In the corporatist model, the

state not

only intermediates between groups but also organizes and recognizes what groups are to

be included

in the

policymaking process. This does not mean

direct role in the intermediation process.

As

that the state

always plays

will be discussed in chapters four through

seven, the state, after establishing such a system

may have

little

direct role in the process

other than to maintain the infrastructure of corporatism. (Katzenstein 1987) Hence, the

role

and function of the

a

state varies significantly

85

amongst the

pluralist

and corporatist

models, as does the relationship between
1997;

political parties

and

interest groups.

(Wiarda

Lehmbruch 1979a)
The conceptualization of corporatism, under

its

various definitions, has led to a

categorization of corporatist regimes, structures, and systems that

under the

liberal, pluralist,

developed and developing

is

as extensive as those

or Marxist banners. Thus corporatism can be found

states

and

in liberal

democracies as well as

in

in authoritarian

regimes. The categorization of corporatist regimes itself seemed like a growing cottage

industry

amongst scholars of comparative

politics

from the 1960s through 1980s.

Modifiers such as social corporatism, state corporatism, liberal corporatism, strong
corporatism,

weak corporatism,

authoritarian corporatism,

new

corporatism, meso-

corporatism, micro-corporatism, quasi-corporatism, and neo-corporatism became

common

currency of corporatist scholarship. (Katzenstein 1984; Lehmbruch 1979;

Schmitter 1979; Williamson 1985;

One

1986; Pike and Stritch 1974)

important and lasting categorization of corporatist regimes has been the

differentiation

a distinction

Cawson

between corporatist and neo-corporatist regimes. Schmitter provided such

between forms of corporatism

in his

groundbreaking

article “Still the

Century of Corporatism?” (Schmitter 1979) State corporatism, or now usually known
merely as corporatism, has come
authoritarian and

to

top-down regimes

be specifically applied to the hierarchical,

common

America. Wiarda suggested that due to

to fascist

Europe and authoritarian Latin

their Catholic, neo-feudal,

and cultural

histories,

these regimes typify a form of “organic-statist” corporatism where the state plays a

dominant and often authoritarian
the Catholic Church,

armed

role incorporating traditional domestic interests such as

forces,

and large landowners. (Wiarda 1997) Corporatism
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also

emerged

in

Northern Europe, finding institutionalization

in the

professional and

guild systems of the Hanseatic League and Italian city-states amongst others. (Berger

2002; Landauer 1983) Neo-corporatism, conversely,

is

generally applied to the

modem

democratic and bottom-up regimes of Europe and the advanced industrial world. In these
systems, the corporate units, usually representing organized labor, business interests, and

farmers, are the

away from

more powerful
The

the state.

sovereign state”

is

actors and play a far larger role decentralizing

labeling of neo-corporatist postwar

as the “semi-

an exemplar. (Katzenstein 1987)

Defining the term has not been a particularly easy
that corporatism

Germany

power

affair, yet the results

do

testify

does explicitly describe and explain a form of state-interest group

relations that varies

from the assumptions and expectations of the dominant

pluralist

model. Before further detailing the conditions and assumptions under which corporatism

and neo-corporatism
historical

exist, this

chapter will briefly explore the philosophical origins and

development of corporatism and neo-corporatism.

Origins of Corporatism

While corporatism does describe a particular type of state-society relationships,
the ideological origins of corporatism stem

from numerous

theological, societal, and philosophical elements.

corporatism that have been explored

Western sources of philosophical,
1984; Landauer 1983;

in

The

cultural, political,

economic,

principal ideological roots of

comparative politics derive primarily from

social,

and

political thought.

(Cawson 1986; Black

Elbow 1953; Bowen 1947; Wiarda 1997)

It is

also important to

note that the Western world and Latin America has been the area where corporatism has
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been more completely exemplified

and continues
and regimes

in

both practice and theory. However, there has been

to be valuable scholarship exploring the origins

in virtually

of corporatist structures

every region of the world. Such research has included studies of

state-society relations in South

and East Asia, Islamic and African

societies, as well as in

former communist states of Europe and Asia. (Zeigler 1988; Pempel and Tsunekawa
1979;

McNamara

1999; Nyang'oro and

Ruble 1998) While

this section

should not be limited

economic, and

in

Shaw

1989; Laothamatas 1991; Bianchi 1989;

does primarily focus upon the Western origins, one

viewing corporatism as merely a product of the Western

political experience.

The

application of the corporatist approach to a

variety of cultures, often those that have a non-individualist or

is

a testament to

its

social,

communalist background,

conceptual value and to the diversity of cultures that

fall

outside of

the pluralist model.

Corporatism, despite

its

more modern

application, can trace

as far as the ancient Greeks, the rise of Christianity, and the

have traced the ancient origins

its

ideological roots

Middle Ages. Some authors

to three distinct influences: biblical,

Greek and Roman.

(Williamson 1989; Wiarda 1997) The biblical contribution to corporatist thought
primarily derives from

politics

is

St.

Paul and

an “organic” unit

units integrated,

that, like the

human body,

harmonized and performing

most closely

Greek origins

relate

between

and society

state

Thomas Aquinas, who

“integral, unified

is

suggest that society and

operates with “all

their proper function.”

to Aristotle's text.

The Polities

,

in

its

functional

(Wiarda 1997) The

which the distinction

non-existent. For Aristotle, the state should endeavor to be

and even monolithic” and should be organized along “natural"

functional societal lines. (Wiarda 1997) This organization along occupational and
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functional lines

would promote order and harmonization of the

state,

which

The Roman contribution

to the ancient origins

conceived

and

as an organic whole, rather than a collection of disparate social, economic,

actors.

is

political

of corporatism included an early

version of a functional corporatist regime whereby the empire was intermittently

organized under and operated by a series of corporate associations, including military
orders, religious orders, and professional associations. (Black 1984;

these ancient sources most of the foundations for

modem

Wiarda 1997) Within

corporatism can be found. The

ancients shared a view of the state as an organic and unified entity that promotes social

and

political order

are regulated

by organizing society into functional and ordered corporate units

by the

that

state.

Further development of the ideological origins of corporatism emerged from the

Middle Ages.

The church

First

itself

was

the

emergence and predominance of the Roman Catholic Church.

was organized along functional

lines

of religious orders, teaching

orders, caregivers, military orders, monastic divisions, cloisters,

Roman

and other

units.

The

Catholic Church exemplified the form of top-down, unified, and monolithic

organization promoted by

much of corporatist

thought. (Wiarda 1997)

feature that distinguishes Catholicism from Protestantism

corporatist organization of church, clergy,

A
promoted

notable

the very hierarchical and

and orders.

second trend was the emergence of artisan and
a corporatist vision

is

One

of social, economic, and

craft guilds,

which also

political organization.

The

guilds

functioned as hierarchical, monopolistic, and regulatory associations that had strong
influence upon economic policies of the times, including

wages and trade

policy. (Black

1984) The Middle Ages were typified by the estate system of medieval feudal
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relationships between the nobles, church, and

main

pillars

commoners. Interspersed within these

three

of society were military orders, guilds, and other functional organizations.

The Roman Catholic Church strongly supported

the estate system through

which

it

could

exert tremendous influence in “worldly affairs”. (Landauer 1983) Based on rank, social

order, and function, the estate

was

upon

influential

and effective corporatist governance was also

League as well

as the city-states of Italy.

Hence corporatism, even
governance

modem

Rome

state

would remain

hallmark of the trans-Baltic Hanseatic

(Landauer 1983; Berger 2002; Bowen 1947)

in its early history,

found variety and

fell,

utility in a

and

system replaced the feudal order, the ideological origins of corporatism

as recessive elements in the Western philosophy of politics and society.

across Europe,

it

simultaneously ended

corporatist structures.

the eventual demise of absolutism

many remaining

The promotion of individual

traditional or

medieval

rights, or liberalism, in lieu

down, monopolistic system of corporate privilege swept across Europe

As

number of

the Reformation loosened the grip of the Catholic Church,

The French Revolution of 1789 not only signaled

degrees.

Complex

settings.

While
the

a

later corporatist thinkers.

in

of the top-

varying

the old regimes toppled, so did the remaining ancient and quasi-feudal

conceptions of corporatism. From 1789 to the mid-nineteenth century, the defenders of
corporatism were generally considered reactionary elements, fearing social and political
disintegration, looking to restore the absolutism and central direction of the state.

1953, 1966;

Bowen

than liberalism,

(Elbow

1947) The emergence of socialism, an ideology even more radical

in the

mid- and

late

nineteenth century

was

itself a great

opportunity for

corporatism to provide an alternative to the two other competing ideologies.
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A number of thinkers
the focus

emerged

in the

mid- and

late

nineteenth century minimizing

upon the absolutism of past corporatist thought and seeking

a

somewhat more

reformed version of corporatism. These primarily but not exclusively Catholic
philosophers and writers such as Durkheim, La Tour du Pin, Rathenau, Spann, and

Manoilescou resurrected corporatism and developed

on par with

its

contemporaries. (Landauer 1983;

it

into a

Bowen

modem

political ideology

1947; Berger 2002; Williamson

1989; Wiarda 1997) Rather than being primarily confined to Catholic states such as

Italy,

France, and Austria, corporatism also gained traction in Protestant societies afflicted by

the economic, social,

and

of industrialization. The emergence of trade

political challenges

unionism and an industrial working class was not only the hallmark of the growing power

of socialism but also of the emergence of modem corporatism. Corporatist principles
aspiring to

harmony between

of national unity gained

classes, versus the socialist principles

in popularity as

of class struggle, and

an alternative to either liberalism or socialism.

(Williamson 1989; Wiarda 1997)

By

the late nineteenth

and early twentieth centuries, corporatism emerged as an

important national strategy to address social, economic, and political instability.

Descending from ancient
estate

biblical,

Roman

Greek, and

and guild systems of the Middle Ages,

modem

origins, filtered through the feudal

corporatism exploded onto a

European scene ravaged by the socioeconomic challenges of industrialization,
urbanization, and social instability.

The popularity of corporatism was due

provision of an alternative to liberalism, which

social order,

and

to socialism,

many viewed

which had within

its

in part to its

as corrosive to political and

ideological

framework an inherent

focus upon class conflict. The Catholic Church was one of the more vigorous proponents
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of the corporatist revival. This was most notable under Pope Leo XIII
encyclical

Renun Novarum

in 1891 that

capital for the

the church,

new

common

framework

that sought to coordinate labor

good. (Landauer 1983; Berger 2002; Wiarda 1997) Beyond

corporatist thinkers such as

of Austria, La Tour du Pin

in France,

Giuseppe Bosca of Italy, Karl von Vogelsang

and Wilhelm Ketteler

in

Germany openly

ancient and medieval origins of corporatism while concurrently forging a

modem

issued the

recognized labor organizations as legitimate

social institutions within a limited corporatist

and

who

cited

new and

version of corporatism to address the social, economic, and political dilemmas of

the industrial age. (Landauer 1983;

Elbow 1953; Bowen 1947; Berger 2002)

It

should be

noted that the corporatist alternative was viewed by most political and social thinkers not

merely as an ideological abstraction, but also as a pragmatic form of national governance
that could be utilized to address

perceived

pitfalls

ongoing socioeconomic challenges while avoiding the

of either liberalism or socialism. (Williamson 1989; Cawson 1986;

Wiarda 1997)

The anti-democratic and
attracted a

anti-liberal tendencies

of corporatist thought also

number of supporters and proponents who viewed corporatism

as a viable

solution for the economic, social, and political instability of states in the years leading up

to

and following World

War

I.

Rather than promoting social peace with democracy, these

thinkers, such as

Gaetano Mosca, Georges Sorel, and Ludwig Glumpowicz, saw

corporatism as a

way

this era

to limit

democracy and forge

social order.

(Wiarda 1997) Hence,

of corporatist thought was already exhibiting the lasting divide between the more

democratic and authoritarian variants of corporatism.
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Nonetheless, both variants of modem corporatism exhibited a

from ancient forms of corporatism
of modem corporatism
stability.

Unlike

focus upon the state and

communism and

minimal or intended
that

is its

in its explicit nationalism.

to wither

liberalism that

saw

its

critical distinction

Perhaps the defining feature

interests,

power, prosperity, and

the role of the state as either

away, corporatism was an explicitly nationalist ideology

argued that rested upon the logic of protecting and enhancing the state's power,

especially given their perceived relative weakness, in the global order. (Wiarda 1997;

Cawson

1986, Williamson 1989) Perhaps this

authoritarian and fascist

movements, such

numerous Latin American
manifestos.

The

states

is

the primary explanation

why many

as those in Italy, Spain, Portugal, Poland,

and

absorbed corporatism into their philosophies and

(Cawson 1986)
early twentieth century provided

more than enough

crisis to

move

corporatism from an interesting ideological concept to an adopted strategy of governance.

Economically, increasingly costly labor-business disputes and the series of recessions and
depressions and the

late

nineteenth and early twentieth century peaked in 1929 with the

onset of the Great Depression. Politically, the prolonged conflict of

World War

I

and the

brutality of the Russian Revolution in 1917 brought disillusionment to the utopian ideals

of many of

liberal

which they found

and
in

socialist stripes.

These events led many

seek an alternative,

corporatism. While one might suggest that the ancient and medieval

origins of corporatism necessarily beget the consolidation of

of the twentieth century,

upon

to

this

to address the practical

modem

corporatist regimes

would be an overstatement. Corporatism was often
and pragmatic concerns of political

the excesses of both liberalism and socialism.
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The

elites

and

called

their fear

ideological origins of corporatist

of

thought certainly did provide a particularistic lens by which
leaders

viewed the relationship between

economic, military, and

political crises,

state

many modem

thinkers and

and society, but without the existence of

corporatism might have remained primarily an

ideological pursuit rather than a pragmatic one. (Williamson 1989;

Wiarda 1997; Adams

2002; Diamant 1960; Landauer 1983; Field 1938)

Corporatism

The

in Practice

early twentieth century, especially in the interwar era,

saw

a spectacular

explosion of corporatist regimes and structures throughout Europe and Latin America.

While many of these regimes
perhaps the exceptions of

explicitly called themselves corporatist, almost none, with

Italy

form of government based

under Mussolini and Portugal under Salazar, adopted a

solely

upon corporate

associations.

Wiarda 1993; Schmitter 1975) Most regimes of this and
operated in a mixed system of corporatist and

(

Sarti 1971; Field 1938;

later eras

adopted structures that

liberal, statist, or authoritarian

forms of

governance. While ideology often tends towards the pure form, like any theory put into
practice there

was tremendous

variation

amongst

the cases of states adopting corporatist

regimes.

Corporatism emerged

in brief

the late 1910s and early 1920s.

and application was

that

and limited forms

However, the

of Benito Mussolini

first

in Portugal.

Greece, and Spain

in

corporatist regime of significant length

in Italy

from 1922

utilized corporatism to seek greater control over Italy's

to 1939. Mussolini

economy, especially

unions, and to consolidate his personal authority. (Field 1938; Sarti 1971

)

its

volatile

While

Mussolini's brand of corporatism was primarily a fayade for his authoritarian aspirations.
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it

has unfortunately

Iberian Peninsula

become

was

also

the

most frequently

home

to corporatist

identified

example of corporatism. The

regimes that duplicated some elements of

the Mussolini model. Portugal under Salazar and Spain under Franco created corporative

units to

manage

especially in

the national

Spam, most

and other radical

economy and

efforts

delimit political participation.

were rather thinly veiled

societal groups rather than

However,

efforts to suppress labor unions

promoting genuine functional representation.

(Wiarda 1993; Schmitter 1975)
During the interwar era varieties of corporatism could be found

in

numerous

European regimes including Bulgaria, Poland. Albania, Greece, Lithuania, Estonia,
Latvia, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Austria, Ireland,

and Romania. (Wiarda 1997;

Adams 2004)

Most of these regimes were hybrids of corporatism and some form of statist
authoritarianism or monarchism, though cases such as Ireland also included

and

socialist elements.

some

liberal

(Naylor 1993) Vichy France and Nazi Germany also exhibited

elements of corporatism though these were dominantly instrumental, as

it

was

in Italy

and

Spain, in promoting dictatorial control rather than functional representation. (James and

Tanner 2002; Paxton 1972; Wiesen 2001)
Latin

America also began

to

widely adopt corporatist regimes, structures, and

processes. Primarily based upon their Catholic, Iberian, and neo-feudal traditions,

numerous authoritarian Latin American
regimes of Rafael Trujillo

in the

states fell into the corporatist category.

Dominican Republic, Arnolfo Anas

in

The

Panama, Alfredo

Stroessner in Paraguay, and Jorge Ubico in Guatemala typified corporatist organizations

based primarily on the three traditional
1968;

Ropp 2004; Veliz 1980) More

units, the church, military,

and oligarchy. (Wiarda

populist regimes, such as those of Getiiiio Vargas in
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Brazil, Juan

Peron in Argentina, and Lazaro Cardenas

in

Mexico, included newer and

non-traditional units often representing labor, peasants, indigenous peoples,

other socioeconomic groups. (Bak 1983; Grayson 1998) In

some

women,

cases corporatism

found within the structures of authoritarian-military regimes, while

in others

it

or

was

was

located within the auspices of civilian political parties or civilian-dominated

governments. (Wiarda 1981; Collier 1979; Pike and Stritch 1974; Malloy 1977)
In

Northern European states such as Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, and the

Netherlands,

structures.

many

The

corporatist elements

alliances

between

were integrated

into democratic

industrial labor, agrarian interests,

policymaking

and

political parties

helped not only moderate and coordinate their demands and behavior but also provided a

critical

mass of support

for transition to parliamentary

democracy despite conservative

and reactionary objections. The most notable developments were a
that shifted the conflict

economic

interests,

between labor and

from outside

while not nearly as comprehensive as

Andeweg

in the

(Einhom and Logue 2003;

1993; Lijphart 1969) The process,

Southern European cases, was decidedly

coiporatist in forming a formal, hierarchical, bureaucratic,

between important
were intended

social

and economic

to alleviate the

of legal reforms

capital, as well as other important socio-

to inside state auspices.

Katzenstein 1980, 1985; Diamant 1960;

series

interests

and the

and policymaking relationship

state.

These corporatist reforms

growing costs and disruptions of labor-capital disputes

(such as general strikes) that debilitated national economies without sacrificing other

democratic structures of governance, hence falling more properly into the category of
neo-corporatism. (Einhom and Logue 2003; Diamant 1960) These neo-corporatist

structures

promoted and required consensual consultation and bargaining between
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social

and economic

interests

and the

state

on issues such as wages, pensions,

labor safety, and other social policies. This pattern

postwar

era,

relations.

becoming

central to

would develop and expand

in the

numerous European systems of labor-capital-state

(Bischof 1966; Heisler 1973; Katzenstein 1987; Lehmbruch 1982; Lijphart

1969; Wolinetz 2001;

Armingeon 1997)

While adoption varied amongst
structures

industrial policy,

still

states, national coiporatist

and neo-corporatist

shared numerous characteristics distinguishing them from pluralist,

Marxist, or clientelist state-interest group models.

The

corporatist processes and institutions in Austria and

specific

Germany

development of neo-

will be addressed in

significant detail in chapters four through seven. Nonetheless, corporatism

and neo-

corporatism were founded and operated upon several key assumptions regarding the role

and powers of the

state

and

interest groups, as well as the relationship

actors. In addition, corporatist scholars suggest that corporatism

were more or

less likely to

between these

and neo-corporatism

occur under certain social, economic, and political

preconditions. (Offe 1984; Katzenstein 1978;

Cox

1988; O’Sullivan 1988; Wiarda 1997;

Schmitter 1972; Landauer 1983; Lehmbruch 1982; Lijphart 1984)

The conditions and assumptions

that underlie the

of corporatist and neo-corporatist structures

is

development and maintenance

central to this research's

emphasis

explaining and understanding the impact of Europeanization upon such structures

Germany and

Austria. If

misfit with corporatist

in

in

European integration and multi-level governance has a greater

and neo-corporatist structures

at

the national level, adaptatational

pressures for structural domestic change would result. (Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso

2001; Hix and Goetz 2000) This might not necessarily result
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in actual

adaptation since

Europeanization rarely results

in

isomorphism or "wholesale convergence or divergence”.

(Knill 2001; Hertier 2001; Risse, Cowles, and

structural

change

will be

Caporaso 2001) Instead, domestic

dependent upon mediating factors found amongst the neo-

corporatist institutions and actors at the national level,

which

will be explored in chapters

four through seven. (Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso, 2001; Hix and Goetz, 2000)

Nonetheless, the preliminary step in following the Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso model

is

determining the "goodness of fit” between European and domestic structures and the

subsequent adaptational pressures that arise from the level of misfit between the two.

While some
of neo-corporatism

fit

in

and misfit certainly arises from the particular institutionalization

Germany and

Austria, there are fundamental characteristics of

corporatism and neo-corporatism that

may

exacerbate and magnify the misfit between

integrated European multi-level governance and domestic structures. (Falkner 1997,

2001

)

states

These foundations of corporatism and neo-corporatism are shared amongst both
and

their social partnerships.

And

while there are important national variations that

shape the likelihood and manner of domestic structural change, explored
the commonalities

may

is

chapter eight,

contribute to misfit between European multi-level governance

and domestic neo-corporatist structures
This

in

in all cases.

not to say that European governance and social partnerships are

completely antithetical to one another. (Schmitter and Grote 1997; Katzenstein 2003)
fact the

and
the

EU

and

its

predecessors have partially operated through numerous committees

institutions, like the

Common

In

Economic and Social Council, European

Social Dialogue, and

Agricultural Policy that exhibit strongly neo-corporatist strategies of

decision and policymaking. However, these institutions have been largely marginalized
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)

or underdeveloped within the

EU

framework

in

comparison

to other institutions that

operate under non-corporatist means. (Sargent 1985; Streeck and Schmitter 1991
Additionally, corporatist and neo-corporatist institutions and structures can adapt and

reform and revitalize themselves to better

fit

the

new European environment. These

structures and their institutions and actors are certainly capable of making significant and

lasting alterations to the existing patterns

of corporatism or neo-corporatism. Hence,

while the very existence of the neo-corporatist social partnerships in
Austria

may

Germany and

contribute to greater adaptational pressures, the end results are not wholesale

change or dissolution. (Heinisch 2000; Falkner 1997, 2001 Falkner and Leiber 2004;
;

Katzenstein 2003)
Lastly, the existence of misfit

structures of social partnership

between European governance and national

assumes

that there

is

a coherent or agreed

upon

assessment of what encompasses European governance. However, and as will be
discussed

in this

and

later chapters, the

European Union exhibits numerous forms of

existing policymaking models, including pluralism, corporatism, and statism, but

also be a completely

there

is

certainly

policymaking

new form of governance. (Falkner 2000) This suggests

some

misfit

between neo-corporatist patterns

European one, the misfit might be

at the

patterned than one could find between

systems. This would

be

mean

less consistent, stable, or patterned,

and the impetus for

structural

change

domestic

specifically addressed in the concluding chapter.
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national level and

corporatist, pluralist, or statist

from Europeanization would also

exacerbating difficulties

at the

while

far less consistent, stable, or

more dominantly

that adaptational pressures

at the

that

may

levels.

in

measuring both misfit

This will be more

Conditions of Corporatism and Neo-Corporatism

Corporatism and neo-corporatism, as theories and empirical structures of
governance,

rest

state, interest

on

a

number of key assumptions and expectations about

the role of the

groups, state-society relationships, and political culture. These

some divergence from

and from structure

state to state

to structure.

may show

Yet for the most

part,

scholarly analysis and case studies of corporatism and neo-corporatism have suggested

several conditions under which corporatism and neo-corporatism are

emerge and
delineated

thrive.

when

The

distinctions

corporatism and

its

its

likely to

between corporatism and neo-corporatism

applicable, as there

between neo-corporatism and

more

is

much

will be

scholarship that suggests a divergence

advanced, industrialized, and democratic path and

tendency towards authoritarianism.

These assumptions and conditions may be

critical in

assessing the impact of

European integration and multi-level governance upon domestic neo-corporatist
structures not only in the cases focused

in all cases

upon

Germany and

in this research,

Austria, but

within the European environment. If the assumptions and conditions of neo-

corporatism do indeed misfit with the structures and process of European integration and
multi-level governance, then adaptational pressures will follow. These

result in

domestic change of the neo-corporatist structures;

particularistic institutionalization

of neo-corporatism

in the

it

is

is

a critical step in this research.
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or

may

not

dependent upon the

domestic

Hence, understanding under what conditions neo-corporatism

may

political system.

arises, thrives,

and survives

9

The Sovereign

State

One of the fundamental assumptions of corporatism
sovereign

state.

The linkage of corporatism

is

the primacy of the

to nationalism is a rather

within corporatist thought. Ancient conceptions of corporatism,

Roman,

biblical,

Catholic, or medieval sources did not view the

to the nation-state.

is

body

politic as

confined

the very

generally considered a post-Westphalian development, ancient

corporatism was not linked to nationalism

in

any meaningful way.

However, the new corporatist thinkers and ideology
th

w hether stemming from

(Cawson 1986; Wiarda 1997; Williamson 1989) Since

concept of statehood

20

modern incarnation

that

emerged

lh

in the

1

and

centuries were decidedly nationalist in orientation. This reflects changes in the world

order and

its

philosophers after Westphalia. The re-founding of corporatist thought was

based upon the solid and positivist conception of a world order of states and national
interests.

social,

Corporatism was explicitly sought as a national solution

and

political turmoil

and other pressures

that

to solve

economic,

caused by liberalism, socialism, industrialism, radicalism,

were perceived

to

be dividing and weakening the

state.

(Cawson

1986; Williamson 1989)

Modem
power over

the

corporatism assumes the state will exert monopolistic and sovereign

economic and

social

policymaking process. As Williamson argues, the

corporatist state in entrusted to establish and maintain a particular

order

state

in lieu

social

of the chaotic or divisive liberalism or socialism. (Williamson 1985) The

must identify national economic or social

through

economic and

state policy.

As Winkler

interests to

be sought and achieved by

suggests, the corporatist state directs the

economy

according to four principles: “unity, order, nationalism, and success”. (Winkler 1976,
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103) Others suggest that the distinction between the state and interests in corporatism are

reduced and are “fused” by the incorporation process. (Jessop 1979) The autonomous

agency of the
interest

While

state is a

key question.

group struggle, or does the

pluralist theory tends

domestic
the state

state

also an actor with

even contradict domestic

have

merely a translator of the domestic

its

own

specific interests

towards the former view of the

interests, corporatist theory

is

Is the state

its

own

state as a

and identity?

mere referee of

almost always and without exception assumes that
preferences and agency to shape and sometimes

interests. (Zeigler 1988;

Adams 2004)

Nonetheless, while the debate over the state's autonomy from domestic interests

can certainly be continued,

modem

corporatist theory

and practice does begin with an

assumption of state sovereignty. This includes both external and internal
sovereignty. Internally, the state must be the highest and unchallenged

state

power over

population and territory and, externally, the state must identify and defend

encroachment by others. The
in the

state

from

must be the monopolistic locus of authority and power

realm of economic and social policy

maintain a particular economic order. As
state is thus central to the

itself

its

if

it

is

Cawson

to identify

and effectively establish and

tautologically posits, “the role of the

concept of corporatism: the state

is

the arena in

which the

process of corporatist politics takes place.” (Cawson 1986, 36)

Scholarship and case studies of neo-corporatism do not dispute the primacy of

state sovereignty as

between the internal

found

those of corporatism. While there

role, nature,

corporatist regimes, and

state as

in

and power of the

state

is

significant divergence

between neo-corporatist and

amongst corporatist scholars, both

rely

upon assumptions of the

sovereign and the ultimate arbiter of economic and social disputes and the
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)

monopolistic authority over the location of the policymaking process. (Cox 1998;

Cawson

1986; Williamson 1989; Nordlinger 1981; Jessop 1979) Hence both corporatism

and neo-corporatism tend

to

assume the

state is

sovereign externally and internally and

can and will be protected, pursued, and achieved

that there are national interests that

within the anarchy of the global order. States seek national economic and social interests

through implementation of wage, price, trade, housing, industrial, education, taxation,
transportation, agricultural, foreign,

neo-corporatism

security,

rest

and employment

upon the assumption

economic prosperity, and

policies.

that the state is the

Hence, corporatism and

only sovereign vehicle to

social peace.

However corporatism and neo-corporatism do

not vary tremendously in their

conceptions of state sovereignty from most approaches within comparative politics and
state-society relations. Pluralism, clientelism,

and even Marxism also tend

sovereignty, though the Marxist interpretation of state sovereignty

economic and
develop as

social development. Yet,

strictly national strategies

modem

is

to

assume

state

as of a hindrance to

corporatism and neo-corporatism did

and ideologies

to address national

social problems. (Katzenstein 1978, 1985; Grant 1985;

economic and

Williamson 1989

)

Hence

state

sovereignty seems to be of far greater prominence in corporatist and neo-corporatist

thought and practice than in pluralist or other approaches to state-society relations.
Despite the positivist assertions of state sovereignty and Westphalian order by

most corporatist scholars, as well as most approaches of comparative
significant

room

politics, there is

for contention regarding the conception of sovereignty.

suggests, sovereignty

was never

As Krasner

as historically absolute or consistent as has been

suggested by theorists of comparative politics or international relations. (Krasner 2001
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In addition, the

changes

in

meaning of sovereignty may have already undergone generational

meaning and

applicability

from

earlier definitions. Aalberts

suggest that the recasting of states in Europe within the
redefining of statehood and sovereignty within the

EU may

and Schuppert

require a constructivist

new environment of multi-level

governance. (Aalberts 2004; Schuppert 2006) Corporatism and neo-corporatism, along
with most other approaches to state-society relations, has assumed a very
positivist conception

that within the

of the

and sovereignty. Aalberts, and many others,

new European and

means may prove not only
Hence while

state

static

positing

global context, redefining what state sovereignty

useful but also necessary. (Aalberts 2004; Schuppert 2006)

the scholars and practitioners or corporatism and neo-corporatism have

posited the necessity of state sovereignty, those assertions and assumptions

been based on rather tenuous foundations of what such sovereignty
Nonetheless,

modem

(Pelinka 1999;

may have

infers.

corporatism and neo-corporatism have developed as

dominantly national strategies of state-society and

changing or

is

and

Cawson 1986)

If the

political

economic organization.

conceptions and assumptions of state sovereignty are

state sovereignty is itself

being subjugated to pressures, such as those from

globalization or European integration, what are the implications for corporatism and neo-

corporatism?

Two

level corporatism

globalization?

relevant questions

emerge

to address this

quandary.

First,

can national-

and neo-corporatism survive an era of European integration and

And

second, can corporatism and neo-corporatism emerge, thrive and

survive in regional, global, or local societies and polities rather than
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at the

national level?

In addressing the first question, the survival

and neo-corporatism

However,

to estimate.

to abolish.

is

in a

of national structures of corporatism

changing environment of state sovereignty

like

most

political structures,

obviously difficult

is

once created they are often

difficult

Yet the mere continued existence of corporatist and neo-corporatist structures

not nearly as important as measuring the actual efficacy, effectiveness, or legitimacy of

such structures

in

an ever-globalizing and Europeanizing atmosphere.

previous chapters, the persistence of corporatism and neo-corporatism

As suggested

may

be strongly

dependent upon the scale and manner of institutionalization that varies from

Hence some

corporatist and neo-corporatist regimes

may

resilient to challenges to state sovereignty than others.

1998;

Royo 2002; Falkner 1997)

be able to adapt to a world order

changes or becomes
traditionally

null.

While

In

in

in

state to state.

be more responsive and

(Crepaz 1995; Siaroff 1999; Ruble

some forms, corporatism and neo-corporatism may
which the absolute conception of state sovereignty

modem

been nationalist ideologies

corporatism and neo-corporatism have

in a

perceived anarchical global order, the reality

has been one of far less than absolute sovereignty and anarchy. Given the debates
regarding sovereignty and

its

meaning, one can assume

that

corporatism and neo-

corporatism have already weathered significant changes in the defining features of
sovereignty from Westphalia to the

WTO.

Nonetheless, the impact of European

unique and substantially more supranational than other

integration

and governance

challenges.

The impact of European Monetary Union (EMU) and more

is

pluralist

policymaking environment suggest a certain anti-corporatist element within European
integration

and governance. (Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Streeck 1991)
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This leads to the second question regarding the likelihood of corporatism and neocorporatism to persist

at the global, regional, or

have

is

to suggest that

it

subnational level. Historically, one would

certainly possible. Ancient corporatism itself was not based on

nationalism or the nation-state and existed

(Roman Empire, Hansatic League), and

at

transnational (Catholic Church), regional

local levels

(Germanic

guilds).

(Williamson

1989; Wiarda 1997; Black 1984: Landauer 1983) In addition, as Katzenstein argued that

neo-corporatism already exists within a system of divided or semi-sovereignty
the state

is

already limited by the authority and

power of organized

associations. (Katzenstein 1978, 1987) Hence, while

corporatism are dominantly nationalist

modem

in

which

and peak

interests

corporatism and neo-

in orientation, there is not necessarily

an

underlying structural incompatibility between corporatism and neo-corporatism and local,
regional, or global governance.

But have

modem

of governance? There

corporatism or neo-corporatism actually emerged

is, at

best, a

at

other levels

mixed record of such developments. Local corporatism

based on guilds and other functional associations was

common

Europe stretching back

(Black 1984) But these localities

were

for all intents

to at least the twelfth century.

and purposes self-managing units

that

were nominally

in

Germanic regions of

had some, but limited,

connectivity with surrounding regions. While clearly not states

localities

in

in the

economic temis, “sovereign” while the

modem

political

sense, these

local associations

and

guilds were “national” in that they represented the entire economic territory. (Black

1984) The exception here would be the Hanseatic League that created a proto-integrated
transnational network of trading cities with a

However,

modem

local

common

guild association system.

and subnational governments are
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far

more

integrated.

economically, socially, politically, into regional, national, and global polities and

economies and may not exert the same kind of monopolistic economic and

political

control that guilds and associations could during the Middle Ages. Nonetheless, local and

may

subnational governments

provide the kind of social capital, identity, and solidarity

which corporatist and neo-corporatist arrangements might
Hernes and Selvik 1981

)

These would

entity.

Yet there

political

1999;

is

thrive. (Nordlinger 1972;

likely be limited in scope, authority,

by both the smaller economy of scale, population, and

some evidence of growing

in

territoriality

and influence

of the governing

local or regional corporatism in

many

systems including eastern Germany, Spain, and Russia. (Padgett 1999; Ruble

Royo 2002; Pelinka 1999)

Some have

suggested federalism and corporatism

existence of corporatist institutions in

many

may

be incompatible despite the

federal or devolved states such as Austria,

1

Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, and Spain. (Encamacion 1999; Scharpf 1985) Federal
and confederal systems tend

to distribute sovereignty

between

territorial levels

of

government and hence create systems with shared, dual, or decentralized sovereignty
saps power from the central state to the regions. Corporatism

few or no

efficiently at the national level with

sovereignty. (Pelinka 1999) This

is

limits

is

on central

theorized to operate most

state authority

As Encamacion

1

Spain, as

it

if

there

was

and decentralized authority amongst subnational governments.

suggests:

Encamacion argues,

regions of Spain,

and

based on both the conception of a national economic

order and national economic interests that could not be effectively achieved

significant variation

that

is

is

not truly federal. While the constitution does grant

not explicitly federal.

other regions suggests a system

more

The devolution of authority

to Catalonia,

some autonomy

attune to a devolutionary unitary system like the United

rather than a purely federal one.
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to the

Basque Country, and

Kingdom

...federalist

and corporatist arrangements embody

diametrically opposed conceptions of

power

relations

within the nation state... Federalism stresses decentralization of the policy arena along territorial lines.

...By contrast corporatism emphasizes centralization of
the policy arena at the national level with participation at
the bargaining table limited to a

few powerful

groups that often enjoy monopolistic status
(

interest

in society.

1999 )

This debate seems to have a rather easy solution; the clear division of reserved and

enumerated powers between central and subnational governments removes
concern. Even

if corporatist

subnational authority,

it

just

such

and neo-corporatist structures spanned central and

remains unclear that

this

should explicitly make corporatism or

neo-corporatism antithetical to federal arrangements. While

it

may

inhibit absolute

national authority and sovereignty over corporatist and neo-corporatist processes and

institutions, federal corporatist

regimes could be arranged

to function quite well, just as

they have in the German, Austrian, Swiss, Belgian, Brazilian, Mexican, and Venezuelan

cases to

name

a few. (Schmidt

2006)

The development of regional
potential both within the

or global neo-corporatist structures also has

European Union as well as within other international

organizations and regimes. Specific and important elements of

decision-making seem

shown

to follow in the neo-corporatist

Economic and Social Committee (ESC),

Works Councils (EWCs), and

the

the

Common

policymaking and

mode. Most notable are the

European Social Dialogue (ESD), European
Agricultural Policy (CAP), and a variety of

professional, economic, and labor associations found under the

Greenwood 2001; Gorges

EU

EU. (Compston and

1996; Berger 1981; Visser 2004; Keller and Platzer 2003)
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)

The
at best.

in the

results

of EU-level neo-corporatist

The European Economic and Social Committee

EU, established

in the

Treaty of Rome

The members

authority and reach.

in 1957.

is

But

and practices have been mixed
the oldest neo-corporatist

it

is

are nominated directed by

representing specific social partners.

official

institutions

The commission

is

tremendously limited

member

agenda or important
In

some

structural elements

areas, such as

significant expansion

at the plant

EWCs create

this

number

consultation in the

of policy. (Compston 2001

institutions for

As of 2004,

is

some evidence of

employee involvement

was estimated

it

EWC directives that covered about

area employees. (Fitzgerald 2004)

reduced

its

limits their ability to influence the

European Works Councils, there

or firm level.

firms currently under

states rather than

and growing importance. (Eberwin, Tholen. and Schuster 2002;

Keller and Platzer 2003)

making

and

late

in

advisory only and can issue

Opinions that have no binding power to the EU. Further

policymaking process usually comes quite

body

significantly.

that there are

in

decision-

over

1

,800

10% of European economic

The 2004 and 2007 expansions of the

EU

have

But more importantly, the net impact of EWCs

is still

uncertain.

While

EWCs

have contributed to some increasing collective agreements over

workplace management and improving employer-employee communications,
consultation, and cooperation,

it

is less

clear if this has long-term and

EU-wide

implications for social partnership and neo-corporatism at the supranational level.

fact that

many EWCs have developed

in states

The

with preexisting affinities for

codetermination or strong union participation, such as Germany, the Netherlands, and

Belgium, suggests one limitation. Secondly, the absence of industry-wide or EU-wide
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collective agreements and bargaining arrangements further limits the implications for

EWCs to propagate

broader social partnership

at

the

European

level

of governance.

(Keller and Platzer 2003)

The European Social Dialogue
organization and scope. The

ESD

is

began

clearly

in

more European and supranational

in

1985 under Jacques Delors and includes an

arena for consultation and discussion of proposed European social policy proposals by
the social partners representing European employers' and trade union organizations.

ESD

mimics national

strategies

of neo-corporatism by providing the

ability

Committee and European Council

decisions. This

is

of the social

Economic and

partners to conclude binding agreements upon the European Union's

Social

The

distinct in the

EU

as

most

other social partnership arrangements are merely advisory or consultative only.

(Compston 2001; Benedictus,

et al

2003; Obradovic 2001

increased institutional capacities within the

agree to

common

has been mixed

However, despite these

structure, the will to reach

consensus and

binding agreements on a range of Europe-level policies and programs

at best.

number of low-level
more

EU

)

critieal issues

While achieving some very moderate consensus on

a limited

or sectoral issues, there has been greater failure to address larger and

due

to

seemingly intractable divisions between opposing

interest

associations as well as important intra-interest schisms that are based on regional,

ideological, economic, social, and political factors. (Obradovic 2001

)

The system has

collapsed on occasion and was in hibernation for several years in the early and mid

1990s.

(Compston 2001 The

centrality,

)

ESD

and efficacy as found

(Benedictus,

et al

in

has not achieved the level of institutionalization,
national level neo-corporatist policymaking models.

2003; Mangenot and Polet 2004; Obradovic 2001;

Weber 2001)

The
European
into the

creation of peak associations for industry, labor, or agriculture

at

the

been rather weak. Industry and employers have been organized

level has also

Union of Industries of the European Community (UNICE) and the European

Federations for Branches of Industry (FEBI). Comparatively, these have been a

EU

successful in both maintaining cohesion and influencing

Greenwood 2001 However
)

social partnership.

these have failed to

Most members view these

more

policymaking. (Branch and

gamer much commitment

institutions

bit

to the idea

of

almost purely as lobbying

conduits for European industry and business interest rather than as potential social
partners. (Sargent 1985;

Greenwood

This has been notable

some key

in

1997, 2003, 2003a; Branch and

Greenwood 2001)

sectors such as technology, pharmaceuticals,

biotechnology, and aircraft where there has been more cohesive and successful sectoral
business association representation

effective lobbying rather than

Greenwood

1995;

at the

EU

level, yet

it

can be best described as merely

any form of social partnership (McLaughlin and

Greenwood and Ronit

1994; Schmidt, 2006)

Labor has been organized under the umbrella of the European Trade Unions
Congress (ETUC) since 1973. While providing
the

member

states,

it

a

common

voice for

all

trade unions from

lacks the monopolistic authority and role to act as a collective

bargaining actor. The overall decline of organized labor

in

Europe has weakened the

overall position unions in the policymaking process at all levels.

Many

national unions

have also remained outside the group, including the French, and there are significant
divisions within

be.

ETUC

affiliated

This further weakens

its

members over how

centralized the organization should

representative authority. (Sargent 1985;

2003a; Dolvik and Visser 2001)

Greenwood 2003,

Nonetheless, there has been some increasing effectiveness of ETUC through the

expansion of European Works Councils. However, their future role
in the perceived potential

is still

often couched

of a unified European labor organization rather than an existing

one. In essence, organized labor at the European level remains a fairly lonstanding goal

rather than

one of tangible existence.

While these European associations and
organization of interests and actors

at the

institutions

domestic

mimic

level, all but

the neo-corporatist

CAP

have proven

to

be

weakly supported and lacking effectiveness. (Sargent 1985; Greenwood and Aspinwall
1998; Streeck and Schmitter 1991;

institutions that

Greenwood 2003, 2003a; Pelinka 1999) The

have developed upon corporatist principles or processes tend not to be

very influential in the

EU

policymaking process. (Sargent 1985; Streeck and Schmitter

1991; Pelinka 1999; Keller and Platzer 2003) The development of Euro-corporatism,

while often heralded, has failed to materialize

1

996; Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Streeck

more

like

Washington

in its “richness,

community' than any other national
pluralist, the

EU

1

in

99

1

most manners. (Sargent 1985; Gorges

)

As Hix and Goetz

complexity, pluralism, and openness of the ‘policy

capital in Europe”. (2000, 8)

system of governance

is

certainly a

complex and

several forms of policymaking and governance as well as

(Falkner 2000; Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006) The

“beyond any

The

posit, Brussels is

EU may

many

Even
rich

if

not truly

combination of

potential

new

ones.

be a political system that

is

traditional typology”. (Pelinka 1999)

failure

of these structures, save

success under normal conditions due to

its

CAP

which

is

usually not

large budgetary pressure

deemed

as a

and perceived

subsidy of inefficiency, suggests that the failure of such structures to thrive relates to

other factors other than

mean

its

mere regional

institutionalization.

Of course

this

does not

cannot develop into more effective and important institutions

that these

future. (Pelinak 1999)

EU

structures at the

As some

level are

in the

studies and scholarship has suggested, the neo-corporatist

showing some signs of increased efficacy and influence.

(Compston and Greenwood 2001; Berger 2002; Dolvik and Visser 2001; Visser 2004)

The

fact that the

EU

has emulated and invested effort into mimicking state-level neo-

corporatist structures suggests that there

is

not a formal institutional barrier to or

prohibition of corporatism and neo-corporatism at the

While there has been some

European

level.

institutionalization of functional interest groups

representation in other regional trade blocs such as Mercosur (The

Common

Market of

South America), the Andean Community, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC),

and others, these have been primarily weak and purely advisory

institutions often for

publicity rather than policymaking. This has also been the fate of similar experiments in

corporatism and neo-corporatism

at the

global level.

A number

of international

organizations have created corporatist or neo-corporatist structures to

functional organization found within national systems.

Most notable

mimic

the

are several

organizations under the umbrella of the United Nations Organization including the
International Labor Organization (ILO), the

the Global

Compact

instituted

World Commission on Dams (WC'D), and

by former Secretary General Kofi Annan. (Ottaway 2001;

Kell 2003; Therien and Pouliot 2006; Tosstorff 2005)

World Trade Organization (WTO). World Bank and

Even elements

International

have decidedly corporatist and neo-corporatist elements within

(DiMatteo

et al

2003)
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integrated into the

Monetary Fund (IMF)

their

broader frameworks.

This inability to jump to regional and global levels

may be

explicitly linked to

sovereignty, in that interests and actors in the political system are loyal to and maintain

solidarity with existing political units

and

their

corporatism and neo-corporatism are viable
actors

and

its

who

economic and

social goals.

at the national level

Hence,

because interests and

operate within such systems demonstrate regularized allegiance to the state

national interests.

(Cawson 1986; Cox 1988) While

there

may always be some

divergence between the state's broad national interests and those specific to

socio-economic actors, the system nonetheless requires some
solidarity to operate as a legitimate

minimum

policymaking structure. Hence

its

domestic

level of national

states’ roles

may be

to

establish

and maintain a particular national economic or social policy, but without some

minimal

level

of popular legitimacy and affirmation, such systems would lack efficacy,

effectiveness, and longevity.

As many

scholars suggest, neo-corporatism

national response to the international environment and

national or state-level context. (Streeck 1991

and neo-corporatist structures created

at the

;

is

was

itself a

therefore strongly nested in the

Katzenstein 1978, 1985) The corporatist

European and international levels lack the

kind of legitimacy and primacy that are currently associated with the state and

its

perceived monopoly on power, authority, and the people’s loyalty. (Streeck 1991; Streeck

and Schmitter 1991; Pelinka 1999)

How ever,

if

the state has difficulty in or

is

incapable of exerting sovereign

authority in economic and social policy areas, identifying and establishing a national

economic

interest, or if

domestic actors cease

to grant the state

solidarity, state-level corporatism or neo-corporatism,

altogether,

is

far less likely to thrive or survive
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monopolistic loyalty and

along with the state's legitimacy

and might engender the creation and

affirmation of supranational or international corporatist and neo-corporatist regimes. This

would require

the creation of identities and civil societies that surpass the nation-state and

coalesce around institutions such as the

EU

or

UN.

(Risse 2001; Checkel 2001;

Friedman, Hochstetler, and Clark 2005; Lipschutz 1996)
societies truly

emerge and become powerful

If regional or global civil

forces, perhaps, neo-corporatist

corporatist structures at the regional and international level might

life.

However,

the social

system

in a

and economic

likely to occur.

identities

Hence while

capabilities at these levels

is

identity

and the

of citizens and most

state

show some
still

interest groups, this is far less

levels, their ability to generate

highly dependent upon a

signs of

tend to dominate

national neo-corporatist interest groups have

and transnational

lose at the supranational

solidarity

which national

in

and

number of factors

much

and maintain

including, the

of their membership on supranational or transnational issues, the material

ability to project

momentum

power

of their

at the

supranational or transnational level, and the historic

institution.

Hence some types of interest and

social groups, including

multinational business and industry, agriculture, or environmentalists might be

capable of deploying and exercising
business.

at

more

multiple levels than others such as labor or small

(Compston and Greenwood 2001; Greenwood 1997, 2003; Pelinka 1999)

While even

economy within

in

the

Europe there

EU,

is

a trend towards supranational organization of the

there has also been a

commensurate trend of delegating more

authority to subnational governments and actors. In the

subsidiarity

in

to gain or

and

is

EU,

this trend

is

called

closely linked to the emergent popularity of federalism and devolution

regime design. (Tiersky 2004; Buclet 2002; Duff 1993; Dinan 1999) Subsidiarity,

principle,

would only

transfer the auspices of the state to the
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European

in

level if necessary.

But defining necessity and the overlapping competencies of economic,
political authority

many

may make such

traditional roles

ideals difficult to enforce.

and powers of the

state,

it

social,

While designed

and

to protect

has also created a strong regional or

subnational tendencies within the EU. (Borzel 2001, 2002) Hence, while the traditionally
corporatist and neo-corporatism rested firmly

upon the sovereignty and

role

of states

in

the realm of power and interest representation, the existence and operation of multiple

levels of

governance

in the

European Union may provide

significant challenge to national

systems. However, as Krasner strongly suggests, even within the framework

globalization and a

still critical, if

more powerful European Union,

not dominant, forces. (Krasner 2001

)

states

and sovereign

state

power

are

Additionally, as discussed earlier,

corporatism and federalism are not necessarily antithetical to one another, which will also

be discussed

in the later

chapters on

Germany and

Austria. Nonetheless, states are

beginning to share or pool their sovereignty with regional and global organizations and
structures of governance that

may

create fundamental challenges for

all

forms of

state-

society relations, not just those of the corporatist and neo-corporatist variety. (Pelinka

1

999; Schmidt 2006) Schuppert and Aalberts argue that Europeanization

the lines

may be

and meanings of statehood, sovereignty, and public and private actors

blurring

in just

such a way. (Schuppert 2006; Aalberts 2004)

While corporatism and neo-corporatism are conceptualized and have operated

as

primarily national strategies and structures under the monopolistic authority of the

sovereign

state, if

has emerged

policymaking

in the

is

to exist within a

European Union, the question

corporatism can survive

in or

is

system of multi-level governance, as

whether corporatism and neo-

adapt to such a two- or multi-level environment.

As

discussed

level

in the

previous chapter, the strategies that actors

game may challenge

the corporatist

may

pursue in a two- or multi-

and neo-corporatist assumptions of the

monopolistic authority of the sovereign state to limit and regulate the interest articulation

and intermediation process. (Putnam 1988) Corporatist and neo-corporatist systems are
theoretically

and

institutionally oriented as closed

and monopolizes the

interest intermediation

on two

at the

European

fronts. First,

policymaking arena

)

state

In

both limits

an

systems are increasing facing pressures

increasingly seek to go outside the national

to the supranational level to influence

and lobby the policymaking

Putnam 1988; Greenwood 2003; Streeck and Schmitter

process. (Hix and Goetz 2000;

1991

may

which the

much socio-economic policymaking does

level, neo-corporatist

domestic actors

in

and policymaking processes.

environment of multi-level governance where
take place

systems

Second, most important social and economic policy decisions must meet some

level of supranational approval or legitimation.

(Andersen 1993; Hix and Goetz 2000;

Tiersky 2004) In both cases, the continued monopoly and sovereignty of the state’s
structures of governance

seems

“compound” nature of the
disruptive to other

EU

compound

to

be clearly reduced. However, Schmidt argues that the

policymaking and governance system
polities

is

actually less

such as those in the German social partnership

where authority and governance are decentralized

to multiple levels

and social

actors.

(Schmidt 2006) Overall, the perceived “misfit” between neo-corporatism and European

modes of governance

is still

quite

open

for debate.

)

The Strong

State

The
is

meant

to

groups but

pluralist

model regards

the state's role in soeiety as rather minimal.

moderate the competition, bargaining, and confrontation between
not explicitly ascribed with

it

own

its

agency

goals, interests, or

The

state

interest

in the

intermediation process. Hence pluralism assumes that within a democratic context, the

state

should be somewhat weak and dependent upon the input, guidance, and direction

from the

pluralist interests

the individual,

working with other individuals

society (Zeigler 1988)

interests

compete

some groups

of society. (Bentley 1908) Pluralism
in interest

The governmental process of the

to influence

is

in

essence built upon

groups, as the keystone of

pluralist

model

is

one

and dominate the policymaking process and

are well represented, organized, or integrated into the process

in

that

which

whether

was not “a

matter of great significance”. (Truman 1951

Corporatism, on the contrary, views state-society relations as a far more

and complex relationship
Society itself

is

ideology of the

viewed
state.

guiding role

which

itself.

in not

which the

state takes

on additional roles and authority.

in a far less individualist, replaced

(Zeigler 1988)

moderate or referee the
intermediation

in

interest

The

critical

by a more functional group

corporatist state has authority not only to

group struggle but also

in participating in the

(Schmitter 1979; Wiarda 1997) The state plays the directorial and

only mediating the competition amongst interests but also

interests are to be represented,

how

in

choosing

representation will be structured, and limiting

the potential range of activities of the interests in the policymaking and implementation

processes. (Collier and Collier 1979)

Hence not only does

the state play a

role in society than in pluralist systems, requiring a greater range
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much

stronger

and depth of state

intervention in

economic and

social spheres, but society itself is conceptualized not in

mere terms of individualism but also

Cawson

1986; Williamson 1989;

The
and

in terms

of functional groups. (Zeigler 1988;

Cox 1988)

recasting of the state as a major actor with

activist role

its

own

ambitions, preferences,

was one of the fundamental accomplishments of corporatist

as well as

other non-corporatist scholars of the post-development era. (Huntington 1968; Skocpol

1979; O'Donnell 1986; Stephan 1978; Linz and Stepan 1978) Corporatism has been

relatively successful in the process

Corporatism assumes

that the relationship

more or equally important
there

of the

is

of bringing the

as relationships

state

between the

back into comparative
state

and

societal

politics.

groups

may

be

between the groups themselves. Nonetheless,

remarkable divergence amongst cases and scholars regarding the role and power

state in corporatist

and neo-corporatist systems.

The strong state-weak

state

debate has been a significant schism amongst scholars

of corporatism and neo-corporatism since
comparative

politics.

its

early

development

in the field

of

(Cawson 1986; Williamson 1989; Grant 1985; Cox 1988) The

general debate revolves over the necessity of a strong state model for corporatism to

emerge and

The linkages between corporatism and fascism

survive.

or authoritarianism in

Latin American and Southern Europe were significant evidence that led to such

conclusions. (Field

this chapter,

1

938; Sarti 1971; Malloy

1

977; Wiarda 2004)

As mentioned

earlier in

corporatism does suggest a more powerful and interventionist state than in

pluralist systems.

The

and directorial role

state is required to

in the

have an intervening, intermediating, regulatory,

policymaking process amongst socio-economic

bulk of corporatist theory assumes that a strong state

is

actors.

The

both a necessity for the creation

and maintenance of corporatism
Grant 1985; Streeck 1991

)

economic or other schisms,

There

is

Cawson

1986;

also a tendency of weak states, divided by socio-

to adopt corporatism as a

more powerfully

divisions and create a

(Offe 1984; Williamson 1985;

in practice.

means

institutionalized

to

compensate

and legitimated

for such

state.

(Wiarda

1997)

However,
limitations.

does not necessarily mean an absolutist

this

As Williamson

illuminates,

numerous

theorists

state

with few societal

and proponents of

corporatism held a wide range of opinions regarding the nature and limitations of state

power. While some tended towards absolute
that while vital, central,

and necessary, the

All theorists

saw

power,

state's role

it

many

other thinkers

assumed

was not unlimited.

the state as ultimately having

extensive responsibilities
affairs.

state

However,

in

economic and social
was not to

to the majority this

result in unlimited state intervention.

(Williamson 1985)
For most corporatist scholars and theorists, the state would always be a central and
critical actor in the

much of corporatist

regime but
theory

it

was

need not always be authoritarian or

fascist.

However,

put into practice by just such authoritarian and fascist

regimes due to the shared vision of a strong

state

and the order

that

could be created and

maintained under such systems.
Nonetheless, the emergence of corporatist structures in the democratic states of

Europe did suggest

a

major variation

in the

conception and institutionalization of

corporatism within a democratic context. Democracy, by definition and empirical
ev idence, rests on a far weaker conception of state power. (Schmitter and Karl 1991

coexistence of corporatism and democracy required a
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new typology

)

The

within the corporatist

theoretical universe.

state corporatism,

O'Sullivan 1988;

The

Hence

the distinction

between corporatism or

in Schmitter’s

terms

and neo-corporatism, or social corporatism. (Schmitter 1979;

Cox

1988;

distinctions

Lehmbruch 1979)

between neo-corporatism and corporatism are most notable

precisely in their regards and assumptions of state power.

Lehmbruch 1979; Cawson 1985)

(Cox 1988; Schmitter 1979;

Overall, while the role of the corporatist state has often

been authoritarian and strong, neo-corporatist systems exist within democratic contexts
that decentralize

the

German

power and autonomy away from

the central state. Katzenstein noted that

case of neo-corporatism provided a “semi-sovereign state" in which state

power was strongly dispersed
labor. In these system, social

to the

and

major socio-economic

interest groups,

interests

of business and

such as unions, business associations,

and farmers’ groups, were self-organized but semi- or pararpublic

institutions the

performed quasi-regulatory or governmental functions. (Katzenstein 1987; Schmitter and
Grote 1997; Schmidt 2006) Hence, neo-corporatism differed strongly from corporatism
in that is existed

within and respected the parallel democratic, constitution, and

decentralized structures of governance. (O'Sullivan 1988) This led

many

scholars to

suggest that neo-corporatism itself was not a unique or singular typology of state-society
relations but merely a

Beyme

form or extension of pluralism. (Cawson 1986; Zeigler

1

988; von

1983, 1993)

However, even neo-corporatism

in

theory and practice does presuppose a

decidedly more involved and interventionist state than most pluralist systems. The

while

still

constrained by democratic and constitutional structures

democracies such as

civil liberties, free

common

to

state,

advanced

and open elections, and checks and balances must

power

also have

to define

important limitations upon the interest articulation,

would be absent

intermediation, and policymaking process that

(Schmitter and Karl 1991; Schmitter 1979; Lehmbruch 1979;

Neo-corporatism, while eschewing the

statist

Cox

is

true that

once

set. that table

may run

1988;

systems.

Thomas 1993)

authoritarian language of corporatism,

nonetheless often calls upon the state to play an important and

bargaining process as well as determining

in pluralist

who

gets to

sit at

critical role in the

the bargaining table

very effectively with

little

itself. It

or no need for constant

or strong state direction, but the state will always need to remain close by and ready to

intervene

when

neo-corporatist bargaining stumbles or breaks down. (Grant 1985;

Katzenstein 1987; Pelinka 1999)

This division between direct and indirect state action

and policymaking process
It

has also

become

often quite vague and difficult to discern. (O’Sullivan 1988)

pluralist.

which

O'Sullivan

is at

is

some

points and times neo-corporatist and others

highly critical of the lack of genuine neo-corporatist

theory that would help alleviate such concerns.

primary exists within democratic contexts
types.

Systems

that

intermediation

the premise of a major debate within neo-corporatist scholarship

relating to the dual state,

seemingly

is

in the interest

(

1988) However, neo-corporatism

that are

themselves mixed rather than ideal

have been categorized as strongly

corporatist elements.

Wiarda has suggested

just this in

pluralist

may

also exhibit neo-

regards to the United States and

its

“creeping corporatism” as has Lowi in his arguments regarding the “capture” of the state

by the wealthiest and most powerful

interests.

(Wiarda 1997; Lowi 1979)
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Even given these
systems

The

still

envision and establish a relatively stronger state than in pluralist systems.

state is still

identify

take a

criticisms of neo-corporatism in theory, in practice these

expected to maintain and regulate the intermediation process as well as

which actors should be included. But, beyond these

more minimalist

duties, the state

role in the intermediation process. In fact, as in

little

or no direct central state action. (Pekkarinen, Pohjola, and

may

process results

and

when consensus

1992;

state

building becomes too difficult or the intermediation

in policies that the state

social interest. (Vail

take place

Rowthom

Grant 1985; Schmidt 2006) The systems are often self-maintaining requiring
intervention only

often

Germany,

Scandinavia, and elsewhere, the actual intermediation between interests

with

may

deems

antithetical to the overall state

economic

2003)

Additionally, neo-corporatist systems due to their parallel existence with

democratic institutions and structures can be altered, bypassed, and reformed through the
democratic process. Usually
institutional

this is difficult

due

to

entrenchment of

momentum. Nonetheless, neo-corporatism,

interests

and

unlike corporatism, does exist

within a democratic framework that can, though with difficulty and often torturous

complexity, circumvent and even recast the neo-corporatist institutions and structures.

The Netherlands of the 1980s and perhaps Germany of the 1990s were such cases of
reform. (Visser and Hemerijck 1997;

The

corporatist

Andeweg 2005;

and neo-corporatist

state

Vail 2003; Heinisch 2000)

must not only intervene

relationship between interests and the state itself but

must also be more interventionist

markets. All corporatist systems are directly concerned with

economic and

social order with

in the

how

the state can sustain an

predominantly privately owned property and means of
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in

production. (Williamson 1989) This

to create

is

not to say that corporatism

is

usually far

more

pluralist systems. (Collier

Cox

communism, seeking

an economic order in which the state monopolizes the economy under

ownership and command. Nonetheless,
the state

is

in

its

direct

most corporatist and neo-corporatist systems,

interventionist in

economic markets than neo-liberal and

and Collier 1979; Grant 1985; Williamson 1985; Zeigler 1988;

1988; Schmitter and Streeck 1991)

However,

there

is

some

significant dispute regarding exactly

intervention corporatist and neo-corporatist states require.

One

how much market

classification

corporatist regimes developed by Katzenstein suggests that neo-corporatism

liberal

and social

varieties. (Katzenstein 1980, 1984)

While some corporatist

Austria pursued a strongly interventionist social democratic model,

offer a

more mixed

of neo-

may come

in

states like

Germany tended

to

“social market” system while others, like Switzerland, Chile, or

Finland pursued far more neo-liberal forms of intervention. (Pelinka 1998; Helander
1982;

Lehmbruch 1979; Katzenstein 1979, 1980) The

exhibit relatively

wide divergence

in state

problematic for neo-corporatist theory in

economic approach

it

is

far less

fact that

neo-corporatism can

economic intervention

many

respects.

It

homogenous than one would hope

types of states. This does not necessarily

it

indicates that there

institutionalization

amongst many

is

weaken

its

seemingly

suggests that as a political

posited in earlier chapters, neo-corporatism and corporatism exist

term; rather

is

or expect. Yet, as

in

many forms

in

many

usage as a theoretical and descriptive

variation of corporatist

and neo-corporatist

different types of states, political systems, and political

economies.
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It

more

should be noted that even

in liberal neo-corporatist

interventionist than in neo-liberal political economies.

systems

Switzerland utilize

like

elements

still

act as limitations

many market-based

and barriers

to

more

systems, the state

While

is

usually

liberal neo-corporatist

processes, the neo-corporatist

fully

developed and unencumbered

neo-liberalism or pluralism. (Armingeon 1997; Kriesi 1982; Steiner 1974; Steiner 1996;

Katzenstein 1984, 1985) Hence, while neo-corporatism

social varieties,

more

limiting role

liberal

liberal

in

both liberal and

neo-corporatism does expect the state to play a stronger and

upon both

and markets than found

interests

in

most

pluralist

and neo-

regimes.

The

may

even

may come

reliance

upon

a stronger state

by both corporatist and neo-corporatist systems

be fundamentally challenged by several trends both within Europe and the global

order.

As more and more policymaking

the ideal of the strong state

process

in the

may

takes place in Brussels than in national capitals,

be mitigated

European Union seems

far

if,

more

as

many

suggest, the policymaking

pluralist, or

mixed, than corporatist. (Hix

and Goetz 2001; Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Pelinka 1999; Falkner 2000; Falkner and
Leiber 2004; Schmidt 2006)

However, as noted
dominantly

pluralist

earlier,

governance.

it

If

modes of policymaking may cause
systems

it

difficult to assess if the

would be

EU

constitutes a case of

EU

were, pressure to conform to

standards or

greater misfit to and adaptational pressure

that are strongly neo-corporatist.

domestic reform of existing

it

is

upon

This would not necessarily lead to structural

political, social,

and economic

a minimally necessary condition. (Hix

institutions

and Goetz 2001

;

Caporaso 2001; Knill 2001; Borzel and Risse 2003) However, there
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and processes, but

Risse, Cowles, and

is

also the possibility

that the process

power

EU

in

of European integration

many ways by

requiring

its

itself helps bolster state

and neo-corporatist

participation in the creation and administration of

policy and law. (Falkner 2000; Heinisch 2000; Schmidt 2006)

There

is

also a

growing

strain

of neo-liberalism present

in

both the European and

national political systems seeking to reduce the role and scope of the state in market and

social policy. (Pierson 1994, 2001;

Schwartz 2006) While the expected massive

reductions of the welfare state and social spending have yet to materialize, the

liberalization

of employment policies, the reform of pension, healthcare, retirement, and

unemployment

benefits,

serious push to

weaken

Gooby 2001, 2004)
or even create a

and the privatization of national firms and

the state's influence in social

suggest a

and economic realms. (Taylor-

Further, in an ever-globalizing world, the ability of states to achieve

macroeconomic policy

take on a greater share of states’

internationalized,

utilities

and as

losing their traditional

capital

GNP,

is

diminished.

As

international trade begins to

as monetary policy

becomes more

and currencies become more mobile, governments are

methods of economic influence and

control.

(Graham 1996;

Lipschutz 2005; Friedman 1999, 2006; Pelinka 1999) The inability of the state to

fulfill

this

primary role undermines some corporatist and neo-corporatist assumptions of the

role

and power of the

The
by similar

state.

forces of neo-liberalism, while

calls

on the global

still

a minority voice in Europe, are amplified

level. Globalization's trend

toward

freer

markets and

smaller government intervention reinforce the pressures to reduce the role of the state in

social

and economic policy upon which corporatism and neo-corporatism

predominance of neo-liberalism has pressed

for shrinkage

126

of the welfare

rest.

state.

The

privatization of formerly state-run industries and services,

and a general trend towards

smaller government on a global scale. (Wolf 2004; Friedman 1999; Bhagwati 2004)

the state’s role in welfare policy,

the capacity of the state to

macroeconomic

manage

simultaneously diminished. This

policy,

and the public sector contracts,

neo-corporatist arrangements

may

As

may

also be

be perceived as not only a threat to corporatism but

to state sovereignty as well.

Interestingly,

many have noted

challenges of globalization to

that integration itself

many European

states.

may

European

be a solution for the

states

may

harbor from the vagaries of globalization within the European Union and

economy of scale and
state

capacity to deflect

many of the

find safe

challenges to the European welfare

and way of life. (Gordon 2004; Verdier and Breen 2001; Hennis 2001;

Of course,

for neo-liberals the use of the

their free trade orientations.

upon important

political,

EU

as a barrier to free trade

(Wolf 994) The
1

corporatist

macroeconomic, and

social interests,

whatever they

is

antithetical to

social levers to both regulate

may

be.

Adams 2007)

and neo-corporatist

intermediate the interest group struggle as well as to ensure

economic and

greater

its

its

ability to

state relies

and

defend national

Hence, while the strong

state has

been amongst the foundations of corporatist and neo-corporatist thought and practice, the
pressures of neo-liberalism and globalization conspire against the maintenance of the

interventionist state. Nonetheless, neo-corporatist systems could be put in a difficult

position between globalization and Europeanization. While globalization

as a larger threat to the

similarly

that

undermine or

economic
alter other

tenets of neo-corporatism,

may

be viewed

European integration may

important political and economic powers of the state

have been hallmarks of neo-corporatist governance. (Schuppert 2006)
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Incorporation of Interests and Limitations on Interest Articulation
Corporatist and neo-corporatist goals of regulating interest groups and their

participation in the policymaking process primarily necessitate the assumptions of the

strong and sovereign state.

The dominant

corporatist regimes from pluralist ones

policymaking process. Hence, the
groups and

is

feature that distinguishes corporatist and neo-

the incorporation of interest groups into the

ability to organize, incorporate

their relationship to the state

and

limit interest

and policymaking process are fundamental

assumptions of corporatism and neo-corporatism. (Collier and Collier 1979; Schmitter
1979; Schmitter and Grote 1997)

The underlying

rationale for such incorporation varies tremendously

amongst

scholars and theories of corporatism and neo-corporatism, as well as amongst empirical

cases in practice.

Some

stem primarily from

scholars and theorists argue that corporatism and neo-corporatism

cultural, historical,

polities as functionally

in

and “Thomistic”

dominantly Catholic

that support a vision

of

segmented and organized. (Zeigler 1988) As Wiarda suggests,

corporatism, especially

statist”

and philosophical roots

the cases of Latin

social, political, philosophical,

societies.

Catholic societies, there

America and

Iberia

and

stem from “organic-

cultural roots

(Wiarda 1997; Wiarda and Mott 2001

may be

)

of these

Even

in

non-

important social, cultural, and historical bases for

adopting corporatist or neo-corporatist regimes that reflect the underlying beliefs
regarding the roles of and relationship between the state and social groups. (Cawson
1986; Zeigler 1988) Historical traditions and practices

may

importance of guilds and other functional organizations in

also be influential, such as the

many Germanic

(Landauer 1983; Black 1984; Bowen 1947; Williamson 1989)
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societies.

But corporatism
social,

may

also have developed as a product not merely of cultural,

and historical influence but as one of institutional and

and neo-corporatist regimes

may

political choice. C'orporatist

be designed and implemented to organize and

intermediate interests by political systems, elites, and other actors to achieve

particularistic national social,

1979;

economic, and

political goals. (Katzenstein 1984; Schmitter

Lehmbruch 1979) The incorporation and

institutionalized to solve long-standing or

limitation of interests

may be

seemingly intractable social conflicts

that

hinder the state's political, social, and economic development. Corporatism and neo-

corporatism

liberalism,

may be adopted

as a rational solution to the deficits of pluralism, neo-

and other state-society and

economic regimes.

political

Corporatism and neo-corporatism have emerged from two distinct views of
corporatist development.

social forces; the

The

first

stems from cultural, historical, philosophical, and

second stems from more immediate

challenges. (Chalmers 1985;

institutional

and rational

political

Wiarda 1997; Adams 2001, 2004) This dichotomy

nearly as absolute as one might imagine. While scholars such as Wiarda

fall

is

generally

and choice

into the first

camp, they generally do recognize

important

considering the constructing corporatist and neo-corporatist regimes.

in

(Wiarda 1997) Scholars

that often fall into the

that institutional design

is

second camp, such as Schmitter and

Katzenstein, also recognize that cultural, historical, and social conditions

some

not

“elective affinity” towards corporatism and neo-corporatism in

may

many

provide

regimes.

(Schmitter 1979; Katzenstein 1985)
Despite these divergences, corporatist and neo-corporatist theory and practice
generally assumes that the state plays an important role in identifying and incorporating

major

some

interests into the

limits

1985, 1989)

policymaking

institutions

on the absolute freedoms and

The

actor demands.

It

state

and process. The

liberties

state usually places

of interests and actors. (Williamson

cannot be regularly challenged by majoritanan or particularistic

must coerce or persuade social and economic actors

to limit their

actions to those that are compatible with the goals of the economic and social order.

(Collier

and Collier 1979; Williamson 1985)

The extent

to

varies tremendously

and methods by which the

state intervenes

amongst corporatist regimes. The most notable

between the authoritarian and

statist

corporatism found

and Latin America and the democratic and

in

methods by which

distinction

interests

is

regimes of Southern Europe

social neo-corporatism

Western Europe. (Adams 2004) This variation exists both
state as well as the

and incorporates

found primarily

in the teleological goals

in

of the

interests interact with the state.

In authoritarian corporatist systems, the state’s goal is usually to constrain or

subjugate social interests that have traditionally hindered the state's authority and
legitimacy while simultaneously institutionalizing the

that

power and

supported a more dictatorial regime. This was most notable

authority of interests

in Italy

under Mussolini,

Spain under Franco, and Mexico under the long domination of the Revolutionary
Institutional Party (PRI)

which

all

used corporatist organization to either subjugate or buy

off social actors that had been previously challenged the state while simultaneously

reinforcing the

power of loyal

institutions

and

actors. (Field 1938;

Wiarda 1993; Grayson

1998) Franco’s Spain used incorporation to bring Spain's unions and labor organizations

under control while also using corporatism to enhance and reinforce the power and role

of the military. (Wiarda 1993) Nonetheless, the goals of corporatist incorporation were
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to

solidify

and centralize authority and power

state at the

in the

hands of the authoritarian

expense of other social interests and groups. Hence,

this

was

a

elites

of the

“top-down”

process of institutionalizing corporatism with explicitly authoritarian goals. (Field 1938;

Wiarda 1997)

The process of incorporation amongst
notable in that

was

little

it

was often done through

the authoritarian regimes

was

also

most

significant coercion or threat of violence. There

choice amongst the actors and groups incorporated under the state

policymaking umbrella. Again, the primary examples are

European and Latin American regimes
electoral alchemy,

media suppression,

that

fascist or authoritarian

Southern

used violence, the threat of violence, bribery,

exile, political detention,

and economic

punishment as methods of ensuring limited challenge

to state authority

1938; Stepan 1973; Collier and Collier 1979) Hence,

many of these regimes used

and power. (Field

corporatism and the corporatist ideology as the tools to build a stronger and more
authoritarian state, rather than functional organization as a goal in and of

addition, this further solidified the

military, church, large landowners,

(Wiarda 1997)

In essence,

power and

itself. In

authority of institutions such as the

and others

at the

expense of other social

interests.

corporatism paradoxically used inclusion and incorporation to

create greater exclusion and disenfranchisement.

In neo-corporatist

systems, the state’s goals and methods diverge significant from

authoritarian corporatist systems. Neo-corporatist regimes, while also attempting to limit

and incorporate
are far

social interests

more “bottom-up"

institutions

under the auspices of the

affairs that operate within

and processes. The

policymaking process,

and parallel to existent democratic

state’s goals are not to
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state's

dominate or otherwise suppress

interest

and

groups so

much

as

is

it

attempting to reign

in the

vagaries of the policymaking

interest representation process to achieve social partnership, social peace,

and

consensus. (Lijphart 1975, 1999; Scholten 1987; Lehmbruch 1982) In addition, the

methods by which the

state

coerces and incorporates interests are fundamentally limited

by the legal and social constraints of democracy and a democratic
eorporatist state does not, and has

powers

polity.

regimes traditionally employ. Nonetheless, even

within neo-corporatist systems there can be tremendous distinctions

2000

the neo-

no intention of using the types of coercive violence and

that authoritarian corporatist

state in the

Hence

in the role

of the

policymaking and economic governance arenas. (Katzenstein 1987; Heinisch

)

This relates to a point mentioned earlier

in this

chapter regarding the

consideration of neo-corporatism as merely an extension of pluralism within the

democratic context. (Cawson 1986) Williamson posits that the institutions of neocorporatism are not liberal democratic and pluralist
that corporatism

in nature.

and democracy are incompatible. Actors and

This

is

not meant to infer

institutions

may be

democratically selected and accountable, yet, and perhaps more clearly, the point that

Williamson
and

its

is

trying to

make

results are not reliant

in that the specific

upon

pluralist

neo-corporatist policymaking process

and majoritarian institutions and processes.

(Williamson 1985) As Lijphart suggests, the majoritarian or
is

pluralist

model of democracy

“exclusive, competitive, and adversarial” whereas neo-corporatist and other consensual

political

models

are characterized

compromise” (Lijphart 1999,

by an essential “inclusiveness, bargaining, and

2) Hence, democracies

may empower policymaking

processes and decisions to relatively un-pluralist and non-majoritarian institutions or
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)

structures such as those

particularly

common

to neo-corporatism.

uncommon, most judicial systems

(Lehmbruch 1979) This

not

is

are insulated from majoritanan and

popular will through anti-democratic structures such as non-elective,

life

appointments.

Hence, neo-corporatism and representative democracy can co-exist and are not exclusive
or antithetical to one another.

Even with these important

variations

amongst the goals and methods of

corporatist and neo-corporatist regimes, both systems utilize a similar structure of

mandatory and monopolistic functional representative organizations

to take

an

intermediary role between the state and the societal actors. These organizations are

compulsory and provide formal and inviolable linkages between
state.

They

act as the

societal actors

and the

primary pathways for societal interests to lobby and negotiate with

the state and other actors while simultaneously providing conduits for the state to ensure

regulatory compliance and nominal solidarity. (Williamson 1985)

The

corporatist

model

generally assumes a formal or legal system of relationships between the state and societal

groups. This differs significantly from the pluralist model, which assumes an informal

and segregated relationship between the

state

and

interest groups.

As

Lijphart suggests,

“pluralism... means a multiplicity of interest groups that exert pressure on the

in

government

an uncoordinated and competitive manner.” (Lijphart 1999,16) This also varies from

the Marxist model,

which assumes

that the state mirrors the existing relationship

classes within the society; or the totalitarian variant,

totally control all interest

group

activity.

which assumes the

(Adams 2001
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between

state attempts to

However, corporatist and,
levels of informal

Some

especially, neo-corporatist systems

may

exhibit high

and extra-governmental relationships between important social

actors.

argue that they work optimally and with greater flexibility given the reduced

The

formality. (Heinisch 2000; Pelinka 1999)

state

must not formally be included

in all

negotiations, compromises, and bargaining. Corporatist and neo-corporatist systems, once

established, might be rather self-sustaining without the need for omnipresent state

intervention. (Katzenstein 1987; Lijphart 1975;

However,

the state

is

corporatist structures

almost always a vigilant watchdog of corporatist and neo-

and processes so as

and

by the

to ensure all actors abide

and are working towards desirable national economic,

institutionalized conventions

social,

Armingeon 1997; Scholten 1987)

political goals.

Nonetheless, corporatist and neo-corporatist regimes rest upon the assumption

that social

and economic

interests

can be organized and incorporated into the state's

policymaking process. (Pelinka 1999; Schmitter and Grote 1997) This organizational and
incorporation effort works best

if

number of easily

there are a small

identifiable

functional interests. Lijphart argues:

Concertation
large,

is

facilitated if there are relatively few,

and strong

and/or there

is

groups

interest

functional sectors

-

in

each of the main

labor, employers, farmers

a strong

peak association

in

-

each of the

sectors that coordinates the preferences and desired
strategies for each sector.

(

1

999, 6)
1

Katzenstein considers the centralization and concentration of interest groups to be one of
the primary characteristics

of democratic corporatism.

(

1985) This characteristic tends to

hold constant across both corporatist and neo-corporatist systems

and practical terms. Philosophically,

in

in

both philosophical

accordance with much of corporatist theory.
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society

the

is

body

envisioned as unified and that interests represent particular parts or organs of

politic.

(Cawson 1986; Landauer 1983; Williamson 1985; Schmitter and Grote

1997) Even as manifested in

and encompass the national

modem

social,

authority. (Williamson 1989;

corporatist thought, the state

economic, and

Cawson 1986)

political locus

to

embody

of identity and

Practically, the ability to organize

incorporate interests into the state policymaking process

the existence of a small

meant

is

number of identifiable,

is

and

streamlined and simplified by

functional interest groups. (Lijphart 1999;

Katzenstein 1985; Pehnka 1999)

The organization and incorporation of interests
social

and

and economic organization of the

actors.

But

if

is

therefore dependent

upon

the

state into readily identifiable sectors, interests,

these distinctions and divisions are difficult to discern and

operationalize, the ideals of corporatist and neo-corporatist functional organization

become

less salient

of trends

modem

and fare more problematic

in institutionalization.

that challenge coiporatist functional organization

European context.

capital, financial,

First, the

There are

and incorporation

a

number

in the

Europeanization and globalization of business,

and other economic

interests creates a transnational

dilemma

in

delineating national business interests from foreign ones.

These transnational and European business

interests

may

be less likely to share or

possess either the normative or socio-cultural predisposition towards corporatist and neocorporatist structures than predominantly domestic-oriented business interests. This

product not

just

of corporate operations and trade

that force firms to

compete

is

a

in

continental and global markets tending towards isomorphism, but also that firms have

become

transnational in ownership, financing, capitalization, and stakeholding,
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all

which

)

undermine a nationally-based corporatist or neo-corporatist operating
2001

)

principle. (Kurzer

National corporatism and neo-corporatism must face the prospects diminishing

leverage against increasingly European and global firms, once thought to be national.

Consider the merger of Daimler-Benz and Chrysler

to

German, American, or transnational corporation? Can
effectively coerce and persuade Daimler to abide

state-society relationships

form Daimler-Chrysler;
the

both changes to

its

its

own

by German neo-corporatist structures of

and policymaking when the firm’s owners, operations, and

influence and options in the

ownership and

policymaking process

itself?

European

Can Daimler continue

to

German policymaking process given

interests, as well as to the

Europeanization of the

(Adams 2001

National firms themselves have also

as

this a

German government

stakeholders are increasingly spread across six continents?

voluntary limit

is

integration, globalization,

become

increasingly divided over issues such

and protectionism. While some national firms

have adopted more European, global, and free-trade orientations, other firms may
these processes and wish to retain higher levels of state-sponsored

reject

economic

protectionism and market intervention. (Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Schmidt 2006;

Cowles 2001

)

In addition, large

modem

firms often operate in

many

sectors

simultaneously, including industrial, manufacturing, finance, insurance, and sen ices

making functional categorization

difficult if not impossible.

(Graham 1996) The

Europeanization and globalization of the economic order has made the identification and
incorporation of business interests under a single

banner problematic.
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common

corporatist or neo-corporatist

It is

not just firms that have changed and challenged existing neo-corporatist

orders in Europe. Changes and decline in labor unions have also begun to erode
the foundations of the corporatist and neo-corporatist order in

many European

Another important foundation of neo-corporatism was the assumption

would be
between

ideal at addressing

states.

that such structures

and alleviating the longstanding social question and conflict

and working classes

capital

many of

in

many European

states. (Wallerstein,

Golden, and

Lange 1997; Diamant 1958, 1960; Shanahan 1954; Lijphart 1968, 1992; Armingeon
1997;

Einhom and Logue 2004; Williamson 1985) This

changes

in Europe, including the decline

industrial

is

challenged by socioeconomic

of trade unions and emergence of a post-

economy. (Visser 2002; Esping-Andersen 1993, 1996; Pelinka 1999)

As Europe has become

less industrial, the

certainly been transformed if not marginalized.

importance of the social question has

The post-Fordist

era has seen a

remarkable decline in union membership and industrial employment, the building blocks

of the neo-corporatist order. (Pontusson 1995; Visser 2002) Further, the neo-corporatist
relationship

was

also clearly based

upon

a class relationship

(Williamson 1989) However, as union wages
the average industrial union

member

in

capital

and

is

more

likely to

sector employment. (Lucifora,

unionization

is

common

to industrial

McKnight, and Salverda 2005)

increasing, these tend to be white-collar

In areas

in

and manufacturing

where

and professional sectors of the

European economy rather than lower wage service segments. (Crouch 1986)
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risen,

be middle

income than lower income. (OECD) Lower income workers are found primarily
serv ice industries lacking levels of unionization

labor.

and manufacturing have

in industry

Western Europe

between

If the

interests

and

neo-corporatist and corporatist state

their participation in the

is

going to effectively intermediate

policymaking process, incorporated units are

required to be unitary functional actors representing important socio-economic sectors

socio-economic schisms. Neo-corporatism was most often adopted

and reflecting

critical

to address the

longstanding social question and political schisms that often ripped

European

states

between left-oriented labor and right-oriented

Panitch 1979) But

if

capital.

peak associations and other functional organizations cannot maintain

discipline and effectively represent

and organize

their functional sectors, the corporatist

and neo-corporatist structures may lose efficacy and effectiveness.
interests

no longer

(Williamson 1989;

reflect critical

If the incorporated

and outstanding social and economic cleavages,

existing corporatist and neo-corporatist structures

may

also lack salience and legitimacy.

(Pelinka 1999)

Political Stability

Another fundamental characteristic of corporatist and neo-corporatist systems
political stability.

when

is

Corporatism and neo-corporatism are effective almost exclusively

the political system exhibits a strongly predictable and stable balance and

consensus between major socio-economic and political actors. Katzenstein and others
suggest that neo-corporatism and political stability are mutually contingent. (Katzenstein
1984, 1985; Scholten 1987) Corporatist and neo-corporatist structures require guarantees

of access and monopolistic representative authority
limitations

upon

their activities,

demands, and roles

to interests in

in the

exchange for the

state’s

policymaking process.

(Katzenstein 1985; Collier and Collier 1979) Hence, changes in fortunes from election to
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election between parties are not

institutions

meant

to significantly alter or disrupt the processes

of representation, intermediation, and policymaking established

and neo-corporatist

structures. This requires relatively stable political

and

in corporatist

systems

that

mitigate frequent and radical changes in political leadership and reduce the potential

impacts that majoritarian or radical electoral swings might otherwise produce. Hence, the

adoption of corporatist and neo-corporatist structures requires a level of political stability

and consensus

that is often absent

from

pluralist

(Katzenstein 1984, 1985, 1987) This stability

and

legal institutionalization

is

and majoritarian systems of governance.
usually derived from both constitutional

of corporatist and neo-corporatist structures as well as

through preexisting agreements and arrangements amongst the major political parties,
political leadership,

and socio-economic

elites. (Collier

and Collier 1979; Katzenstein

1985; Nordlinger 1972; Lijphart 1984)

Political stability

interests are

expected

to

is

necessary for several reasons.

agree to

some

level

First, if

socio-economic

of state-mandated limitation upon or

regulation of their interest articulation activities and participation in the policymaking

process, those interests must usually be guaranteed certain inalienable and inviolable

rights to monopolistic access

and representation within the corporatist or neo-corporatist

policymaking structures. Second, the policy process within such corporatist and neocorporatist structures

must not be easily dismissed, ignored, or bypassed by other

institutions. If the corporatist

and neo-corporatist structures and

their outputs

political

were simply

ignored or altered by bureaucratic, parliamentary, or judicial actors, the efficacy and
legitimacy of such structures would be minimized and actors

outside the institutions created. (Katzenstein 1987;
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would regularly seek

to act

Lehmbruch 1982; Thomas 1993)

accompanied by strong consensus amongst not only

Political stability is usually

the socio-economic interests to abide by the corporatist and neo-corporatist rules of the

game, but also by

Even when

political parties.

must eontinue

the corporatist and neo-corporatist structures

transitory rise

and

fall

of electoral

politics.

parties retain a large governing majority,

to operate

beyond the

(Katzenstein 1985; Scholten 1987; Li jphart

1984, 1999; Daalder 1987) Hence, neo-corporatist and corporatist systems often thrive in

systems

in

which

these structures

is

a strong

consensus regarding the institutionalization and insulation of

agreed upon by

all

major

political parties

and

As Katzenstein

actors.

suggest, neo-corporatism usually coincides with “the absence of a winner-take-all

mentality.” (Katzenstein 1985, 157)

Victory or defeat on any given issues does not lead to an
escalating spiral of conflict because a continuous sequence

of political bargains makes

all

actors

aware

that victory

today

can easily turn into defeat tomorrow. The predictability of the
process enhances the flexibility of the actors.
(Katzenstein 1985,33)

States that see radical shifts

between

politically

parties are less likely to maintain stable corporatist

and ideologically divergent

and neo-corporatist regimes since

policymaking preferences and processes of governance are often regarded as spoils by the
victorious political parties taking office. If parliaments, cabinets, and executives begin

regularly bypassing or ignoring the corporatist and neo-corporatist structures of

governance, or treating them as extensions of their majoritarian mandates, the future
viability

of such regimes

is

certainly curtailed.

(Gobeyn 1993; Rose 2000; Crepaz 1994;

Vail 2003) Coiporatist and neo-corporatist regimes can only properly function

socio-economic interests are incorporated under the
politicized. at least in terms

state

and insulated

when

in a relatively de-

of majoritarianism and electoral implications, arena.
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the

Otherwise, the willingness of interests to enter into and abide by neo-corporatist and
corporatist arrangements

that

given changes

would be

fleeting at best since they could rationally recognize

in electoral fortunes

they could either dominate the policymaking

process or be locked out entirely. Actors enter corporatist and neo-corporatist

arrangements precisely

to mitigate the potential

swings in electoral politics

that

might

bring a feast-or-famine cycle to their participation in the policymaking process.

(Katzenstein 1985; Lijphart 1999)

counter-example

in

electoral vagaries

The American system might suggest

which labor and business

interests are far

just

such a

more susceptible

to the

and fortunes of the Republican and Democratic parties whose control

of Congress and the White House will strongly determine their

ability to influence

and

actively shape the policymaking process.

Political stability

may be fundamentally

challenged by European integration

in

several meaningful ways. First, the process of European integration itself has split

political parties,

skeptical lines.

alliances

and even factions within

Europeanist and Euro-

(Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Schmidt 2006) Second,

between

increasingly

political parties, across

leftist

parties

weakened by

and

issues of

labor,

and

European

rightist parties

traditional

and business have been

integration. (Ignazi 2003;

Steenbergen 2004; Miiller 2000; Muller 1996) Third, the

rise

Marks and

of post-material parties and

schisms within existing dominant parties has uncovered a growing decline of consensus
regarding neo-corporatist structures and processes. (Inglehart 1977; Luther and Miiller

1

992; Conradt 2001

legislation,

)

Fourth, the rise of European levels of governance, representation,

and governance creates a

environment

that

makes consensus

far

far

more complex, and

more

less stable, political

difficult to achieve.
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(Schmidt 2006; Dyson

2003)

Fifth, there is

some evidence

that the process

of integration has raised the

importance and powers of governmental actors such as parliaments and executives

in the

policymaking and governance process. This would accrete governance authority and

power away from

the social partners

who have

traditionally

been responsible for

many

such duties. (Vail 2003; Falkner 1994) In combination, these changes suggest a far less
stable

and predictable

political order

argued, seems to necessarily

upon which corporatism and neo-corporatism,

it

is

(Katzenstein 1984, 1985, 1987)

rest.

Cultural and Institutional Solidarity

One of the fundamental

debates

in corporatist

the role of political culture in explaining the rise

neo-corporatist regimes. Focusing upon the

colonial,

and implementation of corporatist and

common

religious, cultural, historical,

and societal features of the Iberian and Latin American

the “unique tradition” of corporatist organization

was

and neo-corporatist theory has been

clearly state corporatism,

from the Thomistic, Catholic, and Iberic-Latin American

was

Wiarda analyzed

amongst the regimes of this region. This

“top-down and authoritarian,”

Crucial to Wiarda's early conception

states,

“state-centric,”

and derived

(Wiarda 1981, 1997)

tradition.

the notion of corporatism

imbedded within

the

socio-cultural tradition of Iberia and Latin America.

In

Northern Europe, the ideological and cultural affinity towards corporatist and

neo-corporatist governance

down from

emerged from long-standing

traditions

and practices passed

the Medieval ages of guilds and Catholic orders. (Black 1984; Landauer

1983; Offe 1984; Schmidt 2006)

As Katzenstein

characteristics of neo-corporatism

is

suggests one of the critical

an "ideology of social partnership” rather than one
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of conflict. This does not mean the termination of political contestation, rather

major socio-economic and

political actors share

that the

“vaguely held but firmly shared notions

of public good” (Katzenstein 1984, 27) This does not even suggest

that political

contestation will not be bitter and fervent, but does imply a consensual style which

Austrian Chancellor Kriesky called “a loveless marriage that works” (Katzenstein 1984,
26) This argument regarding the sociological and cultural bases of corporatism and neo-

corporatism

is

not without critics and controversy, most notably that found in the

work of

Philippe C. Schmitter.

Schmitter’s definition, cited earlier in this chapter, focused on the institutional
basis of corporatist arrangements. Rather than looking at the socio-cultural basis of

corporatism, Schmitter identified the causes of corporatism as residing within political

and economic variables including the growth of central planning, the need for peaceful
labor-capital relations,

economic and

and the necessity of bureaucratic implementation of state

social policy. Rather than

stemming from

“elective affinity” towards corporatism in

(Schmitter 1972)

As Katzenstein and

regimes are adopted as solutions

some

culture, Schmitter suggested an

states, especially those

of Latin America.

others suggest, most corporatist and neo-corporatist

to intractable social conflicts that require

new forms of

consensual governance inclusive of once bitterly divided adversaries. (Katzenstein 1984,
1985; Nordlinger 1972) In Northern Europe, these truces, including

Agreement of 1935,

the

1934, the Swiss Peace

Norway's Basic

Dutch Corporatist Charter of 1938, the Belgian Solidarity Pact of

Agreement of 1937, and

the Danish Kanslergade

Compromise of

1933, were adopted to address the long-standing social question and conflicts of

industrialized Europe. (Katzenstein 1985;

Einhom and Logue 2004; Armingeon
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1997;

Lijphart 1968; Visser and Hemerjick 1997) In Southern

corporatist regimes of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Mexico,

imposed or implemented

after long periods

Europe and Latin America, the

Colombia,

Brazil,

and Peru were

of civil or social insurrection, economic

recessions and crises, or political factionalism and instability. (Sarti 1971; Field 1938;

Grayson 1998; Schmitter 1971, 1975; Wiarda 1993; Stepan 1973, 1978; Kline 1993)

In

both corporatist and neo-corporatist systems, these structures seem to have been

of their eras and

politically expedient or necessary solutions to address particular crises

not necessarily products of socio-cultural determinism.

However, as
cultural

the scholarship regularly illustrates, the institutional

and socio-

arguments regarding corporatism and neo-corporatism are not necessarily

exclusive or incompatible. Most cases suggest that both socio-cultural and political
institutional factors important to the adoption

and implementation of corporatist and neo-

corporatist regimes. (Katzenstein 1984. 1985, 1987;

Lijphart 1968)

Wiarda 1997; Schmitter 1971;

The existence of corporatism and neo-corporatism

of both long-standing socio-cultural bases
corporatist governance structures

institutional opportunities

that

in

affinity

likely a

that

made

combination

towards corporatist and neo-

and more immediate and short-term

and circumstances

of such structures seem useful

have

is

the adoption

political

and

and implementation

achieving particularistic political, social, and economic

solutions to long-standing conflicts.

Regardless, there does appear to be

solidarity

and consensus that must

emerge and

thrive.

The

some nominal

exist for corporatist

level of cultural or political

and neo-corporatist systems

lack of significant cooperation, consensus,

to

and social agreement

regarding such forms of governance would seem to quickly limit the efficacy, legitimacy.
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and effectiveness of corporatist and neo-corporatist structures
succeed
the

at

to properly function

and

achieving their particularistic social, economic, and political goals. Obviously,

methods of organization and the openness of the system

differ

tremendously between

and amongst corporatist and neo-corporatist systems. Nonetheless, cases of both
corporatism and neo-corporatism do usually share a

common

underlying philosophical,

historical, cultural, or sociological basis for the creation, institutionalization,

and

maintenance of such regimes.
This does not suggest that the underlying cultural and social foundations are
sufficient to maintain corporatist

societies,

and neo-corporatist regimes. Changes do occur

economies, and polities that

system and drive them

may

alter the preferences

of actors within the

to discount or prefer particular political options.

neo-corporatism likely emerged from

just

to

Corporatism and

such circumstances, and changes in the

substance and balance between socio-cultural preference and immediate social,

economic, and

upon

political conditions

corporatist

would

and neo-corporatist

likely

structures.

change the value

that societies

may

place

Hence, while some societies might have a

socio-cultural affinity towards corporatist or neo-corporatist regimes, the social,

economic, and

political

circumstances and opportunities of a given era

in that

while Mexican society

practices and social structures that

may

still

reflect

many of the

just

such an

overt and underlying

promote corporatist organization, the association of

corporatism with seventy years of PRI-led authoritarianism have led

pluralist structures

discount the

Mexico may provide

likelihood of adopting and implementing such systems.

example

may

many towards more

and preferences of governance since the democratization era of the

1990s. (Grayson 1998)

The converse

is

also possible, in
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which societies

that

have

much

traditionally lacked

in the

corporatist or neo-corporatist

to specific social,

New

modes of governance due

economic, and

political

Deal era of the United States

political

their

way of corporatist ideology and

to the perception

w here due

into administrative

and

to the

legislative policy

extreme economic,

social,

in the

and

programs such as the

WPA

and

Act.

corporatism, the institutional argument also

virtually unlimited

numbers of cases

might have been effective and useful

in

all

cases of corporatism and neo-

fails in a similar regard. First, there are

which corporatist and neo-corporatist system

in addressing long-standing social

conflicts but lacked the underlying socio-cultural bases of consensus

to

of applicability

dilemmas. This might be most notable

While socio-cultural variables may not explain

seem

do adopt

consequences of the Great Depression, many neo-corporatist elements made

way

Wagner

practice,

have been necessary

to adopt,

and economic

and solidarity

that

implement, and maintain such systems. These

could potentially include Tsarist and Revolutionary Russia, postwar France, Yugoslavia,
post-Apartheid South Africa, and post-independence Malaysia and India. Second,
institutionalized cases of corporatism

cultural bases

have generally failed

political results.

many modem

and neo-corporatism without underlying socio-

to thrive

Such instances can be found

political

Egypt, Nigeria, and

and achieve desired
in failed

social,

economic, and

programs and policy structures

in

systems such as the United States, Australia, France, Indonesia,

many

other developing states. (Bianchi 1989; Nyang'oro 1989)

Hence corporatism and neo-corporatism

rely

socio-cultural and institutional, that in combination

upon two

seem

sets

of important variables,

to explain

when and how

corporatist and neo-corporatist policymaking solutions and regimes are
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more

likely to

emerge, be adopted and implemented, thrive, and ultimately survive. The balance

between the two variables may show tremendous variation, but the absence of one or the
either

seems

likely to

reduce the efficacy, necessity, quality, and longevity of both

corporatist and neo-corporatist structures of governance.

It is

manner

in this

developments

that corporatism

in the global social,

specifically rests

upon

and neo-corporatism may be threatened by

economic, and

reduced

successes. In

that

many ways,

states

NATO

many now
world and

its

effective

in

may have become

and instrumental tool

new

threats

to

a victim

“win the
of

its

last

war”.

own

Germany, Austria, and other

welcome

is

in fighting

no longer suitable

in

and winning the Cold War,

addressing the post-Cold

War

and environments. Similarly, neo-corporatism may have

precisely because

economic growth, prosperity, and
But

were designed

the future of neo-corporatism in

suggest that the alliance

overstayed

agreements. (Compston 1998)

resembled similar debates about the future of NATO. While many claim

was an

its

compromise,

such structures of governance would be

institutional necessity for

of Europe, neo-corporatism

In the context

European

to reach

corporatist and neo-corporatist structures

if

Neo-corporatism

the willingness of organized interests to negotiate,

and bargain, and hence concede some ground,

The underlying

political context.

it

provided a long era of social peace,

political stability.

an ever global and European environment,

many view

neo-corporatist

structures as hindrances, rather than assets, to effective interest articulation,

intermediation, and policymaking processes. (Crepaz 1995;

The Economist 2003 The
)

still

Gobeyn

1993; Gerlich 1992;

cultural solidarity underlying neo-corporatist consensus

exist as a philosophical, ideological,

and socio-cultural
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may

ideal but with diminished

)

perceptions of

its

political necessity

and efficacy

European integration and globalization

it

is less

to address current

dilemmas of

likely to survive. (Pelinka 1999; Streeck

and Schmitter 1991

Conclusion: The

Fit

of Corporatism and Neo-Corporatism to Europeanization

Corporatism and neo-corporatism

in

theory and practice rely upon several critical

assumptions and arguments regarding the nature of the

state,

sovereignty, interest

organization, solidarity, and political culture. European integration

forces that

may be

is

one of several

eroding the foundations of neo-corporatism. (Streeck 1991; Streeck

and Schmitter 1991; Pelinka 1999) Along with globalization, post-materialism, postindustrialism, structural socio-economic change, and domestic political transformations

the foundations of

may

modem

neo-corporatism seem under assault. European integration

be influential precisely because

it

has impacts upon almost

theoretical and empirical underpinnings of neo-corporatism

and

all

of the underlying

social partnership.

(Pelinka 1999; Falknerand Leiber 2004)

First, in

threat to the

more

terms of state sovereignty, while

that globalization is also a

Westphalian order of the international system, the European Union

institutionalized in terms

The EU

many argue

itself

is

of hierarchical power and authority over member

provides a system of multi-level governance that presents

many

far

states.

critical

challenges to neo-corporatist systems that had previously assumed to be operating within
the context of the monopolistic authority of the sovereign state. Second, in terms of state

power, European integration along with globalization
the state and

its

is

pressuring for

some reductions

authority over socio-economic policymaking that were once the
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in

hallmarks of neo-corporatist governance, though

in

some ways Europeanization may

also

increase the influence and primacy of the state in policymaking in areas of administration

of new EU-level policies and programs. (Knill 2001; Pelinka 1999; Schuppert 2006)
Third, European integration has created schisms amongst existing national actors

regarding the process, scope, and pace of integration itself Europeanization

of political contestation that

may

is

a

new

area

not necessarily be well absorbed by existing

policymaking patterns. (Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Schmidt 2006) This has been
exacerbated by both global and socio-economic developments that have altered the

politics

of associability and class

in

neo-corporatist systems,

coherent organization of interests extraordinarily

new

to these

issues

difficult.

making functional and

However,

if

systems can adapt

and environments, the long-term implications might be mitigated.

Fourth, European integration, along with globalization and post-industrialism,

have shifted
pattern

political conflicts

away from

the traditional left-center-right, labor-capital

upon which neo-corporatism was predicated

Century. (Hix and Goetz 2000)
issues have

made

New

in the first

political parties,

new

half of the Twentieth

cleavages, and

the existing neo-corporatist institutions and structures

new

divisive

seem

anachronistic and have eroded the necessary political stability upon which the systems

were

built.

And

finally, the cultural

institutionalization,

and

political

consensus regarding the adoption,

and maintenance of neo-corporatist systems may be declining due

to

both the success of the existing institutions to address and solve the social, economic, and

political

problems of the past

new European and

fifty

years and the inapplicability of these solutions to the

global social, economic, and political environments states must

face.
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now

European integration
and neo-corporatism

is

potentially at the core of all five challenges to corporatism

theory and practice. While the European Union and

in

and institutions are not explicitly or intentionally

and processes, there

not an

is

overwhelming

fit

antithetical to neo-corporatist structures

either. (Pelinka 1999; Streeck

Schmitter 1991; Streeck 1991; Falkner 2001; Falkner and Leiber 2004)
existing neo-corporatist regimes and structures

economic, and

political

dilemmas of the 19

th

treaties

its

do seem

to

Many

and
argue that

be designed to address social,

th

and 20 Centuries rather than the 21

(Crepaz 1995; Gobeyn 1993; Streeck 1991; Streeck and Schmitter 1991

)

This

is

s
'.

not to

say that there has been isomorphic response to these pressures amongst neo-corporatist

structures in

European

states.

(Falkner 2000; Falkner and Leiber 2004) Quite to the

contrary, the responses of states and their neo-corporatist institutions, processes, and

actors, has illustrated a

wide variety of reforms, reorganizations, retrenchments, or

resignation.

Importantly,

it

is

quite difficult to assess the level of misfit between the

and neo-corporatist patterns of policymaking precisely because there
or even dominant

is

European

no single uniform

model of European policymaking. (Falkner 2000; Pelinka 1999;

Sehuppert 2006; Schmidt 2006) While some have suggested a significantly more pluralist
orientation of the policymaking process in Brussels, the complexity of the system defies

simple categorization. As

many

and corporatist tendencies

in its

governance. The

EU

EU

model suggest

scholars have suggested, the

EU

exhibits pluralist,

statist,

policymaking patterns as well as entirely new forms of

can perhaps best be described as a hybrid. Detailed studies of the

a diversity of public-private interactions within the policymaking

process that shift and alternate depending upon numerous factors including the presence
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of preexisting lobbies or policy communities, issue networks between the supranational

and national

levels, the level

of competence transferred

to the supranational level,

and

specific sectoral issues. (Falkner 2000; Pelinka 1999; Schuppert 2006)

Schmidt argues

that

and misfit are primary dependent upon the overarching

fit

structure of domestic political systems. Strongly simple

and unitary patterns of

policymaking and governance, such as the United Kingdom and France,
correspond with the complex, dispersed modes of governance

at the

EU

fail to

level while states

with compatible patterns of compound and decentralized governance, such as

or Italy, are

more

social partnership

likely to

have better

fit.

and neo-corporatism

in

She

as

Germany

devolved model of

explicitly points to the

Germany

in

much more accommodative and

adaptive to Europeanization than other unitary or concentrated policymaking systems.

(Schmidt 2006) This suggests

that the level

patterns of policymaking and governance

of misfit between the

may be

EU

and neo-corporatist

far less than Streeck

and Schmitter

imagined. (Streeck 1991; Streeck and Schmitter 1991)

In essence, the

EU

policymaking system seems

far less pluralist than

suggest and that the fragmented and segmented European model

may

many

allow considerable

space for neo-corporatism and other national forms of governance patterns to continue to
function with only minimal changed. In

actually

promote

a neo-corporatist

some cases EU standards and

implementation such as

Directives inclusion of a provision that requires that

employers and
state,

labor, in

in the

“member

directives

Working Time

states

may,

after consulting

accordance with the traditions and practices of each

decide not to grant equal

their stay abroad”. (Falkner

minimum pay

to

may

posted workers during the

member

first

month of

2000) Hence, while there has been much consternation and

supposition over the impact of Europeanization and integration on neo-corporatist
patterns of policymaking, the actual level of misfit

irregular.

seems rather inconsistent and

The neo-corporatist systems of governance

policymaking and governance process

at

have significant variation. Nonetheless,

at the state level

and the

EU

the supranational level are not identical and

it

is

absolute misfit between the neo-corporatism

difficult to assert or quantify that there is

at

the national level and

EU modes

an

of

policymaking and governance.
In addition,

any misfit that does exist between traditional corporatism and neo-

corporatism and European integration must not necessarily continue unabated. The
process of Europeanization

is just that,

a process,

and does not necessarily have

particular endpoint of convergence or isomorphism.

of governance are
misfit,

whatever

still

that

unwritten.

might

Two

be. First,

The

future of the

EU

and

a

its

modes

potential futures could alter existing levels of

European integration may become

less antithetical

towards national structures of neo-corporatist social, economic, and political governance.
(Pelinka 1999) Europeanization

is

an ongoing and still-debated process that does not

necessarily end with a permanent system of multi-level governance in which states cede

significant levels of sovereignty, authority,

there

is

some evidence

that the efforts

and

state

power. (Schuppert 2006)

In fact,

of European integration even through today have

not been nearly so detrimental to state sovereignty, authority, and capacity as have been

argued generally. Additionally, as Aalberts and Schuppert argue, Europeanization

is

changing the meaning and nature of sovereignty and statehood themselves. (Aalberts
2004; Schuppert 2006) Second,

new

transnational, national, subnational, or multi-level

forms of neo-corporatism could arise and become influential and lasting structures of
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governance within the European framework. Again, the contestation over the scope, pace,

and content of integration

is

far

from complete and beyond debate.

While the current systems and assumptions of neo-corporatism seem
fully

less than

compatible with the processes and structures of European governance, neo-

corporatist structures could adapt and reconfigure so as to remain both as influential and

effective structures of governance within Europe. (Pelinka 1999) Falkner and

suggests just this scenario as Austria has

made

a

number of reforms

reducing the influence and role of social partnership

that,

Hemisch

while certainly

policymaking and governance,

in

nonetheless maintained significant continuity in their neo-corporatist structural

characteristics

and processes as well. (Falkner 2001; Heimsch 2000)

In all, while

European integration and neo-corporatism do certainly share a

number of conflicting assumptions, conceptions, and

structures,

it

would be inaccurate

to

suggest that they are absolutely antithetical or hostile to one another. The misfit between

neo-corporatism and Europeanization
Nonetheless,

in the

may

be emergent but not necessarily decisive.

context of the theories of Europeanization, even modest misfit

between neo-corporatism and European integration certainly increases adaptational
pressures upon neo-corporatist states to adjust to the

new European environment.

(Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse 2001; Hix and Goetz 2000; Pelinka 1999; Falkner 2001;

Dyson 2005; Falkner and Leiber 2004)
However, the concept of misfit seems

less than

complete and of utility under these

circumstances precisely because of the overwhelming variations of neo-corporatism

between member

states

and even within member

later chapters, the differential institutionalization
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states.

As

will be explored in detail in

of the social partnership in Germany

and Austria

is critically

important to understanding the role of Europeanization

in

prompting continuity or change within the domestic sphere. The response of neocorporatist systems

and

states to the challenges

of Europeanization

is

dependent upon the

specific institutional characteristics of national neo-corporatist structures

These specific

how

states

institutional

might transform or reform

their

domestic structures of governance. (Cowles,

it

does not seem clear

measuring or identifying misfit as a necessary condition of change

and

fit

is

that

useful or viable.

Hertier and Knill argue, assessing misfit appears to be an unnecessary and

potentially incorrect theoretical assumption.

cases of

patterns.

and mediating factors are the primary determinant of if and

Caporaso, and Risse 2001; Falkner and Leiber 2004) However,

As

and

as well as misfit,

political constellations

Domestic change or continuity may occur

and may be purely dependent upon the specific

arranged

at the

institutional

domestic, sectoral, or policy level. (Hertier

and Knill 2001; Schmidt 2006) Hence, whether neo-corporatism
European modes of governance may be

in

fit

or misfits with

less important that the particularistic political,

economic, and institutional conditions, actors, and structures taking place

in the

Europeanization process. While neo-corporatism and corporatism have some similarities
to

and differences with European modes of governance,

it

is

necessary to explore the

empirical cases to understand and explain the impact of adaptational pressures upon

change and continuity.
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CHAPTER

4

THE PARADIGMATIC CASE OF SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP

IN

AUSTRIA

Introduction to the Cases

As
level

stated in the introductory chapters, while there

is

significant debate over the

of “misfit” between European governance and neo-corporatism, the mere existence

of fit or misfit does not explain the likelihood or the variation of convergence or
divergence of national structures from the European model. (Falkner 2001
the misfit

Hence while

between the social partnership and European governance may or may not

explaining

still

)

how

particular states respond to adaptational pressure

and Europeanization

found within the institutional characteristics of the social partnership structures

each

state. (Risse,

may

structural

it

in

cause either domestic structural change or continuity

depending upon the particular institutionalization of the social partnership
Therefore,

will require a case study

of comparative analysis

at the national

to explain particular

changes or continuity amongst the Austrian and German social partnerships.

Because the Europeanization

literature focuses

upon the “neither wholesale

convergence nor continuing divergence of national policy structures,
other patterned relationships” from European

institutions,

and

modes of integration and governance,

the

analysis of when, why, how, and to what extent domestic change or continuity occurs

central.

is

Cowles, and Caporaso 2001; Schmidt 2006) In other words, European

integration and governance

level.

exist,

is

(Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001; Schmidt 2006; Borzel and Risse

2003) As has been explained
characteristics

do matter and

in earlier

result in

chapters of this research, national institutional

“domestic adaptation" to European integration and

governance “with national colors”. These variations encompass formal and informal
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institutions as well as the

and

As noted

thrive.

norms and conventions within which such

in chapter three, there

extraordinary variation in the

is

amongst neo-corporatist regimes. The

institutionalization

structures survive

social partnerships of Austria

and Germany are not exceptions and are comprised of a variety of formal and informal
structures. (Heinisch

governance

is

more

2000) Hence

likely to

to explain

when and how European

cause domestic structural change or continuity, a

comparative analysis of the social partnerships

While

this will

contexts for the cases,

try

and

fit

in

both states

it

to adaptational pressures

frameworks of Europeanization of Risse, Cowles,
to Risse,

points, facilitating formal institutions, organizational

empowerment of domestic

when domestic
European

Cowles, and Caporaso, responses

of European governance and integration are dependent upon the

presence or absence of five specific mediating factors

2)

necessary.

will also be instrumental in providing institutional analysis so as

and Caporaso and Hix and Goetz. According

Caporaso 2001,

is

be used to provide historical, economic, political, and cultural

the cases into the theoretical

differential

integration and

According

to

actors,

national level: multiple veto

and policymaking cultures,

and learning. (Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and

Hix and Goetz, domestic structural change

actors, institutions, or processes

new

level in three areas:

at the

exit

is

have increased opportunities

pathways,

new

informational advantage. (Hix and Goetz 2000, 13)

more

likely

at the

veto powers, and gaining

Hence these next four

chapters, while

providing an institutional and comparative analysis of the social partnerships, will also
address the presence and absence of these criteria that will then be assessed within the

Europeanization framework

in

chapter eight.
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Introduction to the Austrian Case

Austria has long been considered one of the strongest examples of corporatism,

even having been labeled as the paradigm or prototype case. (Lijphart and Crepaz 1995;

Crepaz 1995; Lehmbruch 1982; Gerlich. Grande, and Mtiller 1988; Encamacion 1999;
Kittel 2000;

Kunkel and Pontusson 1998) To be precise, Austria

is

perhaps the

preeminent model corporatism within a democratic framework, or neo-corporatism,
rather than as an

example of an authoritarian mode of corporatism. While Austria had

existed under an authoritarian version of corporatism during the interwar era, postwar

Austrian corporatism

is,

with

little

debate, clearly a form of democratic corporatism.

Neo-corporatist institutions and processes in Austria are generally

Sozialpartnerschaft or social partnership, as they are also
,

and other

states.

But perhaps

in

no other

known

known
in

as

Germany,

Ireland,

state is the social partnership so politically

entrenched. (Katzenstein 1984, 1985; Schmitter 1982; Gerlich, Grande, and Miiller 1988;

Pelinka 1998; Kittel 2000) Austria has been ranked amongst the strongest in both

qualitative

and quantitative studies (see table

1

below) of

interest

group corporatism.

(Katzenstein 1984; Gerlich, Grande, and Miiller 1988; Siaroff 1999; Hicks and

Kenworthy 1998) As one Austrian saying goes,

the social partnership “need not be

explained to an Austrian and simply cannot be explained to a foreigner”. (Gerlich

1

992;

Talos 1996; Pelinka and Bischof 1996)
In contrast to the pluralist

social partnership

is

systems of the United States or Canada, Austria and

its

dominated by relatively centralized, highly concentrated, and quasi-

monopolistic interest associations that are integrated into political decision-making

structure.

They

are not merely pressure groups. (Talos 1996; Katzenstein 1984; Talos and
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Kittel 1996;

Crepaz 1995; Lehmbruch 1982) This has lead many

partnership and

its

to criticize the Austrian

close concertation between the major interest groups and the state for

resulting in a nepotistic and clientelistic patronage system that rewards those

inside but excludes those groups

1996; Marin 1985) This

in

is

not an

and

interests not incorporated.

uncommon

on the

(Crepaz 1995; Markovits

charge against most neo-corporatist systems

both practice and theory. (Ottaway 2001; Zeigler 1988)

Norway
Sweden

0.44

Costa Rica

0.50

Botswana

2.60

Austria

0.62

Australia

2.66

2.50

Denmark

1.00

Barbados

2.80

Switzerland

1.00

France

2.84

Israel

1.12

Ireland

2.94

Netherlands

1.19

New

3.00

Belgium

1.25

Portugal

3.00

Japan

1.25

Italy

3.12

Finland

1.31

Spain

3.25

Germany
Luxembourg

1.38

Bahamas

3.30

1.38

Jamaica

3.30

Zealand

Mauritius

1.60

Malta

3.30

Venezuela
Papua New Guinea

1.90

Trinidad

3.30

2.10

United States

3.31

Iceland

2.25

United Kingdom

3.38

India

2.30

Greece

3.50

Colombia

2.50

Canada

3.56
9

Table

1:

Index of Interest Group Pluralism in 36 Democracies"

But even amongst other neo-corporatist systems and

social partnerships, Austria

has often stood out as a penultimate case. The levels of concentration, centralization, and

institutionalization

of the Austrian social partnership are what tend

to differentiate

Austria from other “more normal” or moderate neo-corporatist regimes in Europe such as

Germany

2

or the Netherlands. (Katzenstein 1984; Pelinka 1998; Crepaz 1995;

Kunkel and

Siaroff uses over twenty variables to create this scale including labor-business centralization, labor-capital

conflict, political consensus, wage-setting arrangements, direct interest participation in the

process, and formal institutions of corporatism. (Siaroff, 1999)
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policymaking

Pontusson 1998) Austrian corporatism has three main features: a close interconnection

between

parties

and economic associations, dense and obligatory

and a comprehensive structure of co-decision-making powers
(Pelinka 1998) In

all

three features, the Austrian

comparable neo-corporatist

states or regimes.

2000; Kunkel and Pontusson 1998;
In addition, the Austrian

stability”

Mann

interest associations,

at the

national level.

model ranks above most other

(Lehmbruch 1982; Pelinka 1998;

Kittel

1987)

model of social partnership, because of its

“ultra-

and miraculous economic success from 1950s through 1970s, was regarded as

something unique and worthy of study and emulation. (Gerhch, Grande, and Muller
1988) Austro-corporatism became a password to describe the Austrian model of
“cooperation between business and labor under the auspices of benign government” that

provided “the best of all worlds” including “democracy and welfare, capitalism and union

power, economic growth and
(Pelinka 1998, 2)

full

The Austrian

significant scholarly

employment

social partnership, especially

and policy attention for

practice of neo-corporatism.

but without significant inflation”.

its

from the 1970s, garnered

emblematic and highly successful

(Lehmbruch 1979; Katzenstein 1984; Markovits 1996;

Pelinka 1998)

Historical

and Social Preconditions for the Austrian Social Partnership

Austrian neo-corporatism and social partnership are not merely political or
bureaucratic institutions without underlying historical or philosophical bases. Scholarship

rarely omits the social

specific historical

and

and cultural ideals of social partnership
political

development. Talos and
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Kittel,

in

Austria as well as

its

echoing Lehmbruch and

9

others, argues that propagating

and maintaining corporatist

political institutions is

“largely dependent on historical preconditions”. (Talos and Kittel 1996;

1979) The preconditions for
the end of

World War

II

modem

Austrian neo-corporatism can be found not only

lh

century

and Muller 1992; Talos 1996; Talos and
to mitigate

if

not earlier. (Katzenstein 1984; Luther

Kittel 1996)

A number of institutional

and mediate social and economic conflicts

established the proto-foundations for the

the creation of the

at

but in important political, social, economic, and bureaucratic

developments and policies of the 19

developments

Lehmbruch

modem

in the 19

Ul

century

Austrian social partnership including

chambers system. (Katzenstein 1984; Talos 1996; Talos and

Kittel

1996; Kittel 2000) Nonetheless, cooperation and consensus between interests and the

government was quite limited

in

content and temporality until the interwar era of the

1920s and was not fully institutionalized and made permanent

until after

World War

II.

(Katzenstein 1984; Talos 1996; Talos and Kittel 1996)
In terms

of social and cultural preferences there

often ascribed to the Austrian political system and

Markovits
the

,h
1

1

its

is

a strong pattern of concordance

political culture. (Gerlich 1996;

996) But Austria’s political culture has been one of significant change from

to the

20

th

centuries as the state and society evolved from a powerful multi-

national and multi-ethnic empire into a smaller,

more homogeneous

state.

(Pelinka 1998)

Despite these changes, there have been long-term influences from Catholic doctrine, the

Lager or

pillars

of society, and the Stcmdestaat or medieval guild-state corporatist model,

upon which one could

link pre-

and postwar eras

in

Austrian society and political culture

(Diamant 1960; Luther and Muller 1992; Crepaz 1995; Markovits 1996; Talos and
1996)
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Kittel

However, the divergence from prewar

to

postwar Austrian

political culture is

quite striking. Staunch ideological divisions typified prewar Austria. There

fragmentation between the three Lager camps or
,

pillars,

was deep

of Austrian society, Catholic-

Conservatives, Socialists, and Pan-German Nationalists. (Diamant 1959, 1960; Luther

and Muller 1992; Crepaz 1995; Pelinka 1998a) This contributed

to the

weakness and

eventual failure of the First Republic that led to an authoritarian regime from 1934 to

Germany

1938, the Anschluss with Nazi

in 1938,

(Pelinka 1998a) Lager identities were usually

national Austrian identity that had

little

and the catastrophe of World War

more important

historical or cultural

(Brucktnuller 1998) Postwar Austria, because of the costs of

became
than

far

more

likely to seek

in prior eras.

the ideological

As Pulzer

camps

still

true

common

amongst the

meaning or adhesion.
its

previous divisions,

political processes

suggests, this differed from the First Republic in that while

existed, “their teeth

Austrian identity

socialist

to individuals than a

and employ consensual or cooperative

were drawn” (Pulzer 1998)

while Austria remained ideologically divided along Lager

secondary to a

II.

in the

lines, these

In essence,

eventually

became

Second Republic. This was especially

and Catholic-conservative

elites

who

sought recovery and

reconciliation. (Pelinka 1998a; Bruckmtiller 1998)

The

social partnership

would seem

to be

more prevalent

in societies

where one

might find regularized and effective subordination of individuals and associations
those

at the

to

national level, high recognition of the importance of negotiation and

compromise, and important informal or discrete
national problems. (Gerlich 1996) In societies

and distinction between

social,

economic, or

elite interactions to

common

where systematic compartmentahzation

political
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address

groups

is

strong, corporatism

and

neo-corporatism might be more

likely.

The Lager mentalities and

their

subsequent

divisions between labor, capital, and agriculture, while secondary to an Austrian identity,

nonetheless

may

positively contribute to the kind of neo-corporatist institutions and

structures found in the social partnership. In addition, these subcultures

"'closed”

stability

relatively

and highly organized and disciplined. This fragmentation and mtra -Lager
continued for decades after 1945. (Pelinka 1998a) These political cultural

and others
found

were

that

in vast

may

traits,

help explain the Austrian affinity towards corporatism, have been

reserve in studies of the Austrian polity over

many

decades. (Lehmbruch

1967; Steiner 1972; Katzenstein 1984, 1985; Pelinka and Plasser 1989; Fitzmaurice 1990;

Luther and Muller 1992; Markovits 1996; Pelinka 1998, 1998a; Bruckmuller 1998)

Hence, the Austrian system
historical preconditions

This

is

is

one

that possesses a

upon which

number of social,

political,

and

the social partnership could be predicated.

not to say that the existence or absence of particular historical, social, or

cultural characteristics will necessarily result in neo-corporatism or other regimes.

is

There

a genetic trace of neo-corporatism in almost every European state despite tremendous

variation in political cultures, development, and social characteristics. (Markovits 1996)

However,
political

as Katzenstein, Schmitter,

and economic opportunities,

corporatism

may

and others strongly suggest,
cultural

and historical

that given specific

affinities

towards neo-

certainly bear fruit. (Katzenstein 1984, 1985; Schmitter 1979)
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Austria’s social partnership, while perhaps rooted in

history, thrives as a product

of critical postwar

political,

its

political culture

and

economic, and social

developments. In other words, the actors, groups, and parties of postwar Austria

have discovered

that neo-corporatist cooperation

would

may

result in higher payoffs than

continuing patterns of conflict. (Katzenstein 1984; Luther and Muller 1992; Talos and
Kittel 1996; Pelinka 1998; Seidel 1996)

Corporatism

in the

Empires

&

First

Republic

The rudiments of the Austrian

social partnership

century. Early interest organizations began

in the

mid 19

lh

amongst employers and large

in the 19

industrial firms

century. These were mostly local and entirely voluntary, but they did

begin to slowly coalesce into larger units by the

Fuerboeck 1986) This unification of business
the ban

lh

were established

on workers' organizations was

lifted

late

nineteenth century. (Tomandl and

interests

and

in

was not without

1870 strikes ceased

catalyst. In 1867,

to

be

These reforms were primarily inspired by the new 1867 Austrian constitution

illegal.

in

which

conservatives were forced to compromise with liberals on a range of issues. (Fitzmaurice
1990; Pelinka and Plasser 1989; Katzenstein 1984) Employers and large industrial firms

had a

first

common

interest in securing

large national

government favor and limiting

forum of employers’

interests

Chambers of Commerce, which was created by
Chambers became generally recognized by both

was housed

power of labor. The

new forum,

statutory law in the 1860s.

the

The

the state and labor as the primary

representatives of industry and employers by the late 19
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in a

the

th

century The authority to

9

designate delegates to reserved seats of the Austrian Parliament enhanced their power.'

(Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986)
employers and industry

In essence, there

to organize

were numerous tangible incentives

for

and cooperate.

Early Austrian labor unions developed in similar fashion, starting out as mostly
th

voluntary and local units and merging into ever-larger ones by the end of the

century.

1

National labor unions became the dominant form of worker organization by the early 20
century but were

split

th

primarily along ideological lines. There were three major labor

umbrellas encompassing Socialist. Christian Democratic, and pan-German Nationalist

political

and economic manifestos competing

fiercely

and sometimes violently for

support in the working classes. (Diamant 1960; Katzenstein 1984;

Tomandl and

Fuerboeck 1986) This division weakened labor’s overall leverage with both the

and

state

employers.

Hence, the early

interest association

system

in Austria within the

Austrian and

Austro-Hungarian Empires was decidedly lopsided and not particularly based on
of consensus and national

solidarity. Austrian

better organized, unified, financed,

interests.

The

ideological divisions

a significant counterweight to the

and

amongst labor proved

Chambers of Commerce. The

It is

were

a significant barrier to creating

which came

in

fact that the

working

1907, further exacerbated the

industrial interests. (Katzenstein 1984;

1986; Luther and Muller 1992)

industrial interests

model

legally integrated into the state than other

class had not yet obtained suffrage rights,

gap between labor and

employers and

a

Tomandl and Fuerboeck

also clear that neither labor nor business primarily

Delegates that represented and were selected by specific functional, professional, or social groups was
increasingly

common

in the

new

constitutional parliamentary systems of 19"’ century Europe.

there are semblances of this system in the Irish Senate

where occupational, professional, and

elect delegates to the assembly.
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Even today,

social groups

viewed the policy-making process as primarily based on cooperation. This was a
which business and

oriented, winner-take-all system in

trumped

conflict-

industrial interests regularly

labor. Nonetheless, increasing labor organization

and demands were

transforming the system.

The collapse of the monarchy
the First Republic finally provided

end of World

at the

some balance between

War

of Labor and Agriculture

in all nine

the enfranchisement of the

direct

and the establishment of

and labor

capital

associations and power. While the business associations and

survived the transformation, the major alteration

I

came with

interest

Chambers of Commerce

the creation of the

Chambers

provinces of the newly federalized Austrian state and

working class with the new 1920 constitution. This allowed

and formal participation of labor and farmers

at the

Lander

level as well as

indirectly at national level through representation in the Social Democratic, nationalist

workers’, and farmers' parties in Parliament. However, there were no formally organized

chambers

for labor or agriculture at the federal level similar to the

Commerce. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986,

15;

Chambers of

Pelinka 1998) In addition, labor remained

strongly divided amongst Christian Conservative, Socialist, and Nationalist factions that

rarely exhibited a unified position

sects.

even on basic issues

common

to all three ideological

(Diamant 1960; Katzenstein 1984)

While a growing balance of power between labor and business
characteristic of the First Republic, this

commerce and

labor

saw

was

far

from a

interests

true social partnership.

was

a

Both

the institutions as merely conduits of their pursuit of political

and economic aims rather than

for true

consensus building. There was a lack of

centralized bargaining at the national or even sector level and relations between capital
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and labor were as best

hostile,

The very

First

conflict

failure

of the

between the

left

and

at

worst prone to disruption and occasional violence.

Republic was due

and

right,

in

no small

and

part to the instability

between labor and business, between Social

Democrats and Christian Democrats, and exacerbation by the Great Depression.
Nonetheless, the

first

attempts to create direct intermediation between labor and

the business in Austria also emerged. Several industrial

1919), a parity

commission 1921
(

),

commissions (held

in

1918 and

and industrial and economic conferences (held

1919 and 1930) were typical of early cooperative

efforts.

in

These were primarily ad hoc or

temporary, almost always voluntary and non-compulsory, and lacked binding resolutions.
Nonetheless,

some of the

first

semblances of coordination were developed

postwar recovery and reconstruction

efforts,

to address

wages, prices, inflation, and collective

bargaining which would become the eventual backbone of the post- World

War

II

social

partnership. (Kindley 1996)

The
with

First

Germany

in

Republic was beset by innumerable problems.

1918 and 1919 was opposed by the victorious

The remaining “stump” of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, now
was facing high unemployment, demobilized
shortages.

The economy was

agricultural territories

postwar

treaties.

Even

soldiers,

Its initial

allies

attempt to fuse

of World

War

I.

the Republic of Austria

and serious food and

fuel

also hurt by the remarkable loss of industrial and

and markets as the old empire was dismembered by the numerous
after the

economy

stabilized by the mid- 1920s, Austrian

democracy was besieged by an increasingly polarized
1960; Fitzmaurice 1990)

The Great Depression and

political scene.

its

resulting

(Diamant 1959.

economic turmoil

prov ided the catalyst for further weakening of the democratic institutions of the First
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Republic.

Much

radical parties

like in

Weimar Germany,

and leaders of the

far left

votes and support began flowing to the

and

right.

(Pelinka and Plasser 1989)

elections installed essentially a Christian Social authoritarian

immediately installed a corporatist
(Pelinka 1998,

1

1 )

By March

state,

government

based on Mussolini's

more

The 1930

that

Italian fascist

model.

1933, Chancellor Englebert Dollfuss engineered the

collapse of parliamentary democracy, “liquidated” the First Republic, and instituted a

period of “Austrofascism”. (Diamant 1960; Staudinger 1991; Fitzmaurice 1990; Pelinka

1998)

The collapse of the

First

Republic resulted in the institutionalization of a far more

authoritarian corporatist system, initially under the governments of Engelbert Dollfuss

(1933-1934) and Kurt Schuschnigg (1934-1938) With Parliament eliminated and
opposition political parties banned and their leaders imprisoned, Austria, under the

domination of the Christian Socials led by Dollfuss, was to be restructured on a pattern of
an “authoritarian Catholic state” of “medieval corporatism”, or Standestaat based
strongly on the 1891 Papal encyclicals of the

Anno of

Rerum Novarum and

the

Quadragesimo

1931. (Diamant 1959; 1960; Landauer 1983; Black 1984; Staudinger 1991;

Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Pelinka 1998; Weinzierl 1998; Katzenstein 1984) These
were supported by advocates of corporatism, including Karl Vogelsang and Ottmar

Spann who were

the Austrian intellectual vanguards for the fascist-authoritarian

ideology. (Fandauer 1983; Markovitz 1996)

1848 and more laissez
liberal

faire

order by the early 20

economics
th

The

after the

failures of liberal constitutions after

1860s further solidified distrust of the

century. (Luther and Muller 1992)
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.

Under Austrofascism,

the three

competing trade union groups were replaced with

a single trade organization under the state's domination.

15)

Hence while Austria was now

(Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986,

a functioning corporatist regime, this

was under

less

than democratic conditions. The interest associations, labor, business, farmers, and

others,

were reformed as Biinde public corporations
,

that participated directly in the

Bundeswirtschaftsrat This was merely a consultative body to legitimate and support

government policy and had no independent decision-making authority. (Talos and

Kittle

1996)

But Dollfuss and the Christian Socials were also fighting a new and growing bloc
in Austria, the National Socialists.

The Austrian Nazis,

allied with Hitler

and the German

National Socialists organized a putsch in July 1934 and assassinated Dollfuss. The putsch

was eventually put down, leaving Dr. Kurt Schuschnigg

as Chancellor

and leader of the

Vaterlandisches Front, or Fatherland Front, political organization, (Fitzmaurice 1990;

Konrad 1991

)

However, under continuing

eventually accepted the Anschluss with

Konrad 1991; Pelinka 1998) After

internal

Germany

and external pressures, the Austrians

in

March 1938. (Fitzmaurice 1990;

the Nazi invasion and Anschluss in 1938, Austria

governed under the pseudo-corporatist regime of Nazi Germany

semblance of functional corporatist organization, but was merely

that utilized

was

some

a formalized

method of

control over workers, business, farmers, and other socio-economic groups similar to the

fayade of functional corporatism used under fascist regimes such as Benito Mussolini's

Italy after

1922 or Francisco Franco’s Spain after 1939. (Fitzmaurice 1990; Segar and

Warren 1991; Luther and Muller 1992)
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9

The

failure

of the

First Republic, the authoritarian experiences

under Dollfuss and

Schuschnigg, the Anschluss, Nazi occupation, and embarrassment of wartime defeat and

postwar occupation brought the costs of social conflict, division, and economic failures
into harsh focus for the Austrian polity

failures

of the

th
1

and early 20

th

and

its

assorted socio-economic interests.

The

centuries to maintain the empire, achieve economic

growth, manage social peace, increase political

stability,

and even remain sovereign

created a mass of political, economic, and social will for change in Austria by 1945. For

the

first

takes

all

time

in history the potential for a

philosophy so important

consensus

in the First

in

Austria existed while the “winner

Republic never made a comeback

in the

Second”. (Pulzer 1998; Katzenstein 1984; Pelinka 1998; Kindley 1996) The political
necessity for the social partnership as a

way of rebuilding

the Austrian

economy and

unifying Austrian society was overwhelming. Hence, Austro-corporatism was a method
to replace class

Seidel 1996)

war with

The

rise

class cooperation. (Bischof

of the social partnership

and Pelinka 1996; Kindley 1996;

in Austria,

while a primary product of dire

postwar conditions, was nonetheless also a product of the experiences and failures of
Austrian dating well back into the previous century. (Pelinka 1998; Fitzmaurice 1990;

Famleitner and Schmidt 1982; Katzenstein 1984; Markovits 1996; Talos and Kittel 1996;
Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988)
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The

Social Partnership in the Second Republic

The Postwar Development of the

(

1940s- 1980s)

Social Partnership

While Austria's prewar and wartime experiences provided
political preconditions for the neo-corporatism, the

stabilizing the social partnership

emerged

primary

after 1945. After

and

the historical

criteria for

developing and

having negotiated and secured

a reestablishment of an independent Austrian state under the auspices of the occupation

by the United

States, Soviet

Union, France, and United Kingdom, there were

still

considerable doubts regarding the economic and political viability of Austria. (Pelinka
1998; Knight 1998) Austria learned from

years, institutionalizing pragmatic

political

First

problems

that divided

its

bitter

experience of the interwar and war

methods of addressing the economic,

and weakened the

state

from the 19

lh

social,

and

century through the

Republic. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Katzenstein 1984; Kindley 1996; Gerlich,

Grande, and Muller 1988) Nonetheless, success for the Austrian

state

was

far

from

self-

evident. (Knight 1998; Talos and Kittel 1996)

Surviving trade union leaders decided not to reestablish the three rival trade
organizations that existed prior to

the Osterreichischer

The

OGB

1

934 but instead created

a single labor organization,

Gewerkschaftsbund (OGB), or Austrian Trade Union Federation.

formed during the occupation period before the formal reestablishment of an

independent Austrian state and intended to cut across ideological and religious

(Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Kindley 1996) This was also

a decidedly

lines.

more

compromise and cooperation-oriented labor organization than had existed before
Labor leaders seemed more willing

to

compromise and bargain with business

and institutionalized patterns. Postwar Chancellor and

170

SPO

in

leader, Karl Renner,

the war.

formal

admonished labor

that “not struggle, but organization”

had become the “watchword”.

(Kindley 1996; Seidel 1996) The Chambers of Labor, which had been abolished
state-controlled corporatist institutions during the Dollfuss regime,

in the

nine provinces and, for the

federal level.

first

in lieu

of

were also resurrected

time, given juridical identity and rights at the

(Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1996; Katzenstein 1984)

Amongst employers and business

interests, the

Chambers of Business had

survived the Nazi era and continued to operate after the end of fighting in 1945. The

group was purged of National Socialists during the occupation by the Four Powers and
also

all

expanded

its

range of activities and duties to include monopolistic representation of

matters of industrial relations.

They

also

began forming a number of new voluntary

associations to represent specific business sectors or interests, the most notable being the

Vereinigung Osterreichischer Industrieller (VOI), or Association of Austrian
Industrialists.

(Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Katzenstein 1984) Importantly, employers

and industries were also more willing
era. Julius

Raab, longtime leader and

employers’ interest

“must exercise

in the

to negotiate

and compromise than

member of the

OVP and a representative

Chambers of Business expressed

self-restraint” with labor

prewar

in the

of

a “clear creed” that business

and negotiate and compromise rather than

confront them. (Pelinka 1998; Talosand Kittel 1996; Kindley 1996; Seidel 1996)

This was even more urgent given the occupied status of the Austrian state and the
garrisons of allied troops, including the Soviet.

By seeking compromise with

employers and business associations were aiming

would be supported by

to preclude radical socialist

the Soviets in their occupation zone.

Steininger 1995)
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(

labor, the

swings

Bischof, Pelinka, and

that

In agriculture

and

forestry, there

was no creation of a

national or federal interest

association to represent or unify farmers and other agrarian or timer interests.

Under

a

rather arcane element of the 1920 Constitution, the creation of a single such entity at the

was forbidden. However,

federal level

were organized

at the

to represent agricultural

provincial level.

and forestry

interests

Chambers of Agriculture
and acted

in concert to

provide de facto federal organization of agricultural interests. Later, these would be
unified in the Presidents' Conference of Austrian Agricultural

Chambers

that

would be

given similar legal and procedural rights as the Chambers of Business and Labor.

(Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Talos and
Almost immediately

Kittel 1996)

after the cessation

of hostilities and the repartition of Austria

from Germany, several wage-price and social benefit agreements were negotiated

between the four major

interests associations (the

OGB,

and the Chambers of Labor,

Business, and Agriculture) and the Austrian state with an explicit hope of encouraging
rapid postwar economic recovery. While negotiations did include both the

Federal

series

Chamber of Labor, many workers

of serious strikes

the strikes illustrated

in the fall

how

a lack

OGB

and the

did not fully support the measures leading to a

of 1950. (Talos 1996; Talos and Kittel 1996) However,

of cohesive solidarity within

interest associations

and

broader socio-economic discord could harm the entire Austrian economy. More intense

and institutionalized concert amongst

The

first

inflation crisis

interests

was

the unintended result. (Kindley 1996)

permanent institutionalization of the social partnership came

of 1947 when an informal

joint

(Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Talos and
created a framework of five price and

economic commission was agreed upon.

Kittel 1996; Heinisch

wage

pacts between
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in the

1

2000) The commission

947 and

1

95

1

,

as well as the

Currency Act of 1947,

that

was agreed upon by

all

four major interest associations.

success of the commission and navigation out of the inflation
to a proposal to turn the

commission

crisis, led the

into an official directorate

of the

The

government

state in

which the

government would participate alongside the four peak associations. While the
Constitutional High Court rejected this proposal,

institutionalize the social partnership.

it

did create further impetus to formally

(Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1996; Kindley 1996;

Heinisch 2000)
Despite the occasional strikes, lockouts, and other disputes, the ad hoc and
informal cooperation and coordination of the late 1940s and early 1950s successfully

navigated large-scale economic recovery in Austria. (Fitzmaurice 1990; Gerlich 1992;
Pulzer 1998; Kindley 1996) The “Great Strike” of 1950, organized by the

was aimed
prices.

at the social

partnership as

much

The Communist labor organizers and

attempting to undermine the

new

as

it

the

was aimed

Communist

failure

Party

(KPO) were

more revolutionary ideology.

of this general strike to encompass socialist and conservative workers and

unions, or to gain popular traction,

the left

higher wages and lower

neo-corporatist partnership between conservative

business and socialist labor which excluded them and their

The

at

Communists

and

communists

right.

The

results

and the

in labor

was

in part to strong

anti-communist rhetoric by both

were quite more conclusive

KPO

in

in that

it

ended the power of the

Austrian party politics permanently. (Pelinka 1998;

Talos and Kittel 1996; Kindley 1996)

However,

the

interest associations

economic success

that

ensued magnified differences between

over a range of budgetary, economic, social, and employment

policies. (Talos 1996)

On

issues such as inflation, international competitiveness,
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and

scare labor supplies there

interests.

was often

little

common

currency between labor and business

Here, the state and the governing coalition partners, the Osterreichische

Volkspartei (OVP), or Austrian People's Party, and the Sozialistische Partei Osterreichs

(SPO), or Socialist Party of Austria, were

critical in

providing the structure to extend the

cooperative arrangements between interest associations to the state policymaking level.

(Talos 1996;

Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Talos and

between economic

interest associations threatened not

between business and

was

a strong governmental

partnership.

While the

The growing divide

only to lead to greater conflict

labor, but also threatened to break the

between the two parties leading
there

Kittel 1996)

grand coalition partnership

to overall political instability at the federal level.

and bureaucratic

interest associations

would

Hence,

interest in institutionalizing the social

still

need

to

be the primary actors

in

achieving a permanent structure for cooperation and consensus, the state and political

parties

became strong supporters and organizers of such

efforts. (Pelinka 1998;

Talos

1996; Kindley 1996)

In 1957, the

Council of Ministers established the Paritdtische Kommission, or

Wages and

Joint (or Parity)

Commission,

was

one between Johann Boehm, President of the

a bipartisan

for

Prices.

Federal Chancellor and de facto representative of the

The

became

a

permanent

to

moderate and

fixture

partnership in Austria.

limit labor

and Julius Raab. the

initially

intended as a

and business demands the commission

and the primary vehicle

Initial

OGB,

commission

Chambers of Commerce. (Tomandl

and Fuerboeck 1996; Pelinka 1998; Kindley 1996) While
temporary instrument

effort to create the

in institutionalizing the social

opposition and dispute was quickly addressed by an

expansion of the commission’s competencies and the inclusion of more
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interest

association influence over decision-making. (Kindley 1996) But

mechanism was

The economic boom slowed by

success.

commission

the perceived necessity of the

the

to

its

greatest support

maintain macroeconomic

mid 1950s, and while informal and ad hoc

coordination had been up to the tasks of the late 1940s and early 1950s, greater

permanent institutionalization was demanded from
agriculture, business,

if the specifics

the actors involved. Elites in labor,

and government generally favored greater

suggests, there were both ideological and pragmatic

the involved players. (Kindley 1996)

all

economic

expanding and institutionalizing the neo-corporatist arrangements. This

increased the likelihood of successfully launching the Joint

from

even

institutionalization,

of the structures were to be quite fiercely debated and negotiated.

As Kindley
rationale for

all

the state and major parties as a

Commission with support

The process was

way of institutionalizing and

also strongly supported by

structuring the collective

bargaining and intermediation process under once roof. This simplified and reduced the

complexity of the system and allowed the

state a single-entry point with the social

partners.

This

to pursue.

is

not to say that the Joint

Kindley suggests that the

Commission was

tripartite

the only, or even the best policy

formula was, perhaps, a “second-best”

alternative. (Kindley 1996, 75) Nonetheless, the establishment

was

a seminal event in the

The

OVP and

early 1960s

SPO,

of the Joint Commission

development of the social partnership

saw

as well as by

in

postwar Austria.

further expansion with support by both political parties, the

all

three federal

chambers and the OGB. (Talos 1996,

1

10;

Talos and Kittel 1996) The creation of the Advisory Council on Economic and Social

Questions within the Joint Commission

in

1963 subjected a
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much wider

range of

economic policies

to critical analysis

institutions. (Katzenstein 1984;

was tasked

to

make

by the social partnership associations and

Heinisch 2000) As Alfred Klose suggested, the Council

“politics less political”

input into the process. (Pelinka 1998;

and increase both

scientific

and academic

Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1996; Fitzmaurice 1990)

This particular expansion allowed the social partners to expand their influence over
matters as diverse as transportation, the environment, education, and other policy matters.

(Heinisch 2000)

Talos argues that the Austrian social partnership developed with far more
continuity and stability than either the Dutch or

1

German models.

960s witnessed the social partnership exceeding

and creating

institutions

and structures

its

(Talos 1996,

1

original aegis in prices and

to address various aspects

10)

The

wages

of national economic

policy including labor markets, fiscal and monetary policy, and investment policies.

(Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988; Pelinka 1998)
Estimates cite that social partners regularly interacted with

at least

90 governmental

committees and over 220 advisory councils or subcommittees. (Heinisch 2000) This has
been called
issues

a “spillover”

of neo-corporatist policy into broader economic and social

beyond the scope of the

original institutions.

(Lehmbruch 1979; Katzenstein 1984)

Surviving periods of one-party rule as well as that of changing economic, social,

and

political

the Joint

and

environments of the 1970s and early 1980s, the social partnership, through

Commission and

lasting institution

its

various committees and subcommittees

a powerful

of Austrian economic and social policymaking. (Gerlich. Grande,

and Muller 1988; Fitzmaurice 1990; Gerlich 1992; Talos 1996,

1

became

1

10;

Talos and Kittel

996; Pelinka 1998, 1998a) The results were not only a stable and growing
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economy

throughout the period but also a remarkably low level of labor-business conflict. In
addition,

major

legislative acts such as the

Work

Constitution Act (regulating

codetermination and collective bargaining), the Employment Act, and Employment of
Foreigners Act were passed largely because the major inter-association conflicts had
already been resolved outside of parliament in both the federal chambers and Joint

Commission on Wages and

Prices. (Talos 1996,

engrained as one of the most

vital

1

10)

The

social partnership

became

and successful structures of the Austrian policymaking

system. (Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988)

Organizing Austrian Interests
In legal terms, interest associations are organized quite freely

and voluntarily

under very “liberal and permissive” statutes of the Austrian constitution. (Tomandl and

Fuerboeck 1986,

13; Pelinka

1998) There are a large number of unions, business

associations, non-governmental bodies, civic associations,

virtually unlimited

health, sports,

number of issue

and beyond.

In this

and clubs organized around

a

areas including economic, trade, the environment,

way, Austria does not seem unlike more

pluralistic

systems of interest representation such as those in the United States, Canada, or Australia.

But interest associations also exist

known

at a statutory level.

These statutory organizations,

as chambers, are formal intra-govemmental institutions that possess legal

monopolies over the

right

of representation and articulation of interests

the federal policymaking process.

in

key areas of

(Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1996; Markovits 1996;

Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988)

Membership
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in the

chambers

is

obligatory for

all

those

whose economic

1996;

Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Talos and

interests the

chamber was established
Kittel 1996;

(Markovits

to represent.

Crepaz 1995)

Furthermore, unlike private and voluntary associations, no qualified

member can

be excluded or expelled from their chamber. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986, 13) Hence,
the state did exercise

well as requiring

some important

some

controls over the composition of the

internal decisions to be endorsed

chamber

as

by public bureaucratic or

parliamentary oversight. In levying of dues and spending there are defined legal statutes
that place certain limits

on the chambers as well. Nonetheless, direct

state intervention in

the chambers' internal organization and proceedings had been quite rare until the 1990s.

(Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Viebrock 2004) Elections of officers and

internal

organization of committees had been primarily autonomous of the state for most of the

postwar period, though since the 1990s, the

state has

been more

likely to exert

and extend

oversight to ensure democratic and transparent standards. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986;

Talos and Kittel 1996; Viebrock 2004)
Labor, both white and blue-collar, are organized into two interest associations: the

Osterreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund (OGB), or Austrian Trade Union Federation, and
the Federal

all

Chamber of Labor. The

OGB

had historically represented more than

blue and white-collar workers in Austria providing

it

sizable leverage and

60%

power

of

to

negotiate with both the state and business. (Talos 1996, 105; Katzenstein 1984, 36;

Gerlich 1992; Heinisch 2000) Membership density was bulwarked by labor laws that
protected closed shops,

made union membership

in both the

of Labor compulsory, and applied the laws deeply into
businesses. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986) However,
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OGB

and Federal Chamber

medium and some
its

small

share of representation in the

Austrian workforce has gradually declined, and

(Pelinka 1998;

IMF 2007)

Nonetheless, the

chamber, was granted de facto status

at the

is

OGB,

now

well under

50%

of all workers.

while technically not a federal

chamber

level through

law as well as

convention. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Talos 1996; Pelinka 1998) This was due in
part to the remarkable level of centralization

most centralized trade union federations
Katzenstein 1984) Under the

OGB

of the

in the

OGB,

long considered amongst the

world. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986;

charter, the fourteen constituent unions that

make up

the federation (such as specific unions for metal workers, food industry workers,

construction workers, railroad workers) had very limited independent identities and

autonomy. (Talos and
into the

Kittel 1996)

weak

The power over dues and spending were concentrated

hands of the national federation. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986, 18) The member

unions did have important powers

in

recruitment and negotiating collective agreements,

but these must always have been approved by, and potentially vetoed by, the national

federation.

(Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Katzenstein 1984)

This differes tremenosuly from the more decentralized system

in

Germany

discussed in the next chapter. There are no unions, other than the civil service unions,
outside of the

OGB.

(Pelinka 1998) Since the 1990s, there has been a gradual

decentralization of the

OGB

and labor significantly increasing the autonomy and power

of the local works councils, member unions, and other sub-federal labor organizations.
(Viebrock 2004) Nonetheless, for most of the postwar
centralized and very powerful labor organization.
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era, the

OGB

was

a highly

There
or

is

also the official

chamber association

Bundeskammer fur Arbeiter und Angestellte

Arbeiterkammer (AK), which
the provincial level.

chamber negotiates
Kittel 1996)

is

The unions

mandatory

or as

for workers, the

it

is

usually

Chamber of Labor,

known by

The provincial chambers

shorthand

for all workers, excepting civil servants, at

for civil servants are independent of the

directly with the state.

its

OGB

and

their

(Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Talos and

are linked to the federal

chamber through

the

Austrian Chambers of Labor Conference. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986, 20) Hence the

Chamber of Labor

Federal

has a near absolute representative monopoly of Austrian blue

and white-collar workers. The Chamber of Labor
itself as the intellectual

Austria.

and

scientific

backbone of the labor and union movement

The Chamber publishes books and compiles

acts as a representative voice

of all labor voices

Fuerboeck 1986, 20) The Chamber has

Commission and must
unlike the

OGB

has tended to view

at the federal level

legal

legally be consulted

on labor

data, consults

in Austrian society.

and statutory authority

issues,

and

(Tomandl and
in the Joint

by parliament over proposed

which has been granted such

in

legislation

status through convention only.

(Tomandl

and Fuerboeck 1986; Pelinka 1998)

Combined,

the

OGB

and Chamber of Labor have

relationship.

They have developed

Commission

as well as in other areas

and often overlapping

a task-sharing arrangement both within the Joint

of labor relations and organization. Nonetheless, the

OGB

has tended to act as the “senior partner” to the

to

most of the important positions

fill

a close

in the Joint

Chamber of Labor. The

Commission and

is

OGB

tends

often dominant in

terms of propagating and defining labor interests. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986;
Katzenstein 1984) While there

is

sometimes competition between the two organizations.
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for the

most part they have been quite effective as a dyadic partnership

and representation of broad and specific labor

interests at the federal

in the articulation

policymaking

level.

(Pelinka 1998)

Business interests are organized into the Vereinigung Osterreichischer
Industrieller (VOI), or Association of Austrian Industrialists, and the Federal

of Economics, Wirtschaftskammer Osterreichs (WKO), formerly known
as the Bundeswirtschaftskammer

as

Commerce

or Employers.

(BWK),

The VOI

is

the

Chambers of Business

Chambers

until the

1990s

(or alternately

know

a purely voluntary organization of Austrian

firms and employers and has been historically dominated by Austria's largest firms and

industries.

(Heimsch 2000)

The

statutory national chamber, the Federal

Chambers of Business, includes

all

firms, approximately 300,000, as well as self-employed businesspersons with the

exception of agriculture and forestry as well as specific professions such as physicians,
lawyers, pharmacists, engineers, architects, or accountants

own

particular professional chambers.

(WKO

who

are organized into their

2007) These small professional chambers

have different and more limited roles than the major chambers, usually confined

to very

specific areas of legislation dealing with professional qualifications, standards, licensing,

and practices. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Talos 1996; Pelinka 1998) The Chambers
of Business

is

complex

in bureaucratic organization,

perhaps even unnecessarily

cumbersome. (Heimsch 2000; Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986) While amongst workers,
the voluntary

OGB dominates the compulsory Chambers of Labor,

this

has historically

been reversed amongst employers. The Chambers of Business had tended
and eclipse the voluntary business associations such as
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VOI

to

dominate

during most of the postwar

(Katzenstein 1984;

era.

also been

chamber

own

Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986) The Chamber, unlike

VOI, has

dominated by smaller and midsized firms. (Heinisch 2000) The federal
is

actually comprised of nine

legal identity. (Talos

and

chamber, are subdivided into
crafts

the

and industry,

chambers

Kittel 1996)

six sections

at the

Lander

level

each maintaining

its

These chambers, as well as the federal

based upon their area of enterprise; commerce,

transport, tourism, finance,

banking and insurance. (Tomandl and

Fuerboeck 1986; Pelinka 1998) All businesses whose activity

falls

under one of these

sections must be enrolled as a

member of the chamber and

the subordinate section.

also subdivided into

numerous groups known as

Fachgruppen which represents

section

is

the interests

of a particular branch or

field.

Flowever,

Each

at the federal level, the sections are

divided into combinations, or Fachverbaende, not groups. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck

1986)

This complex organization was adopted for historical and institutional reasons.

First,

Austrian firms had been traditionally decentralized by autonomous guild regimes.

Secondly, there was a pragmatic attempt to create a system of “checks and balances”
both the provincial and federal levels after World

the

members could be mediated and

has

made

sector,

the Federal

Nonetheless, the

II

so that the exclusive interests of

coordinated. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986) This

Chambers of Business

and group organizations than

War

is

far less

found

in the

autonomous from

OGB

its

provincial,

and Chambers of Labor.

WKO and the OGB have been the leading institutions of the social

partnership and Joint

Commission

at

since the 1940s, far exceeding the influence of the

other chambers. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1996)

182

Farmers and agricultural interests are organized into the Presidential Conference
of the Austrian Chambers of Agriculture or Prasidentenkonferenz der

Landwirtschaftskammern Osterreichs (LWK). Nearly

all

members of the Chamber of Agriculture. The chambers
level

and

much

like

commerce and

labor.

self-employed farmers are

are also organized at the

(Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Talos 1996; Talos

Kittel 1996; Pelinka 1998)

While the chambers are organized

at the

provincial level of Austria’s nine Lander,

or states or provinces, they primarily operate as national organizations

in

Lander

Vienna. The exception

is

agriculture in

more powerful position within

at the federal level

which the provincial chambers are

in a slightly

the national structure than in either labor or business.

(Talos and Kittel 1996) The chambers are legally guaranteed financial resources by

means of compulsory membership

dues. Hence, the Austrian system provided one of

known

concentrated, well-financed, and dominantly monopolistic peak associations,

Dachverbande

,

at the federal

chamber

level.

The

federal

chambers are also granted

important legal rights to control the personnel and financial resources of their

and make decisions
state in a

that are

members

binding for them. These rights are supported by the Austrian

number of ways including subsidizing of the

sanction or punishment of non-conforming members.

1984;

as

Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Talos and

interest associations

and the

(Lehmbruch 1982; Katzenstein

Kittel 1996; Gerlich,

Grande, and Muller

1988; Crepaz 1995; Viebrock 2004)

Nonetheless, the system was predicated on, and worked best with, voluntary

cooperation and coordination amongst the social partners. Nonetheless,
inaccurate to argue that there

was

little

it

would be

internal dissent or conflict within the
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peak

As Katzenstein

associations.

suggests, “the image of order and symmetry... is

somewhat

misleading” since political conflicts within the organization have been quite intense.
(Katzenstein 1984, 27) But the settling and compromise of these disputes inside the

and outside of the public realm was precisely one of the perceived

interest associations

benefits of the social partnership's policymaking process.

The peak

reached consensus within their membership, were then able

full

to

associations, having

bargain and act with the

support of their compulsory membership, thereby decreasing conformity costs and

increasing the speed and flexibility of the deliberations amongst the peak associations

the national level.

Kittel 1996;

The

at

(Lehmbruch 1979, 1982; Katzenstein 1984; Gerlich 1992; Talos and

Crepaz 1995; Heinisch 2000)

Structure and Operation of the Social Partnership

The Austrian

social partnership, despite

its

perceived centralism and

concentration has been a rather complex network of formal and informal structures

amongst the

interest associations, the federal

(Gerlich 1992)

illustrates the

The

social partnership

complexity and

tiers

was

government, bureaucracy, and parliament.

institutionalized

Prices,

it

sits

levels. Figure 2

of the Austrian social partnership as well as the typical

decision-making procedures. While the central institution

Wages and

on several

is

the Joint

Commission

for

atop a structure that interwove important interest associations.

(Talos 1996; Markovits 1996)
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The Structure

of the Joint

Commission on Wages and

Prices

General Assembly of the Commission

formal final
decision

ft

informal final
decision

Preliminary meeting of the presidents of the four interest
associations

ft

ft

Subcommittee on

Subcommittee on

Wages

Prices

prelim mary

ft

Advisory

Com-

mittee on

decision

Economic and
Social Questions

ft

Federal
of

Chamber

Presidential

Labor

Conference of the

Chambers

of

Agriculture

Austrian Trade

Federal

L'ruon Federation

Wage

Earners'

Employers'

Associations

Figure

2:

The Structure of the

Associations

Joint

Commission

The General Assembly of the Commission
and included,
Affairs,

until

Chamber

of Business

is

(Talos, 1996)

chaired by the Federal Chancellor

reforms of the 1990s, the ministers of Agriculture, Labor and Social

and Economic Affairs, and the presidents of the four peak associations;

Chambers of Labor, Business,

Agriculture, and the

OGB.

In addition at least

one or two

vice presidents of the peak associations, as well as secretary-generals and other staff

usually take part in deliberations and consultations bringing the

number

to

between 25

and 30 members. From 1966, the only voting members were the four peak association
presidents. Votes are secret and require unanimity for action, reflecting parity and the

demand

for

consensus within the social partnership. (Crepaz 1995; Talos 1996; Tomandl

and Fuerbock 1986)
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Importantly, the decisions of the Joint

Commission

are not legally binding and are

merely advisory and governmental or parliamentary adherence

to

its

findings

is strictly

voluntary. Prior to the 1980s, examples of government or parliament action in spite of, or

in

opposition to a contradictory decision by the commission were quite rare and the Joint

Commission acted with

a de facto veto. (Gerlich 1992; Talos 1996, Pelinka 1998;

Tomandl and Fuerbock 1986) This was due

to the social partners’ strong ties

and

influence within the major political parties and the legislative process. But as will be

illustrated in a later chapter, these links

government or parliament

to ignore the Joint

However, even while

may wish

have weakened and the willingness of

Commission has

steadily increased.

legally only an advisory institution in

to voluntarily cooperate, there are areas

have traditionally exerted more power than

which the government

where the economic

in others.

This

is

interest

groups

especially true in the areas

of wages, inflation, monetary policy, agricultural subsidies, and a range of social welfare
provision. (Katzenstein 1984,

most notable

security provision

is

Commission have

historically

health, old age,

the 1990s,

it

Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Pelinka 1998)
in that the association

members of the

Joint

been the primary institutions of decision-making regarding

and accident insurance. (Pelinka 1998) While

still

Social

this

has also declined since

remains an important part of the social partnership’s importance and

authority. (Viebrock 2004)

The
Prices

is

structure of the General

Assembly of the

Joint

Commission of Wages and

clearly intended to grant parity to the interests of commerce

1998, 92; Markovits 1996)

and

labor. (Pelinka

As Katzenstein notes “the system of social and economic

partnership reflects and shapes a policy process built around an equilibrium of power”.
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(Katzenstein 1982, 153) The ability for each to veto or block any decision was central to
the social partnership’s intent to inextricably tie the major interests to wider responsibility

in the

Austrian

state.

and addresses the
and

(Pelinka 1998, 1998a) This joint governance structure also reflects

typical

right in Austria

and historic

political

and between the major

1994, 1995; Heinisch 2000)

The

structure

provide roughly equal weight to both the

Labor) and the right (the

OVP, VOl, and

The strong linkages between

and economic divisions between the

political parties, the

seems

left (the

Federal

to

OVP

left

and SPO. (Crepaz

have clearly conceptualized

to

SPO, OGB, and Federal Chambers of

Chambers of Business and

Agriculture).

the parties and interest associations are explored later in this

section.

Below

the level of the General

Assembly

are the prepatory, preliminary, and

informal meetings and conferences undertaken by the chiefs, officers, and staffs of the
particular interest associations prior to General

Assembly meetings. While

vote and debate of policy takes place in the General Assembly

the formal

much of the “heavy

lifting”

of negotiation, compromise, and debate usually took place well before such

events.

Most

details, issues, concerns, obstacles

and questions were well addressed

solved before the issues were put forth in front of the Chancellor and ministers

General Assembly
Chancellor,

level.

This also included the cabinet ministers and

members of parliament, and

staff,

if

not

at the

the

the federal bureaucracy. Hence, the system,

while possessing a strong institutional structure has also been run with an extraordinary

amount of informal and
2000

unofficial legwork. (Talos 1996; Talos and Kittel 1996; Kittel

)

Much

of the fundamental and important work of the Joint Commission on Wages

187

and Prices has been accomplished through the preliminary decision-making of the

subcommittee and advisory council
interest associations

amend

level.

(Talos and Kittel 1996; Kittel 2000) Here,

and other parties research, debate, negotiate, write, re-write, and

potential policy initiatives for the General

on pending
created a

legislation in parliament

Assembly

as well as track

and parliamentary committees. This

“shadow parliamentary committee” system

and comment

parallel

that exerted influence

on

system

bills still

being considered by parliamentary committees. Hence, the influence of the Joint

Commission and

the interest associations

framework but was also

was not only within

in its ability to exert its joint

power

the specific institutional

in other areas or

government

or parliamentary interest that have not been explicitly placed under the commission's

aegis. (Talos

and

Kittel 1996; Pelinka 1998; Kittel

This does not

mean

that the

2000)

peak associations were connected or involved

every political decision or policy area. Quite to the contrary, there were
as education, justice, arts, science, and research

where peak association

many

in

areas such

interest was,

and

continues to be, minimal or inconsistent. However, given the wide range of economic,

social,

and

political interests that the

commented on

peak associations encompassed, they regularly

draft bills in such diverse issues as criminal justice,

primary and higher

education, and science. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Talos 1996; Talos and Kittel

1

996) There

is

a legal right granted to the

Austrian parliament and

its

chambers

to

comment on any

draft bill in the

committees. The underlying legal and philosophical

foundations of this practice have been central to the social partnership. Such practices
offered “the best chance of reaching compromise on controversial issues and securing

consent”. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986, 6) Given this and the strong linkages between
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the interest associations and the political parties and cabinet ministers, interest

associations have had a

number of strong formal and

legal, as well as

informal and

conventional, conduits to decidedly impact the Austrian policy and decision-making

process. Austria perhaps exhibited

its

corporatist credentials

most strongly

manner. The interest associations have been so centrally ensconced that

expanded

latitude into policy areas

arrangement

2000

that is

found

beyond

it

in this

allowed them

the intended locus of neo-corporatist

far less frequently in other neo-corporatist systems.

(Heimsch

)

The
legal

social partnership has also

systems of Austria as well as

been well entrenched in the constitutional and

in the

Austrian population's general tendencies

towards negotiation, bargaining, and compromise

Fuerboeck argue, there has been
conflicts

a

rather

1

1

by bargaining rather than by formal struggle”

)

The Austrian

amenable

of contlict. As Tomandl and

“fundamental Austrian attitude of trying to

the social partnership's widespread success

1986,

in lieu

that

settle

helped explain and underpin

and acceptance. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck

constitution and legal system had been relatively flexible and

to granting strong

leeway

to social partners to enact policy. (Gerlich,

Grande, and Muller 1988: Pelinka 1998; Marin 1987; Heimsch 2000) Hence the legal
system, as well as the general political climate of postwar Austria, tended towards
decisions, agreements, and settlements that

emerge from consensual or

proceedings. This varies from the more codified

German model, which

next chapter, highly formalizes and defines the social partnership

many ways

Austrian social partnership

Verrechtlichung that

is

seen in the

is

unique to

German

its

discussed in the

in strict legal

terms. In

lack of rigid juridification or

or Dutch models.
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arbitrated

(Mann

1987)

In addition to the formal

Commission, there also existed
ideas, opinions,

government, the
parties,

and informal structures and processes of the Joint
a constant

and often informal dialogue and exchange of

and preferences between and amongst the peak associations, the
state

and other

bureaucracy, the legislature, provincial governments, political

social,

economic, and political actors. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986;

Katzenstein 1984; Crepaz 1995; Kittel 2000)
partners and parties

was performed

Much work and

negotiation between the

in confidential, if not secret, negotiations

and

in

“gentleman’s agreements”. (Crepaz 1994, Viebrock 2004; Heimsch 2000) While the

framework of the

Joint

Commission provided

a legal

and formal locus, the social

partnership regularly occurred beyond the committees and commission structures. While

Tomandl and Fuerboeck argue

that this

provided a purely “voluntary and informal”

and

stability

of the Joint Commission would suggest a

relationship, the influence

far

formal, institutionalized, and structured relationship. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986)

more

The

voluntary, informal, continuous, predictable, and regularized patterns of political

bargaining became a structure of the Austrian policymaking and political system that

shaped the

interests, behaviors,

policy. (Katzenstein 1984)

and expectations of its actors as well as the content of

As Heinisch

suggests, the Austrian system

was

built

upon a

process that implied high-trust relations in bargaining and negotiation that required as

less explicit

and

less rigid legal

enforcement mechanism. (Heimsch 2000)

was

In other words, the social partnership of Austria

the need for strict state regulation or intervention.

German system of semi-sovereignty,
system on

Much

the Austrian state

a regular basis as the social partners
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like

rather self-sustaining without

what

will be

was not required

found

in the

to perpetuate the

were capable of doing so with

little

direct

government intervention. (Katzensetin 1987) Nonetheless,

interests usually

must also

have had some guarantee of voice, veto, or authority to deter majoritarian efforts and
continued to find value

in participating in the social

partnership

itself.

Bischof and Pelinka 1996; Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988) Hence,

view the Austrian

social partnership as

one

that

was strongly

(Katzenstein 1984;

it

is

perhaps best

to

institutionalized in both

formal-legal and informal-conventional manners.

While some suggest
voluntarily organized, this

that the interest associations are primarily informally

seems

to

omit the coercive structural power of the formal and

elements of the social partnership that

institutional

expensive or unsuccessful

in political

make

variance or non-conformity

and economic terms. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck

1986; Heimsch 2000; Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988; Crepaz 1995) In

this parallels

and

many ways,

elements of Europeanization scholarship that seeks to understand

how

European governance can condition or constraint the actions and structures of member
states

even without explicitly or formally requiring reform or change. The social

partnership did provoke significant criticism from

elitist

many

orientation of the partnership. (Katzenstein 1984;

given the more conservative and

Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986;

Fitzmaurice 1990; Markovits 1996; Pelinka 1998; Viebrock 2004)
suggests,

it

As Markovits

entailed a “clear preference for stability and discipline to the direct detriment

of democratic change and participation”. (Markovits 1996,

2004) Nonetheless, strong and lasting public and
ideals of social partnership reinforced

elite

18;

Crepaz 1995; Viebrock

support for the institutions and

and empowered the neo-corporatist structures and

processes of the social partnership in Austria. (Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988; Gerlich
1989; Pelinka 1998; Markowits 1996)
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Linking Social Partners and Political Parties

The concert of interests of the

federal

OGB

chambers and

was reinforced by

a

very close relationship between the peak associations and Austrian political parties. The

Second Republic was long dominated by two major

political parties: the Osterreichische

Volkspartei (OVP), or Austrian People's Party, and the Sozialdemokratische Partei

Osterreichs (SPO), or Social Democratic Party of Austria.

4

Both parties have had

extensive institutional links to the large economic interest associations. This

was

highlighted by the fact that individuals often concurrently hold positions in both. In 1973,

5

1

.4% of the deputies

to the Austrian Parliament

were also representatives of interest

associations. (Talos 1996, 108; Katzenstein 1984; Gerlich, Grande,

interest associations

and Muller 1988) The

had historically possessed plurality factions within the major

parties’

congresses, organizations, membership, and leadership.

The

links fell in line with the typical

postwar

SPO, OGB, and Federal Chamber of Labor strongly
traditionally

found allegiance with the

1990; Crepaz 1994) In agriculture, the

VOI and

left-right political

allied,

the Business

OVP absorbed

large

Agrarian League, or Landbund (LB), following World
allied with the

while the

War

Chambers of Agriculture. (Muller 1996) The

spectrum with the

OVP

had

Chamber. (Fitzmaurice

numbers of fanners from
II

the

and had been traditionally

OVP

itself

has been

internally organized

around functional leagues, or Biinde including the Osterreichischer

Bauernbund { OBB),

or Austrian Fanners' League, the Osterreichischer Wirtschaftsbund

(OWB),

or Asutrian Business League, and the Osterreichischer Arbeiter-

Angestelltenbund
operate at
4

,

all

(

OAAB),

or Austria Workers’ and Employees’ League. These leagues

levels of the party (local. Lander, federal)

The SPO was known

und

and were the primary institutions

as the Socialist Party of Austria, Sozialistische Partei Osterreichs , until 1991
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for recruiting

and mobilizing specific functional party members. The Farmers’ and

Business’ Leagues were amongst the strongest actors within the

decision-making process during
internal structure,

it

much of the postwar

era.

OVP

While the

structure

SPO

had

and

a similar

operated quite differently and has been far more centralized in terms

of authority and organization. (Muller 1996; Pelinka 1998)

The

close ties between the interest associations and the parties often moderated

the political parties' behavior vis-a-vis one another.

associations, the parties

became extensions of the

As

reflections of the

interests'

major

commitments

interest

to greater

consensus-driven and cooperative policymaking. That Austria has endured long periods

of grand coalition government (see table below) between the

SPO

and

OVP since

1945,

with the historic exclusion of the FPO, illustrated the prominence the symbols of

consensus found

in

both the social partnership and peak associations that encompassed a

large share of the parties’ memberships. (Gerlich 1992; Gerlich, Grande,

and Muller

1988; Fitzmaurice 1996; Pelinka 1998; Luther 1998; Markovits 1996; Floward 2000)

The party system

itself

developed

that coincided strongly with the lager

society. (Luther

and

in a structured

interest association cleavages

and Muller 1992; Crepaz 1994) The

political parties in the post-Nazi era, the

Osterreiches (KPO), or Austrian
Pelinka 1998) The

KPO

and limited manner

SPO,

Communist

the

after

of Austrian

allies initially legitimized

OVP, and

the

1945

only three

Kommunistische Partei

Party. (Weinzierl 1998; Luther 1998;

quickly lost legitimacy and support due to the Soviet occupation

of Eastern Austria and ceased

to be a functioning

In 1949, the allies established the

and important party by the early 1950s.

Verband dev Unabhdngigen (VdU), or League of

Independents, to represent former Nazis and nationalists. The allies viewed the creation
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of such a party, while seemingly
to include these

well as a

name

to

way

FPO

to

antithetical to

postwar de-Nazification, as a necessity so

remaining in the democratic process and marginalize their demands as

keep tabs on their members. (Pelinka 1998) The

in 1956. In essence,

VdU would

change

its

by 1949, the three major Lager Catholic,

Conservatives, Socialists, and Nationalists, had been formally institutionalized into

representative political parties.

The linkages and agreements between

major

SPO

the

interest associations, the

with

OGB

the parties and the

and the Chambers of Labor, the

VOI, Chambers of Commerce, and fanner’s Landbund (LB) helped create

wound

political universe. (Luther

OVP

with

a tightly

and Muller 1992; Pulzer 1995; Pelinka 1998;

Katzenstein 1984, 1985; Crepaz 1994)

Years

Chancellor

Maioritv Partv/Coalition

1945-1947

Renner

Klaus

SPO-OVP-KPO
OVP-SPO-KPO
OVP-SPO
OVP-SPO
OVP-SPO
OVP-SPO

Klaus

OVP

Kriesky

SPO
SPO-FPO
SPO-FPO
SPO-OVP
SPO-OVP
OVP-FPO
SPO-OVP

1945-1947

Figl

1947-1953

Figl

1953-1961

Raab
Gorbach

1961-1964

1964-1966
1966-1970
1970-1983
1983-1986
1987-1987
1987-1997
1997-2000
2000-2007

Sinowatz
Vranitzky
Vranitzky

Klima
Schtissel

Gusenbauer

2007-Present

Table

The SPO and

OVP

1947 to 1983, from 1987

2;

Governments

in Austria since

1945

ruled either together in grand coalition or by themselves from

to

2000, and once again from January 2007 (see table above).

They established an extraordinary model of sharing power known
consociationalism

in

which,

much

like neo-corporatism, the
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major

as proporz, a

parties

fonn of

would seek and

institutionalize

consensus and consultation

in

decision- and policymaking.

(Lehmbruch

1974, 1979, 1979a; Marin 1987; Lane and Errson 1997; Luther and Muller 1992; Rose

2000; Saltiel 2000) Lijphart identifies four essential characteristics of consociational

democracy: grand coalition, mutual veto or concurrent majority
political representation,

and highly autonomous

political associations. (Lijphart 1975,

1984, 1997) Austria's proporz system between the

interest associations, functioned

along these

rule, proportionality in

lines.

SPO

and OVP, and

their affiliated

Proporz existed concurrently and

in

adjunct to the social partnership creating a nexus of party-interest-govemment

relationships.

(Lehmbruch 1974, 1982; Luther and Muller 1992; Pulzer 1995; Pelinka

1998, 1998a; Luther 1998) This

was

a tightly linked system comprising both neo-

corporatism and consociationalism built around an institutionalized and structured system

of codetermined and consensual policy and decision-making. As Marin suggests, not only

was Austria

the paradigmatic case of neo-corporatism, but

it

was

also the “crow n jewel”

of consociationalism and proporz party systems. (1987)

The
parties

stability

of the social partnership was commensurate with

stability in political

and parliamentary elections. Elections seldom produced major or radical changes

in the respective strengths

Katzenstein 1984)

of the major political parties. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986;

As Katzenstein

suggested, political stability

social partnership, guaranteeing a predictable

was

and reliable arena

a requirement

for consensual decision-

making. (Katzenstein 1984) But the social partnership, as Austria demonstrated,
provide further reinforcement of such

stability.

reinforcement between the social partnership,
the major parties. In the Austrian case,

it

may

also

There was an almost cyclical pattern of

its

interest associations,

seems clear
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of the

that the

and the proporz of

growth and development of

the social partnership

went hand

in

hand with the development of a stable two-party

system predicated upon a consociational proporz relationship between the

and the exclusion of the

FPO

and other smaller

parties. (Gerlich,

Grande, and Muller

1988; Luther and Muller 1992; Gerlich 1992; Pulzer 1995; Saltiel 2000;

Crepaz 1994, 1995) The

lines quickly

became nearly impossible
institutions

OVP and SPO

Howard 2001;

became so entangled and overlapping

to discern the divisions

of the social partnership, the

between the

it

interest associations, the

political parties, parliament,

During periods of one-party government,

that

OVP majority

and government.

from 1966-1970 and

SPO

majority from 1970-1983, the system could not rely upon proporz between political

parties to balance the system. In such periods, the social partnership regularly played the

critical

balancing role between the interests of the

of proposed codetermination laws
this section. (Pelinka 1998,

between

social partnership

parties

1973

is

and

right. (Pelinka

one such example and

is

1998) The case

discussed later in

1998a)

Talos and others argue that
structure

in

left

and the

this

concentrated and centralized organizational

interest associations

was

a necessary prerequisite for the

and neo-corporatism. Only through concentration and centralization

were the heterogeneous

interests forced to integrate

conflicts by encouraging,

and diffuse intra-organizational

and sometimes forcing cooperation between the

interest

associations, parties, and government. (Talos 1996; Katzenstein 1984, 1985)

others suggest that this

was

quite antithetical to

policymaking marketplace was “rigged” by the

democracy and
elites
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that the electoral

of the parties,

government. (Rose 2000; Crepaz 1994, 1995; Viebrock 2004)

However,

interests,

and

and

With

state

sponsorship and monopolistic legitimacy, the peak associations were

able to minimize defection and maintain the cohesion and loyalty of their membership.

The linkages

to political parties facilitated replication

of the structures and processes of

the social partnership into the representation and legislation arenas of political parties and

parliament. This also simultaneously provided an additional political arena in which

compromise and negotiation could occur. This

further entrenched

interest associations at the federal, as well as state

and

and empowered the

local, levels in the Austrian

political system.

The Austrian system
social partnership with so

much

number of centralized peak
Austrian

parties.

certainly ranked as

one of the most concentrated varieties of

authority placed in the hands of a relatively small

associations, externally support and legitimized by the

with tight membership and political linkages to the two dominant political

state,

(Lehmbruch 1982; Gerlich 1992; Luther and Muller 1992; Pulzer 1995; Talos

1996; Fitzmaurice 1990, 1996; Pelinka 1989; Crepaz 1995)

state

and party

state

were

in

The Austrian

complementary synchronization

for

neo-corporatist

much of the Second

Republic. (Lehmbruch 1982; Pelinka 1998, 1999; Markovits 1996) Whether this was

antithetical to

Social

democracy and efficiency

Democracy

&

will be discussed in latter sections.

the Social Partnership

Katzenstein utilized the term "social corporatism” to describe and categorize
Austrian social partnership from other more “liberal” or mixed systems of neocorporatism. (Katzenstein 1984, 1985; Markovits 1996) This

more

interventionist and protectionist role of the state in the
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was primarily based on

economy through

a

total or

partial

ownership of industries and a more extensive welfare

state.

The Austrian

state

had. with the passages of the Nationalization Acts of 1946 and 1947, held and increased

ownership over a large number of enterprises for much of the postwar period. These
included industries that were often publicly-owned in other states, such

utilities

and

public transportation, but also included an extensive range of other sectors including

communications,

steel, coal,

banking,

salt,

tobacco, and insurance. (Seidel 1982; Talos

1996; Katzenstein 1984, 1985; Markovits 1996) Historically, approximately

total

working population and approximately

25%

20%

of the

of industrial production had been

in

public-sector industries and services. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Fitzmaurice 1990)

These firms were managed through the state-organized Austrian
Administration
the

Company (OIAG) which,

at its

Industrial

peak, accounted for

at least

one-third of

GNP. (Lens 1985)
While public ownership of communications and heavy

most

visible signs

of the strongly interventionist Austrian

commercial banking was amongst the most

critical areas.

Austrian banks gave the state vast leverage, if not

fiat

sector manufacturing, consumer, and sendee firms.

industry,

state, state

were among the

ownership of

The holdings of the major

ownership, over

many

private-

(Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986;

Katzenstein 1984; Markovits 1996) The large public sector provided a framework for
fusing and simplifying the relationship between the state and national economic interests.

It

also provided leverage to the Social

Democrats and

labor, through the state control

and

regulation, over major industries, both public and private. (Katzenstein 1984; Talos 1996;

Marchant 2001 This was especially
)

full-employment policy for

many

true in

employment

decades. (Lens 1985)
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in

which Austria maintained

a

In

exchange

commercial

for this high level

interests

of state regulation and control, industrial and

were provided guarantees included insulation from work stoppages,

a say in the costs of their contributions to the provision

of the welfare, and high levels of

subsidy and other protectionism to safeguard Austrian firms competitiveness. This
protectionism found

partially

due

in Austria,

more than many other neo-corporatist systems, was

to the state’s very large national sector but also

due

to private industry's

domestic orientation and demand for heavy subsidy. Hence, voices for free trade were not
particularly strong even

among

the business elite until the late 1970s and 1980s.

(Katzenstein 1984;Talos 1996)

In addition, the central

institutions

cites a

in the

that

state, or

and

The

OGB

itself

was

a

major shareholder

and

policies. (Katzenstein 1984) Private capital in Austria

It

was

was

quite

weak and

also often oriented towards labor, the

publicly-owned industries. Private capital became increasingly rare by the 1960s

some cases hardly

(BAWAG)

private at

was established

in

all.

The Bank

fur Arbeit

owned by

the

OGB

was purchased

in

AG

It

would eventually become

fully

during the 1960s.

The bank was closed from 1934-1947.

involved bad loans

und Wirtshaft

1922 under the name Arbeiterbank, or Workers' Bank, by

the Austrian state to provide credit the lower classes.

5

state

Austrian Nationalbank providing labor deep penetration into the Austrian monetary

strongly regulated from 1945 until the 1990s.

in

by the

ranked the independence of Austria’s Central Bank as

the lowest in the world. (Lijphart 1999)

institutions

and

political tool

of the social partnership to achieve desired economic or social goals. Lijphart

number of indexes

amongst

bank was used as a

BAWAG

is

most notable

for

its ties

to the

US

excess of 425million Euros necessitating a government bail out

2006 by Cerberus Capital Management, the same firm
Chrysler from Daimler in 2007
in
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that

firm Refco which

in

2005. The bank

began the purchase of

The welfare
“liberal’'

state

has also been more extensive in Austria than other cases of

neo-corporatism such as Switzerland, Germany, or the Netherlands. Austria’s

preference of equality over efficiency resulted in a more “social” neo-corporatist.
(Katzenstein 1984; Markovits 1996; Marchant 2001) Public expenditures were high as
the state provided an exhaustive “cradle to grave” security blanket through high levels of

public intervention and social provision.

norm amongst

substantially surpassed the

significant budget deficits

By

the 1970s Austria's public spending

other

OECD

states.

By

the 1970s this

meant

which were financed through surplus revenues saved from the

previous decades of growth, as well as through short and medium-term borrowing. This
large social welfare system

economy and

its

a

generous built-in cushion or stabilizer for the Austrian

workers but with potentially long-term

considerably through the

status

was

late

costs. Public debt rose

1970s and into the 1980s and impacted Austria's credit

by the 1990s. (Katzenstein 1984; Pelinka 1998) This was often cited as one of the

fundamental weaknesses of the Austro-corporatist political economy of the postwar era

and a contributor

to Austria’s overall

economic

decline.

Solidarity and Social Partnership

Solidarity to the social partnership has been a critical factor in the support and

survival of the Austrian social partnership.

As Katzenstein

notes, “social corporatism in

Austria mobilizes and maintains a strong political consensus around a strategy of national
adaptation to and a public compensation for economic change”. (Katzenstein 1984)

Postwar Austrian social partnership differed significantly from interwar and 19

lh

centuries models of corporatism precisely because major interests abandoned their most
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conflict-oriented and incompatible goals within a highly democratic framework.

postwar period saw a remarkable reconfiguration and limitation on

demands. The

OGB abandoned many of its

interest association

most radical demands and

developed a much more cooperative and consensual perspective

improve the conditions of workers but also recognized
and economic development, and the economy as

that

strategies

and

sought not only to

their responsibility

a whole. (Gerlich,

The

towards social

Grande, and Muller

1988; Talos 1996; Kindley 1996; Seidel 1996; Kittel 2000)

Business also moderated their demands and accepted that while they had

a

duty to

represent their specific commercial interests that they also had duties in “maintaining a

responsible attitude towards the whole

interests

economy” which

of individual economic groups

to

often required “immediate

be subordinated to general economic goals”.

The Chamber of Business must look beyond

its

short-term members' interests and

“attempt to balance interests... for the sake of the whole economy”. (Talos 1996, 107;
Seidel 1996; Kittel 2000) Katzenstein labels this “an ideology of social partnership

expressed

at

the national level”. (1984, 27)

defend their vested interests

at all costs,

Hence

interest associations are not tasked to

but explicitly sought, in the postwar

environment, more accommodative or cooperative strategies and goals for the betterment

of state and society.
This did not, nor does

it

mean

interest associations in the federal

that conflict

and dissent ended.

chambers often struggled

to find

On

the contrary,

ground upon which

compromise. Former Chancellor Bruno Knesky once characterized the

social partnership

as “a loveless marriage that works”. (Katzenstein 1984. 26) Nonetheless, the overall

results

of the Austrian model were characterized by widespread consensus, especially
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to

among

elites,

on a number of fundamental social and economic objectives including

economic growth, wages,

and international competitiveness. (Talos

stable currencies,

1996; Kindley 1996) In such a system, conflicts were limited by being "framed within

vaguely held, but firmly shared notions of the public good”. (Katzenstein 1984, 27;

Kindley 1996) The environment of consensus and
success

its

subsequent economic and political

postwar era engendered further public and

in the

support for the system.

elite

(Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988)

A

poll

of federal chamber members

in

1990 found

that

more than half preferred

to

have economic and social decisions determined through the state-business-labor
association negotiation. Only

3%

supported extreme and active dissent practices such as

strikes or lockouts. (Talos 1996, 107)

rare

and usually a

more preferable
economic, and

last resort.

Hence

in the Austrian

While

strikes

and lockouts do occur, they are quite

“class struggle at the negotiating table” has been far

system than conflict-oriented strategies

political divisions. (Pelinka 1998;

to address social,

Kindley 1996; Gerlich, Grande, and

Muller 1988)

The 1970s saw
interest associations

issues.

Growing

the

emergence of greater and greater divergence between

the

and even within the associations themselves on a number of policy

inflation, associated primarily with spikes in

energy and

oil prices,

decreasing industrial competitiveness, higher unemployment, and revenue shortfalls

strained the social partnership.

due

to lack

A number of proposed

of consensus while others were

entirely bypassing the federal

ability for all the

major

initiated

chambers and the

interests to negotiate or
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economic reforms were quashed

on the floor of parliament

Joint

itself,

Commission. This limited the

maneuver towards consensus.

A

prime

example was

the increased corporate tax burden passed in 1977 despite

heavy business

disapproval. (Seidel 1996)

However, the

social partnership

was

still

effective in a

number of areas through

the 1970s and 1980s including the regulation of agricultural commodities, the Sickness

Benefits Act of 1977, and the

1986. (Talos 1996, 111)

Amendment

Even with

the

to the

Works

more right-wing

Constitution Bargaining Act of

Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs

(FPO), or Freedom Party of Austria, becoming a governing coalition partner from 1983
until 1986, the stability

of the social partnership between the government and

associations remained mostly unchanged. (Talos 1996)

A

1987

poll

Austrians were proud of the social partnership. (Bruckmuller 1996)

that,

when asked

would opt

to

interest

found that

A

63%

of

1981 poll indicated

choose between the social partnership and parliament, a majority

for the former. (Pelinka 1998a)

An OECD

assessment from the same year

noted, “Austrians are in fundamental agreement about the need to settle conflicts and

wield power in a

1

3;

spirit

of moderation and cooperation”. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986,

Kindley 1996)

Results of Social Partnership

(

1940s- 1980s)

The postwar Austrian economy achieved very high
measures by the early 1980s. There
affluent

European

“outperformed

its

states, in

is

levels of success in almost

significant evidence that even

all

amongst other

terms of macroeconomic performance, Austria

neighbors and trading partners by substantial margins”. (Arndt 1982;

Katzenstein 1984) Austria ranked, and continues to rank, amongst the wealthiest
countries of the world in terms of per capita

GDP,
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currency stability

(until

adopting the

Euro

2000), low unemployment, social welfare provision, and environmental quality.

in

(Lauber 1996; Katzenstein 1984; Pelinka 1998) Austria also developed a highly stable
political

system that had reached a very comfortable level of proporz between the major

and

parties

interests.

Austrian politics had

become

predictable and perhaps even a

little

boring due to the high levels of concordance. (Kramer 1996; Pelinka 1998) While only
part

of this can be accredited

social partnership, in both

to the social partnership, the continuity

economic and

markedly increased the economic and

and

stability

of the

political terms, contributed to conditions that

political gains

of the Austrian

state.

(Lauber 1992,

1996; Katzenstein 1984; Arndt 1982; Pelinka 1998; Katzenstein 1984, 1985; Gerlich,

Grande, and Muller 1988)
Economically, growth in Austria had been amongst the highest

unemployment and

inflation

were amongst the lowest. By managing

in the

world while

to spread

wage and

benefit increases over long periods of time, the threats of inflation and international

competitiveness were minimized. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Lauber 1992, 1996)
This

in

especially true in light of Austria's “small state” status and the difficulties

is

it

faced

surviving and competing in the postwar economic and political environment.

(Katzenstein 1984, 1985; Lauber 1992, 1996) Overall, Austria became a prosperous and

advanced
that the

industrial state

and the social partnership surely played a

two necessary preconditions

growth and

stability

for this

role.

Lauber argues

Keynesian period of high Austrian economic

(sometimes known as Austro-Keynesiamsm) were

a large public

sector and the close cooperation of major interest groups, or the social partnership.

(Lauber 1992, 1992a; 1996; Seidel 1982; Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988; Markowits
1996)

Many of the most

important commitments
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made by

the Austrian state during this

period could not have been accomplished without the social partnership. These include

the

commitment

to a hard currency

and anti-inflationary policies and de-politicization of

prices and incomes policy. (Lauber 1992a, 1996; Talos 1996,

1996) The incremental and gradual increases

demands allowed Austria
postwar period

to

manage low

until the late 1970s.

in

14;

1

Arndt 1982; Seidel

wages, pensions, and other labor

inflation

and high economic growth

in the

(Arndt 1982; Katzenstein 1984; Tomandl and

Fuerboeck 1986)

The Austrian

social partnership

interest association conflicts,

legislation,

and contributing

was

also quite successful in mitigating inter-

manufacturing consent for consensually supported
to

economic growth and

political stability.

Fuerboeck posit “the social partnership has brought internal
virtually

vii)

coalition

between the

OVP and

incredibly low rate of labor unrest solidifies this point.

under the

interests

and

stability in party politics

complete freedom from strikes and lockouts”. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986,

The long periods of grand

rule,

Tomandl and

OVP

from

1

966- 970 and under the
1

were checked from pursuing radical policy

SPO,

as well as the

Even during periods of one-party

SPO

from

shifts

1

970- 983, parties and

by the

1

institutions

and

structures of consensual decision-making. (Katzenstein 1984, 1985; Fitzmaurice 1990;

Talos 1996)

A

good example was

the 1973

Labor Relations Act

that

would have

introduced rules of codetermination not unlike that of Germany after 1966. The

SPO

had

a parliamentary majority and could have passed the act in spite of a veto in the Joint

Chambers of Commerce and vehement

Commission by

the

parliament The

OGB

law that established a

and

SPO compromised

much weaker

OVP

opposition in

with the employers and

OVP and passed a

version of codetermination than labor preferred.
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(Aztmuller 1984; Pelinka 1998a) In addition,

strikes, lockouts,

and other economic

disruptions were held almost completely in check. Labor conflict

the world, averaging only

two

was nearly

the lowest in

days of work due to strikes for every thousand

lost

1

workers.' (Talos 1996,

Of course

1

15;

Lauber 1996, 128; Fitzmaurice 1990, 148)

the social partnership

of the Austrian postwar economy,

it

was

not responsible for every major achievement

was more

number of key policy

influential in a

areas

but less so in others. Nonetheless, as Talos argues, the Austrian social partnership's

primacy

in three policy areas is clear.

These included prices and wages, currency and

and social welfare and labor markets. (Talos 1996) As noted, the core of

inflation,

Austrian neo-corporatism had been the Joint Commission on

should of

little

Wages and

Hence

Prices.

it

surprise that this has been one of the most notable areas of concerted and

consensual policymaking. But even here the results were generally been mixed. While the
Joint

Commission was extensively

powerful

in

influential

over wages,

it

was

historically less

regulating prices, especially since the 1970s. Since the 1970s

more

have become exempt from the commission’s control While the commission,

once regulated approximately

consumer
and

20%

(retail) prices,

70%

by the

prices

at its

of manufacturer (wholesale) prices and nearly

late

1970s that had dropped to

less than

50%

peak,

60%

of wholesale

of consumer prices. (Arndt 1982; Talos 1996) Further, price policy became

less salient

due

to

low

trade partners, such as

inflation

and fixed exchange rates between Austria and

Germany, through

its

far

major

the late 1970s and 1980s. (Talos 1996;

Katzenstein 1984)

6

This was amongst the lowest

United States, 191

in

in the

world, well ahead of

Sweden, and 719

in

Greece.
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1

1

in

of

Japan, 35 in West Germany, 162 in the

In areas

of wages, the Joint Commission’s important Subcommittee on Wages

exerted strong influence by approving collective bargaining of wages in different sectors.

The subcommittee, with
filter that

representatives of all of the four interest associations, created a

had effectively subjected the wage demands of unions

to preliminary

examination of both extent and timing increasing the chances of orchestrating a new

wage

policy that would be a product of the social partnership solidarity and beneficial to

the national

economy

as a whole. (Lauber 1996; Katzenstein 1984; Haberler 1982)

wage demands of specific
that

was

labor unions

would automatically be subject

likely to consider the broader national

inflation,

commission

economic impacts of wage demands upon

unemployment, and international competitiveness.

The consequences of the system included
peak associations
organizations.

that

to the

Hence

It

at the federal level at the

also provided a

more

a strengthening of the leadership of the

expense of the lower levels of the labor

stable business climate in terms of

wages and

costs

tended towards gradual or incremental increase. This stability and insulation against

radically increasing business costs increased

over the costs of new hiring.

It

employment by minimizing business

also helped check inflation by keeping

wage

fears

increases

small and incremental. (Seidel 1982, 1996; Katzenstein 1984) Austrian boasted one of the
smallest inflation rates in the world between 1953 and 1981.

In

macroeconomic

policy, the results

or policy area. Cooperation

commodity markets,

state

7

Austria ranked

were also mixed depending upon the issue

was most common and successful

in areas

of agricultural

subsidy of exports, and tax credit policy Most notable was the

consensus on a policy of “hard currency”

German Mark.

(Seidel 1982)

.

that

pegged the Austrian Schilling

to the

(Katzenstein 1984; Arndt 1982; Seidel 1996; Heimsch 2000) This

fifth

behind Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, and the United States
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in this

period

stabilized trade with

As Talos

Germany, Austria's

and kept inflation low.

notes, this illustrates one important aspect of the social partnership,

on a continuous

The Austrian

basis.

economic emergencies
coordination

among

The system was

wage

largest trading partner,

it

was

social partnership

a consistent

was not used

for just crises or

and regularized pattern of consensus and

also typified by “big bargains" or “package deals" in

by the

OGB, Chambers

of Labor, and

which income and

SPO would

be negotiated

against revenue, hard currency, or competitiveness policies supported by the

Chambers of Business, and OVP. The
of the system

The

salience

the interest associations and state. (Talos 1996; Katzenstein 1984)

policies supported

the intent

its

third area

VOI, the

results usually struck a successful balance, as

in the first place.

was

(Talos 1996; Katzenstein 1984, 1985)

of extensive social partnership influence was

welfare state and labor market policies. While

in the

area of the

many of these agreements were

the

products of fierce conflict over labor market protections, expansion of social security,
pensions, retirement, and healthcare, they were primarily achieved through the structures

and institutions of the social partnership

making by

and decision-

the interest associations. (Katzenstein 1984, 1985; Talos 1996; Seidel 1996)

The most notable

features of the Austrian social partnership that distinguished

from other neo-corporatist systems was
both the

that required consensual policy

economy and

in

in its

it

high level of direct state intervention in

the welfare state. Hence, Austria's social partnership

labeled as a social variant of neo-corporatism versus

more

was

liberal versions that existed in

Switzerland. Germany, or the Netherlands. (Katzenstein 1984, 1985) The Austrian social
partnership, according the Katzenstein,

prominence was “secured through

was centered on

political penetration
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labor and trade unions. Their

of key institutions

in

Austrian

society; nationalized industries, banks, media, the

SPO.

the Nationalbank,

codetermination, as well as Parliament”. (Katzenstein 1984, 37) But labor had also
penetrated the political parties of the right as both the

OVP and FPO both

had sizable

union and labor presences that could not be entirely ignored. (Katzenstein 1984; Pelinka
1998)

The development of an expansive and generous welfare
characteristics of the Austrian social partnership

Austrian

economy boomed

demanded by Austrian
in

in the

labor.

state

was due

to several

and economic development. As the

1950s and 1960s, increasing social benefits were

While the

social partnership did spread these over time

and

incremental fashion, by the 1970s the benefits were amongst the highest and most

generous

in the

OECD.

(Lens 1985; Katzenstein 1984) This was

in part

due

to generally

high levels of economic growth but also by the beginning of thirteen years of
uninterrupted

SPO

majority government from 1970 to 1983. The party was strongly

linked to and dependent upon the

OGB

and labor and increased counter-cyclical

spending, increased social outlays, and enhanced worker benefits despite declining

economic growth. (Katzenstein 1984, 1985; Gerlich. Grande, and Muller 1988; Seidel
1996)

By

the 1980s,

all

Austrian workers were entitled to free medical care, relatively

high pension payments, higher than average family allowances, and a generous

unemployment package of up
and up

to as

many

as five,

to four-fifths

at least

one year,

from the time of termination. (Lens 1985)

The Austrian system did generate
deficits. First the

of the previous salary for

a significant

number of detractors and

system was a closed or locked system

that

significant additions, reforms, or reappraisals since the early
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potential

had not undergone any

1

960s.

The peak

9

associations and their leadership served as guardians and gatekeepers of a system that had

some

its initial

many argued

foundations set in the

that the

20

th

many

and early 20

lh

centuries. In the Austrian case,

system reproduced and magnified a number of preexisting

inequalities such as those based

For

th
1

on gender, region, and

class. (Talos 1996; Pelinka

the social partnership represented the schisms and issues of the 19

centuries and

was ill-equipped

to deal

with

much

else.

The

th

the Austrian policymaking process an exclusive club of anachronism.

features

made

the social partnership successful in the 1950s

become millstones around
The system was

also dominated by small

interest antithetical to rank

levels

While these

the neck of Austria in the future. (Crepaz 1994, 1995)

numbers of elites from

connections between the peak associations and parties

The

was based,

and 1960s, they would

associations and dominant political parties. (Crepaz 1994, 1995;

of

and early

class struggle, social

questions, and traditional left-right division upon which the social partnership

made

1998)

and

file

may have

members of either

the

peak

Howard 2000) The
led to serious conflicts

party or the peak associations.

of formal and informal cooperation and coordination required close working

relationships between the top tiers of the state, interest associations, and political parties

and helped create an exclusive and often secretive iron triangle of political and
policymaking power. (Crepaz 1995; Viebrock 2004) This has been accused of creating a
system that operated on the principles of secrecy and groupthink and rarely envisaged

non-conforming solutions

to Austrian problems.

(Unger 1999) The close relationships,

while predicated upon larger national goals and advantages, have been accused of being
both far too exclusive and lacking in both transparency and accountability. The system

was

also said to maintain far too

many democratic and
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legitimacy deficits, including

informality, nepotism, elitism, and secrecy, to properly function in a

modem, democratic

system. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Crepaz 1995; Viebrock 2004)
the undemocratic nature of obligatory

who

insulation for top officials

membership

Many

that also creates privilege

are then not easily held accountable

by

their

also point to

and

members.

(Crepaz 1994, 1995; Rose 2000; Pelinka 1998)

Another significant

deficit

of the system

may have been

the creation of a

comparatively weaker Austrian business sector. Major industries and banks were
nationalized and the remaining private capital and industry

was

essentially small or mid-

sized firms that were not particularly European or global in scale. Unlike neighboring

Switzerland and

its

liberal corporatist

model, or even Germany where nationalization was

highly limited and large firms saw the global

emerged from

economy

the 1970s as global underperformers

European or international

and

as a primary target, Austrian firms

less

prepared for competition on

scales. (Pelinka 1998; Seidel 1996; Gerlich,

Grande, and

Muller 1988; Katzenstein 1984)

Many

also criticized the social partnership

and the policymaking process

for

its

diminishment of Austrian federalism and the general weakness of the Lander. The
division of powers between the central state and Austria's nine provinces or Lander had

been decidedly lopsided

for

most of the Second Republic. (Pelinka 1999)

Constitutionally, while labor relations and social insurance

powers of the
policies

fall

within the enumerated

central government, public assistance, healthcare,

were reserved

to the provinces. This has

caused occasional problems

policymaking within the Joint Commission and parliament
bargains or compromises

made within

and other welfare

in

the social partnership

in

Vienna since many of the

would have nominally

required Lander governments’ approval. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986) However, the

federal

government and peak associations had been successful

of the provinces and provincial chambers
postwar

era.

in a

in gaining subordination

dominant number of cases during the

(Pelinka 1998, 1999; Pelinka and Bischof 1996;

Tomandl and Fuerboeck

1986)

Unlike Germany and Switzerland, labor relations and social insurance are
exclusively within the purview of the central government rather than the federal states.

While these areas are primarily the bailiwick of the
and Switzerland, the actual operation

is

far

central

government

more decentralized between

Lander and cantonal governments. However, the Austrian

states

in

both

Germany

the central and

do have a greater

role in

public assistance and healthcare provision which often overlap into areas of federal

jurisdiction over social insurance

and labor

centralized than perhaps intended.

relations, thereby

making

the system far less

(Tomnandl and Fuerboeck 1986) Nonetheless,

Austrian federal states have been far more subservient to Vienna than their

Swiss counterparts are
that

to Berlin

the

German and

and Bern. This coincides with many scholarly arguments

have found federalism and neo-corporatism

antithetical to

one another. (Lehmbruch

1982; Encarnacion 1999; Scharpf 1985; Pelinka 1999)

Yet Austria's social partnership would have
successful on almost

political

normalcy

in

all fronts.

By

have been deemed widely

the late 1970s and early 1980s, “social stability and

Austria contrast with instability and crisis elsewhere". (Katzenstein

1984) While the economy had slowed,

advanced

to

it

appeared

industrial states. Politically, the

to

have weathered

far better than other

system remained quite stable and saw none of

the major swings in parties and politics in other

European

states

undergoing similar

challenges.

The

social partnership

Escaping “Europe's misery”,

was given much

credit for this overall success.

interest groups, parties,

and the other elements of the social

partnership remained stable and absent of the “advanced decomposition” in so

many

other industrial states.

As Katzenstein
precisely because of

reform

its

posits, Austria

to

to avoid

many of the

crises of the 1970s

adaptive social partnership which was able to quickly react and

in textiles, steel, finance,

system seemed

was able

insurance, and other industries. (Katzenstein 1984)

The

continue to exhibit flexibility, adaptability, and empirical success in

navigating the small Austrian state to economic prosperity and political stability while
striking a precarious balance

between conflict and cooperation. (Katzenstein 1984, 1985)
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CHAPTER
THE GERMAN SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP

5

IN

MODELL DEUTSCHLAND

Introduction

Germany
amongst

modem

is

often considered one of the strong models of neo-corporatism

cases.

The postwar German economic policymaking process has been

characterized by the strong participation and relationships between major peak

associations of trade unions, agriculture, and business associations and the state typical of

neo-corporatism

in

both theory and practice. (Katzenstein 1987, Wessels 2000; Streeck

and Hassel 2004; Vitols 2004) Yet the German system of state-interest groups relations

is

also often said to possess strongly pluralist and decentralized elements that suggest a far

more mixed model of interest group and

state interaction especially in

of the strongly corporatist Austrian case studied
1991; von

Beyme

Whereas

in the

comparison

to that

previous chapter. (Fuchs and

Koch

1993; Schmidt 2006)

the Austrian case

is

often considered one of strong macro-corporatism

with a highly centralized, powerful, and national system of interest intermediation and

decision-making, the

corporatism due to

Gold 2000)

In

its

German case

is

often considered one of weaker sectoral or macro-

more circumscribed and informal

many ways, Germany does seem

institutionalization.

less neo-corporatist

because

type of permanent, compulsory, and overarching chamber system that

This has led

many

less centralized

which

form of neo-corporatism

in

is

it

found

Germany

is

lacks the

in Austria.

one with

macro-corporatism but with significantly more meso-corporatism

tripartite or

place in a

to suggest that the

(Casey and

sometimes only

far

in

bipartite neo-corporatist interest intermediation takes

more diffused and decentralized manner. (Cawson 1986; Allen 1990; Casey
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and Gold 2000) Katzenstein suggests
characteristics of both

that the

German model

exhibits unique

“Anglo-Saxon liberalism” and “continental statism and

corporatism”. (Katzenstein 1987)

However, despite the perceived lack of a
neo-corporatism

in

lasting

a centralized institution at the national level,

ranked amongst the most neo-corporatist

modem

beginning of the previous chapter). Even

if falling short

model and

its

and formal institutionalization of

political

Germany

is

often

regimes (see the chart

still

at the

of the paradigmatic Austrian

highly centralized and compulsory chambers system, the postwar

German

policymaking process has often been dominated by both formal and informal structures

of social partnership. Hence, while Germany may seem
corporatism to the Austria model,

the

in

broader terms, the

more neo-corporatist of the postwar
The

distinctions in structure

a

weaker version of neo-

German

case has

still

been among

era.

and pattern between the German and Austria social

partnership are quite notable and important to this research project. This chapter will not

only discuss the development and institutionalization of the social partnership in

Germany

in the

postwar

era, but will also

compare

the

German

version to that of the

strong Austrian case discussed in the previous chapter. These distinctions are critical

given the emphasis upon domestic institutional features found

model

utilized in this research. Despite

in the

some important overarching

Europeanization

similarities, the

development, institutionalization, and structure of social partnership has been quite
diverse between the

German and

Austrian models of postwar neo-corporatist

policymaking. (Heinisch 2000)
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Historical

and Social Preconditions

As suggested
corporatism

affinity for

is

more

in earlier chapters

likely to

develop

for the

Gennan

of this research,

many

Social Partnership

scholars believe that neo-

with certain preconditions that create an

in states

consensus-based and inclusive models and structures of policymaking. These

include a political culture that supports and prefers an inclusive negotiation and

bargaining process, well-organized and powerful associations of important socio-

economic

interests,

and a

w illingness of elites

and negotiation process found

at the

to create

and sustain the type of bargaining

core of the social partnership. (Wessels 2000)

It

may

also include historical, social, economic, and political developments that drive political

actors towards

accommodative

structures

due

of policymaking. Postwar Germany, much
preconditions that

new

it

was divided by

political, religious,

of previous forms or models

possessed a number of fertile

the social partnership a preferable

model of

Federal Republic.

The dream of social harmony and
as

like Austria,

made neo-corporatism and

decision- and policy-making in the

to the failure

national

community had long haunted Germany

and ideological boundaries. The lack of a

coherent or unified national identity or polity was a product of successive historical

developments spanning from the death of Charlemange
subsequent Thirty Years'
early

War

German economic and

to

to the

Reformation and

Napoleonic conquest. (Katzenstein 1987) Interestingly,

professional governance

was often

far

more

centralized and

unified than the political institutions of these earlier eras. Early professional and guild

organizations such as those of the Hanseatic League were examples. These interest

groups also provided a conduit for participation in otherwise absolutist and authoritarian
political

systems of the early

German

states,

(von
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Beyme

1993: Schmidt 2006)

Membership

in

such groups entitled one to a certain social status and rights that were

absent in the undemocratic environments of the early

German

states.

Hence, there has been a long-standing corporatist traditional or
societies

and

Even

polities predating the

emergence of a

as the notion of a unified

German

began

strongest advocates were also proponents of corporatist

organization. Notably,

German Romanticism

individualist tendencies liberalism

modem

state or society.

emerge,

many of its

methods of social and

strongly rejected

many of the

political

atomistic and

,

monarchists such as Friedrich Schlegel

of the

to

German

and preferred the Stand the corporate group, as the

best unit of social organization. This ideal

reformist political thinkers such as

affinity within

modem German

state

(Landauer 1983)

(

was found among German conservatives and

1772-1829) but also with nationalist and

Adam

Muller and Joseph Gorres

nationalism of the French Revolution despite

its

who were

admirable

anti-corporatist biases.

(Landauer 1983; Berger 2002)

By

the

facing Europe,

mid and

many

lh

late 19

century, with the challenges of liberalism and socialism

notable advocates of modem corporatism, including

authoritarian and fascist variants,

included

Othmar Spann,

emerged from

the

German

intelligentsia.

its

more

These

the intellectual architect of the Austrian corporatist state of the

1920s but also included democratically oriented thinkers
the optimal locus for vocational

who saw

elected parliaments as

and corporatist representation. Heinrich Ahrens and

Robert von Mold both advocated forms of parliamentary and bicameral representation
with chambers organized along functional and vocational delegations. Karl Christian

Planck went further suggesting that functional and social structures and representation

should be instituted

at local,

provincial and national levels in a regime that fused federal
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9

and corporatist
troubled

suggested that the only path to social peace for the

ideals. Karl Levitas

German

states

of the mid and

th

late 19

comprised of corporative bodies representing

century was one where the state was

all

classes and divisions of society.

(Bowen

1947; Landauer 1983)

Hence Germany has had

and

political affinity for corporatist

and policy-making structures. (Berger 2002)

institutions

of

a long social

right to left

and crossed religious

lines.

Among
The

strong ideological affinity for corporatism.

It

Catholic

spanned the

German

estates system

political

spectrum

thinkers, there

was

a

had been one that was

congenial to maintaining church power and authority in “worldly affairs” while

it

simultaneously reflected the Church’s wish to maintain a semblance of social order after
the disorganizing pressures of the reformation, Napoleon, and industrial revolution.

most prominent Catholic German advocates of modem

political

The

corporatism included the

Bishop of Mainz, Wilhelm von Ketteler, Franz Hitze, and Constantin Frantz. Frantz
advocated a
limitations

German

far

more decentralized model with strong

upon

central government. There

constitutional

and even federal

were also notable Protestant and

leftist

supporters of corporatism such as Jakob Marschak and Karl Polanyi. Even

German communists

th

in the late

1

and early 20

th

centuries used particularly corporatist

terminology and concepts, with a strong emphasis on structure and functional
organization, as part of their revolutionary rhetoric.

(Bowen

1947; Landauer 1983;

Berger 2002)

Much
and

right,

European

like Austria,

Germany

with

its

multiethnic empire and strong divisions between

left

lacked the kind of national solidarity and unity found in other

states in the 19

lh

and early 20

lh

century.
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It

was divided

ideologically, socially.

religiously, politically,

for

many

as

it

and economically. Corporatism was an attractive national strategy

semblance of cohesion and unification.
back

and constructed the

potentially provided a bridge of these divides

and

to the guild

It

also had historical

social roots stretching

estates system, finding affinity with Protestants

Despite the failed efforts of Imperial and Nazi

Germany

to

through military and authoritarian organization, postwar

critical historical

and

and social preconditions

that

and Catholics

bind Germans together

Germany seemed

would make

alike.

modem

to possess

democratic neo-

corporatism a viable solution to the ideological and socio-economic divisions of a
rebuilding

German

state.

Nonetheless,

social

and

it

may

on corporatism into the modern

political thought

has been

little

or even

9"'
1

change

be difficult to estimate the long-term implications of German

in the

century, and

German economy,

society,

era.

This assumes that there

and polity since the Middle Ages

would be quite off the mark. (Bowen 1947) Yet there

is

significant evidence that while political culture, along with the economic, social,

political

are a

environments of the German

number of consistent and

lasting

state

and

and peoples have dramatically changed, there

norms, beliefs, and cultural preferences

that

have

transcended the tides of history. (Berger 2002; Schmidt 2006) These affinities for
vocational, functional, or corporatist organizations

certainly helped shape the range

German

state

and

its

of institutional and policy options by the postwar

political actors.

However, as noted

in the previous chapters, these affinities

fruition given particularistic

institutional

and decision-making processes

economic,

social,

and

might only come

political conditions at the time

and structural transformations. The postwar German model of social
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of

to

partnership provides

some evidence

opportunity, or even necessity,

that this

was present

confluence of cultural affinity and political

at the

foundation of the Federal Republic.

(Allen 1990) While the postwar social partnership

may owe some of its

ideological and

nonnative affinity to a long and vibrant history of corporatist thought and experience,
also must be

institutional

viewed as

a product

atmosphere of the postwar

Corporatism

A

of the specific

political,

economic,

social,

it

and

era.

in the Early

German

States

&

Empire

variety of associational groups representing occupations and

economic

interests

can trace be traced to the system of corporate guilds and estates system, the Standestaat
or corporate state, which provided quasi-govemmental functions for long-standing

professional and aristocratic groups dating back to the Middle Ages.

(Bowens 1947;

Landauer 1983; Black 1984; von Beyme 1993; Conradt 2001; Berger 2002) The
Hanseatic League was perhaps the most notable example. Comprised of guilds, traders,

and merchants

in a

few northern German

cities

and

states, the

organization blossomed

into an expansive mercantile association throughout the Baltic basin

Sea. (Braunthal. 1965)

It

became broadly

influential in a

and eastern North

number of areas of economic

governance including the performance of regulatory functions such as licensing,
apprenticeship, taxes, and professional standards.

still

be found amongst

modem German

Many of these

interest associations.

roles

and structures can

(Conradt 2001)

At the time, these organizations served practical economic functions as well as
social

and

political ones.

While the German

states lacked both unity

and democracy, the

professional and guild orders often transcended religious and political frontiers while
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simultaneously providing policymaking authority to the membership over important
issues of trade, apprenticeship, taxation, professional standards, and other matters of

economic governance.
governance
political

that

to

many of the German

new demands

many who would

otherwise been excluded from both

states, especially in the

for representation

and

political rights

post-Napoleonic era after 1815,

were often met through the creation

large professional and industrial associations.

first

rebirth

gave power

system helped create a parallel form of

and social advancement. (Bowen 1947; Landauer 1983; Katzenstein 1987)

In

of the

In essence, the guild

of political corporatism

in

Germany was

conflict and labor unrest. In 1819, the

The primary impetus

industrialization

Commercial and

for the

and the growing social

Industrial Union, a

manufacturers' and merchants' association was founded in the central and southern states

while

first

1

in

1829 an industrial association for the Kingdom of Saxony was founded. The

major industrial concerns such as Krupp and Borsig were also founded between the

820s and

industrial

Bowen

1

830s, adding to the growing

and commercial

demand

interests within

for collective representation

and amongst German

states.

of

(Braunthal 1965;

1947)

In

1848, Karl Mario helped create the

Handicraft Workers.

It

Hamburg Congress of the North German

established a coqmratist assembly, beginning in 1849, that

comprised of social and vocational

estates.

was

The goal of this “Handicraftsmen’s

Parliament” was to draft resolutions and suggested laws for the

German

constitutional

assembly and subsequent parliaments. (Shuchman 1957) These types of institutions

became

far

more common throughout Germany, though they were common almost

exclusively to the local or provincial level. Given the continuing political decentralization
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of the German

states this is not surprising. Yet,

at national levels, especially after

German

such institutions also began

unification in the 1870s.

to

be asserted

The spontaneous

explosion of new and large vocational interest groups including trade associations,

chambers of commerce, vocational congresses, and
urgency to find pathways

to preserve order

local trade

unions created a greater

and social peace creating

movements and corporatism. Many policymakers and

nascent syndicalist

between the

a link

political

thinkers viewed corporatist structures and processes as possible prescriptions. (Landauer

1983; Berger 2002)

The mid

19

lh

century was also a period of significant growth and interest

models of codetermination
representation in the

the linkages

that

would give workers’ guaranteed

management of their

factory or firm. There

levels

is

is

w ell

as socialists, leftists,

and other Marxists assess codetermination quite skeptically, claiming

economic democracy. (Leaman 1988; Spiro 1958) Further, many
social democratic credentials, such as the Netherlands, lack the

codetermination seen in the

German

state.

On

the other

to

lh

centuries

industries.

offers

hand Austria

is

1983; Berger 2002)
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have strong

German
first

context

propositions

in the early

thinkers, labor leaders, and regional guilds

(Bowen 1947; Landauer

true

also strongly neo-

be some correlation or connection between the two as the

amongst German

little

models of

of codetermination developed concurrently with those of corporatism
I9

it

states that

corporatist and has low levels of codetermination. Nonetheless, in the

seems

that

primarily a feature of social democracy or outright socialism rather

than of corporatism. (Pejovich 1982) However, communists, as

there

of participation or

some controversy over

between codetermination and corporatism. Some suggest

codetermination

in

and mid

and heavy

In

known
large

1

848, the

as the

German

first

German parliament meeting

Reichgewerbeordnung
industries.

While the

that

would

legislation

in Frankfurt introduced legislation

create

works councils

was never enacted,

it

at the plant level in

did begin a trend of

voluntary and local experimentation with codetermination in Germany. In 1850, an
association of printers in Eilenberg created the

first

functional

works councils

that

required employees to be consulted in matters of general importance to the firms.

(Pejovich 1982) These types of arrangements spread to other sectors and throughout the

German

state

over the next few decades. Nonetheless, they remained voluntary,

consultative, and generally local or provincial in scale until the 1890s. In 1891, the

German

state

enacted the

Law

for the Protection

of Labor requiring factories with more

than twenty workers to establish workers committees. Again, these were merely
consultative councils with no institutional authority to actually stop or change firm

behavior.

By

1906, about

10% of German

(Shuchman, 1957) Individual German
codetermination laws into the early 20

firms were operating with such committees.

states

th

passed additional and often further reaching

century including Bavaria

in

1900 and Prussia

1905.

In Prussia, the Junkers the landed aristocratic heirs of the Teutonic order,
,

historically controlled

economic and

political resources.

Th q Junkers

utilized a

mix of

feudalism and paternalism to govern the Prussian state that solidified after 1700.
Significant coordination between the Junkers and the

necessity as

it

industrialized

marginalizing the

growing Prussian

and competed for regional power

many of the

liberal gains

in

state

was

a

Europe. After

following the revolutions of

1

848, Prussia

reverted to a fonn of industrialization, militarization, and growth based strongly on
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its

in

traditional feudal

and

elitist

order.

Under

the leadership of Chancellor Otto

von

Bismarck, himself a Junker of more non-conformist and modest heritage, from 1862 the

modem

Prussian state began a process of expansion under a

authoritarian model.

The

close ties between the governing elite and Junkers continued, but under Bismarck the

state

took a more directing role so as to enhance industrialization and military

capabilities.

Reich

(Hancock 1989) This continued

in 1871. Social historians

industrialists

Germany

after the creation

have argued that

it

was

of the unified German

the political alliance

between

of the West and landed Junkers of the East that helped finally unify

into

Empire

the first formal

in the

1860s and 1870s. (Katzenstein 1987) This was also an era of

peak associations for industry

Economic Council

in

that functionally included the

aristocratic, professional,

and even worker

Germany. Bismarck created
major

interests.

the Prussian

industrial, agricultural,

(Landauer 1983; Berger 2002) This

tended to under-represent workers and was dominated by the Junkers and Western
industrialists for the

most

common

political

to

German

pail, yet did

much of the

would be

German

(Katzenstein 1987)

the basis for elite domination and governance in the

The accelerated economic grow th during
the empire

corporatist orientation

and philosophical preconditions. This coordination between

“iron and rye”

state.

possess

new

the eras of absolutism, especially under

from 1871, offered the prospect of unity by the

state

through embracing and

organizing interest groups. Between 1876 and 1880 there was a “feverish outburst of

and iron industries. (Braunthal 1965) With

organizational activity”

in the coal, textile,

economic growth came

social contlict that in turn provided the impetus for the

development of large, powerful, and national economic
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interest associations for both

Beyme

labor and capital. (Katzenstein 1987; von

1993) Notable was the Central

Association of German Industrialists or Centralverban Deutscher Industrieller (CDI) that

was formed

in

1

876 as a way

trade-related issues.

By 1900

upon the

to exert greater pressure

there

state

on a number of

were well over 500 national and regional industry

associations with over 1,200 affiliates spanning the state. (Braunthal 1965; Berger 2002)

The CDI was
It

was organized

the forerunner to the

for the primary

modem

peak association of German industry.

purpose of exerting greater influence over key

governmental positions and promoting a variety of trade and commercial policies.
(Braunthal 1965) While the

CDI was

the preeminent of such organizations, with a full

lobbying program including paid representatives, electoral program, and legislative

liaisons,

most other

act at this level.

interests lacked both the financial

These groups, representing smaller

and organizational wherewithal

trades, agriculture, or other interests,

were often internally decentralized or divided. The success of the CDI

number of protective

Industrialists,

formed

in getting a

legislative acts through the Reichstag with the support of

Chancellor Bismarck by the
interests to organize

to

late

1870s led

along similar

which gained

in 1895. (Braunthal

In fact, the lack

lines.

many

other industrial and commercial

These included the

the support of the Association

rival

League of

of Saxonian

Industrialists,

1965)

of coherent and compulsory peak associations and the very

competitive lobbying atmosphere of the Reichstag led Bismarck to attempt to
institutionalize the interest representation process.

industrial associations

began

to hinder effective

The

fierce rivalries

between competing

policymaking as disputes percolated into

bureaucratic and governmental ranks. During the 1880s and through the 1890s, Bismarck
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proposed the creation of a national Economic Council, or Volkswirtschaftsrat based on
,

vocational and functional representation and modeled on the institution he helped formed

in Prussia in the

1860s. (Landauer 1983)

Nonetheless, neither Bismarck nor Imperial Germany, were particularly

committed

to strong

corporatism

and then

structures created in Prussia

were

politically

Imperial order.

implemented
and was
there

one

far

in

weak and tended

which

to

The

Empire from the 1870s

in the

be dominated by the

at the national level.

It

elites

World War

until

of the Prussian and

neo-corporatist systems. (Landauer 1983) If

and

juridical

system of corporatism was subordinated

absolutism and state power. (Katzenstein 1987) The Empire

forms of corporatism, but

it

was

know

difficult to

if

may have

some and

The increase

it

was

to

toyed with some

Bismarck was serious about using

corporatism as a guiding principle of governance or whether he merely used
to frighten

fully

ideological or empirical basis for corporatism during the Imperial era

a formal, legal,

I

also tended to under-represent, or exclude, workers

modem

oligarchic than

and

corporatist institutions

The Economic Council had only advisory powers and was never

more

was an

at the national level.

it

as a tactic

placate others. (Landauer 1983)

in

underlying tensions in the

German

political

system would

eventually cost Bismarck his position and lead to the end of the Second Reich with the

conclusion of the First World War. The industrialization of Germany had the

consequence of a relatively quick industrial

stratification

workers were influenced by a range of ideologies, from
strident

of society. Urban and industrial

communism and

pan-German nationalism. (Hancock 1989; Katzenstein 1987)

were passed

to

A

socialism to

series

of laws

both organize and control interests and the interest group system.
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One

such law was the Zwangsinnun

Gen enacted

in

1

897

and artisan organizations. (Landauer 1983) Other

that created

compulsory professional

efforts included those forcing fanners,

workers, teachers, and others into state-organized, and often state-dominated, peak

associations.

Hence Imperial Gennan

authoritarian,

and perhaps

interests

statist-corporatist,

were organized on a

manner more common

future regimes of Spain, Italy, or Dolfuss-era Austria than

modem

far

more

to Latin

America or

social or democratic

neo-corporatism. (Landauer 1983; Berger 2002) But the absence of labor and the general

weakness of the representative authority and legitimacy of the other associations
prevented any creation of a functional corporatist regime.

Prior to

World War

I,

functional and sectoral lines.

new employers'

industrial associations did begin to coordinate along

The major

industrial associations

were reordered while two

associations were created to handle labor relations. These

two

employers’ associations eventually merged into the League of German Employers
Associations or Vereinigung

the

tier

GDI. Nonetheless, attempts

Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbande

to bridge the

associations failed until the onset of

was even

less

war

in

VDA)

and replaced

gap between competing industrial

1914. (Braunthal 1965; Landauer 1983) Labor

coordinated and centralized. While there had been a concerted effort to

amalgamate and condense
institution, these

mostly

craft

and trade unions into a more concentrated labor

fell short.

The German labor movement was

between a bloc of thirty-nine artisan-small
textile, metal,

(

craft guilds

over a schism

and large industrial unions

mining, and construction workers. (Markovits 1986)
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split

for

During World
coordination of the

War

I,

there

was an obvious need

economy within

all

But the German case was notable for
Kriegsgesellschafen, the

the belligerents,

its

for

and

and Germany was no exception.

and methods of centralization through the

level

War Committee

for greater state organization

German

Council of German Industry that was organized

Industry,

in 1916.

formed

it

1914 and the

These were amalgamative

corporations of private firms and industries equipped with coercive quasi-regulatory

powers, endorsed and backed by governmental decree, to manage scare industrial and
agricultural resources

needed

to

conduct the war. Functionaries of business and

employers’ associations including the

VDA, League

of

Industrialists,

and Chemical

Association staffed these institutions. (Braunthal 1965) They were assigned based on
their expertise in particular

with this system as

it

consumer or worker

commodities or services. There were innumerable problems

was dominated by

large business and industrial interests,

friendly, often tended towards corruption

and nepotism, lacked

professional administrative and bureaucratic oversight from the

hugely unpopular

in the public’s opinion.

German

The empire ended with
Wilhelm

II

in

November

1918.

the end of

German

World War

turmoil and contestation over the future of the

move

the state

I

German

the military loss

maintain semblances of authority. Liberals, with
efforts to

future.

away from

its

to

and were
self-

imagine similar

(Landauer 1983; Berger 2002)

and the abdication of Kaiser

The abdication threw Germany

many moderates were stunned by both

state,

Nonetheless, this form of industrial

governance and powerful national peak association did lead many
institutionalized solutions for the postwar

was not

state.

into a period

of political

Conservatives as well as

and abdication and scrambled

much moderate

to

support, launched

conservative and traditional order towards one of
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modem

parliamentary democracy. Communists and socialists saw the collapse as an

opportunity for revolution and the establishment of a Soviet-style communist

state.

The

Social Democrats, along with support from centrists and moderate conservatives, were

able to act

first

and seized power,

hastily declaring a Republic only

two days

abdication. (Hancock, 1989) These changes were then enshrined in the

constitutional, written

and adopted in the

city

after the

new

of Weimar, establishing the new German

state as a parliamentary republic.

Corporatism
In the

many

pillars

Weimar

in the

Weimar Republic

&

Nazi Germany

Republic, the Social Democrats attempted to weaken or dissolve

of the old regime including the army and feudal order in

civilian parliamentary

lieu

of a system of

democracy. However, many conservative and imperial

remained well entrenched

in the military, judiciary,

interests

and bureaucracy. (Henig 1998; Lee

1998) Nonetheless there was some important reshaping of relationships between interests

and the

state.

Many of the

quasi-corporatist institutions and structures from the Imperial

period were dismantled, including the Kriegsgesellschafen. (Landauer 1983; Hancock

1989) The coordination between industries that existed during the war did not lead to
effective concentration after the end of fighting as both business interests and labor

unions quickly returned to their competitive and antagonistic relationships amongst
themselves. (Braunthal 1965)

With the dissolution of the wartime economic and planning associations and
councils, there were increasing

create and structure the

demands from both within and outside

German

state’s industrial
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and socio-economic

the

government

interest

group

to

system. This was

reconstruction,

deemed necessary due

economic planning, industrial-labor

democratic procedures and

institutions.

more

1918 and 1919

to create a

and the

group system.

interest

to the costs

One of the

earliest

Elektrizitatsgesellschaft

A

and complexity
relations,

states or

addressing

and the building of more

number of schemes were developed between

corporatist

and functional organization of policymaking

was by Walter Rathenau, president of Allgemeine

(AEG), one of the two biggest

electrical firms in

one of the primary organizers of the German wartime economy
Kriegsgesellschafen.

in

He suggested

that the

German economy’s

Germany and

in the

division into functional

Fachstaaten was problematic given the lack of expertise and bureaucracy

at the

national level to ensure that these “states within the state” were actually pursuing policies

that did not serve goals contradictory to those

of the nation as a whole. His plan was

would be administered by

create a

Fachparlament or Vocational Parliament,

specific

government ministry with oversight of each functional group. The

,

that

to

a

Fachparlament would negotiate conflicts or overlapping jurisdictional problems between
Fachstaaten. (Fandauer 1983; Berger 2002) This

unworkable scheme, yet was important

in

was an overly complicated and probably

motivating more practical neo-corporatist

solutions to postwar organizational and institutional reforms.

Rudolf Wissell, Social Democratic Minister of Economics, and

Wichard von Mollendorf, who was himself a coworker of Rathenau

his colleague

in the

wartime

Kriegsgesellschafen introduced a more streamlined plan. They suggested that
,

industries should

form obligatory organizations

that

all

would be directed by business,

worker, and consumer representatives tasked to ensure that the industries were acting for
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the

common

good. Planwirtschaft or Planned Economy, had elements of both neo-

corporatist consensual decision-making as well as codetermination that

more universally following World War
the

competence of a

issues

would be

left

II.

The obligatory organizations would be under

central council, the Reichwirtschaftsrat that
,

up

would be enacted

to the sectoral organizations

council level. (Landauer 1983; Berger 2002)

would determine which

and which should be reserved

at the

The underlying emphasis of the plan was

the

interdependence of industries upon one another and the imposition of a moral, national
obligation to look

corporatist

beyond

their

narrow

self-interests, falling well within the

neo-

framework and ideology.

The SPD and other

parties

Mollendorff scheme but did

of the Weimar Republic rejected much of the Wissell-

in fact institutionalize

some key elements. The

Reichwirtschaftsrat was created to provide functional representation for

industries and

economic

actors.

However,

it

was

a significantly

German

weaker and diluted

version of the original proposal. Trade and economic organizations could propose

appointments

to the

Economics Minister

body but they had

to

be approved and formally appointed by the

effectively giving the

government veto powers.

regional organization and substructure severely limiting

and society

that

still

had strong provincial and regional

its

It

reach into

identities

also lacked formal

German

industry

and divisions.

It

was

purely advisory and was subordinate to the Ministry of Economics and parliament. In

practice,

most economic and

social representatives spent their efforts

on lobbying

administrators and legislators rather than working with one another to achieve consensus.

One of the
in

lasting

problems of the Weimar era

economic matters amongst the

politicians

w as

the lack

of advanced policy expertise

and higher bureaucrats. (Lee 1998; Berger
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2002) This led the

state to

adopt and follow

many

monetary, industrial, and commercial policies
party supporters.

One can argue

that the

less practical

in lieu

overarching

of those linked

fiscal,

to patronage

from

primary impact of the Reichwirtschaftsrat was

create an institutionalized lobbying system that had

little

emphasis on

common

to

public or

national goals. (Landauer 1983; Berger 2002)

The Weimar
cartel

of

all

state also created the

coal and lignite firms that

Kohlwenwirtschaftsverband. a compulsory
,

would be supervised by

a public authority, the

Reichskohlenrat comprised of officials from both industry and workers. While

initially

,

meant

to be

self-managing,

the Ministry of

Economics

that

commodities. The combined

maximize

profits

led to a strong collusion

it

was required

interest

to

between the firms, workers, and

approve

all

price increases in the

of the industries and workers to increase prices, to

and wages, required the

state to

become more deeply involved

in

moderating price and wage demands from both industry and miners. (Landauer 1983)
This seems to have fallen strongly into a corporatist model of interest intermediation and

consensual policymaking, yet

it

was never expanded beyond

the coal industry.

The

proposals for a concurrent steel cartel, the Eisenwirtschaftsbund never got out of the
,

planning stages due to strong industry opposition. (Landauer 1983) Interestingly,

a

much

like

an early example of what would

Community (ECSC)
These
did create a

efforts,

that

would become

while limited

later

in

the

seems

European Coal and Steel

the basis of integration in postwar Europe.

in scope, applicability,

more centralized and streamlined

(Berger 2002) Lobbying

become

it

and effectiveness, nonetheless

pattern of state-interest group relations.

parliament and access to

many

ministries

was

limited to

nationally organized and approved interest groups. This accentuated the need for
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hierarchical centralization and the concentration of actors into formal

peak associations

that

would be resurrected

after

World War

Wissel-Mdllendorff plan bridged conservative and
the gap between feudal tendencies and

there

was very

little

modem

sects.

socialist,

The

(Landauer 1983) Yet

interests.

and ideological

political

)

ideologies as well as spanning

sympathy and unity amongst most German

primary divisions within labor were amongst

(Conradt 2001

socialist sympathies.

Labor unions were highly divided along

Conservative

leftist

II.

and quasi-legal

communist,

lines.

liberal,

The

and Catholic-

(Berger 2002) They vied with one another for support and members,

fragmenting the labor movement not unlike that of the Austrian

First Republic.

(Conradt

2001) The largest unions were the social democratic General German Trade Union
Federation

(ADGB),

the Christian conservative

German Trade Union

and the smaller and more white-collar Union Ring. The
collar workers while the

DGB

was

split

Federation (DGB),

ADGB tended to represent

blue-

between both blue and white-collar Catholics and

conservatives. (Markovits 1986)

However, labor was also divided along

sectoral lines, creating a highly

decentralized and uncoordinated labor movement.

nationalist labor

entirely

far right

of the

SPD

radical,

communist, and

regularly refused to accept the legitimacy of the republic

(Hancock 1989) Only

appealing.

the

movements

Many

a handful

of unions and labor organizers, usually from the

or strong adherents to guild socialism, found a corporatist model

Most labor organizers,

socialists,

more mainstream SPD favored

communists, and even those

affiliated with

greater nationalization over corporatism and

creation of cartels. Increased worker rights, wages, and representation in the

were

their

primary goals and

many

felt that

corporatist institutions
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were

its

economy

likely to insulate

industries

and employers from

their

the decentralization and division

World War

I

amongst

era in terms of social

The most important were
rights

more

significant

labor,

demands. (Landauer 1983) Despite

major gains were made during the post-

democracy and codetermination.

the institutional and legal development of guaranteed

of collective bargaining, works councils, and codetermination or Mitbestimmung.

Many of these were developed
industrialists, fearful

or enacted during the immediate postwar period as

of outright revolution, agreed to significant accords with labor

that

recognized the rights of unions to organize and collectively bargain. These became
legally binding with the passage

under the law the

state

assumed

of the Collective Bargaining

Law

a right to intervene in the collective bargaining process

through mandatory arbitration. (Bosch 2004) Further, under the
right to create

of 1918. Importantly,

Weimar

Constitution, the

and organize labor associations was enshrined. This was followed by the

creation of a special system of labor courts, the Recihsarbeitsgerichte , tasked to

adjudicate labor-business disputes.

institutionalized

workers a

works councils

right to consultation

The Works Council Law of 1920 created

at the firm, regional,

and national

a system of

levels, granting

over both shop floor and firm-level decisions

in areas

of

innovation, hiring and layoffs, expansion, and changes in procedure. (Markovits 1986;

Berger 2002)
Business interests were

Many key
the

initially

divided and weakened after the war as well

industries that had been important in the defense and military build up prior to

war had

lost their allies in Berlin

with the transition to the republic. The

marginalization of the Junkers and eastern agricultural interests

w as

also magnified by

the repatriation of large chunks of previously Prussian territory to Poland and
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Czechoslovakia. The once dominant alliance of “iron and rye” had been dissolved.

(Hancock 1989; Landauer 1983) With
forced to

make

SPD

in

power, business interests had been

While few “enlightened”

several concessions.

greater channels of

the

industrial interests

wished

communication and consensual decision-making with workers

time, a series of worker safety and codetermination laws

at this

were enacted including the

creation of shop stewards. Betriebsrdte and the elections of worker committees in a
,

number of industrial

enterprises.

(Landauer 1983)

Nonetheless, industrial organizations did eventually manage a level of unity that

escaped them during the Imperial

German

era. In

February 1919 the National Association of

Industry or Reichverband der Deutschen Industrie (RD1)

The RD1 was

a “super-association” of

was formed

in Berlin.

26 trade groups encompassing over 400 national

associations and cartels, 58 regional associations, 70 local associations, 70 chambers of

industry and

commerce, and over one thousand individual members and

as well as the

(DNVP)

VDA

had strong

or the center-conservative

While the transformation
briefly

ties to the

conservative

German

to republic

at

and new forms of governance and policies had
to quickly

the national level by the

Despite the process of democratization, the

tended

to effectively operate

rebound and reestablish

mid

1920s. (Berger 2002)

Weimar Republic developed

closed system of interest representation and participation

interests that

National People's Party

People's Party (DVP). (Braunthal, 1965)

shaken German industry, they were able

themselves as a powerful force

German

at the

national level.

and be recognized were those

that

strongly dependent upon or tied to the primary governing political parties.

larger electoral strength

The RDI,

firms.

and consistent inclusion
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in coalition

a rather

The only

were

Due

to their

government, the center-

leftist

SPD and

center-conservative

German

Peoples' Party monopolized the policy- and

decision-making process and subordinated interests to their party structures. (Hancock

1

989) The exclusion of such a large percentage of interests and parties, especially the

communists, independent

socialists,

pan-German

nationalists,

and others, was one of the

fundamental and lasting problems of the Weimar Republic and contributed to

of legitimacy amongst many German

The

elites, interests,

and

citizens.

its

deficit

(Landauer 1983)

effectiveness of SPD-affiliated unions and the conservative/centrist-affiliated

employers and industrial associations, the RD1 and

VDA, was

a testament to the tight

policymaking process and growing social partnership of the Weimar Republic. However,
this centralism

who
the

felt

between the social democrats and conservatives alarmed many

SPD

the

should be dedicated to preventing or excluding capitalist influence

policymaking process. The RDI attempted

process to provide greater cover to both the

there

was

a

socialists

to

SPD

lower

and

growing perception amongst the more

were over-represented and extensively integrated

its

its

profile in the

conservative

in

policymaking

allies,

nonetheless

socialist left that business interests

in the halls

of government. (Braunthal

1965)

Even

after

economic and monetary

stabilization

by the

late

1920s, the republic

lacked cohesion, legitimacy, and popular support. The Great Depression from 1929

onward magnified

this

beyond

repair. Interests, elites,

towards more socialist-communist tendencies
strategies to the right.

(NSDAP),

The

rise

or Nazi Party, and

The Nazis were

and masses quickly polarized

to the left

and nationalist and

fascist

of the National Socialist German Workers Party

its

eventual overthrow of parliamentary republic ensued.

able to gain strength through a coalition of frightened middle-class
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farmers and urbanites

who

who

communist

feared the rising

German

nationalists

German

industrialists

it

from

out of the mainstream parties,

felt left

all

threat

German

industrialists

from inside and outside Germany, and Pan-

classes, including labor.

and the RDI were opposed

to

(Hancock 1989) Nonetheless, many

Nazism and

actively

worked against

However, a segment of the RDI eventually broke away by 1931

in the 1930s.

the National Socialist

movement. (Braunthal 1965) Amongst

labor, support

to support

was garnered

through significant socialist elements in the party that favored nationalization and other
policy prescriptions not entirely unlike those in revolutionary Russia.

failed to solve

many of the

longstanding social, economic, and political questions that

had haunted Germany into the

Weimar democracy
The
more

rise

took

liberal

19'

1
'

century, and exacerbated by the Great Depression,

much of the

blame.

of Nazism in Germany was linked to a resurgent

nationalist, statist,

The republic had

and authoritarian regime. The perceived

democracy, led many back

to the conservative roots

literature favoring a

failure

of

Weimar and

of the corporatist ideology

in

both Catholicism and the Standestaat. Both proposed alternatives to parliamentary

democracy

that focused

upon order, hierarchy, and the unifying

state.

The 1920s and

1930s saw an explosion of numerous writers and thinkers, with a plurality being German,
arguing the merits of a state corporatism. (Landauer 1983)

The writings of Othmar Spann would become highly
Austrian corporatist state of the 1920s but also influenced

become

the architects of the Nazi regime. Spann's work,

State argued that a democratic state
,

Catholics, the

was not

a true state.

developing the

many Germans who would

Der waive

Staat or The True

(Landauer 1983)

Quadragesimo Anno issued by Pope Pius XI
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influential in

in

Among

1922 to mark anniversary

of Leo XIII ’s Rerum Novarum resurrected a corporatist approach
through the “well-ordering” of the social body that leant

(Landauer 1983; Wiarda 1997)

In fact,

many of the

to

seeking social peace

itself, implicitly, to

fascism.

Catholics, small shopkeepers, and

other interests that backed the National Socialists, expected the creation of a corporate

state

once the republic was abolished, as many were strong advocates of restoring

economic corporatism
that the

via resurrection

of the guild system. Some industrial

interests felt

National Socialists offered a strong model to limit worker demands and also

increase government expenditure on

armaments and

all

forms of capital goods.

Many

workers were drawn to the pan-German rhetoric of National Socialism but also sought a
stronger order in which the state would mediate and mitigate the

interests.

power of industrial

(Landauer 1983)

Under Nazi

rule

from 1933, almost

disappointed by the results. Almost

all

all

advocates of corporatism were

discussion of creating a corporate state

disappeared soon after the National Socialists took power.

German

interest

groups were

harshly suppressed and reorganized to serve the Third Reich. This consolidation included

the dissolution of almost

all

private interest associations in lieu of a national

Gleichschaltung or coordination under Nazi direction and command. Workers and labor
leaders

who had been absorbed by

the

more

socialist rhetoric

of the party were also

disappointed as most of the socialist workers’ elements were marginalized from the party

by the mid 1930s. All trade unions were disbanded along with industrial and private
capital associations.

Reich

itself.

The

central state

(Hancock 1989)

In

one

would organize these

fell

vestiges of Junker feudal aristocracy,

swoop

into

Hitler had abolished almost

Weimar democracy, and
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extended arms of the

all

social disunity.

the

The Nazis created many compulsory organizations
to

that,

on the surface, appeared

be modeled upon corporatism. (Berger 2002) The Association of Farmers, handicraft

chambers, industrial sector
All were

endowed with

cartels,

and Labor Front

official public

any meaningful autonomy from the

somewhat

in tact

aggressive

First, the

all

resembled functional corporatism.

and quasi-regulatory functions but none possessed

state

and Nazi Party. Only industry was

during the early years of Nazi rule. The National Socialists were less

in dissecting the

powerful German industrial associations for several reasons.

Nazis received some important financial support from some firms and

industrialists in

its

rise to

power. Secondly they required the industries to be complied

the militarization process about to be undertaken

industry were initially

left to their

own

by the

state.

infiltrated

devices, the Nazi state eventually restricted

Hence corporatism was merely

by

VDA, were

were merged

late 1933.

consensual decision-making regime.

Landauer 1983) Not long

into a single organization that then

succumbed

to

much

after, the

the

RDI

Nazi dissolution

(Braunthal 1965)

Under Nazi

control, industry

into the Organization

directly controlled

and business associations were

tightly structured

of Trade and Economy, an overarching and authoritarian institution

by the Minister of Economic Affairs and the National Economic

Chamber. The organization was
role. Industry

in a

a “cloak” for dictatorship under the Nazi regime

as in Mussolini’s Italy. (Braunthal 1965;

VDA

more

by Nazi party members and were often used as levers of control and

propaganda rather than functional representation

and

in

While business and

and more of their independence. The associations, including the RDI and

same

left

was concentrated

territorially

into

organized and broken

down by

functional

one of seven nationwide functional groups, the
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Reichsgruppe Industrie. (Braunthal 1965) All preexisting labor unions were abolished by
the Nazi

regime

in 1933.

Labor Front (DAF)
infiltration

leaders

that

Workers and

was

were reorganized

state

German

its

and Nazi Party. The most important labor

either jailed or fled into exile until the war’s end. Intriguingly, the shared

exile experience

of socialist, conservative, and other labor leaders helped bring about the

blueprints for the eventual unification and reorganization of

1986;

in the

not a trade union in any conventional sense given

and direct control by the

were

their institutions

German

labor.

(Markovits

Hancock 1989)

The end of the war meant

significant

change for

interest

system as a whole. The de-Nazification of all government,

groups and the political

institutional,

and

organizational structures included the decentralization of the economic system and

elimination of “cartels, syndicates, trusts, and other monopolistic arrangements”.

(Hancock 1989; Berger 2002) This process of destruction was balanced by the urgent
need

to reconstruct

and revive German

civil society

through political parties, trade

unions, and other voluntary associations. Hence, the immediate postwar development of

Austria and

Germany

did diverge in the perceived degree of compulsion. While

compulsory chambers were permitted by the occupying four powers
that tended to

was blamed
meant

emphasize

its

status as a victim

for the war, resulting in a greater

that interest organizations,

central features

centuries prior to

German

postwar Austria,

of Nazi aggression. German totalitarianism

demand

for decentralization. This also

once again independent of the

of the postwar German

in

political system,

unification in the 1870s. (von
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much

state,

would become

like they

Beyme

had been

in

1993; Katzenstein 1987)

The Social Partnership of the Postwar Federal Republic
Developing the German Model
Neo-corporatist developments

historical antecedents,

were primarily

Federal Republic, while based on social and

in the

a product

of postwar structural and

political

change. The institutional and operational characteristics of the postwar model constitute a

distinct

form of democratic corporatism, or neo-corporatism, versus

earlier

German

examples of proto-corporatism of the middle ages or authoritarian corporatism during the

Second or Third Reich. Germany’s turbulent

past

tempered

its

citizens'

and leaders’

responses to economic, social, and political dilemmas of the postwar period, not unlike

that in Austria.

that

(Hancock 1989) The principle

had been the culprit

were not

to

in

Germany's

social,

instability

economic, and

from the 19

lh

political divisions

century through

be repeated. The utter destruction of the Second World

Weimar

War allowed

the

surviving elites and citizens an opportunity to achieve the kinds of cohesion and stability
absent from previous

The

German

regimes. (Hancock 1989; Nicholls 1994)

defeat and occupation of Germany transformed

political institutions. After the period

dominated decision-making model

of Nazi

that

was

The demand

and attempts

policy and

rule, the authoritarian, traditional,

the

state

for greater transparency, participation,

to foster intense nationalism or statism in the
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and

state-

backbone of previous forms of German

governance became unacceptable to both the new German
occupiers.

German domestic

and the victorious

allied

and liberalism overrode

postwar

political

environment.

)

Hence
comparison

to

what was permitted

the Federal Republic

political

German

the role of the

system and

would

diffuse

civil society

state

in the

would be considerably circumscribed

in

Austrian model. The organizational structure of

power and policymaking across

and create a “semi-sovereign

the institutions of the

state”.

(Katzenstein 1987;

Schmidt 2006)

The

intricate

web of relations amongst

autonomy

Federal Republic resulted in low state

state’s role

was diminished by

the political actors and institutions of the

as

power was

diffused.

the importance of political structures and

The new German
norms diffused

throughout the political system and society. (Katzenstein 1987) This also weakened the
traditional links

between

interests

regimes. This distinguishes

and

interests

and

political parties that

Germany from

were prevalent

in the

prewar

Austria where the connections between parties

were strongly reestablished through a system of neo-corporatism and

consociational proporz. (Conradt 2001

The formal

was accompanied by

disintegration between parties and interests

significant increases in cooperation

and consensus between the major

interests

and parties

over a wide range of economic and social policy goals. To maintain political order and to
obtain prosperity and social peace,

associations,

were more

German

elites, in

common

and fundamental

new postwar environment. (Hancock

1989; Vail 2003)

likely to act in concert to

principles of solidarity in the

both the parties and interest

defend

There was also an important structural simplification of the German

policymaking process. The reduction
of radical parties of the
associations

left

was one way

and

that

right,

postwar Germany, much
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and

through marginalization

in viable political parties,

and the concentration of

political

interests into national

peak

like Austria, distinguished itself

from other

states,

and

its

own

past.

Hence while

the postwar

German and

Austria

partnerships did vary in their institutions and levels of concentration and centralization,

they did share a

common

solidarity

towards consensus building and co-deterministic

forms of policy and decision-making amongst the primary interests and the

one of the more notable

German

political

is

postwar developments of the Austrian and

systems and political economies.

The postwar
preconditions but

similarities in the

This

state.

social partnership

made

was one

inspired by historical and social

possible by the economic, political, and social necessities of

reconstruction of the state, economy, polity, and society. (Allen 1990; Berger 2002)

These factors constituted the basic prerequisites and
democratic corporatism

made by

in the Federal

the important political actors

have necessarily developed

consent that resulted in

Republic. Yet, deliberate action, intent, and choice

were primary

partnership. Without significant cooperation,

associations, political parties,

critical

in

achieving postwar social

compromise, and recognition by the

interest

and other major social groups, neo-corporatism would not

in Federal

Republic.

Organizing German Interests

During the occupation period, the reconstruction of autonomously organized
interest

groups was

to

go hand

in

hand with

administrative structures of the state.

the creation of new decision-making

The formation of peak associations of unified

unions, industry and employers’ organizations, and agricultural groups

necessity for practical

economic policymaking

manner of reconstructing

a

and

postwar German

to aid in reconstruction but also as a

civil society.
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was viewed

(Hancock

1

989) The new

trade

as a

group system developed into one with a high degree of sector concentration and

interest

high membership density, (von

Beyme

1993)

Germany developed

a robust civil society

of interest group activity with nearly four voluntary associations for every thousand
citizens.

Germans

government than

are

more

likely to use interest

groups as a means of influencing

citizens in the United States or United

methods of interest group

politics has

Kingdom. But

the style and

been what has made the system a

vital part

of the

policymaking process. (Conradt 2001)

While most

interest

groups are

apolitical, civic, or local, there are a

politically important national interest associations that represent the

economic cleavages
significant

in

German

society. (Dalton 1989)

Many

number of

primary socio-

of these chambers retain

quasi-govemmental regulatory functions including licensing,

training,

apprenticeship, and standards that restrict the legal practice of the profession or activity.

(Hancock 1989; Conradt 2001 They also controlled recruitment and membership
)

that

can translate into economic as well as political power. Most were hierarchically
organized from the local to federal levels and had considerable autonomy
the state or one another. This

made

the

members

fairly

dealing with

dependent upon and subordinated

to the groups' leaderships especially at the national level

becomes

in

where the

elite structure

the locus of representation, negotiating, bargaining, and policymaking. (Conradt

2001; Katzenstein 1987)

While some had labeled
pluralist, the

the postwar

German

political

system as dominantly

system of peak associations seemed to suggest a more incorporative pattern

of concurrent pluralism and neo-corporatism, (von
as early as 1965, well before

much of the

Beyme

1993)

corporatist literature
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As Braunthal suggested

emerged

in

comparative

politics, calling the

peak associations of the German federal republic “lobbies” was

too limiting given their wider and

more

direct roles in regulatory

far

governance and

policymaking. (Braunthal 1965)

The most notable

distinction

between Austrian and German

interest

group

systems has been the level of compulsory membership. The Austrian chamber system
relies

upon three compulsory membership organizations, the Chambers of Labor,

Commerce, and
bargaining

Agriculture, with representative monopolies in articulating interests and

at the federal level.

The other Austrian organizations,

the

OGB

and VOI,

while not compulsory had demonstrated unrivalled centralization and monopolistic
tendencies as well. The

German system

is

was deemed unacceptable, and generally

far less

compulsory as obligatory membership

illegal, after the

experiences of pre-1945 forced

membership, (von Beyme 1993) The only compulsory organizations tend

chambers

for professional occupations

to

be the

such as lawyers, doctors, and architects. The

remainder, including unions and business associations, are primarily voluntary unlike the
Austrian chambers that possess compulsory membership requirements. Hence the peak

associations in

Germany tend

to

be national spokesmen for management, labor, and

agricultural interests, but lack the formal authority of

centralized control found in Austria, (von

Beyme

compulsory membership and

1993; Heinisch 2000)

Despite important limitations placed by the allied powers and efforts to
decentralize the policymaking and interest group system.

Germany

did develop a rather

concentrated and dense interest group structure. (Berger 2002) This was in part due to the

consequences of “social leveling” by the war, but also the liquidation of the remaining
great Prussian estates in the East, (von

Beyme 1993) Hence,
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the

war actually contributed

)

to a greater centralization

social

of interest groups by eliminating some of the most excessive

and class divisions as well as removing or marginalizing key ideological

notably pan-German nationalism and
divided during the

Weimar and

communism,

earlier eras.

persistent given the migration within

that

had otherwise kept

identities,

interests

Regional identity had also become less

Germany due

to the

conduct of the war as well as

the relocation of refugees from neighboring states.

Industry and Employers' Associations

During the immediate postwar period, many of the preexisting employers’ and
business organizations were dissolved due to their association with and incorporation

under the Nazi regime. As a whole, employers and industry were strongly discredited by
the Allies and

many Germans

for complicity in the rise

regime. (Braunthal 1965; Wiesen 2001

)

and maintenance of the Nazi

Increasing numbers of strikes and

movements

towards more powerful labor organizations forced businesses into a “defensive response”

of reorganization. (Braunthal 1965) Between 1945 and 1949, a number of groups,
committees, and associations began to emerge

at local

and regional levels

in the

occupation zones. There was tremendous variation from zone to zone depending upon the
political

form

and economic

affinities

of the occupying powers. (Berger 2002) Attempts

a national association for industry failed in

1946 precisely because of the variations

amongst the occupation zone authorities and the general
industrial organization

allied mistrust

of national

and the specific motives of the organizers. (Braunthal 1965;

Wiesen 2001
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to

But by 1949, as labor had been reestablished as a national confederation under the

DGB,

employers' and business interests were permitted, with significant limitations and

assurances by the occupying powers, to soon organize into three peak associations; The

Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI) or Federation of German

Industry, the

Bundesvereinigung Dentsc her A rbeitgeberverhdnde (BDA) or Federation of German

Employer Associations, and
Industrial

2000

the

Deutscher Industrie und Handelstag DIHT) or German
(

and Trade Conference (or

Diet).

(Hancock 1989; Braunthal 1965; Heimsch

)

The DIHT has

significant heritage and organizational history reflecting both

medieval merchant associations as well as contemporary

been organized

was dissolved

in 1861 but

compulsory, a rare exception
charter that

organized

at

the bulk of

roles.

is

dominated by

the local

its

German peak

artisans, crafts,

From

The DIHT had

1956, membership

associations, for

all

interest

was

It

is

its

primarily

and lobbying group, spent

resources on fostering vocational training programs and fulfilling advisory

(Braunthal 1965)

viability as the

The group was never

BDI

or

BDA

particularly

engaged

and has diminished

German economy moved away from

in

in the

policymaking

membership, importance,

smaller artisan and craft

manufacturing towards large scale industrial production. Nonetheless, the
to exist today

initially

enterprises under

and specialty manufacturing.

and regional levels and while an

process to the extent of the

and

for

in 1933.

lines.

pursuing a very modest role

in lobbying,

DIHT

continue

policymaking, and interest

representation process.

The primary purpose of the
for employers’ in labor

BDA

has been to serve as the coordinating institution

and social policies. While the
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BDA

does not engage

in direct

collective bargaining with labor,

policies for

its

constituent

it

has traditionally set

recommended wage and

members, the employers’ associations representing

benefit

specific

national sectors such as banking, industry, insurance, transportation, and agriculture.

The

BDA

has been influential in areas of social and labor law and social security provision.

BDA

has tended to be dominated by large industries and employers’ due to their larger

financial contributions to the association

and executive positions. The
local units,

(von

Beyme

business interests,

trade unions

BDA

and domination of the important administrative

consisted of forty-six national associations and 384

1993) While the

BDA

is

generally representative of conservative

has also operated on the basis of accepting a large and powerful

it

movement

including codetermination. (Braunthal 1965) Hence, the

organization has tended to be rather less bombastic and radical in

demands from both

the state

and labor throughout the postwar

its

relations

era. (Streeck

and

and Hassel

2004)

The BD1 tends

to

be the most dominant and broadly influential business

organization compared to

2001

)

The BDI and

BDA

DIHT

and BDA. (Hancock 1989; von Beyme 1993; Conradt

were operationally and ideologically close from the 1940s

through 1980s, with overlapping and shared leadership and membership. The two even
shared a

common

two organizations
to

have

1965)

most
in a

its

As

own

president during the 1970s. There

in

was even

a proposal to

merge

the

1963. (Braunthal 1965) Nonetheless, each organization has tended

functional competencies and specialization, (von

Beyme

1993; Braunthal

will be discussed later in this chapter, these are distinct organizations that, like

institutions, often

clung to their

more competitive and

own autonomy and

divisive relationship since the
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institutional identities, resulting

1

980s.

The BD1

broadly influential on a range of national and international economic

is

policy issues and

is

Germany. By 1965

the

it

most effective and

influential voice

represented over 100.000 employers.

postwar Germany had returned

to a

system

in

of business interests

in

has often been argued that

It

which the “economic

plutocrats’', broadly

represented by the BDI, were once again in a dominant political position. (Braunthal

1965) There has often been the charge that even

when

the

SPD

has been in office that

they are quite receptive and accommodating of business interests. (Hancock 1989)

Today, the BDI

is

a federation of thirty-nine individual industrial associations

encompassing more than 90.000 firms and has significant financial resources. (Hancock
1989; Conradt 2001

)

Most BDI

activity

is

in direct,

governmental, parliamentary, and bureaucratic

wing

that has

success

helped

in the

and organized

it

small-group consultations with

They have

officials.

compile useful and timely data, improving

decision-making process. (Conradt 2001
into functional interest sections

)

The BDI

a significant research

their access to

is

and

further subdivided

such as manufacturing, construction,

banking and insurance, or agriculture. (Hancock 1989)

Throughout most of the postwar

era, the

BDI and

BDA

connected and dominated by the largest industrial concerns

of the Ruhr region. This caused
in satisfying

many

significant long-term

in

remained closely

Germany, especially those

problems for both

institutions

geographical, sectoral, and size divisions amongst the membership.

(Braunthal 1965; Streeck and Hassel 2004) Nonetheless, from the 1940s until 1980s the

BDI and

BDA

provided a significantly centralized and powerful institutional presence for

industry and employers’

at

the federal level.
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Labor and Trade Unions
During the occupation of Germany, especially

movement

to separate the

was

a strong

unions from the political parties and to create a single

encompassing federative union. This was done
rebuilding purposes.

in the west, there

The de-linking

for both political

or parties and unions

was

and pragmatic economic

part

of the de-Nazification

process but was also engineered to weaken the communists in the western occupation
zones.

On

a

pragmatic basis,

it

was

also easier to push the basic reconstruction-era

economic policies objectives of wages,

prices, inflation,

and working conditions through

a simplified tripartite state-business-labor arrangement. This

number of labor

leaders

who,

was

also supported

after surviving the war, recognizing the strategic

by a

weakness

of labor during the Weimar era and wished to centralize the voice of labor which
concurrently required de-aligning labor with the parties. (Markovits 1986; Conradt 2001)

Hence the unification of German labor was

essentially a postwar, occupation-imposed

necessity that coincided with remaining labor leaders wish to centralize and strengthen

labor at a national level,

much

like that

found

in Austria.

(Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991;

Streeck and Hassel 2004)

Strong and unified labor was a hallmark of the postwar economic and political
reconstruction of Germany.

From

the outset, the

DGB

and

its

member

unions were better

organized than previous eras of German labor organization and were also committed to
the pragmatic goals of consensual policymaking with industry

1940s through 1970s. Compared to unions to
unions have been

much more embedded

most of the postwar

era.

in

in the

and the

state

from the

Anglo-American model. German

both society and the policymaking process for

(Thelen 1991; Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003) Yet
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)

institutionally,

There
in

is

German

labor

is

far

weaker and diffusely organized than

nothing even vaguely comparable to the compulsory' Austrian

Germany. (Heinisch 2000: Markovits 1996) The

German Trade Union
World War
needed
labor.

to

II is

overcome

German

the governing board of the

is

the

(DGB), was formed

trades unions. Importantly, the

the historical legacy of ideological

Membership on

Chamber of Labor

largest labor organization

Federation, Deutscher Gewerkschaftbund

the umbrella organizing

that in Austria.

DGB

after

DGB

and religious divisions amongst

was consociationally and

proportionally divided between Catholics and Protestants during

its

early development.

Marxists were also represented in the earliest stages, but as they declined so did their
influence and membership in the

DGB

leadership. (Markovits 1986;

Hancock 1989;

Thelen 1991

DGB

The

was, by the

late 1950s,

combined membership of almost nine

comprised of seventeen separate unions with a

million.

The

largest

member union

was, and

continues to be, the Metalworkers Union, IG Metalb which had historically accounted for

about one-third of the

total

DGB

membership. (Heinisch 2000; Conradt 2001

)

The

has been historically dominated by industrial unions and workers that

made up

60%

w hite-collar

of the

total

membership during the bulk of the postwar

public employees constitutes around

Thelen 1991
inside the

)

30%

era while

well over

and

over the same timeframe (Hancock 1989;

However, even some smaller unions have exerted significant influence

DGB

and German labor movement. IG Dnick und Papier, the

printers' union,

while amongst the smallest of the trade unions, had consistently “punched above

weight" due

DGB

to

its

prestige

and

tradition as the oldest

(Markovits 1986)
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of the German trade unions.

its

Despite the perception of strong collective organization under the confederative

umbrella of the

DGB,

there have been important and difficult divisions

amongst the numerous trade unions. While the
dominated by the
this leadership

largest industrial

was

DGB

and German labor movement were

unions such as IG Metall for

much of the postwar

neither absolute nor unchallenged. (Heinisch 2000)

industrial unions, the chemical workers’ union,

construction workers’ union,

between and

Amongst

IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik and
,

IG Bau-Steine-Erden (IG Ban),

era,

the

often butted heads with

IG

Metall on a range of issues and collective bargaining agendas. (Markovits 1986; Thelen
1991

)

There were additional divisions between the larger industrial and smaller public

sector and service unions such as those representing postal workers, food processors,

commercial and banking employees, and railway workers. Another important division

was between unions representing growing or declining
war, while industrial production and

artisans, crafts,

many

services

sectors of the

boomed,

and printing industry declined rapidly

economy. After the

others, notably in the

in the face

of mechanization,

European and global economic integration, and the changing economic,

social,

and

technological environment. (Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991)

Hence viewing German labor

as monolithic

somewhat common myth of the postwar
bargaining which

is

era.

The

done by the member unions

and

DGB

fully centralized has

it

itself

at the sector,

been a

excluded from collective

and increasingly, firm or

regional level (Casey and Gold 2000; Heinisch 2000; Markovits 1996)

Under

the

Collective Bargaining Act of 1949, the primary rules of collective bargaining were

established. First, unlike the

and

Weimar

Republic, the state withdrew

right to arbitrate collective bargaining codifying only
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its

interventionist role

unions and employers’

associations could conclude such agreements. (Bosch 2004)

process would

become

institutionalized at the industry-wide

results of the bargaining process

“pilot region”

bargaining agreements. This has been

or Western

Germany

which could

collective bargaining

and regional

levels.

The

between the sectoral union and industry would become a

which would then become the basis

Heimsch 2000) Usually

The

known

the sectoral unions

for national sector-level collective

as the "convoy principle”. (Markovits 1986;

would

Southern

select prosperous regions in

as such test cases so as to extract higher industry contributions

the be replicated nationally.

dominant and leading union

in this

(Bemdt 2000) Again, IG Melall was

often the

process, tending to play the pivotal role. (Thelen

1991; Heinisch 2000)

The

DGB

has also been excluded from almost

all

other essential aspects of union

OGB

activities, including

membership, recruitment, and finances, unlike the

that has historically

dominated the member unions and the most important membership,

financial,

and

political duties, as well as

maintaining a veto power

in Austria

in all collective

bargaining. (Markovits 1996; Heinisch 2000) Despite these weaknesses, especially

compared

to Austrian labor, the

high levels of density though

it

DGB and German
is

most useful

labor in general had maintained very

to conceptualize the

DGB

as merely the

umbrella over a relatively effective and concentrated number of sectoral trade unions

such as IG Metall, IG Ban and IG Druck und Papier. (Markovits 1986)
,

The

DGB

initially

had a strong Marxist tone, reflecting the views of the new

organization leadership comprised mostly of former socialist leaders. Yet the

organization

moved

actions soon

fell

to the center-left rather promptly.

The major emphasis of labor

on shorter working hours, higher wages, and codetermination.
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(Markovits 1986) The

DGB

abandoned most Marxist elements from

their

program, such

as widespread nationalization, by 1963. (Conradt 2001; Heinisch 2000) This decline in

labor’s

more

German

radical

demands

social partnership.

A

signified an important step in developing the postwar

radical Marxist labor

incapable of finding consensus and

program

common ground

almost by definition

is

with business interests and the

state.

This hardly means that conflict and divisiveness between labor and capital diminished,
but rather reflected a significant acceptance of the

policymaking

that

new

rules of

German economic

focused on consensus and solidarity rather than on conflict and

revolution.

There are unions

that fall outside

angered by the unequal balance of power
white-collar unionism,

established.

in the

DGB

umbrella. In 1950 and 1951,

between

The German White-Collar Employees' Union

represented about

20%

number was near 35%

DBB

(DAG)

the

DGB

and

and were

or Deutsche

consists of only salaried employees and historically

of all white-collar workers
in the early 1950s.

Federation or Deutsche r
workers. The

industrial blue-collar

two new white-collar unions broke away from

Angestelltengewerkschat

in the

Federal Republic, though that

The second was

Beamtenbund (DBB)

the

and

German

Civil Servants’

that represents public sector civil servant

operates quite divergently than most other

that the ability to collectively bargain

DBB

DGB

of the

strike

is

German

prohibited under

labor groups in

German

law.

The

tended to act purely as a lobby or pressure group more than a formal labor union.

(Markovits 1986; Dalton 1989; Heinisch 2000)
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Additionally, a

supported through

remnants of the

number of Christian

initial institutional

far right,

and

Union Federation emerged

in

a

trade unions

emerged

and financial assistance of conservatives, the

few within the

CDU/CSU. The German

CDU

diminished into the

1960s and the federation, while maintaining a few pockets of influence

all

but disappeared from the national labor

1960s. (Markovits 1986) Organized labor had

and would remain so

the late 1950s

While the

German

political

DGB

emerged

system

in the

nor monolithic as was found

Christian Trade

1959 with the merger of two smaller right wing and

conservative labor groups. Yet support by the Adenauer-led

regional levels, had

1950s, mostly

in the

at the local

movement by

become decidedly

or

the mid-

allied with the

SPD

by

for the foreseeable future.

as the primary representative of organized labor in the

postwar period,

in the

this position

was

neither as overarching

Austrian system with the compulsory

Chamber of

Labor and the highly empowered and centralized authority of the OGB. (Heinisch 2000)

The

DGB

was characterized by

a lack

of central authority

in areas

of collective

bargaining and more often a reflection of the underlying power and conflicts within

sectoral

member

both the labor

Compared

to

those found

unions than an autonomous and powerful actor

movement and

relations with business interests

at

the national stage for

and the

state.

(Bosch 2004)

more decentralized and weakly coordinated labor union systems such

in

its

as

France or the United States, the German model seems quite concentrated.

Another potential decentralizing condition of German labor has been the system
of works councils enacted through codetermination laws. While codetermination suggests
a greater role for the unions at the firm or plant level, in operation the

works councils

system have sometimes demonstrated a significant centrifugal power to sectoral and
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national union solidarity and strength. (Streeck 1982) Hence, unions in

system of parts ranging from the confederation and sectoral unions
their provincial

levels.

and local offices, and then

(Thelen 1991; Bosch 2004) In

federal republic

is

somewhat

to the

many ways

works council

Germany

are a

at the national level to

level at the firm

the semi-sovereignty of the

and plant

German

paralleled in the geographic, sectoral, and firm-level

decentralization of German labor.

The success of German

labor,

and the economy as a whole,

in the

postwar period

DGB

helped overshadow important internal and organizational conflicts within the

the

German

labor

movement. Hence while there has often been an assumption

and

that the

postwar economic miracle and social democratic gains such as an expansive welfare

and advanced codetermination were due

to the unified

state

and centralized system of German

labor unions, this does tend to gloss over critical schisms that did exist and could

potentially contribute to, in the long term, an increasingly divided

German

labor

movement.

Agricultural

&

Professional Interests

Agricultural interests have been concentrated into the Green Front, an umbrella

association of three agrarian organizations encompassing the overwhelming majority of

German

farmers.

The

three organizations are the Deutscher

German Fanner's League,

the

Bauernverband (DBV) or

Verband der Landwirtschaftskammer or Association of

Agricultural Chambers, and the Raiffeisenverband or Cooperative Association that

specializes in agriculture-related banking, mortgaging, and retailing activities.

Agriculture, perhaps due to

its

small size and well-coordinated membership,
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is

amongst

German

the most politically integrated and centralized of the

Beyme

(Conradt 2001; von

interest associations.

1993; Hancock 1989)

Additionally, there are the smaller professional peak associations including the

Federation of Free Professionals or Bundesverband derfreien Berufe that act as an

umbrella organization of sixty-seven national associations representing doctors, lawyers,
dentists, engineers,

and

architects.

Unlike most other German peak associations, these do

tend to be compulsory due to their powerful role

in establishing

and controlling

professional membership, standards, and training. (Hancock 1989) Otherwise, these

organizations play a very small role

in the

policymaking and

political process.

Hence, the German system of peak associations seems rather similar to those

found

in other neo-corporatist

or the Netherlands. Yet the

regimes or social partnerships such as

German model was

in Austria, Ireland,

generally “looser” than the Austrian

in

terms of compulsory membership and centralization. Despite the lack of compulsory

membership and formal

centralization, the postwar

peak associations maintained a high

of member density and membership numbers. For much of the postwar

level

BDA

included over

80%

of all organized businesses while reaching nearly

the BD1. (Braunthal 1965; Katzenstein 1987; Conradt 2001)

over

77%

90%

by the 1990s. (von Beyme 1993; Conradt 2001

35-44% of the work

much

90%

force, far

below the

higher union density than

especially notable given the

in

many

OGB

Even with

the

DGB

and Federal Chamber

to nearly

only between

in Austria,

other advanced industrial states. This

open shop laws of German employment

compulsory union membership

for workers, (von
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Beyme

within

The Green Front included

of all farmers as early by 1965 and increased membership density

)

era, the

it

is

that prohibit

1993; Heinisch 2000)

has

The Development of the German

Social Partnership

(

1940s- 1980s)

While the Austrian and German models have often been lumped together under
the neo-corporatist banner, the differential institutionalization, processes, and structures

between the two have meaningful

political

and developmental consequences. (Heinisch

2000) The postwar German social partnership developed
characteristics that distinguish

less

or

upon formal

Commission

it

from

its

German model

Commission

and Economic Questions and instead

developed codification of laws
bipartite negotiations

number of unique

Austrian neighbor. The

institutions such as the Austrian Joint

for Social

a

for

relied

to regulate labor-capital relations

Wages and

upon

German

state.

Prices

a well-

and the highly informal

and bargaining between labor and business associations

consensual policy recommendations for the

relied

to find

(Heinisch 2000; Katzenstein

1987)

The

legal codification

German model,
juridification

of social partnership has been quite remarkable

distinguishing

it

from

its

in the

Austrian counterpart. This has been called the

of the social partnership as many elements of labor-business relationships,

including works councils, codetermination, collective bargaining, rights to strikes and

lockouts are highly delimited and regulated under

German

law. (Heinish 2000; Thelen

1991; Markovits 1986; Katzenstein 1987; Schmidt 2006) Notable are the series of

Works

Constitution and Collective Bargaining Acts that have been codified, regularly amended,

and expanded since 1949. This
levels

is

quite different from the Austrian

of significant legal codification found

in

Germany and

relies

model

that lacks the

more upon

the

negotiation and bargaining process within the legally provided frameworks of institutions
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like the Joint

Commission. Many have argued

tremendous influence
while

there

range of policy options within the

had

German system

has allowed greater flexibility within the Austrian model. (Heinisch 2000) Hence

it

is

in limiting the

that this institutional difference has

a strongly legalistic element to the

mode of governance

in the

German model.

(Schmidt 2006)
In

terms of formal institutions, unlike Austria, there have few formal or

compulsory national

institutions

of social partnership. The institutions

that

have been

created at the national level have tended to be temporary in nature and are usually

convened by the

state

only

when

the social partners have been unable or unwilling to

reach compromises and consensus amongst themselves. (Vail 2003; Heinisch 2000) In

times of normal operation and economic growth, the

its

own

state

was able

governance of the economy and leave the process

role in the

social partners.

German

On

issues such as the labor market, wages,

in the

to

minimize

hands of the

employment, unemployment

and health insurance, the postwar German model primarily operated without significant
or disruptive government intervention between the social partners and their suggested

policy prescriptions and consensual adjustments.

The

role

of the

state

was circumscribed

by the “parapublic” and quasi-regulatory roles of the social partners resulting
sovereign

state. (Vail

In the

committed

compromise with

primary goals of the

workers

era, the

DGB

and

democracy and greater economic power

the

semi-

2003; Katzenstein 1987)

immediate postwar occupation

to social

in the

BDA, BDI and

DGB

in their firms.

became

affiliated unions, while

for

workers were willing

other industrial and employer interests.

the creation

One of the

and extension of codetermination

rights

Codetermination, extending participatory rights of workers
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to

in

of

)

management

decisions,

was

itself a

compromise between unions and

industry.

labor had often rhetorically suggested that nationalization of key industries

goal of the

DGB

and other unions,

this

was mostly

willing to grant and extend codetermination rights.

In 1946,

elections,

officials,

at the

a primary

(Hancock 1989; Thelen 1991

,

that

The following

firm level.

was

long as industry was

set aside as

works councils, known as Betriebsrate

were established

While

were formed by employee

year, British occupation

zone

prompted by the unions, endorsed a form of parity codetermination or

Mitbestimmung between workers and firms
for equal representation of labor

experiment

in the British

in the iron

and coal

industries. This provided

and shareholders on company supervisory boards. This

Zone was expanded

Federal Republic in 1951. In 1952, the

to all coal, iron,

and

steel industries in the

German parliament enacted

giving only one-third of the seats to workers

in all

a

weaker version,

remaining industrial firms. (Hancock

1989; Thelen 1991; Markovits 1986)

Extension of codetermination rights became the primary and overarching goal of
the

DGB

from

this point

forward. While not fully satisfied with the

of codetermination passed
a total loss for business.

in 1952,

it

was

still

The BD1. BDA, and

more

diluted version

hailed as a victory by labor. Yet

sectoral industry associations

it

was not

were able

to

sidestep existing and future calls for full nationalization in the compromise. In addition,

the

BDI and

system

that

BDA

secured significant labor peace for the next few decades by creating a

made workers

and personnel decisions

share the responsibility and burden of production, investment,

at the

firm level. This created a far

more

stable labor situation

with greater worker loyalty, efficiency, and commitment to firm-wide goals of

profitability.

The law

also limited the rights of workers to strikes and walkouts and of
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employers

to lock out.

(Bosch 2004; Heinisch 2000; Markovits 1986) Hence, there was

compromise and bargaining on both
low unemployment, labor-capital

These

acts,

sides.

direct state intervention,

little

influenced by the state and the Adenauer

stability

above

was

and employers' groups, and firms

compromise extensions

CDU/CSU-FDP-DP

to maintain social peace,

Adenauer and

all else.

and

his cabinet gently

to accept the 195

1

were strongly

coalition government.

economic growth, and
pushed the BDI,

The

political

BDA,

industrial

codetermination laws and the 1952

as instruments of national stability

Economics Minister, Ludwig Erhard, were especially keen
the

rates

stability benefited all involved.

while done with

state’s overriding interests

Given the strong economic growth

and growth. Adenauer and
to not let labor conflict

his

slow

phenomenal growth of the nascent German economic miracle. While Erhard

ideologically opposed codetermination, Adenauer, the

saw

the value and gains to be

made from

tabling of nationalization talks by the

a

more

politically astute

of the two,

compromise. The benefits were a permanent

DGB

and

affiliated

unions and a more cooperative

and consensual policymaking process between the peak associations with only minimal
guidance from the Chancellor or Minister of Economics. This created the conditions

whereby energies were expended on bargaining sessions rather than external disruptions
such as strikes or lockouts. (Nicholls 1994)

The primary underlying concept of the Adenauer period was one based upon an
“acceptance of certain
institutionalization

model, (von
than

in

common

rules for conflict mediation” rather than a formal

of social partnership

Beyme

that

was found

1993) The state would play a

much

in the Austrian Joint

Commission

smaller “semi-sovereign” role

Austria with less institutional and formal edification of social partnership.
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(Katzenstein 1987) While never securing the same level of labor-capital peace as found
in Austria in the

postwar

era,

Germany nonetheless mostly avoided

labor-capital relations found in

Italy.

Some

many

would have been

more

radical

other postwar European states such as France or

scholars go as far to suggest that

political stability

the

German democratic

less likely or successful if

it

consolidation and

were not

for a strong

and

well-organized labor movement. (Markovits 1986)

From

the 1950s through mid-1960s, the

Adenauer government was able

to

successfully navigate an economic miracle with only broad policy direction by

safeguarding labor-capital coordination and consensus building on wages, prices,

inflation, social benefits,

and

trade. (Vail

2003) Hence the

state's role

was primarily

to

ensure that the infrastructure of social partnership continued to allow the social partners

to

compromise and negotiate

the specific policy remedies and changes. (Katzenstein

1987; Vail 2003) Adenauer’s eventual demise

was

less

about economics than about

foreign and military policy controversies and his declining influence inside the

CDU/CSU.

(Conradt 2001; Hancock 1989) The promotion of Ludwig Erhard to

Chancellor could have signaled an important

market policies

at the

move towards more

expense of social democracy, the

DGB. and German

lackluster leadership, the continuing internal fights within the

weakness moderated such moves. The

rise

of the right-wing

elections in 1965 and 1966 and the defection of the

him and

reluctantly join the

SPD-CDU/CSU

FDP
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labor.

CDU/CSU, and

NPD

in

pushed the

grand coalition

(Hancock 1989; Allen 1990)

neo-liberal and free-

in

But

his

his overall

provincial and local

CDU/CSU

November

to

1966.

remove

)

The grand

coalition

was

the

first

period the

the establishment of the Federal Republic.

in Austria

the

was

Germany. Facing

the first significant

participation in

The existence of grand
Germany,

quite rare at the federal level in

most formal and highly centralized

SPD

institution

government since

coalition,

which unlike

led to the institutionalization of

of neo-corporatism

in

postwar

economic recession since the war and growing

inability for the social partners to find solutions, the

SPD-CDU/CSU

coalition, under

heavy pressure and leadership from the pro-labor SPD, established Concerted Action or
Konzertierte Aktion through the 1967

Law

for

Promoting

Economy. (Hancock 1989) Concerted Action was
Joint

Commission

for

Wages and

Prices and

the

Stability

German

was designed

and Growth

in the

equivalent of the Austrian

to facilitate

consensus

building, policymaking and implementation on issues of economic stability and growth.

The economic downturn
large

SPD

that

had begun

electoral gains in 1966,

demanded quick and consensual

in

1

965 had led

and Concerted Action

action to stabilize the

to both the

in

grand coalition, with

1967, as the state and citizens

economy. The creation of

Concerted Action alone was a result of significant compromise between the

CDU/CSU

as part of the grand coalition contract.

Schiller of the

SPD, became

the ideological

program. (Hancock 1989; Allen 1990; von

SPD

and

The Minister of Economics, Karl

and operational head of the Concerted Action

Beyme

1993; Conradt 2001

Concerted Action was a series of regularized and institutionalized conferences
that

brought together high-level government, business, and labor representatives to

discuss general macroeconomic trends and potential policy prescriptions to reverse the

recent recession. (Conradt 2001;

participants included officials

Hancock 1989; Streeck and Hassel 2004) The

from the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Council of
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)

Economic Experts,

the

Bundesbank

,

as well as equal

business and employers’ associations and the

DGB

numbers of representatives of the

and German

labor.

Concerted Action

was broadly supported by both labor and business which both openly declared

their

willingness to act in concert to promote economic stabilization. (Hancock 1989) While

labor

was

far

more dedicated

to the institutionalization

and centralization of social

partnership at the national level, business and employers' reception

was somewhat more

lukewarm. Nonetheless, given the economic conditions and the growing influence of
labor through the preliminary inclusion of the

SPD

in

government, business and

employers’ were happy to have a seat and were willing to

make some compromises.

(Hancock 1989; Conradt 2001
Concerted Action held

six sessions in

1967 covering a wide range of topics

including income and structural policy as well as broad macroeconomic goals. In 1968,
the four sessions were

expanded

projections, social policy, and

to

encompass new issues such

wage developments.

In 1969, the

as

macroeconomic

agenda

for the three

sessions also included price stability and revaluation of the Deutschmark. (Hancock

1

989) While meeting less regularly every year, they tended to cover more economic and

policy ground.

More of the agenda was being

between the social partners without direct

were becoming more intermittent and

replicated and continued between sessions

state

moderation. Hence while the sessions

irregular, the sparse formal

meetings were

supported by significant informal and regularized patterns of interaction, discussion,
consensus, and intermediation between the social partners outside of direct state

compliance. (Hancock 1989)
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The primary accomplishments of Concerted Action between 1967 and 1969 were
significant

compromises by both labor and business

to

promote the

goals of increased growth stability. Union officials agreed to limit

1967-68

to

season

to

in

show

number of significant cracks

a

began

in

SPD and CDU/CSU

the

SPD emerged

became

rate increases for

in

in its solidarity

dragging labor and business into the

and

Concerted Action

civility.

The

electoral

fray. After the elections, as

victorious and began nearly thirteen years of leadership with the

opposition, labor

demands immediately increased while business

1989) The absence of the

CDU/CSU

industry’s and labor’s adherence and

in

government certainly changed both German

commitment

social democratic-led coalition

the left began pressing for greater

interests

and concede wage increases. (Hancock

less willing to exercise price restraints

With a

late 1969,

September and increased the public and rhetorical bickering between

the

CDU/CSU

wage

overarching

6.5%. By the end of 1968, the unemployment rate had declined and general

economic growth rebounded by 1969. (Hancock 1989) By
began

state’s

to

Concerted Action.

government, the

demands. As corporate

DGB, German

labor,

and

profits increased during the

economic upturn between 1969 and 1970, labor demanded “catch-up” wage increases
the reduced

demands between 1967 and 1968. The number of wildcat and

also increased.

official strikes

Under SPD leadership of Concerted Action wages hiked 12.6%

followed by a 13.6% increase
rate in 1971 well

in

1971. This contributed to a

up from the average

rate

growing disagreements and tensions, the

5.3%

for

in

1970

increase in the inflation

of 3.2% throughout the 1960s. Despite the

SPD

continued Concerted Action sessions into

1970 and 1971. The major agenda items remained centered on methods of lifting sluggish

economic growth, wages,

prices, fiscal

and monetary policy, and foreign economic
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relations.

The

social partners continually

government's efforts and promised
issues in that pursuit, yet

many

recommitted themselves

to seek

felt that

to

supporting the

and find compromise on most important

the true

commitment

to

compromise and

consensus of social partnership through Concerted Action had already passed. (Hancock
1989)

Concerted Action began

to

wobble

in

1972 as the Minister of Economics and

defended of the program, Karl Schiller, resigned. The sessions became

more

irregular

from

that point.

included discussion of the

A number of sessions held

oil crises

and potential

inflationary pressures from the shock.

restrictions

Germany maintained one of the

the period. (Katzenstein 1987 ) Yet

The wage negotiations of 1974-75 were

a

to limit

model of

lowest inflation rates in the industrialized world in

by 1976, labor had become increasingly

wage

restraints

had primarily benefited firms’

profits

merely reduced inflationary pressures. Additionally, the

the sessions, federal ministries, and councils.

2001) Hence, while the

DGB. German
tilt

to

labor,

SPD

and the

economic policy

1975 and 1976 were

During the run-up

leadership

to the

left

SPD and

critical

of the

the perception

margins rather than having

DGB.

affiliated unions,

as they often have during the postwar era, that business

left felt,

labor

1975 and

on wages demands

Concerted Action process given the parliamentary power of the
that the

until

and

on both sides and did reduce inflationary pressures considerably. (Hancock

restraint

1989)

from 1973

less frequent

and the

was over-represented

in

(Hancock 1989; Braunthal 1965; Conradt

seemed content

to continue

Concerted Action, the

were demanding a significantly more partisan and pro-

in the

critical

Federal Republic.

years for Concerted Action and

October 1976 elections, the
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SPD

German

had responded

labor

to increased

)

German

labor pressure for

more

serious social democratic reforms and initiatives.

long-standing issue of extending codetermination was foremost on the labor wish

bill to

list.

A

provide equal representation between workers and shareholders on supervisory

boards of

joint stock

parliament

in

companies employing 2000 workers or more was submitted

December

1975.

The law would not have meant

and labor since a number of rules
Nonetheless

German
The

The

act

it

left

shareholders

was an important demonstration by

labor electoral support by reaffirming

was passed

in

March 1976 and

overwhelming labor and

Of course

the

leftist

BDI,

support.

BDA, and

the

its

SPD

in

the

full

between

parity

dominant positions

SPD

in

to re-secure the

social democratic

to

capital

most firms.

DGB

and

and labor credentials.

prevailed in the elections with

(Hancock 1989; Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991

other employers' and business interests were

fundamentally opposed to the extension of codetermination. In 1977, a group of nine
industrial firms

new law

and

thirty

employers' associations challenged the constitutionality of the

before the Federal Constitutional Court. They argued that that the law

undermined shareholder
property, and

rights,

stymied effective management, violated rights to primate

was “incompatible with

the basic constitutional principles

and guidelines

governing the legal order and nature of the economy and labor relations”. (Hancock
1989) While the court would eventually uphold the law in a 1979 ruling, the damage to
the social partnership and Concerted Action had been done.

Following the issuance of the
illustrated his

unhappiness with business' appeal

scheduled Concerted Action meeting
to lure labor

legal challenge,

back

in

DGB

leader,

to the courts

July 1977. Chancellor

to the table later in 1977, but
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by

Heinz Oskar Vetter

by boycotting the

Helmut Schmidt attempted

that point neither labor nor business

felt

compelled

of the

SPD

to return.

The

resuscitation of the

lowered the commitment of all

alike, to the

German economy and

parties, political parties

electoral victories

and social partners

program. Using the codetermination law fight as a “convenient excuse” to

cease participation in Concerted Action, both labor and business withdrew from the

arrangement

had already become so acrimonious over the past few years as

that

prohibit any kind of successful

compromise anyway. (Hancock 1989; Heinisch 2000)

While Concerted Action was dissolved
quite contentious

amongst

to

scholars.

It

after

one decade, the impact has been

does seem clear

that Konzertierte

Aktion never

attained the level of institutionalization, authority, and influence that the Joint Partnership

or

Commission on

results

Social and

were more limited

in

Economic Questions did

in Austria.

Concerted Action's

consequence, more circumscribed in scope, and more

redacted in time to that found in the permanent institutions of the Austrian social

partnership.

actual

Some even

suggest that the overall impact was negligible as

work and influenced policy even

attention,

less

it

did

little

while being primarily a vehicle for media

ceremony, or merely symbolic significance. (Markovits 1996; Allen 1990;

Heinisch 2000; Streeck and Hassel 2004)

The collapse of Concerted Action did not reduce
economic reform however. By the
inflation,

1970s, with an additional

oil

shock, growing

and growing unemployment, the Schmidt government was desperate

significant fiscal,

and

late

the need for significant

institutional

to enact

employment, revenue, and monetary reforms. Hence while the formal

Concerted Action program dissolved, necessary functional equivalents

emerged. (Hancock 1989)
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The most notable were a
residence in

Bonn

after the

DGB

series

of “bungalow” discussions

at

the Chancellor's

boycott of Concerted Action began

would continue through the end of his tenure

in

in

1977. These

1982 and included intense negotiations

and bargaining between the peak associations were undertaken through the
coordination of federal officials.

The discussions were

to

and

initiative

inform the social partners of

proposed government economic policy and to encourage cooperation through mutual
price and

wage

restraint.

the increasing rate of

After 1980, the talks also included significant efforts to address

unemployment. (Hancock 1989)

While certainly lacking the formal

institutionalization

of Concerted Action, these

discussions sought to maintain both the spirit and intent of social partnership in a less

formal and high-tension environment. In

fact,

it

was

rare for labor

and business

to

negotiate directly, rather the government and the Chancellor tended to bilaterally

filter

and intermediate more actively than under Concerted Action. This diverged significantly
from the Adenauer era where the government's direct role was rather small and the social
partners shouldered the bulk of the negotiation and

compromise

process. This increased

the role of the state in intermediating between the interests and forced

much

larger

and sovereign role

in the

it

to

assume

a

policymaking process, a large departure from

previous eras. (Katzenstein 1987; Vail 2003)

The
find

results

of Bungalow Action were mixed. Unions and business were able

compromise on wage hikes and

at a better rate

than in other major

to

price restraint in 1979 and 1980, lowering inflation

OECD

states.

(Hancock 1989) But

the talks

were never

able to restore the previous levels of growth and lower unemployment, though those

have been out of the control of any social partnership or government given broader
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may

regional and global economic changes.

structural,

too

much

and
for

More

attitudinal conditions

any system

As Hancock

suggests, the changing international,

of the German economy and society were perhaps

to solve simultaneously.

(Hancock 1989)

importantly however, Schmidt was unable to find compromise on a formal

reestablishment of Concerted Action or any similar institutionalization of social
partnership amongst the peak associations. Hence,

German neo-corporatism would

continue without a major formal institutionalization for the foreseeable future. This also

meant

a significant shifting

of even more authority

to the

Chancellor and government

organizing and utilizing the social partnership to achieve consensus. While
already developed into a form of Chancellor

legislative, foreign,

and domestic policy

Democracy

initiatives rested

in

in

Germany had

which many of the primary

with the Chancellor,

in areas

of

wages, employment, and social insurance the social partnership had been the traditional
locus of postwar authority.

Economic policymaking was now becoming more

inextricably linked to individual Chancellors and governments and their programmatic

ability to seek

and manufacture consent amongst the major

tremendously from the semi-sovereign model of low
initially

interests.

This varies

state interference

and authority

developed under Adenauer and from the Austrian model where the Joint

Commission

regularly trumped both Chancellors and parliament in initiating important

economic and

social policy decisions.

Hence by

the

1

980s, the social partnership in Austria, despite being

institutionalized within the

government, was actually

government and generally more

influential in shaping

The German system, while modeled on

far

more autonomous from

the

economic policy. (Heinisch 2000)

the need for only
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more

minor government

roles to

)

ensure the infrastructure and conditions of consensual policymaking between the social
partners, had

begun

Under

to

new

the

show

significant variance

from

original structure. (Vail 2003)

its

Chancellor, Helmut Kohl of the C'DU, from 1982 to 1998, the

government continued the trend of increasingly irrelevant

Kohl

DU-FDP

coalition

government

officially

social partnership.

While the

pursued a strategy to gain consent and

consensus from social partners on major economic and social reforms, they were

far

more

willing to bypass such processes and enact legislation without the consent of the interests,

especially labor. (Allen 1990; Wessels 2000; Vail 2003;

While the return of the
politics,

it

CDU/CSU

to leadership

Gobeyn 1993)

was

a

major change for German

did not always result in immediate or radical departures in the government’s

economic policies or policymaking process. Many foreign observers expected large-scale
liberalizing reform in short order,

was

surprising given the conservative ideological rhetoric of the

(Katzenstein 1987)

the

however, most changes were changes

As some

hegemony” of the more

in degrees.

This

Kohl government.

suggest, the conservative coalition found itself a “prisoner of

social democratic policies entrenched

from the

late

1960s

onward. (Heclo and Madsen 1987; Katzenstein 1987) Generally, the Kohl government

moved

to

reduce budget deficits by reducing public expenditures on social and welfare

programs, a slight liberalization of the labor market, and moderate reductions
All

were aimed

fiscal policy,

at

increasing private investment, maintaining a tighter monetary and

and improving employment. (Conradt 2001

But these changes, no matter
a

tilt

in taxes.

how nuanced,

did matter to

German

towards business as a threat to hard fought social democratic gains.

strikes instigated

by the unions

in

1

983 were intended
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to

warn

the

labor

A

which saw

series

government

of

to avoid

too drastic of a swing

workweek. Escalating

away from plans

to

reduce unemployment and shorten the

labor-capital disputes included a

metalworkers and printers

in early 1984.

seven-week walkout by

The dispute ended when workers and

industry

eventually compromised over a 38.5-hour workweek. (Thelen 1991; Streeck and Hassel

2004) This negotiation and compromise between unions and industry was accomplished
with strong pressure by the Kohl government. Kohl and his cabinet, while generally probusiness and certainly less inclined towards social partnership than past SPD-led

governments, nonetheless continued

many

earlier practices

of informal consultation and

intermediation with leaders of labor and business groups. (Gobeyn 1993; Hancock 1989;

Allen 1990) The need for social peace and to mitigate costly and lasting labor-capital
disputes often required the Kohl government to intermediate peak association relations

not

much

unlike that found in previous eras. While Kohl and his government certainly

used the social partnership

less frequently

and with

less vigor than

previous

administrations, tripartite and neo-corporatist structures continued to play an important

role in the

the state

German economy

was now required

especially in

to take a

more

wages and

collective bargaining. But even here

activist role to prevent a

widening of labor

disputes that threatened overall economic and social stability. In essence, the system of

social partnership that

direction

now

once operated with a

required a

much

social partners both in the

minimum of government

intervention and

stronger state presence and intermediary role between the

policymaking and collective bargaining processes. (Gobeyn

1993; Vail 2003)
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The development of the

social partnership in

Germany from

the 1940s to 1980s

The German

certainly followed a less consistent path than in neighboring Austria.

partnership developed with less formal institutionalization eventually

became

far

social

more

dependent upon the government than the Austrian case. During CDU/CSU-led coalition

government under Adenauer, the

social partnership operated effectively as an informal

but primary policymaking structure between the social partners.

The

more circumscribed and was primarily concerned with maintaining
general policy directions of social partnership rather than

Only when

the system

began

to fail to

policy did the state begin to intervene

more

its

role of the state

was

the infrastructure and

specific content.

develop consensus and deliver cooperative

regularly. (Vail 2003; Streeck

2004) The institutionalization of the German social partnership

at the

and Hassel

national level

within Concerted Action actually illustrated the growing weakness of the social
partnership to act without significant government intervention. While the

Schmidt were clearly more dedicated
partnership,

its

Concerted Action was hardly exemplary. The

limited successes and eventual failures of Concerted Action

to take a far

more

and

and placed greater emphasis on social

to

institutionalization within

Schmidt government

SPD

direct, unilateral,

mid 1970s required

the

and intermediating role

to

squeeze consent from the social partners on important reforms and policies. By the time

of Kohl’s ascendancy to Chancellor, the social partnership was already failing to provide
the types

and levels of governance

it

has

it

the past.

(Gobeyn 1993; Streeck and Hassel

2004; Vail 2003) This was exacerbated by Kohl's low affinity for social partnership and
perceived willingness to ignore or bypass the social partners, especially labor. (Gobeyn

1993)
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By

the 1980s, the social partnership had experienced serious structural decline as

the Chancellor, government, and parliament

policymaking process

was

far

in the stead

began taking on

a greater role in the

of social partnership. (Vail 2003; Gobeyn 1993) This

from the developments of social partnership

in its

neighbor to the south, Austria,

where, while facing a number of challenges was not facing the type of wholesale
structural dissolution than

was beginning

to

commence

Commission and chambers systems, while facing
influence,

levels

was nonetheless more

structurally

1980s.

The Austrian

own problems and

Joint

lessening

sound and maintained much higher efficacy

Hence, by the 1980s, while the social partnership maintained some important

policymaking duties and influence,
had achieved

The

its

in the

in the

its

profile

was

certainly diminished far

of the postwar

comparable

to the Austrian Joint

era.

structure,

institutionalization as

Commission,

entrenched, empowered, or lasting as

its

1940s- 1980s)

found in the Austrian model

While Concerted Action was somewhat

for the bulk

notable for

(

social partnership, as noted in the previous section, lacked the type

of permanent and formal structure and

Heinisch 2000) The

it

1950s through early 1970s.

Structures and Institutions of Social Partnership

The German

below what

its

it

is

clear that

it

was not

institutionally

as well

Austrian counterpart. (Casey and Gold 2000;

German postwar model has

been, in comparison to Austria, most

lack of formal institutions. But institutions are not the only elements of

and the structure of German social partnership was

formal institutions.
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far

more developed than

its

)

The absence of a
suggest that

it

Commission-

Joint

like institution in

had been weakly neo-corporatist.In comparison

assessment holds up well.

On

the contrary however, the

quite influential from the 1940s through 1980s through

Germany has
to Austria

German

led

many

perhaps

this

was

social partnership

numerous

legal, formal,

to

and

informal policymaking conduits. These included numerous formal and informal

mechanisms including

the parliamentary

committee system, the

legal system, ad

hoc and

advisory councils, informal negotiation and bargaining, and through the social learning of

key

actors. (Katzenstein 1987)

In the

parliamentary settings of the national and provincial governments, the peak

associations were always deeply involved in the evaluation

related in

any way

to business, labor, or agriculture.

all

proposed legislation

that

These were not one-off evaluations

but were ongoing and engaged processes that extended throughout the policymaking

process from ministerial drafting, parliamentary debate, and administrative

implementation. The social partners were notable for their exertion of power in
parliamentary committee work through the direct role of elected

members

but also the

consultation process that allows them influence over the design and drafting of

legislation. (Braunthal 1965;

associations

was done

Thelen 1991; Markovits 1986) The consulting of the

as a matter of administrative procedure. This

the lasting impact of social partnership

pragmatic need for expertise

is

a reflection

on the policymaking process as well as the

in drafting

and implementing policy

manner. (Conradt 2001
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in a cooperative

interest

of both

However,

the ability of the

government through
circumscribed than

such as the

SPD

German

parties, parliament,

in the

in the

soeial partnership to influence the

and government has

likely

been more

Austrian case. Even during periods of single party domination,

CDU

1970s and the

in 1980s, the social partnership's abilities to

shape the cabinet, influence ministers, and directly influence policymaking were limited
in

comparison

to the lack

to the tight

and centralized Austrian case, (von Beyme 1993) This was due

of grand coalition as well as the inclusion of the

FDP

much of the postwar

for

governing period. (Heinisch 2000) Relations between the small federal bureaucracy and
interest associations are also primarily informal

characteristics

of the Austrian system. Given the division of federal powers, the social

partners were actually quite often

more

interactive with

bureaucracies on a regular basis than those

One of the ma jor

distinctions

partial shareholder in

some

direct state

Lander governments and

at the national level.

from the Austrian case was the

state-owned or subsidized industries. While the

away from

and lack the compact and strongly linked

German

larger national firms like

is

banking system was a conduit used by the

a

sector.

(Markovits 1986;

much

like Austria, the provincial

state to strongly delegate

German

in

its

power

to the

the Austria state

heavy industry, banking, insurance,
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German

state took a far less

managing important sectors of the economy. Whereas

major shareholder or owner

a

Volkswagen, the tendency was

sector and firm levels. Nonetheless, in overall terms, the

became

become

not to say that the state lacked a strong role in

regulating or shaping the private sector. In fact,

direct role in

state did eventually

ownership of assets from the private

Conradt 2001; Heinisch 2000) This

relative dearth of

airlines.

utilities,

and service sectors, German nationalization was more limited to public sector

service such as transportation, telecommunications, and

As noted

earlier, social partnership regularly

quasi-regulatory authority and roles.

cases including the Federal

was tasked

empowered

the social partners with

The German postwar model exhibited many such

Employment Office

to link jobseekers

utilities.

or Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit

and open positions amongst employers. The

(BA)

that

BA

administered training and job placement funded through a combination of federal

revenues and, primarily, through social contributions from the social partners. The
regional and local offices were operated jointly by both labor unions and employers'

associations and were amongst the most notable quasi-govemmental roles of the social

partnership in postwar Germany. (Vail 2003; Streeck and Hassel 2004) Another related

area

was vocational

training

where the

social partners effectively operated a

governmental-funded and created program via the autonomous and collective efforts of

peak associations. Importantly, these examples also meant a more circumscribed
role in labor market policies

state

and outcomes. (Katzenstein 1987)

Unions also achieved important roles
system and other social insurance programs

in the

at

administration of the social security

both the federal and provincial levels.

(Katzenstein 1987; Streeck and Hassel 2004) Employers’ and business interests similarly

adopted duties including regulations over industrial policy and regulation. As Streeck and
Hassel suggest, the “high

art

of government in West Germany was to turn social

organizations with guaranteed

autonomy and independent power

into agents of publicly

licensed self-government”. (Streeck and Hassel 2004) These

fit

conceptualization of the federal republic as a semi-sovereign

state.
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very well into the

(Katzenstein 1987)

One
the

notable difference with Austria was the role of the central bank. In Germany,

Bundesbank

,

the central

bank of the Federal Republic remained highly independent

from the government and influence of social partners.

In Austria, the state

partners frequently used the central bank to shape and direct

though what was called Austro-Keynesianism. However,

in

and social

macroeconomic trends

Germany, except

for a brief

period in the early 1970s, the central bank was independent and generally biased against

inflation

and used

its

power

to apolitically regulate

monetary values and maintain a stable

investment profile. (Hancock 1989; Conradt 2001; Katzenstein 1987) This highly

moderated not only inflationary pressures but also wage and price demands from unions
as well as industry.

conservative

Almost

in their

all

the major parties and interests tended to be rather

approach to using the central bank, including the

SPD

by

“studiously avoided policy measures that might undermine fiscal stability or unleash

rampant inflation” (Hancock 1989; Allen 1990; Thelen 1991; Kitschelt and Streeck 2004)

The only exception
state did

to the

norm was during

the era of Concerted Action

when

the

German

adopt a more Keynesian model of intervention that required greater instrumental

use of the central bank. (Casey and Gold 2000) But this was short-lived and was halted as

the

German economy showed

signs of recovery by 1972. (Allen 1990) While the

Austrian central bank was less independent,
schilling, the Austrians

more aggressive

fiscal

While the

were able

to achieve

it

should be remembered that by pegging the

somewhat

similarly low inflation despite a

and monetary policy.

central

bank remained a strong

strong barrier to egregious

demands by

pillar

of independence, and hence a

the social partners, the system of municipal and

state-owned banks and savings institutions was a useful conduit for state and social
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partner intervention in the economy. (Kitschelt and Streeck 2004) These Landesbanken

often allowed the state and Lander governments to funnel low-interest or

loans, basically subsidized financing, to

German

Schmidt 2006) Hence while the German
marketplace, such indirect methods were

era.

(Thelen 1991

)

These allowed the

state

industries

and business. (Allen 1990;

avoided direct intervention

common

to the

good term

German system

social partners, the state, unions

in firms

in the

and the

postwar

and business and

employers’ organizations, opportunities to influence the economy and economic

decision-making

at the

firm or sector level. (Allen 1990; Jeffery and Paterson 2004)

conservative stability of central banking as a

both the Austrian and

way

German models. Of course

to control inflation

was common

The

to

the Austrians had a slight advantage of

being able to peg their currency to the Deutsch-Mark as an anti-inflationary benchmark.

Germany

as a major world

economy and

withdrawal of the United States from
Bretton

Woods system

interest rates

its

a regularly traded currency, especially after the

role in maintaining the gold standard

in the early 1970s,

had much tougher choices

to

make

of the
in

terms of

and often stepped on the toes of labor which was normally seeking wage

increases.

In constitutional

and

legal terms, the social partnership

institutionalized through strongly constituted labor

is

also well

and codetermination laws. Germany

has a remarkable level and variety of labor and industrial relations policies codified into
law. This process,

known

as juridification or Verrechtlichung

,

is

one of the most

distinguishing patterns of German labor and social partnership. (Markovits 1986; Thelen

1991; Heimsch 2000; Bosch 2004)

The most important

legal foundations for organized

labor in the social partnership are found in the guaranteed rights of collective bargaining.
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works councils, and codetermination or Mitbestimmung. Many of these began
developed and enacted during the immediate post-World

were discussed

earlier in this chapter. After the

number of important

reestablished in a

War I and Weimar

end of World

War

II,

to

be

eras,

and

these rights were

legislative acts as well as the Basic

Law, the

constitution of the Federal Republic.

Much of the

impetus for the laws came from developments

occupation zone between 1945 and 1949,

in

which the British were quite supportive of

the creation of stronger links between labor and industry. This

many

industrial interests that the British felt

regime but also

German
labor

fit

industrial

demands

in the British

stemmed from

had been too strongly

a longstanding pattern, dating to before

a distrust of

affiliated with the

World War

I,

Nazi

in trying to limit

and economic might vis-a-vis the United Kingdom. Hence German

for greater co-determination coincided with overall British occupational

goals of checking or regulating the unfettered renewal of German heavy industry and

manufacturing. The developments in the British zone were expanded to the trizonal level

by the

late

1940s and then to the whole republic after 1949. (Braunthal 1965; Markovits

1986)

The Basic Law provides much of the foundation
social partnership through subsequent legislation.

Codetermination Acts of 195

1

for the institutionalization of the

The most notable

are the

and 1976, the Works Constitution Acts of 1952 and 1972,

and the Collective Bargaining Agreement Act of 1949. (Bosch 2004)

government also created the Federal Labor Court and defining
appeal process for labor-capital related disputes.

most of the

legal

In

In 1954, the

a specific adjudication

and

combination, these acts resurrected

developments of the Weimar period while also providing significantly
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improved
noted

institutional

earlier, these

and

legal protections

of labor. (Markovits 1986) However, as

laws also prohibit and limit social partners from some actions,

including strikes, lockouts and other disruptions only

conditions.

The

legal

and partnership and

system can therefore be said

limit its potential

when meeting

strict legal

to both institutionalize social partners

range of actions simultaneously. (Heinisch 2000;

Bosch 2004)
Unlike Austria, where the constitutional court and legal system tended
smaller and less integral role, the

and powerful force
regularly handed

social partners

in

German

more

Constitutional Court has been a far

moderating the social partnership.

down

to play a

It

and the labor courts have

decisions that were antithetical to consensually

and government throughout the postwar

strict

era.

made

policy of the

(Thelen 1991; Kitschelt and

Streeck 2004) The special labor courts themselves are often accused of being quite
conservative

in their rulings

and interpretation of existing code. (Katzenstein 1987;

Heinisch 2000) This has limited some policymaking avenues within the social
partnership, far

more than occurs

in the

Austrian case. The ability and increased

willingness of the constitutional and labor courts to effectively veto certain moves,

reforms, and policies changes the calculations of the partners, government, and
negotiation process. This has extended to areas of taxation, social insurance, labor

markets, and vocational education,

all

areas integral to the social partnership. (Kitschelt

and Streeck 2004)
In addition, there is

no constitutional

right to social partnership

and inclusion of

peak associations in the governance of the German

political system.

where the

jure rights to inclusion in the

social partners

have both de facto and de
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Unlike

in Austria

)

policymaking and governance process, the German model
conventional law and norms rather than

is

based almost entirely upon
(Markovits 1986;

strict constitutional protections.

Heinisch 2000)

However, the added benefit of the strong
the social partners, especially

legal

and constitutional limitations upon

on extensive protection of rights

to private property,

freedom of organization, and non-compulsory memberships, has reduced more militant
objectives of both business and,

more importantly,

labor.

(Thelen 1991

)

On

the other

hand, compared to the Austrian model, the codification and juridification of the social
partners primary areas of interaction also limited their abilities to bargain and reach

compromise without regularly exceeding

their legal

mandates or coming

into violation

of

preexisting code. (Heinisch 2000)

Another factor
nature of the

German

jurisdiction in

many

others. For instance

in the

operation of the social partnership has the strong federal

republic.

The system of cooperative federalism strongly divides

areas but requires close cooperation, consultation, and joint action in

some

under exclusive national

issues such as

monetary policy,

jurisdiction. Yet, there are

legislation at both the national

many

railroads,

and

air transport are

matters requiring concurrent

and provincial levels including those relevant

to the social

partnership including laws of association, public welfare, industrial and banking issues,

labor laws, and healthcare. (Vail 2003)

The Lander

also exercise jurisdiction in policy

areas not specifically enumerated to the central government including public education.

(Conradt 2001
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Importantly, the Lander governments also have a strong say

in

enumerated federal

policy areas due to their direct representation and delegations to the upper house of

parliament, the Bundesrat.

The Bundesrat has

authority over 50 to

70%

of legislation

passed by the lower house. (Conradt 2001; Jeffrey 2003) Hence, unlike the Austrian

model with

its

weaker federal structure and lessened provincial power

policymaking process, the German
authority and

state is far

more

federal in

its

in the

decision and

decentralization of

empowerment of the Lander.

While, as discussed

in

of federalism and corporatism

chapter three, there

it

some dispute over

should be noted that the

weaken such arguments. The German
at several levels

is

the compatibility

German model has tended

social partnership existed

to

and was institutionalized

of governance within the federal republic. While

at the

national level,

industry-wide collective bargaining and national peak associations of labor, business, and
agriculture have been integrated into the policymaking process there

is

significant

evidence of concurrent provincial and local neo-corporatism between the Lander

governments and the provincial representatives of business,

Given

the level of involvement of the

Lander

in the federal

labor,

and agriculture as well.

policymaking process as well

as the significant sovereignty over intra-provincial affairs, including social insurance,

labor, industrial,

and vocational education policy

this

should not be surprising.

Importantly the Lander were also quite influential through the use of regional and
provincial banks to fund and regulate regional industry and labor politics. This meso-

corporatism

at the

provincial level

was

rather unique to the

Kitschelt and Streeck 2004)
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German model.

(Allen 1990;

However, the
delimiting their

own

federal

and Lander governments have not always been effective

competencies. The Basic

Law

at

provides a system of considerable

cooperative federalism that requires significant cooperation, consultation, and

compromise between
policymaking

in

the federal and

many

Lander

areas of social partnership does require additional steps to ensure

Lander support and consent over major

social

and economic policies

approval of the Bundesrat the upper house of the
,

Lander governments. (Vail 2003) This
in

governments. (Jeffrey 2003) Hence

level

German parliament

differs significant

that will require

controlled by the

from the weaker federal system

Austria that has tended to see the Lander defer to the central government on almost

issues,

minus

social security,

While limited

in

all

of social and economic policymaking.

many ways by

the courts and federalism of the

German

political

system, participation in panels, committees, commissions, and special councils has been a

primary conduit for the social partners

to exert influence in the

policymaking process.

Parliamentary committees. Chancellor, and Lander governments have regularly

appointed peak association representatives to relevant advisory commissions and
councils. Guidelines and expert suggestions for reforms of wages, prices,

economic

growth, inflation, and other social and economic policies are often addressed by such

committees and commissions and often operate on

a

the tn- or multipartite attendees. Despite the formal

consensus building process amongst

disbandment of Concerted Action

in

the late 1970s, the social partners retained important seats and roles in innumerable

commissions and council consensual ly advising the government on important

economic policy matters.
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social

and

While some neo-corporatist arrangements have been through national

level social

partnership institutions, like Concerted Action, these have varied on the basis of

governmental or social partner support. During times of economic prosperity and growth,
the social partnership between

state

German

labor, industry, employers’, agriculture

and the

operated more informally, silently, but effectively to negotiate, compromise, and

find consensus in areas of

subsidy. (Streeck 1984)

increases

Action.

its

economic governance, wages,

Only

formal profile

Hence while

in

employment, and

prices,

times of crisis and contestation, did the social partnership

in the

the Austrian

policymaking process such as

it

did during Concerted

model of social partnership was one of rather consistent

and regularized patterns of institutionalization and gradually expanding authority, the

German model

has exhibited greater institutional inconsistency.

the social partners

When

times are good,

seemed more than capable of achieving consensus and cooperation

with limited state intervention. (Katzenstein 1987; Streeck 1997; Vail 2003; von

1996) However,

in

times of decline and

crisis,

and when the social partners have been

unable or unwilling to compromise and negotiate, the state’s role
increased as

it

Beyme

did during Concerted Action and, after

its

in the

failure, the

partnership

Bungalow meetings

of the Schmidt government. (Streeck 1997; Vail 2003)
Overall, the structure of the

lacking

still

many of the

German

social partnership

is

quite complex.

formal institutional qualities found in Austria, the

deeply entrenched

in

numerous other informal,

legal, advisory,

structures inside the policymaking system. (Katzenstein 1987)

As

While

German model

is

and conventional

in Austria, the

structures of socials partnership are also found in the linkages of the social partners to the
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political parties

and citizens through

political culture

and solidarity and

will be discussed

below.

Linking Social Partners, Political Parties, and Parliament

While most of the major
major

sitting in the

significantly less

interest associations

political parties, the penetration

pronounced than

in Austria.

have members

in

and mutual dependence

members of Parliament mostly

CDU/CSU

to fifty

Further,

has been estimated that nearly one-third of the parliament’s

their occupations.

is

The professional occupational chambers

have close

it

parliament and

in the

(Miiller-Rommel 1989; Conradt 2001

)

and

FDP

delegations.

members

The numbers tend

to

represent

be

in

professional and occupational associations that include doctors, lawyers, engineers,

professors, architects, and other professional organizations rather than larger labor or

business associations. Hence while the
penetration by interest associations

it

The Austrian case was one of penetration by

and national compulsory chambers or the powerful
Interest

have significant

to

often stems from an extraordinarily narrow range of

professional and occupational interests.

large

German parliament appears

Group/Associations

Professional Organizations

OGB

and

VOI

CDU/CSU
26%

associations.

SPD
1

9%

Religious, Scientific, Political

13%
23%

Unions, Workers' Association

8%

20%
24%

Social Organizations

11%

13%

Employers’ Organization

the

12%

(Hancock, 1989)
Table

3: Interest

Group

The impact of peak
comparison

to that

Affiliation

of Deputies

in the

Major

Parties

(

1989)

associations in the parliamentary process has been

of the Austrian case. The constitution, especially

286

mixed

in

article 38, suggests

that the

government, ministers, and parliament should be “independent” from outside

influences. This

would seem,

in theory, to limit direct intervention

of the peak

associations in the policymaking process. Yet the electoral and organizational linkages

between parties and

interests

allow significant penetration of the legislative process by

the peak associations often resulting in consensually developed and mutually agreed

policy outcomes, (von

Beyme

1993) This

committee and pre-plenary process where

is

In four specific

especially true in the parliamentary

through their parliamentary

interests,

delegates, often shape the eventual acts that

upon

become

law.

committees. Agriculture (67%), Labor (63%), Economics (48%),

and Family and Health (67%), penetration by

interest

groups was well above the whole

parliamentary average. (Miiller-Rommel, 1988) Nonetheless,

much of this

penetration

is

by the professional chambers, doctors, academics, and lawyers, while labor and business
influence

is

slightly less

pronounced. The exception

is

agriculture and

penetration of the relevant parliamentary committees with

(von

Beyme

strong

organized opposition.

1993)

German

parties are prohibited

from running candidates for union offices and

intervening in intra-union affairs. This would seem to

and

little

its

interest group, especially

Austrian case, a

between the

SPD

and

weaken

labor.

number of officials concurrently served

positions. In reality, however, the prohibition

Approximately 35-40% of

SPD

is bit

in

the link between the party

As was

illustrated in the

party and labor association

more technical than

universal.

parliamentarians have strong ties to the labor

and the maintenance of dual membership

is

quite

1986; Conradt 2001)
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common. (Thelen

movement

1991; Markovits

)

Historically the ties

between the

SPD

and German labor have been quite strong

and concentrated. There has been significant interpenetration between the party and
organized labor. (Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991) Yet the relationship between the

and

SPD

from the case of the

SPO

and

OGB

in Austria.

decentralization and weakness of the

times,

it

dependency

lacks the level of intimacy, interpenetration, and mutual

DGB

This

is

vis-a-vis

that differs

primarily reflected by the overall

its

constituent sectoral unions. At

SPD

has seemed clear that labor has been frustrated with the slow pace of the

initiating pro-labor

DGB

in

reform programs and institutionalizing stronger elements of social

democracy. (Conradt 2001

Many on
accommodating

the far left and in the labor

movement

relationship with business and the

Turner 1998) This frustration often leads the

DGB

also accuse the

BDI and BDA.
to reaffirm

and independent posture, implicitly threatening the

SPD

its

SPD

of a

far too

(Braunthal 1965;

official non-partisan

with the withdrawal of its

support and also to appeal to a wider audience in terms of membership and public

credibility.

(Turner 1998; Thelen 1991; Markovits 1986; Conradt 2001)

But the primary weakness between the

DGB and SPD

overarching, and compulsory membership. There

Austrian Federal

Chamber of Labor

more comparable OGB,
dominance over

DGB

the

DGB

the national labor

is

that includes all

lies in its

nothing similar to the compulsory

workers and even compared

unions, the

DGB

is

to the

lacks both the density and centralized organizational

movement of its Austrian

counterpart Because the

often struggles to find a collective and consensual position

member

lack of central,

ultimately

weakened within

amongst

the eyes of the

its

constituent

SPD. While

Austrian Social Democrats (SPO) can rely upon and deal with rather monolithic and
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the

)

monopolistic labor organizations

in the

Federal

Chamber of Labor and

the

OGB,

the

SPD

often must negotiate and bargain with multiple unions as well as the confederation,

complicating the relationship and leading to inter-union division within the party leaders

and members

itself.

Hence, divisions within labor are reflected and sometimes magnified

within the SPD. (Markovits 1986; Heimsch 2000)

This has occurred on numerous occasions. Examples include the

split

between the

metalworkers' union and chemical workers’ union over social insurance and labor market

changes during the Kohl and Schroder governments as well as schism between smaller

and larger unions over issues of pensions, healthcare, and European integration.

(Heimsch 2000; Streeck and Hassel 2004) The decentralization of German labor and the
divisions within the

DGB

and labor movement

itself

tend to be replicated within the

membership, parliamentary caucuses, provincial and
leadership of the

the

SPD

are

SPD. (Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991

more convoluted and

Democrats and Austrian

labor. In

local officials,

)

Hence

less predictable than those

comparison, the

DGB

and national

the links

between labor and

found between Social

relationship to the

SPD

has been

generally strong but with moderate criticism and occasional division. This suggests that

the relationship

is

less strong than the

Kingdom, and well below

that

of the links between the

stronger than the one between the

States.

one between unions and Labour Party

AFL-CIO and

OGB

and

SPO

in the

United

in Austria, but far

the Democratic Party in the United

(Conradt 2001

The employers’ and business associations have tended
with the

CDU/C'SU and gam advantage during

to

enjoy close relations

periods of their government. (Braunthal

1965; Conradt 2001) This differs from the Austrian case where even during periods of
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)

OVP

rule

SPO

rule in the 1970s

(which

itself

was

limited by long-term grand coalition and thirteen years of

and 1980s) there was

little

change from the more social

significant

democratic and neo-corporatist policies and structures. Even during periods of SPD rule
in

Germany,

it

has been argued that the

BD1 and

BDA

have found

difficulty in

little

getting proposals approved by government. (Conradt 2001

The Green Front representing

agricultural interests

represented interest, based on proportionality, amongst the

About

fifty

parliamentary deputies, dominantly from the

is

perhaps the most well

German

political parties.

CDU/CSU, form

a relatively

powerful caucus within the legislature and have dominated the agriculture committee for
decades. (Conradt 2001

CDU/CSU

and

SPD

)

Additionally, farming interests have done well under both

led governments.

Farmers in Germany enjoy very high subsidies

from both national and European levels and have been successful
protection, within the

EU

decision-making structure, of the

(CAP). This has made German agriculture perhaps the

least

at

securing

Common

German

Agricultural Policy

competitive but most

protected of any major European state, quite an achievement given the competition.

The SPD was excluded from power

until the

1966 grand coalition

that lasted until

only 1969 While leading as the senior partner with the Free Democrats from 1969

until

1982, they were again out of power from 1982 until 1997. Another grand coalition

was

reestablished after the 2005 elections and continues today, but

Germany

has had far less

experience with grand coalition and has not developed the type of extensive proporz

system that existed
grand coalition was

making and more

in

Austrian for the majority of the postwar era.

itself less

for the

The

first

period of

motivated by a will or wish for co-determinant decision-

weakened position of the
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parties vis-a-vis a resurgence of the

)

right-wing

NPD

(Hancock 1989)

German
for

In essence, there has

Germany

coalition in

voters

FDP

and problematic relations with the

than in Austria,

been

demand

less

for

mid

to late 1960s.

and experience with grand

many

at least until the last election. Intriguingly,

2005 election was

the grand coalition after the

felt that

in the

German reform which needed consensus from both

and

left

right,

a necessary step

an almost Austrian

ideal for consociational politics.

The
compared

political parties

have also been weaker

to Austria. In 1996, the

80 million. The

SPO

SPD

terms of membership and loyalty

in

only had 900,000 official

of Austria had nearly 700,000 members

million. (Conradt 2001

)

in a

members

in a

county of

country of only 7.5

Also unlike Austria, labor has weak penetration of the right wing

parties

of Germany. While labor has some institutional and organizational membership

power

inside both the

influencing the

FDP

OVP

or

and

FPO

in Austria,

CDU/CSU. There

is

labor

is

far

a small labor

weaker

in internally

wing of the CDU,

the Christian

Democratic Workers or Christlich-Demokratische Arbeitnehmerschaft (CDA) operating
exclusively in the Rhine-Ruhr regions of Germany.

An

additional element that

parties has been the continual role

limiting

was

to

be

From 1952

until 1966, the

the coalition between the

to attract voters

CDA

away from

at a

CDU

the

SPD by

party organization specific to union and labor concerns.
hghters/bottle openers while the

was

a strategy to attract

CDU/CSU was

more while

The

SPD

and

FDP

political rally in

more

CDA

blue-collar oriented-workers

the typical middle and upper class supporters of the

writing.
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from 1969

Bonn

in

apparently

CDU have

pamphlets.

CDU
cigarette

It is

may smoke and

more time

until

July 2002. The

chamber within the
was giving away combination

who

limited

libertarian

offering a

CDU kiosks were primarily handing out pens and

more

and

of third parties in government coalition since the

This author encountered representatives of the

primary goal seemed

if this

social partners

policy programs and legislative agendas by the inclusion of the

FDP. Even more

R

(Conradt 2001

weakens the relationship between

establishment of the Federal Republic.

in their

8

for reading

unclear

drink

and

1982 that tremendously limited the ability of the SPD, as Willy Brandt nearly found out
in

1972 as he only nearly survived a vote of no confidence, to overwhelmingly

wishes of the labor movement and

left

during

its

tenure.

fulfill

the

FDP

(Heimsch 2000) While the

has since been joined by the Greens in the king-making role of junior coalition partners,
the overall result, unlike Austria

party governance for a

which was dominated by

number of years

in the

postwar

either grand coalition or

era, has

one

been a multiparty system

requiring coalition building with the smaller third parties so as to govern. This has limited

the ability of the major parties to fully press for and enact specific interests' agendas

without endangering their governing coalition. In addition, this has often caused

dissatisfaction

amongst the major

interest associations with their respective party partners

and the perceived lack of hoped reforms. (Thelen 1991
Nonetheless, the domination by the

of the Federal Republic allowed a
neo-liberal parties

and reinforced

the postwar era. (Kitschelt

CDU/CSU

;

Heinisch 2000; Conradt 2001)

and

partial neutralization

SPD

since the establishment

of both more radical

socialist

their relationship with the social partners for

and

most of

and Streeck, 2004) The near two-party system also locked the

peak associations of labor and industry into a rather uncompetitive relationship with the

SPD

and

CDU/CSU

significantly moderating their

demands and mitigating extreme

policy options by both sides. (Katzenstein 1987; Nicholls 1994; Turner 1997; Vail 2003)

Social

Democracy and

German

social

Social Partnership

democracy's relative weakness compared

to Austria's also

informed the postwar arrangement of their respective corporatism (Heinisch 2000) This

meant

that the kind

of Austro-Keynesianism

that
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became

the

model of the postwar,

social

)

democratic, neo-corporatist, social partnership

the

German

left

in

Austria was usually beyond the reach of

and SPD. (Markovits 1996; Seidel 1996) Germany, especially under

who

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and his Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard,
himself would become Chancellor
fiscal

measures

policy.

The

to

rates.

mid 1960s, eschewed

promote growth, maintain

central

the central bank,

in the

government tended

Bundesbank

,

full

to rely

to control the

the use

of Keynesian

employment, and enact monetary

upon the regulation of the market by using

supply of money and inflation via interest

(Heinisch 2000; Conradt 2001

The sudden drop
prompted an

CDU/CSU

electoral

in 1966.

in

growth rates and increase

unemployment

swing and the eventual grand coalition between

in the

mid 1960s

SPD and

the

This swung the state towards a far more economically interventionist

agenda and the Concerted Action program adopted
chapter.

in

The new policy

in 1967,

discussed earlier

direction, articulated under the 1967

Law on

in this

Stability

and

Growth, included more a Keynesian counter-cyclical program of increased public
expenditures on infrastructure and housing and increased employment. (Streeck and

Hassel 2004; Hancock 1989)

slump, stimulated

would continue

By

new growth, and temporarily reversed unemployment

into the 1970s as the

the junior partner

FDP

as

from 1969

After the return of the

1982,

Hence

1968, these had stabilized the short-term economic

Germany began

grand coalition ended and the

governed with

until 1982.

CDU/CSU

to the Chancellorship

gradually reducing the

a significant difference

SPD

trends. This

under Helmut Kohl

in

more Keynesian programs of the SPD

between Austria and Germany was the

role

of social

democracy and Keynesian macroeconomic planning. While dominant throughout
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era

the

)

postwar period

in

Austria under

far less interventionist

domination

in

in

governments and coalitions, Germany experienced a

and more intermittent history of statism. The

Austria was mostly absent in the

even then there was

Germany

all

far less direct

German

statist

market

And

case until the late 1960s.

and deep economic intervention of the

state in

terms of nationalization, state-domination of private capital, or other

protectionist or dirigiste practices. (Markovits 1996)

Keynesianism, statism, and social democracy

model of social partnership were

that

Hence

the linkages

were fundamental

either significantly

between

to the Austrian

weaker or absent

in the

German

model. (Heinisch 2000)

As noted

earlier,

German

labor

was

far less centralized

organized than

in the

Austrian case model. There was also significant sympathy for business and industry
the middle class

SPD

and even amongst parties of the center and

(Conradt 2001

“social market

)

Hence compared

economy”

in

to Austria, social

left

such as the

FDP

Germany may have ranked below

and

democracy and the pursuit of a

Germany, while generally agreed upon, has been

limited in scope and scale in practice. (Casey and

in

far

more

Gold 2000) Nonetheless, while

Austria in measurements of both neo-corporatism and

social

democracy, clearly Germany was strongly guided by both ideals compared

entire

community of postwar

industrialized democracies.

Many key

to the

social democratic

goals including an advanced welfare state, significant labor market protections, worker
representation at the firm level through codetermination, and extensive social insurance

were gained by German workers

in the

postwar
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era.

(Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991

Codetermination laws were amongst the more social democratic policies

be

to

institutionalized in the Federal Republic, initially introduced into legislation in 1951

under the

CDU government of Konrad

Adenauer. The laws are designed to grant parity

or near-parity to representatives of workers’ interests on the supervisory boards of larger

industrial firms.

The

intent

and decision-making but
firms. This

it

was

to give labor

was

also a

would hopefully create

a

an active voice

in

method of increasing worker

“p° slt ve
'

attitude

management

corporate

loyalty to the largest

toward cooperation" with business

of employee discontent and radical labor

interests as well as to lessen the likelihood

demands. (Hancock 1989; Katzenstein 1987) Hence co-determination was
that

had potential benefits for both labor and business. However, attempts

codetermination, either increasing power or increasing the applicable

business

2001

felt

was too

restrictive

to a

of private ownership

expand

interests.

new codetermination
rights.

to

compromise

number of firms,

have often run into staunch opposition by German industry and business

most notable was the 1976 and 1977 challenges

a

The

bill that

(Hancock 1989; Conradt

)

During the period of SPD leadership from 1969

to 1982, there

were important

attempts to expand social democracy including the expansion of codetermination laws

and Vermogensbildung, a redistribution of capital through compulsory
Both were strongly opposed by employers’ and business

and works constitution acts were expanded

in

interests.

1972 and 1976

representation on firm boards and the inclusion of a greater

smaller enterprises.

industry and the

The proposed program

CDU/CSU

as well as the
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The codetermination

to include stronger

worker

number of medium and

for profit sharing

SPD's

profit sharing.

was adamantly opposed by

coalition partner, the

FDP. This

coalition of opposition eventually killed the proposal

of Chancellor Brandt with Schmidt

Upon

their return to

power

in

1974. (Nitsch and

1982, the

in

more market-friendly reforms

that

and led

to the eventual

Hams

C'DU/CSU under

replacement

1974; Braunthal 1977)

the Kohl

government

initiated

encouraged private sector investment and cut social

program spending. These were obviously welcomed by employers' and industry

BDA

endured thirteen years of SPD governance. (Conradt 2001; Vail 2003) The BDI and

were temporarily effective
thirty-five

at

had

that

stopping demands for shorter working hours including a

hour workweek plan similar to

that

enacted

France. While successful,

in

it

has

also been partly responsible for increased labor-business conflict since the 1970s.

(Conradt 2001)

Unlike Austria, the German model of social partnership seems to have had a more
fluctuating institutionalization dependent

The

was

social partnership

structural

and

certainly

more

upon particular governments and partisanship.
influential

and empowered with greater

institutional authority at the national level

under Social Democratic or

grand coalition eras of government than under Christian Democratic ones.
suggested that there

some going

a strong linkage

is

between

social

as far to suggest that the social partnership

democracy and
is

democratic policymaking. (Jessop 1979; Wessels 2000)

the highest

In Austria,

Many have

social partnership,

form of social

with long periods of

social democratic participation, alone or in grand coalition, the social partnership

remained a powerful,

vital,

and well- institutionalized model of decision-making.

In

Germany, with long periods of conservative government with more marginalized
institutions

and processes of social partnership, there does seem

suggest such a correlation
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to be

some evidence

to

)

Only during periods of grand

SPD-ied government, such as during the

coalition or

period of Concerted Action from the late 1960s into the early 1970s, has the

German

social partnership been institutionalized at a level like that found in Austria.

Yet the mere

presence of the

SPD

social partnership.

in

government does not explain the

entire

postwar era of German

The Social Democrats were excluded from power from 1949

1966 and again from 1982

until 1998.

until

The C'DU governments of Erhard and Kohl did

not

emphasize national and centralized forms of social partnership. Yet the German
policymaking process was

still

strongly neo-corporatist

is

many key

areas including

wages, the labor market, healthcare, vocational training, pensions, and unemployment
compensation. Under Adenauer, the social partners were able to effectively self-govem
over most of these policy areas with only incremental or general guidance from the

German

state.

While Erhard was more ideologically opposed

his affinities for neo-liberalism.

Kohl would have

likely

to social partnership

have continued the

patterns of neo-corporatist governance if the social partners had been

accommodative

to

one another

in

implementing reforms

in

due

earlier

more

times of economic decline.

Nonetheless, after Adenauer the pattern tends to support the argument that the

SPD

favored greater institutionalization of the social partnership through peak associations
the national level than the

CDU/CSU

to

at

preferred. (Wessels 2000; Conradt 2001

Solidarity and Social Partnership

While the postwar German and Austrian

social partnerships did vary in their level

of concentration and centralization, they did share a

common

solidarity

towards

consensus building and co-deterministic forms of policy and decision-making between
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the primary interests and government. Like Austria, the

that

punctuated pre-war and 19

lh

century

German

more

radical politics

political landscape

and parties

were mostly

marginalized. (Nicholls 1994) The atmosphere was one of necessary consensus building

amongst the major

political

and economic actors

to achieve

postwar economic and

political reconstruction.

Popular support for anti-system, regional, and other splinter parties
dramatically after the war and the rise of centrist parties like the

illustrated a significant

that

emerged

efficiency,

after the

Uniquely, the

CDU/CSU

war favored consensus building,
all

SPD

unity, solidarity,

democracy,

hallmark preconditions for the building of neo-

and processes. (Hancock 1989; C'onradt 2001; Nicholls 1994)

new German

political culture

lacked a strong nationalist rationale

While there was certainly an

and

common
ideal

in

its

tendency towards neo-corporatism

most other

states.

of unifying the society and polity for

reconstruction of the

German economy and

explicitly nationalist

argument for social partnership as was often the case

eras and other states.

The

made

and

break from the past. (Hancock 1989; Vail 2003) The civic culture

and dependability,

corporatist institutions

fell

state, the elites

specific context provided

were not able

to use an

in

previous

by National Socialism and the war

fostering intense nationalism implausible and dangerous. (Katzenstein 1987)

Hence, the

new

Federal Republic and

its

social partnership

explicitly nationalist identity or ideal, rather there

was

were not based on an

the use of a

more

subtle and

inclusive identity to bind the actors and interests together towards achieving consensually

developed economic and social decisions. The norms of consensus, inclusion, and
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solidarity to the ideals

political

of social partnership became important features of the German

and social culture of the postwar

However, Germany
religious,

and social

lines.

differentiated a strong

society.

to

in

1945 was

a society divided along class, regional,

working class-middle class-upper class division

These strongly

CDU

still

(Schrim 2002; Nicholls 1994)

Levels of income, education, and other social

fell in line

criteria

in

German

with the new postwar political parties. The

encompass the lower and middle

The

era.

SPD came

class trades and unions as well as the political

left.

tended to dominate amongst conservatives of both the middle and upper class,

while Conservative Catholics of all classes were drawn to both

it

and

its sister

party in

dominantly-Catholic Bavaria, the C'SU. The FDP, as a smaller classically liberal party,

tended to

attract

many from

the wealthiest portion of

German

more libertarian-minded entrepreneurs and upper middle
Conradt 2001
such as the
in the

)

Communists,

KPD

and

NPD

nationalists,

class

society as well as other

Germans. (Dalton 1989;

and other radicals, while represented by parties

were rather quickly marginalized and lacked much legitimacy

postwar German environment. Hence, the very fragmented party system of Weimar

Germany had been reduced and

simplified significantly, not unlike that which occurred in

neighboring Austria between the

First

and Second Republics.

This helped simplified the relationship between interest groups and parties. (Vail

2003; Katzenstein 1987) German labor had few options other than to work with the SPD,

even when
the

it

was

CDU/CSU.

less than ideal.

(Conradt 2001

significantly streamlined

a

way

that

)

Business interests also had

Hence German

interest

and concentrated, while

provided a semblance of order and

still

option but to align to

group and party

politics

were

within a democratic framework, in

stability that
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little

was lacking during Weimar.

In this

way

Austria and

state-party-interest

major
in

Germany shared

group

relations.

a

common

The strong

ties

concentration and simplification of

between the peak associations and

parties helped solidify democratic institutions

and

political stability

much

like that

neighboring Austria. (Markovits 1986) Hence the social partnership also played an

important institutional option for the Federal Republic

problems of the Weimar era

down

that led

a path

in

solving

some of the nagging

towards national destruction.

This was typified by the conscious efforts of the parties and interests to sustain

pragmatic and effective cooperation and consultation on major political and economic
policies. Alternation

between parties and coalition

changes. (Katzenstein 1987; von

Beyme

in

Germany

Even when conservatives were

1985; Vail 2003)

victorious and held majority, albeit in coalition with the

led to incremental policy

FDP,

in

parliament, they rarely

reversed major social democratic programs like codetermination and avoided breaking
too sharply from the past.

They were

liberalization. (Katzenstein 1987;

SPD came

to

power

in

labor and the

left, in

other areas

more

likely to favor incremental

reform and

Hancock 1989; Vail 2003) Likewise, even when

1969, while

it

far

it

the

pursued and adopted some pet projects of German

was

quite reserved in

its

pursuit of significant policy

changes. Chancellor Schmidt was especially careful to try and include business and

employers’ interests into the policymaking process through both Concerted Action and
his

own Bungalow
This was

the

CDU/CSU

CDU/CSU
tempered

accords. (Hancock 1989)

in part

due

comparable

to the influence

to other

of ideals of “social market capitalism” upon

European center

right

and conservative

parties.

The

tended to pursue a more pro-business and anti-Keynesian agenda but

its

and business demands by favoring a more expansive and generous welfare
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state

and more inclusive model of social partnership governance. Hence while the

CDU/CSU
structure

cannot be said to be social democratic,

and

affinity for free enterprise

Schrim 2002) These ideals helped

FDP,

coalition partner, the

was more “enlightened”. (Katzenstein 1987;

limit the

as well as

maintenance of existing class

its

more

ordo-liberal

demands by

some business and employer

their frequent

interests.

Hence,

despite long periods of conservative rule, which were absent in the Austrian case

altogether until the 1980s,

The

version of capitalism.

Germany's
distrust

CDU/CSU

pursued a

more

socially

moderated

of neo-liberalism was and remains quite strong

amongst the bulk of German, both conservative and
1989;

far

leftists.

(Katzenstein 1987; Hancock

Bemdt 2000; Heinisch 2000)
The SPD was

business.

By gaining

also moderated by a far less conflict-oriented strategy with

strong codetermination rights early in the development of the

Federal Republic, this moderated both the

demands and

levels of conflict

between labor

and capital on a wide range of issues. Germany’s economic miracle also meant a strong
co-dependent relationship between German firm profitability and worker employment,
wages, and benefits. The more decentralized German labor movement and the weaker
confederation of the

business, the

power

DGB

allowed the

CDU/CSU, and

SPD more

other interests.

“wiggle room”

Of course,

until 1966, significantly limiting the direct role

the

in

working with

SPD was

also excluded from

of either labor or the party

in

decision-making. (Markovits 1986)

There were swings
1970s and

CDU/CSU

in

policy during several periods. During

leadership in the 1980s and 1990s, there

was

SPD
less

leadership in the

consensus-based

policymaking and more majoritariamsm. Nonetheless, the policy swings were usually
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lacking radical policy reversals or impositions.

The SPD did not massively upend

dominantly anti-Keynesian model, though they certainly tinkered with
previous

CDU

governments, and the

codetermination laws and welfare

CDU/CSU

state.

single-party

marginalization of social partnership

(Katzenstein 1987; Streeck 1997; Schrim 2002)
coalitions for

dominance

in lieu

of more pluralist and parliamentary

large-scale policy change. (Katzenstein 1987; Vail 2003;

critical role

much of the postwar era,

that often resulted in a

policymaking dominance. But both parties showed significant

The

more than

did not upend the existing

So unlike Austria, which was dominated by grand

Germany experienced more

it

the

restraint

and avoided

von Beyme 1985)

of the social partners cannot be underestimated. The neo-

corporatist system relied

upon these peak associations defining

their interests to take

account not only their constituency of membership but also that of the public

interest.

Strong and well-organized interests helped stabilize and institutional democracy in the
Federal Republic not just a system of social partnership. (Markovits 1986; Katzenstein

1987) With interests working consensually towards similar goals of national economic

and social importance, such as reconstruction, high growth, or
social organizations can enable the semi-sovereign state to

full

employment, the

remain outside of labor-capital

disputes which will be solved via bargaining and compromise. This requires the interests

not only to sacrifice

prosperity but also

hence linking

all to

some demands

demands

to the

“common weal” of social

that those costs

peace and national

be borne internally by their membership

the solidarity of the system. (Schrim 2002; Streeck and Hassel 2004;

Nicholls 1994; Katzenstein 1987)
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This was not merely an ideological pursuit however, unions, business, and the

state all

gained from the

tripartite relationship

through simplification of demands,

regularization of the negotiation and bargaining process, and ensuring tangible material

benefits to the partners. (Katzenstein 1987; Schirm 2002) Solidarity to the

German

model, social partnership, the necessity of German economic growth, democracy, and
political stability all

worked

to help the

major

interests, parties,

and actors narrow

their

demands and work with one another towards consensus.

European Integration

One of the fundamental

differences between the Austrian and

social partnership in the postwar era concerns

neutrality, Soviet veto

membership

of membership, and internal

in the mtegrationist institutions

European Union, remained formally outside

Germany was

a founding

deeply enmeshed

European

member of the

in the integration

German membership

in the

German models of

integration. Austria,

due

to its

political division to direct

of what would eventually become the
until 1995.

integration

(Heinisch 2000) Conversely,

movement

in

Europe and has been

process since the 1950s.

European Coal and Steel Community and the

European Economic Community was predicated upon the necessity of German
reconstruction in both political and economic terms. France wanted to

hand

in areas that

wanted

were most closely linked

to illustrate that

it

was could be

to

war fighting

a trusted

fraternity of liberal democracies. (Tiersky

tie

capacities and

Germany’s

Germany

member of the Western European

2004) European integration became a pathway

towards normalization of Germany’s postwar relationship with
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its

Western European

neighbors and was never purely an economie strategy or one based exclusively on growth

and trade development. Given both the
liberalism, the objective

SPD

and

CDU/CSU

of free movement of goods and services and the integration of

European economies was fundamentally based on
limited

economic

aversions to traditional neo-

strategic political criteria rather than

rationale. (Conradt 2001; Katzenstein 1987) Nonetheless, integration

did hold out significant hopes of material benefit and increased trade as well, so

it

was

not merely a symbolic pursuit either.

Hence European

integration must be understood as a relatively

and orientation of German foreign policy

in the

postwar

era.

permanent goal

After 1949, European

cooperation and integration became “ingrained, even assumed” amongst

political actors in

Germany, including the

Paterson 2004; Heinisch 2000)

From

social partners

the important

parties. (Jeffrey

and

the 1950s through 1980s, this solidarity over

European integration remained dominant amongst

German governments from Adenauer onward.
Schmidt 2006) The

and major

all

all

social partners

and successive

(Padgett, Paterson, and Smith 2003;

social partners, while certainly involved in the negotiations,

bargaining, and domestic political considerations of membership and integration efforts

nonetheless were

in rather

strong solidarity with, or deference to the

German

governments’ overarching goals, especially under Konrad Adenauer, to pursue
integration as the primary goals of postwar

reconstruction, in

economic and

German

political terms,

compromise, negotiate, and moderate

their

foreign policy.

were able

own demands.
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to lead

The demands of

most

(Jeffery

interests to

and Paterson 2004)

The case of the BDI

well into this pattern.

falls

The BDI was dominantly

supportive of Adenauer’s programs of European integration from the 1950s onward. The

BDI on

strong dependence of the

upon

CDU

was

part of this rationale but

a general deference and solidarity to grander

reestablishment

the

the

ECSC

German

in

in the

postwar environment.

EEC

1951 as well as the

in

Some

1957.

German

many

industrialists

The BDI was

cases, the

also rested

foreign policy goals of

opposed integration

ECSC

and

BDI and Adenauer government

strongly on the content of the treaties and the consequences of integration to

firms and markets. Nonetheless, the overall pattern

into

influential in helping shape

foreign economic policymaking on several elements of both the

treaties yet not decisively so. In

it

was one where

the

BDI

EEC

differed

German

supported,

sometimes perfunctorily and sometimes energetically, the broad objectives and policies
of European integration developed by the Chancellor.
threat to the

BDI,

it

used

When

influence to attempt change

its

in

such policies were deemed a

government positions, yet was

not always successful even during C'DU-led periods of government. (Braunthal 1965)

Union involvement

in

European integration was more circumscribed. As the

was marginalized from government

until 1966, the

was able

input from social democrats.

the integration process with

little

German consensual

Adenauer and

format,

CDU

later

SPD

to effectively control

However,

in typical

Chancellors regularly sought and

obtained consent on major treaties and extensions of European integration. Labor had

been invited and involved

in

many of the

early talks regarding the

ECSC

and EEC.

Labor's primary concerns were to increases wages, benefits, and codetermination rights

(Markovits 1986) There was high uncertainty regarding the impact of

of workers

in firms.

integration

upon these goals, however,

for

most of the postwar era German labor found
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little

evidence of negative consequences from European integration given the economic

miracle.

in

The

employee

state

was

security,

able to sooth such fear through regular and incremental increases

wages, social insurance, and increasing codetermination rights

from the 1950s through 1970s. Hence once the material concerns of unions over the costs
of integration were addressed and offset by the

became

deferential

state or

employers,

much of German

labor

and moderately staunch supporters of the integration process from the

1950s onward. (Markovits and Otto 1992) There were some internal ideological disputes
within

German

labor over the implications of European integration on workers solidarity

and social democratic bases. The more
that

leftist

European integration might be assisting

and

activist labor leaders

in the

and unions feared

expansion of neo-liberal capitalism

and an increasingly unjust economic pattern across the continent. (Markovits 1986;
Markovits and Otto 1992) However, amongst these labor leaders and unions, expansion

of international labor relationships with unions
assuage some of these

fears.

The German

state

in

other

was

EEC member

states

helped

also able to address these concerns

pushing for the inclusion of elements of social democracy and social partnership

European

level,

and

to give a

Hence labor was
debates in

Germany by

by

at the

voice to labor in Brussels. (Sargent 1985)

effectively co-opted or marginalized in the

the continuing benefits

European integration

of economic growth and increases

in

wages, social insurance, and codetermination as well as through the effective
subordination of labor demands to larger national strategies towards European integration

arranged by Adenauer and

Thelen 1991

)

latter

When German

Chancellors through the 1980s. (Katzenstein 1987;

interests

were required

European integration and governance, the

to

state usually
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make

sacrifices to

stepped

in to

demands of

help subsidize.

)

reimburse, or offset specific losses. This was replicated for almost
actors including agriculture, labor, and industry

tangible relief

was provided

efforts. (Katzenstein 1987;

in

where

all

the major peak

state-level subsidy or other

exchange for consent and support of European integration

Conradt 2001

In essence, unlike the Austrian case,

EU

membership and

unwavering

a generally

support for greater integration efforts were never primary divisions of German interests

from the 1950s through 1980s. The social partners recognized

Adenauer through Kohl, would

German

tolerate significant deviation

that

no government, from

from the pro-European

position without significant punishment and sanction. There

was

also a

pragmatic economic acceptance, strongly repeated by government, that both unions and
business would greatly benefit from increased intra-European trade and that European

integration

oriented

would

benefit the large, highly industry- and manufacturing-based export-

German economy more

than

its

smaller European counterparts. (Braunthal 1965;

Jeffery and Paterson 2004)

The end

results

of the immediate

thirty years

of postwar integration seemed

support this very argument. Germany’s economic miracle outpaced that of

its

to

other large

European neighbors while simultaneously allowing the normalization of German
relations within a broader

European context. Germany's surprising

ability to

weather the

early storms of the 1970s, including high inflation, oil shocks, de-industrialization, and

social change, reaffirmed to both unions

the postwar

economic and

and industry

that

Germany had indeed navigated

political reconstruction process better than

prosperous, stable, and an accepted

ally.

(Katzenstein 1987)
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most and emerged

Results of Social Partnership 1940s- 1980s

The German

social partnership strongly

conformed

authority, multiple veto points, disposition towards

that

encompassed

the

system of divided

to the

compromise, and

German postwar model of governance. The

political stability

equilibrium and

consistency of the model were considered virtues and worthy of study and emulation.

(Markovits 1986; Vail 2003; Kitschelt and Streeck 2004) This
the state, unions, and business, while

centralization found in Austria,

below the

level

was nonetheless one of the more neo-corporatist models

variations from the paradigmatic Austrian

and patterns of bi-,

negotiations between peak associations and the state.

One

in

tri-,

or multipartite

significant variation

from the

has been the lack of lasting and formal institutions of social partnership.

While the Austrian model was permanently enshrined
and Prices

Despite significant

era.

model of social partnership, postwar German

politics exhibited generally similar structures

mode

arrangement between

of institutionalization and

of economic policymaking and interest intermediation of the

Austrian

tight

in the Joint

Commission on Wages

1957 and the Commission for Economic and Social Questions in 1963,

Germany's experiments with such formal organizations were
2000) While Germany did
the postwar era,

program

utilize the

Concerted Action, the peak of social partnership

briefly in the late 1960s

support nor longevity found

in

quite limited. (Heinisch

and early 1970s,

it

in

has neither the

corresponding Austrian institutions. (Hancock 1989;

Streeck and Hassel 2004)

Another important variation was the lack of centralized and overarching

compulsory authority
BD1, and

BDA

in the

peak associations. While the peak associations

like the

DGB,

are often responsible for providing national voice for interests through
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publicity campaigns, research and publication, and occasional legal actions, they have

had

far less

tripartite

of a formal and direct role in the collective bargaining, wage negotiation, and

system of interest intermediation than their

member

individual trade unions and sectoral industry associations.

1986) The primary counterexample

is in

agriculture

organizations such as

(Heimsch 2000; Markovits

where the Green Front has been quite

monopolistic, and successful, in the unified representation of members and their vested

interests.

Nonetheless,

in the

German

interests

emerged

as relatively powerful

and unified actors

policymaking system. Amongst employers and businesses, sectoral business and

industry associations were tied to the national umbrella organizations of the

BDA

BDI and

which helped provide a valuable nexus of information gathering and dissemination,

cooperation and coordination, innovation, and collective representation

and provincial levels of the policymaking processes. According
almost

98%

of all industrialists were included

1965) This remained above

90%

in the

the national

BDI, by 1960

umbrella organization. (Braunthal

well into the 1980s. (Dalton 1989) Unions, while less

centralized than in Austria, remained strongly linked under the

large, national,

to the

at

DGB

umbrella and

its

and powerful sectoral member unions. Labor was well entrenched and

organized from the firm level, through works councils and co-determination, to the
national level including extensive legal codification of labor and

employment

standards.

(Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991; Heinisch 2000; Kitschelt and Streeck 2004)

Wage

bargaining, while not quite as legally or formally centralized as in Austria,

was organized

at the sector

or industry-wide level. (Casey and

Yet, in practice, collective bargaining in

Germany from
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Gold 2000; Bosch 2000)

the 1940s through 1970s

exhibited a level of centralization nearly equal to that of Austria. While the state was

barred from a statutory wages policy and arbitrating the collective bargaining process, the

system of social partnership provided a framework for unions and employers’ to arrive

wage

at

government intervention, respecting the

settlements, with relative freedom from

needs of high growth, low inflation, and stable employment. (Markovits 1986; Vail 2003;
Streck and Hassel 2004; Bosch 2004)

Initial

negotiations

sectoral unions

would generally be

regional and sectoral level between

at a

and employers’ or industry associations. (Casey and Gold 2000; Bosch

2004) For most of the postwar period, IG Metall tended

would use these regional and
agreements

sectoral agreements to

in the specific national sector

to exert

“wage leadership” and

benchmark not only

all

of metalwork but would also be the standard for

most of the other smaller unions collective agreements

in all sectors

and

industries.

Hence, while the collective bargaining system was technically decentralized
specific sectoral unions, in practice the leadership

Thelen 1991

;

to the

of IG Metall and other larger industrial

unions and their industry and employers’ counterparts
for all collective bargaining

other

set

de facto national benchmarks

agreements across the German economy. (Markovits 1986;

Kitschelt and Streeck 2004;

wage autonomy worked without

Bosch 2004) This system of Tarifautonomie or

the need of intensive or regular state intervention further

supporting the concept of the semi-sovereign

state.

(Katzenstein 1987; Vail 2003)

This tended to concentrate power over collective bargaining and wages

in the

national levels of the trade unions and regional and national employers' associations.

While some modification of collective bargaining agreements could be concluded

at the

firm or plant level, these could only be improvements upon the industry-wide agreements
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not reductions. Hence, while works councils were a notable feature of the postwar

development of German labor-management
limited in their

autonomy and

competence were

in

authority. In

relations, they

were

traditionally quite

most cases works councils primary areas of

very limited firm and plant specific areas of labor-management

relations.

However,

the trend, since the 1960s especially, has been a gradual

independence of works councils. (Bosch 2004) Nonetheless,

growing

their ability to strike

and

vary from industry-wide collective agreements and their national trade union organization

was

rather limited for

association

would be

most of the postwar

if

Firms

that left industry or

legally required to operate under the existing

agreements could be concluded.
agreements

era.

they covered

In addition, the state

at least fifty

employers'

agreements

until

new

could legally bind collective

percent of the workers in the sector and if

approved by committee representing the employers' federations and unions agreed.
Hence, the legal system had a strong

ability to

compel firms

to

remain

in the existing

employers’ associations and to abide by industry-wide agreements. (Bosch 2004) Overall,
this

system was quite centralizing and empowering for the trade unions and employers’

and industry associations.

Amongst

the most notable accomplishments of the postwar era of social

partnership had been the extension of codetermination laws allowing worker

representation and input into the decision-making process of firms and plants. (Markovits

1986; Thelen 1991; Parkes 1997; Kitschelt and Streeck 2004; Katzenstein 1987) Despite

being strongly social democratic and union-inspired, these were accepted by industry and
the state during the postwar era for practical

and national goals of achieving social peace
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and addressing the needs of a reconstructing German economy and
shelved

many of its more

committed

radical

and Marxist

itself to the social partnership

ideals, rhetoric,

polity. In return, labor

and leaders and decidedly

and the processes of compromise and

negotiation with both the state and capital. (Markovits 1986;

Hancock 1989; Thelen

1991)

The end

result

was

a generally successful

and prosperous system for both workers

and industry as was evidenced by examples including German automotive and other
heavy industries. (Streeck 1984; Markovits 1986; Parkes 1997)

Another area

that

came under

strong influence by the social partners

was

in

vocational training. This brought unions and employers, as well as the national, state, and

local

governments, into a mutually supportive system to provide vocational training for

those

coming through

relationship,

known

the

German education

system. (Casey and Gold 2000) This

as a ‘dual system” provided a system of employer-provided

apprenticeship to students while simultaneously attending public trade schools. The long-

term nature of employment
public

demand and

in

German

firms and membership in

German

unions, and the

provision of education, created an obvious area of neo-corporatist

policy and cooperation. (Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991; Vail 2003; Kitschelt and Streeck

2004)

The economic miracle of the 1950s and 1960s

set

Germany

other large European states such as Italy, France, and the United

1987; Parkes 1997)

was

rebuilt

Much

like Austria, but

on a much larger

apart from

many

Kingdom. (Katzenstein

scale, the

German economy

and German society became affluent and comfortable. During the 1950s,

West German growth was

at a rate

of 6.5% of GDP per year, exceeding
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that

of France

and

Italy, as

well as the United States. The rate

below the French
the

same

period.

was only

1

Growth

.8% through

Sweden, but below
terms, the

of growth but

rate

fell to

the

that

still

2.6%

of the US.

German model seemed

the 1960s, falling a bit

in

1970s below France and the United States.

It

a bit higher than France, the United

(OECD
to

4.4% during

above the United Kingdom and United States

in the

mid 1980s,

fell to

1988;

Hancock 1989) Hence,

be doing quite well

in all relative

in

Kingdom, and
economic

standards far into

the 1970s and even into the early 1980s.

Even during

the oil crises of the 1970s,

unemployment, and marginally

better

Germany

growth rates

that

delivered lower inflation, lower

most other Western

industrial

democracies. (Kitschelt and Streeck 2004; Parkes 1997) In terms of low inflation, low

unemployment, and low labor

conflict,

Germany had comparable numbers

to that in

Austria and the Netherlands. (Hancock 1989; Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991)
Austria, the ability of

Germany

to survive the oil

and inflationary shocks

1970s brought about increased scholarly and policy interest

(Markovits 1986; Katzenstein 1987; Casey and Gold 2000)
institutional

It

like

in the early

Modell Deutschland.

was argued

that

German

arrangements succeeded because they lowered transaction costs between

labor, capital,

and the

state

while producing competitive and quality goods and controlled

inflation despite rising labor

and administrative

costs. (Kitschelt

Comparatively, Germany was striking for
initiatives

in

Much

its

and Streeck 2004)

lack of new and bold policy

and the continuation of previous policy. (Katzenstein 1987; Hancock 1989)

Many argued

that

new

policies could only be carried out with

some minimum

level

of

consent from the relevant social partners and that those that lacked such credentials

would usually

fail in

the legislative process without major dilution or bargaining between

the partners. (Katzenstein 1987;

Smith 1992) The

weighted two-party system between the
eras of German party politics.

political stability that

SPD and C’DU/CSU was

emerged with

a far cry

(Hancock 1989; von Beyme 1985) The

a

from previous

social partnership

helped support such a system and perhaps even helped stabilize democracy during the

postwar Federal Republic. (Markovits 1986) While

ties

between the

was seen

associations were slightly less institutionalized than what

the linkages

were significant

policymaking. The

in

in the

and peak

Austrian case,

providing predictable and stable party politics and

German system

the Austrian system. Yet the

parties

clearly never achieved the level of proporz found in

German model possessed

significant levels of political

continuity and stability while experiencing few extreme electoral and parliamentary

shocks. (Katzenstein 1987)

CDU/CSU

The peak

associations’ roles in and linkages to the

certainly contributed to this stability even if it

interest-party integration

and

stabilization

found

fell

in Austria.

SPD and

short of the level of

(Markovits 1986; Katzenstein

1987)

The German

social partnership did perhaps tend to be

Austrian model in terms of policy areas.

As discussed

more

in the last chapter,

institutionalization of the social partnership in the Austrian Joint

Committee on Social and Economic Questions,
significantly

tertiary areas

women's

restricted than the

through the

Commission and

the Austrian social partners

expand the aegis and competencies of the partnership

began

into peripheral

to

and

of economic and social policy including education, the environment,

rights, transportation,

and labor-capital

relations.

corporatist structures

and beyond the limited scope of wages,

As indicated below

between the

state, labor,

in

Figure

3,

social insurance,

Hancock argued

and business were usually
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that the neo-

restricted to a

narrow subset of issue areas unlike Austria where the social partnership was regularly
extended throughout the postwar

era. In area

A, labor and management tended to

negotiate without state oversight on topics such as wages, working hours, and other

“bread-and-butter” issues. In areas

state

and either labor or business

B

in a

systems. True neo-corporatism, in

&

C, there tended to be bilateral talks between the

regularized lobbying format

its trilateral

reflected the overlapping of state, business,

common

form, only occurred

and labor

interests

further suggests that this only occurred during the formation

and

in area

FIGURE

in Practice

6.r

notes: Area A = management-labor consultations and negotiations; area B = governmentmanagement consultations; area C = government-labor consultations; and area D = governmentmanagement- labor consultations.

3:

Hancock's Patterns of Policy Linkages (1989)
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that

Hancock

of grad coalition

PATTERNS OF POLICY LINKAGES

Figure

D

activity.

government. (Hancock 1989)

Democratic Corporatism

to pluralist

However, Hancock may be underestimating the
partnership on

all

areas, A, B, C,

structural impact

and D. The underlying

of the social

social, cultural, political,

and

economic conditions of social partnership drove actors towards consensus and bargaining
on

a

wide range of issues no matter

mostly related

to collective

their location in the policy universe.

Area

A

issues,

bargaining and codetermination, while generally being

pursued without strong and direct government interference were not exclusively

so. (Vail

2003; Markovits 1986) During Concerted Action as well as the subsequent informal talks
arranged by the Schmidt government, the state regularly intermediated in
areas

when

the social partners

were unable

to reach

compromise.

many of these

In addition,

during

tough collective bargaining negotiations with national implications. Chancellors from

Adenauer

to

Kohl regularly became

indirectly or directly

engaged

in

marshalling the

compromise and

collective bargaining process along and helping persuade actors to

bargain. In addition, the judiciary had strong oversight over labor-capital relations due to

the juridification of labor law

In areas

B

from the 1950s.

and C, while direct lobbying did regularly take place especially during

times of one party dominance, such as the
1998, and the

SPD

from 1969

C'DU/CSU from 1949

to 1982, there

to

were concurrent with

1966 and 1982

efforts

by the

to

state to

obtain broad social partner consent on issues rather than to merely legislate from the

majority.

As was demonstrated by

lesser extent.

the policy actions

of the Adenauer, Schmidt, and

Kohl governments, there was a general hope

encourage the social partners

to negotiate

direct state intervention or they

to a

that the state could either

and compromise amongst themselves without

would go out of their way
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to obtain

wider consent from

the opposition before enacting important legislation. (Vail 2003) This mitigated large

policy shifts and continued to uphold the principles of the semi-sovereign state.

(Katzenstein 1987; Streeck 1997)

Some
all.

areas of policymaking don't

International trade, globalization,

policy, with significant

chart yet

era.

were notable

fit

very well into the Hancock pattern model

at

European integration, and other issues of foreign

economic and

social

consequences seem

of consensus and

for their levels

stability

to lack a

space

in the

throughout the postwar

(Katzenstein 1985, 1987, 1989) Further, the ability to disaggregate these policy areas

from one another

is

easier said that done.

As Wilensky and Turner

suggest, neo-

corporatism in Germany, as well as Austria, was typified by significant interdependence

on a range of economic and social issues including

industrial policy, labor markets,

wages, trade, vocational education and training, pensions, and social insurance which

spanned

a considerable political

addition, despite only

partnership

postwar

was

and policy spectrum. (Wilensky and Turner 1987) In

one period of grand coalition from 1966

a regularized pattern

to 1969, the social

of policy and decision-making throughout the

era.

While

it

seems clear

competency nor formally

that the

system was neither as extensive

in policy

institutionalized as in Austria, the compelling structural

pressures to conform to and abide by consensual policymaking strategies and to bargain,

even when not an absolute necessity, tended
particularistic interest wishes.

negotiated approach even

The

when

structural

direct

to

win out over majoritarian and

power of the

social partnership

encouraged

and institutionalized negotiation was absent

(Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991; Wessels 2000) This would be the social learning that the
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a

The

actors developed from the 1940s onward.

consensus and altered their

German policymaking

own

and actors expected

behavior and activities to conform

process. This

associations tended to alter their

interests, parties,

was

own

to the

norms of the

neither absolute nor entirely static, yet peak

behavior and expectations on a range of economic

and social policy areas given the need for consensus and the higher likelihood of veto or
blockage

if

they failed to take account of the other social partners. (Streeck and Hassel

2004; Katzenstein 1987)
Nonetheless, Hancock

is

correct

is

estimating that the

German

social partnership

lacked the breadth of competence found in the Austrian system. The Austrian social
partnership, though the Joint

Commission and other

structures, continually

expanded

range of interests, activities, and influence into policy areas not found under

aegis.

The German model of social partnership between

remain focused on a core

its initial

the state, trade unions, and

business was clearly more limited in scope and competencies.
social partnership tended to

its

set

It is

clear that the

German

of policy issues including

wages, pensions, healthcare, unemployment insurance, vocational training, and labor
markets. (Vail 2003; Streeck and Hassel 2004;

It

in the

was

Heimsch 2000)

in these areas that the social partnership,

more informal

structures before

and

after,

was

under Concerted Action as well as

quite powerful in these policy areas

while there was far less evidence of tripartite arrangements’ influence beyond these
policy areas. Unlike in Austria, where the Joint

Commission and Committee on

Social

and Economic Questions regularly expanded the areas of influence into prices, education,
the environment, and other areas, the primary

German

restricted.
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social partnership

was more

The German

soeial partnership also

was

far

more

framework" than the Austrian model. While Austria's
institutionalized,

it

further

upon

a “rigid legal

social partnership

was more

fully

nonetheless operated with far more flexibility between the social

partners at the national level.

relations actually

reliant

may have

The juridification of German labor law and labor-business

contributed to a less flexible system. (Heinisch 2000) This

enhanced by the decentralization of worker-employer relations

plant level through codetermination that

is

far

more developed

in

to the firm

German than

(Streeck and Hassel 2004; Bosch 2004) This has actually

weakened

links

workers and the sectoral unions

their

own

firm.

in favor

of alliances with

is

and

in Austria.

between

Codetermination and the sector-based collective bargaining model, with the dominant
role

of large industrial unions

like

unitary labor actor, such as the

IG Metall, impeded the establishment of a powerful

DGB,

that

could have provided both flexibility and

leadership in negotiating and bargaining with industry and the state. (Heinisch 2000)

Of note
Under

is

the important role of the executive in sustaining the social partnership.

Article 65 of the

German

Constitution, the Chancellor

is

granted important

independent authority over the “general policy guidelines” of the
Paterson, and Smith 2003; Conradt 2001

)

German

state. (Padgett,

However, since the creation of the Federal

Republic under Adenauer, the Chancellor has become more central to the policy- and

decision-making process within the German political system, (von

2003) This

is

derived from as

many

parties, interests, the

partnership regularly operated with

1993; Goetz

extra-constitutional sources as constitutional ones,

but nonetheless this has placed the Chancellor in the center of the

system where

Beyme

German

political

media, and parliament converge. While the social

little

need of oversight or direct
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state intervention.

there

was

a pattern

of regularized executive activity

in

influencing and shaping the social

partners in both collective bargaining and the policymaking process. Chancellors

Adenauer, Brandt, Schmidt and Kohl, occasionally intervened
bargaining process

when

the social partners

compromise. This certainly increased under

1

seemed

in the negotiation

less likely or

SPD government

and

unwilling to reach a

in the late

1960s and early

970s with the creation of Concerted Action but also continued with the Schmidt

government

after

it

dissolved in 1977. (Hancock 1989)

The Schmidt and Kohl governments became exemplars of the growing
of the

state in intermediating

and shaping the

social partnership

direct role

and social partners as

they failed to reach compromise in the 1980s and 1990s. This broke strongly from the

long tradition of limited state interference
social partners dating

and Kohl began
levels

to

back

more

in the

to the establishment

negotiations and bargaining between

of the federal republic. Further, Schmidt

regularly institute larger reforms and changes despite higher

of dissent from social partners. (Streck and Hassel 2004; Streeck 1997; Vail 2003;

Gobeyn 1993)
It

should also be noted that because of some of the perceived limitations and

inconsistency of social partnership, in scope and institutionalization,

more

characteristics

corporatist

pluralist

of a mixed system of interest representation

model found

in Austria.

The

interest

Germany

that the

did exhibit

more purely

group system often exhibited more

elements depending upon the political and economic circumstances, the policy

area, the strength

and makeup of the

political coalition,

and the preferences of the present

government and executive. (Fuchs and Koch 1991; von Beyme 1993)
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There have been significant criticisms of the postwar German model of social
partnership, and these

would grow stronger from

disenfranchisement and unhappiness of the far
that often

excluded too many interests that

(Streek 1997)

Many on

the left

and

employers were over-represented
the

CDU/CSU

and SPD, and

in

fell

German

in patterns

the 1970s onward.

left

and

right in a

These included the

policymaking process

outside the typical tripartite arrangements.

labor often

felt that

industry and

of governance, were too insulated by both

that the social partnership

tended to reinforce

this inequality

and exclusion. (Braunthal 1965; Hancock 1989; Thelen 1991; Conradt 2001)
Simultaneously, neo-liberal firms and interests berated the

CDU/CSU

for

its

adherence

to

the social market version of capitalism and the strong welfare state. (Streeck and Hassel

2004;

Schnm 2002)
The most fundamental

critiques

came from

the

wings of German society

including radical socialists, terrorist movements, the Greens, the far right, libertarians,

and feminist organizations who

opposed

to the system.

for varying reasons felt

Many from

the socialist

and numerous radicals from the neo-Marxist
partnership did

little

but maintain a status

left,

left,

excluded or ideologically

such as Claus Offe, Jurgen Habermas

argued that the system of social

quo of inequality amongst classes and

perpetuated an industrial order that was illegitimate. (Hancock 1989; Offe 1984) Feminist

and Green organizations

felt

excluded from important policymaking processes as well,

though both issues were eventually co-opted to some extent into the system by the
and inclusion of the Green Party and significant legislation and
that

political party

birth

changes

brought more feminist issues into the policy process. (Hancock 1989; Parkes 1997)
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A

major limitation of the social partnership, compared

been the strong role and authority of the Lander

in the

to that

policymaking process as well.

While both Austria and Germany are federal regimes, the German
powerful federal system
the

a

in

which the provinces play

state

has a far more

a significant role. Constitutionally,

Lander were reserved important economic powers

number of critical

of Austria, has also

government

vis-a-vis the central

in

areas including social and welfare policy, industrial relations, and

labor relations. (Markovits 1986; Vail 2003; Jeffrey 2003)

The

states also

have a direct

parliamentary role through the Bundesrat the upper house, in approving or vetoing major
,

domestic legislation. (Conradt 2001; Parkes 1997; Katzenstein 1987; Dalton 1989)

Attempts

in the

1980s to formally re-institutionalize the social partnership since

the collapse of Concerted Action in 1977 failed under both Schmidt

governments. The efforts of the

DGB

to establish

an Economic and Social Council,

similar to that found in the Netherlands, during the

business interests but also by

new

mid-1970s were blocked not only by

post-material interest associations, such as

environmentalists and feminists, which

tripartite

and Kohl

felt

excluded from the proposed council and

its

labor-business-govemment structure. (Markovits 1986) There was also strong

disapproval from parliament and legal scholars that argued the plan would weaken the

democratic and representative constitutional order of the Basic Law. (von

Even

the periods

where there was more formal

and meanings of Concerted Action

itself

that

it

was merely used
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Many

suggest

have been “overrated” and

perhaps “conveyed a harmony of interests that never existed", (von

and Hassel 2004) Others suggest

1993)

structure to the social partnership,

such as during the era of Concerted Action, the impact has been muted.
that the effects

Beyme

Beyme

1993; Streeck

as a public relations gambit to

create an illusion of social partnership in lieu of concrete consensual policymaking

structures.

(Hancock 1989) Notable evidence was

that

work stoppages caused by both

labor and business action actually increased two-fold during the period rather than

declined during the six years of Concerted Action.
conflicts could have

been more intense

if the

Of course,

as

von Beyme suggests, the

system was not used

at all.

(von

Beyme

1993)

Compared

to Austria, the

influential into tertiary issues

exhibited a

German model was

not nearly as expansive and

of economic and social policy. In

this

way, Germany

more mixed model of concurrent neo-corporatism and pluralism.

In

some

policy areas and under certain economic and political conditions, the social partnership

might be dominant while

work along more

in

other times and on other issues the

pluralist political lines.

It

also

German system tended

depended upon the specific

political

to

and

economic conditions or “mood” of the German government, (von Beyme 1993)
Importantly, the postwar social partnership was, for the most part, strongly representative

of the model of semi-sovereignty

that

provided a more circumscribed and secondary role

to the state vis-a-vis the social partners in a

number of important

areas of economic

governance including wages, collective bargaining, social insurance, codetermination,
vocational training, and labor market policies. (Katzenstein 1987) Strong peak
associations representing labor, business, and agriculture were able to negotiate and

bargain amongst themselves, and sometimes with the government, to achieve a

remarkable record of economic growth, prosperity, social peace, and
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political stability.

Yet by the

late

1970s and 1980s social, economic, and political challenges were

threatening the very fabric of the

more

difficult to

the once

German model

as consensus

and compromise became

manufacture and the roles of the social partners and

state

dominant model of consensual economic and social governance

Germany

so successful and envied.
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began

that

to alter

had made

CHAPTER

6

THE CRISIS OF SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP

IN

AUSTRIA SINCE THE

1980S

Introduction

The Austrian model of development and

social partnership

came

into

what has

generally been regarded as “crisis” by the mid and late 1980s as economic growth

flattened, regional

and global economic pressures increased, and the domestic

political

environment was transformed. (Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988; Pelinka 1998; Kramer
1996; Talos 1996; Karlhofer 1996; Pulzer 1995; Unger 1999; Kittel 2000; Viebrock

2004) Austria was forced
them, regarding

its

to

make

economic and

difficult choices, or difficult choices

political

model so

as to survive in a

were

thrust

upon

more global and

European atmosphere.
According

to Katzenstein

and others scholars, the social partnership and

corporatist structures should have been ideal in addressing these challenges.

The

its

neo-

social

partnership had navigated Austria through the precarious postwar reconstruction and

crisis-ridden 1970s adeptly. Flexibility

critical

and adaptation were often identified as the most

and positive benefits of the social partnership. (Katzenstein 1984) As Heinisch

suggests, the centralized Austrian social partnership

was able

to “help translate, absorb,

and distribute economic and social pressures created by international economic
transformations”. (Heinisch 2000)

However, by
social

dilemmas

identified

efficient

the 1980s, rather than being

in Austria, the social

viewed as a solution

partnership and neo-corporatism

by many as one of the problems of the Austrian system as

it

to

economic and

would be
created barriers to

economic policymaking. (Crepaz 1994, 1995; Pelinka 1999) Talos argued such
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a

change did not “necessarily portend an end

to corporatism in Austria” but did signify a

tangible requirement for change “in the erstwhile form of interest group politics”. (Talos

1996, 104)

Hence

the 1980s and 1990s

were a tumultuous era

partnership. This section will assess

in the

why

for the Austrian social

the social partnership's fortunes

were so altered

passing of a mere decade. The once revered system transited from domestic and

international adoration to a “burden to modernization” in relatively short order. (Holl,

Poliak, and

emerged

Riekmann 2000)
'' l

in the 2

1

It

has generally been argued that the social partnership

century far weaker and less salient in Austrian policymaking than

had only two decades

prior.

Nonetheless, despite

all

it

the “disorganizing pressures” that

the Austrian social partnership has experienced, there has also been significant continuity

of many “elements of interest intermediation, concertation, and conflict resolution”.
(Kittel

2000) Heinisch even argues

“skillful adaptation

that the social partnership surprisingly

underwent a

of organized decentralization” ending with a strengthened

repositioning of neo-corporatism in Austria. (Heinisch 2000) In any case, the Austrian

social partnership has

undergone

a

remarkable transformation, with evidence of both

change and continuity, from the 1980s

into the early

2f

century.

Economic Transformations and Challenues

The most notable change
lasting

in Austria

during this period was a widespread and

slowdown of the Austrian economy by

the recessions

the 1980s.

While Austria did not escape

of the early 1970s, they were certainly milder than those found

United States, United Kingdom, and most other advanced industrial
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states.

in the

(Haberler

1982; Katzenstein 1984, 1985)

the

Growth between 1971 and 1981 was 4.3% compared

OECD average of 3.2% while cost of living and

compared

9.7%. Unemployment was 2%, the lowest of the

to

(Lens 1985) Hence, Austria weathered the
well.

earliest recessional

were only 6.1%

OECD during the period.
storms of the 1970s quite

Yet by the 1980s, the impacts of economic recession were more strongly

had important concussive

effects.

Economic growth

averages, deindustrialization lead to higher

1

inflation rates

984), high

to

rates declined

felt

and

below European

unemployment (though

still

only

4%

by

wages and taxes drove industry and manufacturing overseas, and budget

deficits soared. (Arndt 1982; Haberler 1982;

Lens 1985; Pelinka 1998; Seidel 1996)

Between 1984 and 1987, economic growth slowed

to

1.8% of GDP. (Heinisch 2000)

Increases in the provision of social welfare benefits had also strained the budget and

economic competitiveness while
These

stories

states in the

began

to

were

common

inflation

and prices were rising

to

problematic levels.

throughout Western Europe and other advanced industrial

1970s and 1980s, and Austria was no exception. As Pelinka argues,

diminish Austria’s “charm” and “special status” as

it

this

illustrated that its prized

Austro-Keynesianism and Austro-corporatism were no longer immune from the vagaries
of the global economy. (Pelinka 1998, 1998a, 1999) The economic downturns and
structural transformation provided

social partnership since

it

was

some of the

first

important challenges to the postwar

precisely these kinds of international

economic

fluctuations that the flexible and consensual decision-making process

was designed

address. (Katzenstein 1984, 1985; Gerlich, Grande, and Mill ler 1988; Gerlich 1992;

Crepaz 1994, 1995; Pelinka 1999)
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to

The 1970s through 1990s were
economy. Austria transformed

a period of important restructuring of the Austrian

dominated by heavy industry. By 1990 over
as white-collar

economy from one

into a primarily service-based

60%

of

its

economy was

in the service sector

employment expanded. Blue-collar employment continued

Austria emerged as a post-industrial economy. (Crepaz 1995)

Its

to shrink as

accession to the

EU

in

1995, continuing de-industrialization, privatization, and other economic reforms were

painful for

decline

many

in Austria. Austria also

in industrial

experienced a massive

fall in

exports, a rapid

production, and a series of failures of large enterprises. The most

affected sectors were steel, iron, chemical, paper, and textile production,

owned heavy

industry

decline of the

German economy,

onward

saw

also exacerbated

losses

of several

billion Schillings.

where

state-

(Dimbacher 1993) The

Austria's largest trading partner, from the late- 1990s

unemployment and low

GDP growth. (OECD

2007; Thomsen

and Hadjimichael 2007) This increased the demand for greater economic reform but

commensurately increased the scale and number of conflicts between economic

The Austrian economy had rebounded and
shrunk, unemployment was reduced, and

still

stabilized

GDP growth

by 2006. Budget

exceeded

3%

in

interests.

deficits

had

2006. Yet Austria

faces significant challenges in areas of deregulation of the service sector, enhancing

competition, and labor market participation. (Thomsen and Hadjimichael 2007) Hence,

while Austria has emerged from the turbulence of the 1980s-2000s
the need to remain adaptable

and flexible

large, if not larger, than in the past.

in the

in relative

good

European and global marketplace

Crepaz argues

that

neo-corporatism

is,

is

order,

as

by definition,

incapable of adapting to the transition from an industrial to post-industrial society.

(Crepaz 1995) However, Crepaz would probably be more accurate to
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state that traditional

tripartite social partnerships

There

is

have difficulty

no reason why post-materialist

in

adapting to such transitions. (Pelinka 1999)

social partnerships

and neo-corporatism could

not potentially arise in the future in Austria or other states. (Wiarda 1997;

Nonetheless, the route that brought Austria to

its

current

economic and

Adams 2002)

political

environment has had enormous implications for the social partnership and

its

future.

(Pelinka 1999)

Liberalization, Privatization, and Challenges to Social

One of the

Democracy

significant reforms that Austria has pursued since the 1980s has been

privatization of formerly state-owned or controlled industries. (Kittel 2000; Pelinka 1999)

This was accomplished for both economic and political rationale. Politically, the

OVP

returned to the government with the renewal of the grand coalition in 1987 and was able

to represent a

1

970s and

to

1

more pro-business agenda

980s. Yet the

left

and

right,

after a long

absence during the SPO-dominated

and labor and business, also recognized the need

reform the economic policies and models of the state as the world and European

economies had placed even greater pressure on Austrian competitiveness. (Crepaz 1994)

Even those

critical

of privatization

globalizaing and Europeanizing

felt

Austria faced few other options in the ever-

economy of the 1980s and

1990s. (Pelinka 1999)

Many

of the anti-cyclical, Austro-Keynesiamsm, and other macroeconomic strategies used by
Austria from the 1940s to the 1970s to sustain economic growth, maintain a strong state

role in the

economy, reign

in inflation,

manage exchange

rates,

keep unemployment low,

provide generous welfare benefits, subsidize domestic industry and farming, and increase
exports had

become

ineffective

and dysfunctional
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in a

transformed world economy.

Change may not have been preferred but was deemed necessary. (Kramer 1996; Arndt
1982; Seidel 1982, 1996; Crepaz 1994; Pelinka 1998, 1999; Marchant 2001; Kittel 2000)

The new

many of these macroeconomic

restrained

151)

global and European economic environments also significantly

As Kramer and

tools of the Austrian state. (Fitzmaurice

1990

others suggest, from the 1950s until the 1980s small states like

Austria were potentially able to be free riders in the increasing global trade environment.

Austria could be protectionist, but by being small enough,

much

attention to

its

policies

Kingdom,

the United

to

avoid drawing too

like

Germany,

(Kramer 1998; Riklin 1991;

Frei 1977;

from large trading

or the United States.

was able

states

and partners

Italy,

Katzenstein 1985) The recessions of the 1970s and 1980s, the reform and reinvigoration

of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)

Uruguay Rounds from

in the

1986, the end of the Cold War, and the increasing pace and importance of European

integration

ended

this “clever trick”

and exposed Austria

to the

wider forces of the global

and regional economies. (Pulzer 1998) Even as a long standing member of the European
Free Trade Association (EFTA), Austria and the other smaller

were able

to

maintain

fairly

members of the group

unequal protectionist economic policies.

Significant privatization and reduction of the public sector has been

commensurate with Austria's
need

integration into the

for privatization, liberalization,

and reform

World Trade Organization (WTO), and

EU

European and world economies. The

to bring Austria in line with

business and industry. (Crepaz 1994; Marchant 2001; Pelinka 1999)

990s saw

a

the

standards of trade and openness has

fundamentally changed the power and role of the social partnership

1

GATT,

in

regulating Austrian

The 1980s and

process of deregulation and privatization of most major state-owned or
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controlled firms. This has been primarily done in an incremental

manner

that continues to

present day. (Kittel 2000; Crepaz 1994; Pelinka 1998; The Economist 2003)

that the difficult process

Many

argue

of structural reform was hampered by not only the scale of

nationalization into banking, finance, insurance, as well as heavy industry, but also by the

social partners' unwillingness to quickly

is

not to say that gradual reform

been significant criticism

own economic
this

integration

would diminish

the

and radically reform. (Crepaz 1994, 1995) This

less preferable to radical reform. Rather, there has

is

that Austria has

gone too slowly and incrementally impeding

its

and growth by unnecessarily dragging out the process. Again,

argument

that the social partnership

and neo-corporatism provide

timely, adaptable, and flexible decision-making to the small Austrian state and enhance

its

economy. (Katzenstein 1984, 1985; Pulzer 1995,

ability to navigate the international

1998; Pelinka 1998, 1999; Gerlich 1992; Crepaz 1994, 1995)

Nonetheless, reform did gradually occur in both privatization and penetration by
foreign capital into the Austrian economy.

The

first

major act of privatization was the

passage of a 1985 law to reduce the holdings of the Austrian

OIAG
steel,

to

state

holding company,

(Osterreichische Industrieholdings-Aktiengesellschaft). The privatization of oil,

banking, tobacco,

salt,

and other

be fiercely debated by the major

industries, while

parties, interests,

mostly accomplished, continues

and other

actors.

(Lauber 1992;

Pelinka 1998; Seidel 1996; Kittel 2000) Nonetheless, even amongst labor and the

there

was resignation

to the necessity

of privatization

to

remain even remotely

competitive in the European and global economies. (Pelinka 1999; Unger 1999)
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left

Banking and finance was perhaps the most hotly contested sector of the economy.

Given
this

and private

the strong role of the state in both public

should not seem surprising.

was

It

also

and finance markets

capital

one of the primary conduits

could regulate or coerce the private sector throughout the postwar

era.

in

which labor

(Katzenstein 1984;

Talos 1996)

The

privatization process

partnership’s efficacy.

illustrated a

SPO

OVP

and

itself

an example of the decline of the social

privatization efforts of the late 1980s and early 1990s

number of trends

privatization period

while the

The

was

that

bode poorly

was punctuated by

OGB

for the social partnership in Austria. This

WKO advocated thorough privatization. The OGB’s influence in the

had declined, weakened by overall decline

weakening party

identity

and

loyalty.

Hence

the

in

heavy

OGB

coalition with the 1987 elections,

The

major reform. The

strictly protectionist

and

employment and

SPO

not “intervene

dissolution of the

and the subsequent creation of a

coalition created the conditions for

and

industrial

was unable and did

decisively in this policy-making process”. (Kittel 2000)

need not maintain

economy

attempts to maintain a mixed

SPO-OVP

realized that

it

SPO-FPO

grand

could not, and

anti-liberal stances in this altered

economic

political landscape.

Nonetheless, the early privatization efforts of the

many major

industries,

of shares and

to try

still

late

1980s, while restructuring

attempted to maintain state ownership of a blocking minority

and keep the firms organized

privatization in the late 1980s

was eventually

into large conglomerates.

instituted,

it

was

far

the

SPO

decision reached with the explicit support of unions and the

OGB

Nonetheless, while

it

might

reflect

compromise between
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Hence, while

from thorough.
and OVP,

it

was not

a

This was primarily due

while labor and the

to the fact that

left

were not

thrilled with the prospects

and

consequences of wider privatization and liberalization of the Austrian economy, they
lacked any viable alternatives. Hence, while the privatization process mostly bypassed

the Joint

Commission and

social partnership, in reality the process

the implicit acquiescence of the

round of privatizations

in the

much weaker SPO and OGB.

was

initiated

(Pelinka 1999)

isolated

SPO. As

compromise took place

OVP rather than
Labor had very
1993

OIAG

it

its

former

from 1986 onwards, while

Kittel suggests,

was primarily between

its

OGB even

from the policy and decision-making process as well as from

political party partner, the

to

second

1990s followed the increased risk of Austria losing

triple-A credit status in the international financial markets. This found the

more

A

due

the coalition parties of the

SPO

and

through the formal and informal structures of the social partnership.

little

input and

became marginalized from

the process. (Kittel 2000)

law firmly placed Austria on the road to privatization in even

its

The

smaller

sectoral holdings. (Kittel 2000)

Almost one-third of all privatized firms ended up

German. (Heinisch 2000) This has increased
Austrian.

A

recent

example was the

owned about

remaining shares

Canadian firm sparked

provincial government of

Upper

criticism of the privatization process as un-

sale of Voest-Alpine, a steel group, in

Austrian government

to a

in foreign hands, the majority

one-third of the shares.

Austria, the

political

FPO,

The proposed

to accept a

the

sale of the

controversy in 2003. The

OGB

and others had serious concerns

not only over privatization but also about the sale to a foreign owner.

agreement was

which

The eventual

lower price for the shares from a domestic investment group, a

uniquely Austrian decision.

(

The Economist 2003a)
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Austria

own
it

is

now committed

to privatization

under European auspices as well

its

domestic attempts to improve the competitiveness of the Austrian economy. Hence

has to address both domestic concerns and politics and European rules and oversight

in

regards to such privatizations. (Pelinka 1998) The inflow of foreign capital and
increasing foreign ownership of Austrian firms has been, and continues to be one of the

largest

consequences of the liberalization reforms. While the postwar period had strongly

linked public and private industry and finance to the state and the influence of the social

partnership, privatization has resulted in a major internationalization of the control of

Austria's major industries, banks, and other firms. Nearly

now owned by German
partly or fully foreign

Commerce 2007)
capitalists”

firms and perhaps as

many

as

20%

40%

of all Austrian industry

of all Austrian firms are

is

now

owned. (Pelinka 1998; Marchant 2001; U.S Department of

Austria can no longer be called a case of “capitalism without capital or

and many of these

1985; Heinisch 2000) This

capitalists are

means

that a

non-Austrian as well. (Pelinka 1998; Lens

growing number of employers and firms

fall

outside of Austrian ownership and reduce the ability of the state to directly influence

firms’ decision-making.

partial or minority

However, the

ownerships

in a

state

still

maintains an above-average number of

number of utilities,

renewal of the grand coalition and re-inclusion of the
privatization have

firms, and industries.

SPO

in

With the

government, new plans for

slowed as well (U.S. Department of Commerce 2007) Hence, while

Austria has seen major changes,

privatization seen in the United

it

is

not

in the

Kingdom

extensive and radical Thatcher model of

in the 1980s
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and 1990s.

There have also been significant changes

to labor

markets and their regulation that

have increased non-union employment and reduced the overall influence of the
organize and participate in

its

traditional roles.

employment reforms were enacted during

A number of flexible,

OGB

temporary and

the late 1990s and early 2000s.

to

self-

(Unger 1999;

Pelinka 1999, Falkner 2001; Kittel 2000) This has had several effects including decline in

union density and membership. But

it

has also created a

split

between secure “core”

employees, tending to be unionized with higher wages and benefits, and
“peripheral” workers

whose employment

stability,

less secure

wages, and benefits are

far lower.

(Unger 1999; Pelinka 1999) This has created new tensions between the Chambers of

Labor and

OGB

the labor market

competitive

as their

was

in the

memberships become

less

and

less overlapping. Liberalization

of

a very contentious but necessary set of reforms to keep Austrian

European and global economies, as well as

to

provide a more flexible

labor environment for greater post-Fordist commercial, service, and technology sectors.

(Pelinka 1999)

In

terms of the welfare

major reductions and changes

state, there

was

significant

to welfare provision

compromise

in the

1990s on

and funding. This was negotiated by

the social partners both within and outside of the Joint

Commission. The 1995 Savings

Package, or Sparpaket consolidated several reforms into a single act including budget
,

austerity measures, lower taxes,

to

wage

cuts, increased

employee and family contributions

pension and healthcare plans, and streamlining or reduction of some elements of

welfare provision. (Falkner 2002) The most notable part was

left

how quickly

labor and the

acquiesced to these changes that ran counter to their entire postwar Keynesian

orientation.
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Unger argues

that this reflected both labor’s resignation to the

new European and

global reality but also a realignment of the social partnership that tended to be favorable

towards commerce and industry. Further,

(Unger 1999) Katzenstein would alternately suggest

becoming more Swiss,

more

undermines the whole principle of Austrian

been based on parity or proporz between labor and capital

social partnership that has

interests.

this

liberal

as

it

transited

that Austria

was merely

from a more social form of neo-corporatism

to a

one as labor becomes weaker while business becomes more dominant.

(Katzenstein 1984, 1985; Unger 1998; Pelinka 1999)

There were also changes

to the

system of vocational training that had been

decisively under the auspices of the social partners until the 1990s.

The Austrian system

of vocational training was officially under the authority of the Ministry of Economic
Affairs, but

much

like in

Germany,

the administration and operation of the system

primarily accomplished by the direct roles of the Federal

was

Chamber of Business (WKO)

and Federal Chamber of Labor (BAK). Unlike Germany, where there was a rather equal
role for each social partner, the Austrian

(Kittel,

2000) Reforms

demands

in the

for greater oversight

vocational training system

and lack of transparency
1997 after protracted

model tended

to

be dominated by the

WKO.

1990s were undertaken due to both government and labor

and

itself,

in the

roles.

These emerged due

to

problems

in

the

including lack of available seats for younger workers

finances of the system.

talks, negotiations,

compromise and consensus between

The eventual reforms enacted by

and bargaining nonetheless reflected

the social partners and state.

a

The system has adopted

higher levels of state financing and commensurate direct state influence in the direction

and operation of the system. Additionally, labor has a larger voice
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in the

system as well

Nonetheless, the

2000) The changes

(Kittel

institutions

and

WKO remains rather dominant in the vocational training system.

of social partnership, they

that enacted

while there are challenges to the structures and

illustrate that

may

still

continue to eventually find compromise

reforms have been more incremental, a major characteristic of the

postwar system.

However, there have been increasing number of cases where compromise and
continuity have been less resilient. Debates over changes to working hours and increasing

flexibility

of worker schedules have met with significant structural conflict since the

1990s. With neither side willing to

step in and publicly

if

announce

its

make

significant concessions, the state

was forced

to

willingness to enact reforms without the social partners

necessary. This threat allowed the government to oversee the remaining bargaining

process and eventually carve out a compromise that broke the stalemate.

By

1997, an

agreement was reached between labor and business with the support of the major

parties.

Nonetheless, while eventually a successful case of compromise and consensus in labor

market reforms,

it

required greater governmental interference and shepherding than had

been the norm during the immediate postwar

The new
itself is

international and

era. (Kittel

2000)

European economic environment

that Austria finds

one with greater economic uncertainty. This stems from an increased pace of

financial

and investment transactions, greater fluctuations

in

markets due

to the increased

options and flexibility of supplies and distribution networks, a more speculative and fast-

paced global investment market, new transformational technologies
the

demands of production,

training,

that regularly

and consumption, a greater demand

change

for flexible

and

adaptive workforces and labor supplies, and a far more competitive global and regional
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marketplace for

all

forms of production and service. (Unger 1999; Kittel 2000; Pelinka

1999) This has increased the number of “shocks” that the system confronts and also

changes the types of shocks confronted. While the 1960s and 1970s shocks were
primarily

demand

or inflationary shocks,

new shocks

are

more

likely to

be structural,

organizational, or institutional requiring significant different policy responses by the

state.

While the

social partnership addressed the

quite well from the 1940s to 1970s, the

social partnership itself.

demands of inflation and other shocks

new shocks have been

(Unger 1999) Most Austrians see

little

globalize and integrate, yet most also feel that the results place

their control or influence.

As

option other than to

more and more outside of

(Unger 1998)

Kittel argues, despite the internationalization, liberalization,

decentralization of the Austrian

commensurate with
intermediation in

2000s

disruptive to the Austrian

all

a “retreat”

economy

areas. His research suggests that

economic policymaking process.
partnership has

since the 1980s, this need not necessarily be

of neo-corporatist policymaking and

that the social partnership

managed

was

still

even into the

interest

late

1990s and early

an effective force inside the Austrian socio-

In vocational training

to adjust

and

and continued

and work hours policy, the social

to thrive,

though

in a less

consensual

and cooperative manner. While there were strong divisions between the sides

in

both

these issue areas, the eventual results were attained within the structures and processes of

the social partnership (Kittel 2000; Falkner and Talos 1999) Kittel argues that in

some

key areas, social partnership might continue to be an ideal form of policymaking even
a liberalizing

and globalizing economic and

political
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environment.

in

Disputing the notion that decentralization or markets (neo-liberalism)

more compatible, and provides

is

always

greater flexibility, with a disorganization of interests

(pluralism) than organized and structured interests (neo-corporatism), Kittel and others

affirm that concertation and social partnership

flexibility. (Gerlich,

may

actually increase efficiency and

Grande, and Muller 1988; Kittel 2000) Nonetheless,

the significant change in the central role of the social partnership in

policymaking. While

it

was once

a consistently strong force,

The

social partnership has

But

in vocational training

less

consensual and cooperative conditions.

showed strong continuity

in

it

is

also illustrates

economic

now

an intermittent one.

addressing working hours policy.

while compromise was eventually achieved

And

it

it

was under

far

finally, in privatization policy, the social

partnership seems to have collapsed as an effective institution altogether. Further, the

increasing role of the state in vocational training and

managing

the process of social

partnership suggests transformation as well. (Kittel 2000; Falkner and Talos 1994)

While the internationalization and Europeanization of the Austrian economy has
certainly contributed to the crises of neo-corporatism in Austria, there

have also been

perceptible changes in the political conditions as well. Liberalization and globalization

certainly represent

enormous changes

to the Austrian

social partnership, yet these cannot be taken out

context in Austria.
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economy and challenges

of the changing domestic

to the

political

There have been enormous changes
institutions

in the political behavior, parties, actors,

over the past three decades that are as

likely, if not potentially

more

and

likely, to

explain the transformation of the Austrian social partnership. (Unger 1997, 1999) These

economic and
certainly

political transformations are not easily disaggregated

seem

to

from one another and

be mutually reinforcing the challenges to the social partnership

in

Austria.

Transformation of the Political Party System
Politically, the Austrian party

and

SPO

have both seen erosion of their support and a decline

membership

ties,

and Plasser

Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Fitzmaurice

1990; Pelinka 1998a) Party identification has shrunk in Austria from approximately

Plasser,

in the

1950s to less than

50%

75%

by the mid 1990s. (Plasser and Ulram 1991;

Ulram, and Grausgruber 1992; Luther 1992; Pulzer 1995; Plasser and Ulram

1995; Muller 1996; Pelinka 1998, 1998a) Voter turnout has also dropped from over

in the

and

in party identification

certainly affecting their ability to mobilize voters. (Pelinka

1989; Plasser, Ulram, and Grausgruber 1992;

of voters

OVP

system has undergone significant change. The

1970s to under

82%

92%

4

by the 1990s. (Pulzer 1995; Muller 1996; Pelinka 1998,

1998a) The increasing importance of the FPO, Green Parties, and other smaller parties
has upended the traditional grand coalition formula frequently since 1986. (Fitzmaurice
1990, 1996; Pelinka and Plasser 1989; Crepaz 1994, 1995; Sully 1996; Pelinka 1998,

1

9

998a; Rose 2000) The shares of seats held by the two major parties, the

Turnout increased to over

84%

in the

2006

elections.
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SPO

and OVP,

have shrunk from nearly
(Plasser,

90%

1950s to

in the early

less than

60%

by the 1990s.

10

Ulram, and Grausgruber 1992; Pulzer 1995; Muller 1996; Pelinka 1998, 1998a;

Sully 1997) Perhaps, as Sully suggests, the traditional two-party system of Austria has

been “usurped by a pentagonal structure”. (Sully 1996, 1997) Elections have also become

more expensive, with each

election outstripping previous totals. (Sully 1997; Muller

2000) Electoral changes in Austria, once small and incremental, have become larger and
slightly

more

volatile despite the electoral reforms

to punish smaller parties. (Plasser,

of 1992 and 1993

were intended

that

Ulram, and Grausgruber 1992; Pulzer 1995;

Fitzmaurice 1996; Pelinka 1998, 1998a; Saltiel 2000; Rose 2000; Sully 1996)
Jorg Haider, the FPO, and other parties have often expressed discomfort with the

elitism,

proporz spoils system, and

insularity

of the decision-making process arguing

that

majority politics and efficiency are more democratic than the system under the social

partnership. (Fitzmaurice 1990;

Crepaz 1994, 1995; Sully 1996; Heilbrunn 1997;

Fairlamb 2000; Nagorski 2000; Pryce-Jones 2000; Rose 2000;

2001
the

)

This more pluralist and

FPO

anti-elitist turn

Saltiel

2000; Marchant

paid large electoral credits

in the

1990s as

gained significant ground with skilled and unskilled workers, farmers, the

employed, and

retirees.

self-

(Crepaz 1994, 1995; Plasser and Ulram 1995; Pulzer 1995; Sully

1996, 1997; Pelinka 1998; Rose 2000; Saltiel 2000; Kunkel and Pontusson 1998)

Of course

critiquing the system

is

far different than governing.

government as the coalition partner of the OVP, the

FPO

Once

in

discovered that support for

major overhauls of welfare, pension, and industrial policy were potentially dangerous.

FPO
10

and

OVP

plans for an Austrian “third

The highest was

way” of smaller government and lower

93.1 in 1971 and 1975 This has since rebounded to just under

parliamentary elections of October 2006. This percentage

amendments and

is

70%

taxes

in the last

important for constitutional

other special acts require a two-thirds majority for passage in the Austrian parliament,
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were revolutionary

for

many

Austrians. (Rose 2000; Marchant 2001

)

The FPO eventually

backed away from many of its more radical platform items and support for
sponsored reforms on a number of issues.

OVP-

The Economist 2000a; Viebrock 2004)

(

This has been met with a concurrent loosening of ties between the interest
associations and political parties and increasing importance of parliamentary politics vis-

a-vis the social partnership. (Crepaz 1994, 1995; Gerlich, Grande,

and Muller 1988;

Pelinka and Plasser 1989; Muller 1992; Pelinka 1998; Karlhofer 1996) This de-alignment

of interests and parties has strong implications for the

institutions

partnership which have been built with strong linkages to what

of the social

was once an

extraordinarily stable political party system.

The defection of OGB and
leftists to

the

labor votes to the populist

FPO, and of radical and

Green Alternative, or Grime Alternative (GA), and the United Greens of

Austria, or Vereinte

provincial levels.

(

Grime Osterreichs (VGO), has weakened

Europe 1999; Kunkel and Pontusson 1998)

had become the major recipient of blue-collar workers

the

SPO

In 1995

in historically

at national

and

and 1999, the

FPO

“red Vienna”.

(Trausmuth 2000; Rose 2000; Kunkel and Pontusson 1998)

The

OVP

is little

better off having lost

business) and agrarian support to the

FPO

some VOI-business

(especially small

and Jorg Haider's new offshoot party, the

Bindnis Zukunft Osterreich (BZO) or Alliance for the Future of Austria. The
also lost support to

or Liberales

some smaller

OVP

nationalist or liberal parties such as the Liberal

Forum (LF) (Crepaz

1994, 1995; Muller 1996, 2000;

1995; Sully 1996; Fitzmaurice 1990)
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Adams

2001

;

has

Forum,
Pulzer

As

parties

have “emancipated” themselves from neo-corporatist couplings, party

much

competition and parliamentary politics have assumed a

decision-making than

in

previous neo-corporatist eras. (Crepaz 1994, 1995) This has

made maintenance of previous,

showed

in

SPO-OVP

SPO-OVP

negotiations, the second longest in postwar Austrian history,

that

emerged was lacking “self-confidence” and

solve urgent problems”. (Sully 1996; Muller 2000)

As many

coalition in Austria functions under different conditions

past. (Gerlich 1992; Pulzer 1995; Sully 1996; Saltiel

There are also fewer members of the
political parties

coalition.

difficult.

and

in

While

coalition, the

were quite turbulent and
the “will

The

Nonetheless the

the increasing complexity and declining consensus of the parties.

the 1995 parliamentary elections resulted in the customary

government

more

as well as the current, grand coalitions

1995 and 2007 parliamentary elections resulted
results

larger role in Austrian

and capacity

the

to

scholars suggest, grand

and different rules than

in the

2000)

interest associations in the leadership

of the

parliamentary seats. (Kunkel and Pontusson 1998; Pelinka 1998,

1999; Lauber 1995) Prior to the 1980s, over half of all parliamentary seats were filled by

persons serving in both political parties and interest associations. (Talos 1996) That

number has dropped below 19% by

the late 1990s. (Karlhofer 1999; Viebrock 2004;

Pelinka 1999) This weakens the interest associations within the decision-making process

as well as within the

major

political parties.

Numerous

disputes, including the 1995 budget battle and the

growing trend and the types of new

legislative

2003 pension reform

political conflicts that

(Crepaz 1994, 1995; Lauber 1995)
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and peak association

bill,

may emerge from

highlight this

them.

)

Year

Labor

Business

Agriculture

Total

1973

31

9

12

52

1978

31

13

13

57

1987

25

10

9

44

1991

21

7

7

35

1995

11

5

5

21

Source: Pelinka, 1999

Table

In

4:

Representatives of Economic Interest Groups

in the

Austrian Parliament

terms of political parties, while the Austrian system has certainly experienced a

slide in party identification, a

benefit of a

number of third

weakening of the two major
and a decrease

parties,

Miilller 1996)

(SPO and OVP)

in party loyalty, Austria

maintains numbers well above the European average in

and Grausgruber 1992; Pulzer 1995;

parties

many

at the

still

categories. (Plasser, Ulram,

While party membership and the

decline of the major parties has implications for the stability Austrian politics and the

social partnership, the continuing strength in relative terms suggests that continuity

is

certainly a possibility. Fitzmaurice argues that anything other than grand coalition has

often

seemed “a deviation from

return. (Fitzmaurice 1996, 90)

those fortunes reversed in the

the

norm” and

that

many

The FPO, while making
last

few

elections.

Austrians believe that

large

Consider

gams

should

in the 1990s, has seen

that in the

parliamentary elections of October 2006, the results created a

it

most recent

new grand

coalition

and

OVP

similar to that of most of the postw ar Austrian political

experience. There are

some

significant differences as well including a

between the

SPO

much

smaller

percentage of parliamentary seats and certainly a change in the membership, issues, and
support for both parties. (Fraser 2007; The Economist 2007; Marchant 2001
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In addition, even with changing electoral fortunes in Austria, the social

partnership can certainly exist in a

while party politics

in Austria

threat to the stability

if the parties

more competitive or multiparty environment. Hence

has certainly more interesting than

of the social partnership

and major

is

in the

previous era the

not automatically endangered. However,

interest associations continue to or increasingly seek to

and marginalize the structures of the Austrian social partnership, greater party
and de-alignment certainly must ring an alarm

Given the more conflict-oriented

)

and vicious tenor of the major parties during recent electoral cycles,
and

ability to

instability

for the neo-corporatist institutions in the

Austrian system. (Crepaz 1994, 1995; Marchant 2001

that both their willingness

bypass

also

it

seems clear

compromise and bargain has been diminished.

(Crepaz 1994; Sully 1996)
Pelinka and Ulram suggest three potential outcomes for Austrian parties that

would

directly influence the social partnership.

Italianization

(Ulram 1990; Pelinka 1998a) The

of the Austrian system would result

in a

complete breakdown of the party

system and realignment along new cleavages, as happened in
This would necessitate a

parties

and

interest

emerge from
breakaway
its

total

groups

Italy in the early 1990s.

reorganization of the links and synchronization between

in Austria.

Netherlandization of Austria's party system would

the decomposition of existing large parties and the establishment

parties.

As happened

in the

of new

Netherlands in the 1970s with the dissolution of

old pillar system of Catholic-Protestant-Socialist consociationa! and corporatist

arrangements, the Austrian party system could emerge as

much more

unpredictable and

with a stronger focus on parliamentary decision-making. This would sap power from the

institutions

of the social partnership and would also require significant realignment
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between
the

parties

system

major
return.

rolls

and

interests.

The

along maintaining

parties while slowly

third potential

it

outcome

is

Switzerlandization in which

proporz brand of consociationalism amongst the

crumbling from the outside, eventually reaching a point of no

(Ulram 1990; Pelinka 1998a)

Transformation of Identities, Solidarity, Post-Materialism, and Post-Industrialism
Austrians have also begun to change their attitudes towards the social partnership

and the nature of its institutionalization
of the system has risen with

many

in the

Austrian political system. Public criticism

sharply disagreeing with compulsory or obligatory

membership. (Fitzmaurice 1990; Crepaz 1995, 1994; Markovits 1996; Rose 2000;

Howard 2000; Marchant 2001; Kunkel and Pontusson 1998)
solidarity within interest associations has also

part in association elections for the federal

berate the

chambers

for lack

Increasingly, loyalty and

been waning. Fewer members actively take

and provincial chambers, while others openly

of equitable representation and transparency, corruption,

nepotism, bureaucratic inefficiency, and lack of innovation. (Luther 1992; Crepaz 1994,
1995; Markovits 1996) Elections within the chambers have been experiencing significant

decline since the 1980s. (Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988; Crepaz 1994; Markovits

1

996) Voter turnout

in

Chamber of Labor

elections dropped

yet to significantly rebound. (Pelinka 1998) Voting in the

shrunk to
Federal

less than

40%

in

1994 and has

Chamber of Business has

62%. (Gerlich 1992) Many unions and workers under

Chamber of Labor umbrellas

at the federal level.

below

the

OGB

also

and

are less and less inclined to support the leadership

(Luther 1992; Crepaz 1994; Kunkel and Pontusson 1998) Union

membership and density

is

also in decline, further
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weakening

their overall leverage in the

system. (Pelinka 1998; Plasser, Ulram, and Grausgruber 1992; Kunkel and Pontusson
1998; Heinisch 2000) Further, the

OGB may also be

failing to identify

and organize new

workers, especially in the service sectors, to bolster their support The schisms within

labor

may

also include those between older

from heavy industries and younger ones

in

and more protected or privileged workers

newer service-oriented and lower wage

employment. (Kunkel and Pontusson 1998; Heinisch 2000) Nonetheless, there have been
only a few changes to the system of centralized collective bargaining that

dominated by the chambers and large peak associations. This

is still

will be discussed in later

sections of this chapter.

Katzenstein's distinction between liberal corporatism, in which business
stronger force, and social corporatism, in which labor dominates,

is

relevant here.

suggests that the decline in strength of labor unions does not necessarily

decline

in

corporatism but merely a

shift

from social

the

is

mean an

It

overall

to liberal corporatism. (Katzenstein

1984; Lijphart 1999) However, the decline of membership and solidarity “weakens the

ability

of labor unions to act on behalf of large numbers of workers and hence weakens

their influence in tripartite negotiations”. (Lijphart 1999; Pelinka 1999)

Labor may not be alone
and monopoly. Solidarity

in

facing both internal and external challenges to

to the partnership also

appears to be

firms competing in the European and global marketplaces.

more European and global

in orientation,

in

decline

As Austrian

among

firms

unity

Austrian

become

customer-base, suppliers, ownership, and

stakeholders, their willingness to remain committed to an Austrian national

solidarity

its

economic

must diminish. Divisions between employers and firms, especially the gaps

between small, medium, and large firms, over globalization and European integration
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have divided the

VOI and

WKO significantly and more regularly. (Karlhofer

Heinisch 2000;

Adams

parties like the

FPO, BZO, and LF who have

increase his and the

from

a

2002, 2002a; Viebrock 2004) This has also benefited smaller

promoted more

irregularly

or pro-business agendas. Jorg Haider

liberal, neo-liberal,

1999;

FPO

was

libertarian,

able to significantly

share of business votes in the 1999 election by getting backing

number of private and family-owned businesses

in Austria.

(Kamitschnig 2000;

Crepaz 1994) Haider’s pro-business, pro-privatization, smaller government,

anti-

compulsory chamber membership, and lower tax platform attracted many business
had previous been reliable
interests

OVP

supporters. This break between the

institutions.

Joint

Commission

vis-a-vis parliament, the parties,

associations”,

many argue

that there has not

idea of the neo-corporatist system

Austrians

still

70% by

more

and other

political

(Crepaz 1994, 1995; Heinisch 2000)

While more and more Austrians are “uneasy with and

to

business

from the VOI and Chamber of Business has ramifications upon the role and

power of the

above

OVP and

that

itself.

critical

of the interest

been a serious question as

(Ulram 1993)

In polling, nearly

regularly supported the social partnership by the

1999. (Karlhofer 1996; Heinisch 2000)

seriously critique the social partnership

which

to the

60%

mid 1990s,

underlying

of

rising

back

However many groups have begun
is

perceived as a system of elitism,

cronyism, and inefficiency. (Fitzmaunce 1990; Crepaz 1995; Markovits 1996; Ladika

2000; Rose 2000) The social partnership

is still

seen by most actors and Austrians as a

desirable part of the political system and prefer a

model on consensus-oriented

democracy. (Karlhofer 1996; Pelinka 1998, 1999) But whether
political

system

is

it’s

a necessary part

of the

surely a fundamental question that has not yet fully been answered.
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)

The

inability

has hurt

it

of the social partnership to address

Plasser,

in

post-material issues and schisms

(Crepaz 1994, 1995; Pelinka 1999)

viability.

Austrian society

new

general

seem

to

Many

also note that elites and

be becoming less consensus-oriented. (Gerlich 1989;

Ulram, and Grausgruber 1992; Luther 1992; Crepaz 1994; Pelinka 1998;

Fitzmaurice 1990; Rose 2000; Marchant 2001

The

traditional

Lager

identities

have also begun to weaken. (Plasser, Ulram, and

Grausgruber 1992; Crepaz 1995) The decline of Catholicism towards secularism and the
decline of socialism after the end of the Cold

for

War have

eroded the organizational basis

segments of the social partnership as well. (Pelinka 1998) Social mobility, secularism,

and post-materialism have

all

contributed to a significant shifting of Austrian political

culture that supported the social partnership for the bulk of the postwar era. (Gerlich,

Grande, and Muller 1988; Pelinka 1998, 1998a, 1999; Markovits 1996; Luther 1992) The
affluence and modernization of Austria has diminished both religious and ideological

identities

of

its

citizens.

Fewer and fewer workers see themselves as proletarians and

living standards rose, both blue

leftist

state

ideological baggage.

and

states.

its

citizens

as

and white-collar workers discarded more radical and

The Catholic Conservatives have met

became increasingly urban,

secular and

(Luther 1992) Within Austrian society, the

new

more

a similar fate as the

like other

European

divisions are based on age,

education, and gender. These growing "post-material” a nd post -Lager gaps are

fundamentally and permanently altering the Austrian political cultural landscape.
(Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988; Plasser, Ulram, and Grausgruber 1992; Crepaz 1994,

1995; Pelinka 1999) These

new schisms and

postwar social partnership's

divisions do not align well with the existing

institutions, associations,
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and

ties to political parties.

(Luther

1992; Plasser and Ulram 1995; Pelinka 1998, 1998a, 1999;

Howard 2000;

Gerlich,

Grande, and Muller 1988) Jorg Haider, the FPO, and other parties were able
gains with voters by attacking the old corporatist order,

to

make

compulsory nature, and

its

its

privileged leadership. (Unger 1999; Marchant 2001)

The
field

ability for the interest associations

of wages or economic and social policy

Howard 2000; Marchant 2001) This has

and parties

is

to forge

compromise

in the

declining. (Pelinka 1998; Seidel 1996;

increased the importance of government and

parliament in the decision-making process. Interest associations’ relationships with the

political parties,

while declining in

stability, are

nonetheless increasing in importance

in

such an environment. The increased competition amongst the political parties has made

them more

selective and discerning regarding legislation

Wages and

Prices,

and has even

led to

many more

from the Joint Committee on

instances of bypassing the social

partnership structure altogether. (Muller 1992; Crepaz 1994, 1995) Parliament, while in
the heyday of the social partnership in the

many

rubber stamp

critical

1

960s and

1

970s was more than happy

to

proposals of the Joint Committee has become far more likely to turn a

and perhaps rejecting eye since the 1980s. (Crepaz 1994, 1995; Pelinka 1998;

Seidel 1996; Muller 1992; Gerlich 1992; Marchant 2001)

Even more notable has been

the

marked increase

in

labor disputes since the

1980s. While Austria had once led the world in the category of least disrupted economies,

it

now

ranks

much lower

and even the United

wide

strike in

over

(see figure 4 below), well behind

States.

fifty

Germany,

(The Economist 2006) Most notable was the

years on

,

May

6,

2003. Organized by the

OGB,

first

country-

the strike clogged

public transport, closed schools and most of the largest firms in Austria.
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Sweden,

Britain,

The

strike

was

organized to protest the plan of Chancellor Wolfgang Schussel and his
coalition in Parliament to overhaul the state pension system.

OVP-FPO

As The Economist

notes, the

old system of social partnership might be “falling apart” not only by the collapse of the

OVP-SPO

grand coalition system but also by an increasing willingness of the

government

to

bypass the neo-corporatist institutions such as the Joint Commission and

legislate directly

from parliamentary majorities with or without the consent of the social

partners. (Crepaz 1994, 1995;

increase the likelihood of

additional

rail

strikes. (U.S.

I

The Economist 2003) This certainly would seem

more regularized public labor

disputes.

to

However, other than an

workers’ strike in the spring of 2003 there have been few additional major

Department of Commerce 2007)

Labour disputes
Iceland has the most fractious industrial relationsin
the OECD. Its strike rate— the number of days lostto labour disputes per 1,000
employees-averaged 581 days a yearfrom
1995-2004. In 1995, its worst year, Iceland lost a most two days
to strikes for every
l

worker in the economy. The OECD strike rate of
39 n 2004 was higher than the year before, but lower than its average over the
preceding decade.
i

Source: Office for National Statistics

Figure

4:

Labor Disputes
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Transformation of the Institutions and Structures of Social Partnership

While Austria may no longer be the “exceptionally pure” example of corporatism
it

was touted

reflection of

like other

to be, this

its

former

does not necessarily imply

self.

European nations

that

it

will evolve into a pluralist

may simply become more

(Lijphart 1999) Rather, Austria

that tend to

be more moderately or weakly corporatist.

(Gerhch 1992; Pelinka 1999) Given the strong

social

and

political preconditions

and

general public support for social partnership, wholesale rejection of the neo-corporatist

model

is

unlikely. Nonetheless, conditions

and public support can change dramatically

under difficult political or economic circumstances.

The complex and extensive network of horizontal and

vertical interaction

the state, government, bureaucracy, legislature, political parties,

and

between

interest associations

has been gradually curtailed and decentralized. (Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988;

Pelinka 1999)

One of the more

Chambers of Agriculture and

VOI
that

has increased

its

gradual changes has been the marginalization of the

the increasing

power of the VOI

was once reserved

for agriculture. (Karlhofer 1996;

Viebrock 2004) This does have

commercial power

other institutions, perhaps swinging the structural balance

more pro-business

expense.

share of committee seats and begun to act as the “fourth chamber”

the tendency of increasing business and

a

at agriculture's

orientation. (Karlhofer 1996) This

in the Joint

away from

may

Commission and

parity

and towards

be one explanation for the

significant liberalization of labor market regulations in Austria since the late 1990s

and

perhaps contributing to the ongoing decline of union density and membership. (Pelinka
1999)
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)

November

In

1992, the presidents of the peak organization recommitted

themselves to the cooperative forums such as the Joint Commission and expressed that
should become a ‘"special arena” for talks between
1996,

1

19)

Hence while compromise and cooperation

basic willingness to pursue consensus

that the search for

compromise

is

may

in retreat

(C'repaz 1994; Pelinka 1998; Rise 2000;

Institutionally, there

from price control
in

to

still exist.

social partners

more

is

difficult to

Yet, there

and Austria

is

and the

is

also

state.

(Talos

accomplish, the

growing evidence

nearing “the end of consensus”.

Marchant 2001

have been significant changes to the social partnership.

Commission changed

1992, the Joint

had been

all

it

the responsibility of the

In

Subcommittee on Prices

studying prices and inflation. While the role of the subcommittee

decline for decades, this

was more than an incremental change. Price

control,

one of the foundations of the Joint Commission, has been abolished from the auspices of
social partnership. (Pelinka 1999)

on Competition by the
Relations

was

orientation as

late

It

was eventually transformed

1990s. (Unger 1997)

also created to give the Joint

was

a

A new

Subcommittee

Subcommittee on International

Commission

new permanent subgroup

into the

a

more European and global

for environmental questions. Further, the

Minister of Finance was added as a non-voting

member of conference committee.

(Pelinka 1998, 1999; Karlhofer 1996) The chart of the revised Joint

Commission

is

shown below.
Beyond

restructuring, the

to their internal operations.

chambers also accepted a number of important reforms

The Chamber of Fabor simplified

their electoral systems,

increased protection of minority rights, extended the franchise to

members,

instituted

new

rights of petition

and rights
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to internal

new

classes of

documentation, a cut

in

and increasing transparency of
bureaucratic staffing, ceilings for leadership salaries,

chamber finances and spending. The business chamber

also instituted important reforms

increased
during the 1990s including reform of finance methods,

of course, changing

their

name

WKO.

to the

The Structure of the

services, and,

(Unger 1999; Viebrock 2004)

Commission

Joint

Formal

member

Plenary Meeting of the

decision

Joint

Commission

_

f
Informal Meeting

Informal
(

“Prasidentenvorhesprechung”)

decision

of the four presidents

/
Preliminary
decision

Sub-

Sub-

committee
on Wages

commitee

on

H

V

/

Council of

Sub-

Economic
and Social

committee on

Advisers

Relations

International

Prices*'

n
Federal

Chamber of

Presidential Conference

of Chambers of

Labor (former Diet of
Chambers of Labor)

Agriculture**

Austrian
Austrian Federation of

* According to the
its

Chamber of

Business (former Federal

Trade Unions

Chamber

of Commerce)

agreement of November 1992, the Subcommittee on prices

will shift

price control authority to the general observation of market conditions.

“The Chambers of Agriculture are of minor importance for business-labor relations.
They are members of the Joint Commission primarily to keep the balance between interest
groups dominated by the SPO and OVP.
SOURCE: Karlhofer andTalos 1996: 30.

Figure

While

this

5:

The Structure of the

suggests continuity,

salience, authority,

it

may

also

Joint

Commission

mask important changes

and emphasis of the social partnership

process. While the social partnership

may have appeared
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in the Austrian

to

to the

policymaking

be “continuing as usual

closer examination revealed “strains and stresses

which

call the

whole system

into

question”. (Gerlich 1992, 132; Pelinka 1998; Karlhofer 1996; Crepaz 1994) In 1995 and

1996, the social partnership had to fend off

federal

government required the chambers

to continue

its first

significant formal challenge

WKO.

(Pelinka 1998) For the

their willingness

90.6%

in

favor with

guarantee that “the siege

66.6%

to

maintain the compulsory system.

.7% approval seemed overwhelming, though voter

the 81

was below 37%. For Labor,

turnout,

the

having the chambers as their compulsory legal representatives. All the

chambers, especially labor, mobilized a large victory

turnout

members and ask

to poll their

when

the

OGB

managed

to

compel higher approval and

turnout. (Viebrock 2004) Nonetheless, this

was no

over” and dwindling approval and solidarity would not

is

continue to undermine the existing compulsory chamber system. (Pelinka 1998; Viebrock

2004)

The
existing

late

1990s saw additional efforts to reform,

chamber system.

In 1998, the

VOI

alter,

attempted to provoke another referendum on

compulsory membership while other employers proposed
parts,

and even dismember the

split

of the

WKO into two

one compulsory and one voluntary. The basis of challenge by the

VOI and

other

complainants was the perceived sluggishness, bureaucratic inefficiency, and costs of
maintaining the

WKO.

The

the chamber, simplified

professionalization of

resulting reforms included

and reduced membership

under the

reduction of dues by an additional

“Modem

40%

Without such reform within

organizational changes to

reduced basic service

chamber personnel. (Viebrock 2004)

affiliated business leaders,

services.

fees,

some

In 1999, a

fees,

and

group of FPO-

Austria” initiative banner,

demanded

a

and the outsourcing of a number of chamber

five years, the
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group threatened

to initiate a

new

referendum of compulsory membership. The

membership, were a
than the

40%

series

results, after a poll

WKO

of reforms including a reduction of chamber dues (though

less

demanded), abolition of special entrance fees for new members,

bureaucratic streamlining, and a decentralization of

chambers. Further reform
within the

of the

WKO,

in

some

tasks to provincial level

2001 included streamlining the decision-making process

reducing the number of functionaries, and increasing transparency. This

has, at least temporarily, shelved future votes

2004) Nonetheless,

this illustrates that the

chamber of business once held over

its

on compulsory membership. (Viebrock

monopolistic control and centralization that the

members had become

quite tenuous

and

that the

organization has been significantly hollowed out.

Amongst

labor, the

OGB

has also undergone important institutional change.

organized labor decreases in power, members, and influence, the

reformed

itself regularly. In

1995, the internal electoral system

OGB

was

As

has amended and

altered to simplify the

process and increase accountability to the trade unions and works councils. In 1999, the
federation also began allowing a greater decentralization of organizational competence to

the functional and territorial subgroups of the

OGB

and

its

member

trade unions.

(Heinisch 2000; Viebrock 2004) This decentralization has led to considerably more

competition and conflict within the

OGB, which

has

made

their ability to represent a

unified and monopolistic trades union federation at the national level

more

has also subsequently weakened their ability to bargain and negotiate, even

centralized collective bargaining process.

decentralization has been

difficult.

in the

However, unlike the German system,

this

more modest. (Crepaz 1995; Unger 1999; Heinisch 2000;

Viebrock 2004; Pelinka 1999) While a

far

more decentralized bargaining and wage
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It

negotiation process has emerged, especially since 1995,

it

is still

amongst the most

centralized in Europe. (Viebrock 2004) While such change has shaken one of the

foundations of the Austrian social partnership, centralized, collective

the national level,

it

has been able to weather the storm. The

primarily responsible and influential over

all

sectoral

OGB

wage bargaining

and

at

WKO remain

and firm collective bargaining

proceedings.

In

remained
the Joint

some

vital in a

number cases and policy

areas in recent years.

Commission, the 1993 reorganization or

EU

agencies, the 1994

critical

and social partnership

cases, the interest associations

made by

the neo-corporatist

authority or extended into a

However,

new

retraining

bills all reflect the

the interest associations within the structure

of the Austrian social partnership. (Pelinka 1998)
bill,

have

The 1992 reforms of

employment and

referendum, and a number of other recent

influence and compromises

reorganization

state

institutions

In

some

cases, especially the 1993

framework has actually been increased

policy area. (Talos 1996;

in

Heimsch 2000)

the overall trend has been a gradual, yet significant reduction of the

influence and authority of the structures of the social partnership and the peak

associations. Interestingly,

1995

in

exchange

European Union
seat,

much of this was

voluntarily ceded by the social partners after

for guaranteed advisory roles with the Austrian delegation to the

in Brussels. (Pelinka 1999;

Heinisch 2000) While

though purely advisory and non-binding,

institutional

and structural authority

the following section

in

this did get

them

a

in Brussels, they did sacrifice tangible

Vienna. This will be discussed

on the effects of European integration.
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in

greater detail in

)

Public discussion of major reforms, changes, reorganization and even scaling

back of the social partnership

is

now

reform of the chamber system seems

fairly

common.

likely. (Gerlich

Viebrock 2004) Nonetheless, the overall pattern

Future institutional and structural
1992; Unger 1999; Heinisch 2000;

currently of incremental and gradual

is

decentralization and disorganization, quite distinct from what has occurred in

neighboring Germany as will be discussed
partners in Austria

may

take

this chapter. Overall, there

many

in the

next chapter. The future of the social

potential paths

and are discussed

at the

conclusion of

has been both significant continuity and change. (Viebrock

2004; Gerlich, Grande, and Muller 1988; Pelinka 1999)

The European Transformation:

Integration

The most notable transformation has been
European Union.

It is

this

transformation “which

& Governance

the integration of Austria into the

it

cannot escape”. (Pelinka 1998)

Falkner suggests that the Europeanization of Austria has been one of moderate misfit,
adaptation, and controversy. This

was especially

true because of Austria’s special and

highly symbolic institutions and patterns of decision-making found in the social
partnership. These adaptational pressures have resulted in challenges to the social

partnership that have results in both continuity and change. (Falkner 2001

Austria’s

initial interest in

was ended by Soviet veto

War

in the early 1990s.

Association

into the

(EFTA)

joining the European

that effectively only

ended

Economic Community

after the conclusion

in

1959

of the Cold

While Austria had been a member of European Free Trade

since

its

foundation in 1960, demands to further integrate Austria

European economy grew

in the

mid and
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late 1980s.

(Falkner 2001)

By

the late

1

1

1980s the European Community and Austria’s potential membership had become the

most important

political

and economic question

significantly seek Austrian

who,

May

in

OVP,

membership

1987, formally pressed for

in the

in Austria.

The

first

interests to

European Community (EC) were the VOI

movement on Austrian membership from

the junior coalition partner at the time. (Schultz 1992; Holl, Poliak, and

the

Riekmann

2000) Such a large project would require significant consensus by the bulk of the major
actors in the Austrian political system including the major parties, peak associations.

Lander governments, and eventually
Falkner 2001
vote

in

)

Additionally

would need

it

Riekmann 2000;

the electorate. (Holl, Poliak, and

to pass a public

referendum and supermajority

both parliamentary chambers due to the necessary constitutional changes

accession would require. (Pelinka 1998)

In 1988, the Austrian

regarding possible European

OGB

recommended

government polled the

social partners

Community membership.

that Austria join,

1

All of the

on

chambers and the

emphasizing the economic necessities and

advantages of membership. Each also pledged to readily cooperate to

way

for full integration. (Pelinka 1999) This

especially form the

Poliak, and

left

their opinion

and their strong

was

a remarkable

paving the

change of opinion,

SPO. (Schultz 1992;

political partner, the

Riekmann 2000; Heinisch 2000) Widespread

assist in

distrust

Holl,

of liberalization, a

hallmark of the social partnership, was surprisingly muted. The general argument was
that

while joining the

partners

saw

little

EC would

option to

full

certainly diminish their

membership given

outside the organization. (Pelinka 1999)

settled,

1

it

was

Once

its

name

to the

political weight, the

overwhelming costs of remaining

issues of Austrian neutrality had been

relative easy sailing for Austrian

The EC changed

the

own

membership

that

was supported by

European Union (EU) with the Maastricht Treaty of 1991
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the

)

major parties as well as the
In

interest associations. (Jahn

and Storsved 1995; Falkner 2001

January 1992, Austria joined the European Economic Area (EEA). This step led to

negotiations on Austrian

full

membership between February 1993 and March 1994.

The negotiations over

full

membership brought out

a

more vocal number of

criticisms from the peak associations concerned over their fate once Austrian joined the

EU

as a full

member. Farmers and the Chambers of Agriculture were the most adamantly

opposed of the peak associations. Austria’s agricultural subsidies were currently higher
than those of the

EC

hence

this

was

a rather easily cost-benefit calculation. (Schultz

1992) The expected effects of EU membership on Austrian agriculture were reduced
prices, lower subsidies,

and declining employment. While some farmers

initially

supported entry, the national chamber was less supportive. (Blithe, Copelovitch, and

Phelan 2002)
Popular support was not

much

better,

varying between only 38 to

40%

between

1989 and 1992. (Holl, Poliak, and Riekmann 2000) Opposition came from numerous
sources including environmentalists, nationalists, and other Austrian

would be

a net contributor to the

EU

and would pay

in

who

felt that

more than they would

they

get back in

terms of benefits. (Blithe, Copelovitch, and Phelan 2002) Hence, manufacturing

consensus on Austrian membership
significant placation

in the

EU was

no small

feat

and would require

of the social partners.

Small and mid-sized businesses were also wary of losing the protectionist
umbrellas and having to fully compete
firms

felt that

in global

and European marketplaces. Even large

they might be “prey” for larger multinationals firms, especially those in

Germany. (Schultz 1992; Heimsch 2000) This was especially
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true in the food processing

and

textile industries that felt particularly vulnerable. (Biithe,

2002) However, the general positions of the

membership. The

WKO and VOI

WKO ran a public campaign to drum

Copelovitch, and Phelan

were uniformly

in

favor of

up support for accession and

approval of the referendum pointing out a variety of economic investments including

lower prices, increased investment, and an upsurge
Labor, through the Federal

economy. (Schultz 1992; Heinisch 2000;

would be
offset

AK

positive.

emphasized

The SPO ran advertisements
the

left.

(Biithe, Copelovitch,

that

to privatize

Biithe, Copelovitch,

OGB

and

were quite

liberalize the

and Phelan 2002)

that their calculations suggested that the overall benefits

While there were sure

by an overall increase. The

growth.

Chamber of Labor (AK) and

concerned about potential wage cuts and the needs

Nonetheless, the

in overall

to

be job losses in some sectors, these would be

AK, OGB, and SPO

“EU Means

collectively endorsed accession.

Jobs!” to boost public support in labor and

and Phelan 2002)

However, through two years of negotiation and bargaining, the government and

EU

social partners reached accords with the

over accession. The negotiations themselves

were quite unremarkable, aside from the quickness

in

which they were accomplished.

Austria’s primary concerns were agriculture, transportation and Alpine traffic, and

regulations against the sale of property in Alpine regions.

much of the consensual groundwork

that

The negotiations

was taking place between

reflected

the social partners,

provincial governments, and major parties prior to negotiations. Interestingly and

typically Austrian, parliament

remained only rather indirectly involved

in the process.

After concluding the negotiations, the government called for an early referendum date,

far

ahead of the other Scandinavian candidates
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for

membership

While primary opposition came from the FPO, Greens, and Communists, these

encompassed few voters
Austrians

came

at

though

out,

the time. (Holl, Poliak, and

in

Riekmann 2000; Heinisch 2000)

somewhat lower than average numbers, turnout was

merely 82.4%, and voted 66.6% in favor of the accession treaty on June
(Karlhofer 1996; Pelinka 1998, 1999; Holl, Poliak, and

12,

Riekmann 2000)

It

1994.

also then

required a two-thirds majority in both houses of parliament to finalize the pact.

of the referendum

in

Austria has itself

become an

interesting effect of

integration. Prior to the 1995 accession treaty there

European

had only been two referenda

Austrian history, the Anschluss in 1938 and a vote on the use of nuclear power
(Jahn and Storsved 1995) Since that point, referenda have
not exclusively related to

EU

The use

in

in

1978.

become more numerous and

treaty matters.

Membership was expected

to

add

a

number of economic

as well as political

advantages including lower prices and inflation, increased foreign investment, increased
exports, creation of jobs, higher

with

NATO

economic growth, and increased security relationships

and the EU. (Schultz 1992; Neuhold 1998; Heinisch 2000)

precisely what happened as prices in Austria dropped on nearly

and foreign investment increased by $4
agricultural and food processing prices

billion in

50%

In fact this

of consumer goods

1995 alone. Most notable were

which shrunk by

large margins within the

few months of membership. Farmers and the Chambers of Agriculture suffered
significant pains of

driving

many

membership

in the first years,

is

first

the

most

seeing prices drop significantly and

family farms to the brink of collapse. (Guttman 1995) Yet their support of

accession had been secured by the creation of several exemptions to
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EU

rules

on Alpine

land usage and significant side payments by the Austrian state to compensate Austrian

agriculture for their predicted losses. (Blithe. Copelovitch, and Phelan 2002)

The

calculation of the partners

seems quite

would make Austria even more economically

logical.

isolated

To remain

and unviable

outside the

in the

and globalizing environment. Austria was already strongly influenced by

making and

integration despite

its

non-membership by being

upon large trade partners inside the organization such as

member of the EU would
Norway remained
the union.

outside the organization but must

Brussels” and “participate

in the

rather than remain outside

it.

It

seems clear

that

(CAP)

subsidies

would be softened by Austrian and

still

policy,

a

navigate a Europe dominated by

suggested,

was

it

being a

EU

member and

better to “sit in

new Europe”

be deeply affected by

helping to

make EU

policy as an outsider. (Pelinka 1999)

EU membership

would be worth

EU

to

and

policy

was

Even

Common

the short-term transitional costs that

adjustment funds.

This would also give the state and Austrian interests a chance

EU

decision-

and Germany. Being

(Guttman 1995) Austria was going

farmers calculated that the long-term benefits of

develop

EU

economy dependent

decision making and in the shaping of a

better than being forced to deal with

Agricultural Policy

Europeanizing

give Austria more power than states like Switzerland or

As Austrian Ambassador Gregor Woschnagg

Europe no matter.

Italy

a small

EU

to help

shape and

and potentially mollify the negative externalities of globalization.

Austrian interests and political leaders calculated that they would be able to better
influence and control their future from inside the

mean promoting more

EU

than from outside. This would also

neo-corporatist and consensual policymaking structures and social

democratic policies from inside the EU. As Wolfgang Schussel, then Vice Chancellor,
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argued, “along with

balance of the

Sweden and

EU” and move

it

Finland,

we

are changing the approach and the cultural

in the right direction”.

membership would give Austria a chip

in the

game

that,

social democratic states, could collectively leverage a

the

EU

and perhaps preserve some of the

along with other corporatist and

more Austrian-flavored

distinctly Austrian elements

neo-corporatist policymaking. (Pelinka 1999;

social partners

(Guttman 1995) Hence,

of consensual and

Unger 1999; Heimsch 2000)

In essence, the

would become “emissaries” or “modernization brokers” of the

partnership at the

EU

Nonetheless,

and global

level.

many argue

masked, by the peak associations,

social

(Unger 1999; Heinisch 2000)

that the disadvantages

elites,

option other than membership resigned

future for

and major

many

of accession were

parties.

The

real, if

lack of a fundamental

Austrians to the fact that they had no choice

but to join, leading to a positive referendum but with quite low public participation.

(Unger 1999; Holl, Poliak, and Riekmann 2000) Austrians also

more than they would

may have appeared
more

a

get out of the

as a ringing

EU. (Guttman 1995) While

felt that

they would pay

the large majority vote

endorsement of accession, perhaps the referendum was

form of Austrian acquiescence or resignation of necessity. Franz Ceska,

Secretary-General of VOI suggested the majority was not because “people loved Europe
so

much

or the European Union, but people were aware of the negative consequences for

the country if we did not join” (Guttman 1995) In addition, as in the normal Austrian

mode, the negotiation and accession
the large parties and social partners

to the

who

EU

was primarily dominated by

the elites of

secured the overwhelming approval to the

accession referendum. (Karlhofer 1996; Neuhold 1998; Pelinka 1998, 1999; Heinisch

2000

)
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One of the more
to the

referendum

1994 agreement
partners

is

in

intriguing deals cut during the accession negotiations and lead up

Austria

the so-called

would be granted

EU

Austria’s

was between

the peak associations and government. This

Europaabkommen

,

or

Agreement on Europe. The

participation in “important, relevant, technical questions” in

representation.

Hence

the Austrian delegation

became

the only mission in

Brussels to harbor both government and interest organization representatives

house and extend neo-corporatism

government attempted
the Council of the

infringed upon

EC

social

in a single

to the supranational level. (Karlhofer 1996) In fact, the

to secure the partners a

European Union

until the

number of seats

working groups of

in the

Commission noted

that this

law which limits only government representatives

would have

to the right to vote

and representation on the Council. (Holl, Poliak, and Riekmann 2000; Falkner 2001

The peak associations of the

social partnership

and Joint Commission exchanged

a significant share of their authority

and vested power

in the

Austrian policymaking

process for these guaranteed advisory seats in Brussels. While this seems potentially

illogical, to give

Brussels, in

up meaningful authority

many ways

in

of the social partnership

growing one seems quite
going

to

have

less

and

in

seems quite

in

Vienna

brilliant.

for

merely advisory influence

Given the declining

efficacy. and utility

Vienna, trading away declining resources for a potentially

astute. In essence, the social partners assessed that

less

in

autonomy and importance

in

Vienna was

Austrian policymaking vis-a-vis

Brussels once membership had been secured. Even possession of mere advisory and

consultative influence in the

EU

European and global orientation

would

delegation would be far

more valuable given

for the future. (Pelinka 1999) This

assumed

their

that Brussels

eclipse most national political structures in a range of issues salient to the social
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)

partners and the institutions of neo-corporatism. These interests had

belief in Austro-corporatism and their ability to control their

own

abandoned

future in a

their

European

and global environment. (Pelinka 1999) Given the perceived lack of alternatives and
political

and economic fatalism regarding the special Austrian way of politics, many

believed that the only future of the social partnership lay in Brussels rather than Vienna.

(Pelinka 1999; Heinisch 2000; Falkner 2001

The peak
at the

EU

but they also wished to vitalize and utilize the existing structures of social

partnership

Social

this

associations hoped to have a strong voice within the Austrian delegation

at

the

European

Committee and

was

a

the

level,

dubbed Euro-corporatism, including the Economic and

European Social Charter. (Pelinka 1999; Gorges 1996) Hence,

two-pronged strategy, outlined

policymaking

at the

European

levels

in a

1996 position paper,

to influence

by being influential through the formal Austrian

delegation and membership conduits and also through the neo-corporatist structures

European

level.

In the

(Unger 1999)

first

way, the social partners could become extended representatives of their

interests in Brussels

in the

at the

and hopefully shape Austria's

EU. (Unger 1999; Heinisch 2000)

official negotiating positions

In practical

and role

terms this has occurred to some

extent as the social partners have been relatively important to the Austrian delegation and

its activities.

The system has developed

into a close

and cooperative relationship

in

Brussels between the governmental and interest representatives. (Karlhofer 1996) In
typical Austrian fashion, the will for consensus, even at the

played out conclusively.
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EU

level

seems

to

have been

In the second, the social partners

institutions to

the global

economy

partnership

European

promote

a grander

level.

and more neo-corporatist vision of Europe, and perhaps

as well. Pelinka

was through

would use the existing Euro-corporatist

even suggests

that the only

way

to

save the social

the creation of more vibrant neo-corporatist structures at the

This would include strengthening the

EU

Economic and

Social

Committee, institutionalizing and incorporating well-defined and organized
labor, business,

and agriculture, and strengthening cross-country and regional European

Works Councils and
As

issues

other similar institutions. (Pelinka 1999;

Unger 1999)

Sully notes, this Austrian approach to dealing with the

“Byzantine”

interests for

in its neo-corporatist

and appeared as

“political

approach

to dealing with the

archeology” unsuited

to a

EU

EU

seemed almost

and membership

new age of Europeanization.

(Sully 1996; C’repaz 1994) There were, and remain, serious doubts of the viability, utility,

and efficacy of the neo-corporatist structures
due

to coordination

much

EU

at

the

and agenda-setting problems,

EU

level. In practical terms, the

EU,

really cannot allow national actors too

control over the details of EU-level policymaking. (Falkner 2001) In addition, the

lacks the social, historical, and political preconditions as well as current exiting

conditions that would seem to provide a hospitable environment for the Austrian brand of

social partnership. Perhaps, as

partnership in Brussels

some have suggested,

was wishful

thinking.

the idea of replicating the social

Unger suggests

that Brussels

was

a “false

bride” for the social partners and lacks most of the fundamental conditions to support

large-scale neo-corporatism at the supranational level.
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(Unger 1999)

)

There was
system were going
the hardest to be

to lose influence to Brussels,

hit.

at best

and the social partnership was amongst

like a potentially smart

and many issues of EU membership seem

politics.

There are

interests

over

itself.

structures of the Austrian political

(Pelinka 1999; Falkner 2001) Hence, pulling up stakes in Vienna

and heading to Brussels seemed

mixed

many domestic

doubt that

little

how

still

to

fierce disputes

between the

manage Austrian-EU

(Kramer 1998; Falkner 2001)

move. Yet the

have been

results

less than settled in Austrian

parties, the social partners,

relations as well as the content of

EU membership

and other

EU

policy

has itself been an incredibly

disruptive element to Austrian politics with significant implications for the social

partnership. Integration into the

EU

has superimposed a “reality of antagonisms between

winners and losers” on top of the former Austrian model of stable, equitable, and
consensual parity. That there are

now winners and

losers has intensified political

struggles that were mitigated under the social partnership which ensured that everyone

won

at least

some of the time and

that losses

were incremental or

offset. (Holl, Poliak,

and Riekmann 2000; Falkner 2001

The

elections since 1994 illustrate that, despite the referendum, Europe and

European integration had become one of the most important schisms within the Austrian
electorate and polity.

many

A

unique brand of “Alpine” Euro-skepticism had made inroads with

Austrians. (Sully 1996) Jorg Haider and the

disenchantment with the

loss

FPO

tapped into a growing

of sovereignty amongst younger and older workers

who

tended towards more nationalist conceptions of economic and political identity. Jndt
(

1999) The FPO, Greens, as well as other parties and interests were

critical

of the

consociational and neo-corporatist appointment process of the Austrian delegation to
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)

Brussels that reflected the patronage of the existing coalition and government rather than

one based on merit. (Sully 1996) Nonetheless, polls

initially

Austrians opposed leaving the EU. (Guttman 1995) This

significantly

and new voices of Euro-skepticism have

2000

EU

is in

EU
Austria,

that

se.

if

)

crisis

coalition after the

However, most Austrian

you

will, rather than in

opposition of Austrian

(Falkner 2001

membership, while viewed as

was

of

regards to enlargement of membership and expansion of

competencies, widening and deepening

membership per

85%

The EU-14 Sanctions

OVP-FPO

election certainly hurt these numbers. (Falkner 2001

criticism of the

that

number has dropped

risen.

over Haider’s potential promotion to Chancellor and the

showed

also viewed by

would otherwise be

some

a necessary

and unavoidable development for

interests as a catalyst for undertaking structural

difficult, or impossible,

policymaking. As indicated earlier

reform

under the preexisting rules of Austrian

in this chapter, privatization,

budget austerity, and

other structural reforms were slow to develop in the 1980s and the blame for this lack of

substantial reform often

fell at

the feet of the social partnership. (Crepaz 1994, 1995;

Pelinka 1998)

Many

in Brussels as

an opportunity to bypass the national level and leapfrog to the

interests

saw

the

complex and more open decision-making process

supranational level where swifter procedures and processes could be better accessed and
influenced. (Holl, Poliak, and

was even more so among
marginalized interests

the

in the

Riekmann 2000) This was

many

especially true of the

VOI

unincorporated, disenfranchised, or otherwise

Austrian political system.
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but

)

The new and complex

multi-level system of governance between the federal

government of Austria and the European Union posed significant challenges
Austrian

state, parties,

and

interests.

Adaptation to the

EU

to the

required solutions to major

problems. First was the necessity of coordinating the Lander and parliament into the

government's

EU

policies. Formally,

Austrian-EU relations were centralized

Chancellery and the Foreign Ministry. But both practical and political reality

in the

in Austria

necessitated the government to formalize better input and scrutiny by both provincial and

parliamentary institutions. The distribution of responsibilities and competences in

Austrian-EU policy
formalized

a

in a

to the Austrian bureaucracy, parliament,

number of agreements and

statutes in

and provinces were

1994 and 1996.

Initially these set

up

system of discussion, debate, consultation, codetermination, and accountability between

the government, parliament, and provinces. Also notable

were

the extension of

parliamentary powers to take part in personnel appointments to Brussels. (Holl, Poliak,

and Riekmann 2000) For Austria,
navigating the multi-level

The

largest formal

EU

other

2001

Articles 23e

)

member

states.

and

has meant an extended learning process in

governance environment. (Falkner 2001

changes were a series of Constitutional amendments

provided parliamentary rights

many

this

in the

EU

policy arena, far stronger than those found in

(Morass 1996; Holl, Poliak, and Riekmann 2000; Falkner

23f, introduced in

December 1994 and

ratified the following year,

obliged the government to inform parliament of any initiatives

in the

advanced agreement and parliamentary approval of all decisions
constitutional

limits the

amendments

that

or changes to existing

community

EU,

requires

that will require

treaties,

and otherwise

scope of autonomy of the government vis-a-vis parliament. This significantly
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increased the potential influence of parliament in

EU

policymaking. (Holl, Poliak, and

Riekmann 2000; Falkner 2001 This coincided with an
)

overall increase in parliamentary

influence due to changes in the political party system, social partnership, and the electoral
fortunes of the major parties. (Crepaz 1994, 1995; Pelinka 1998) However, the

overwhelming amount of information and material
the

that parliament

government and from Brussels has mitigated the

alone. Parliament

was informed of over 17,000

subject to deliberation, and

EU

full effect

initiatives

which only eighteen resulted

in

must

sift

through from

of these changes. In 1995

of which only 100 were

binding opinions. Initiatives

increased to over 37,000 over the next two years, with only eleven opinions issued. (Holl,

Poliak, and

the

Riekmann 2000) By 2001,

the total

mandates made by parliament had become

number of opinions was merely 34 and
less detailed. (Falkner

2001

has been able to handle only a fraction of the initiatives provided forcing

and circumspect

in

most cases despite the creation of specific committees,

chambers, to exclusively concerned with
story

2001

it

EU

affairs.

Hence,

this is far

)

Parliament

to

in

be selective
both

from a success

of increasing parliamentary supremacy. (Holl. Poliak, and Riekmann 2000; Falkner

)

In

many ways, EU membership

has worked against parliamentary power.

Parliament has become an “institutional loser” vis-a-vis the Chancellor and cabinet that

have emerged as the primary centers of influence over EU-Austnan relations. (Falkner

2001

)

This also has implications for the social partnership given

relationships with the major parties in parliament.

The

its

long and intricate

centralization of authority into the

hands of the government and bureaucracy marginalizes many of the potential influence
conduits once held by the social partners. The Austrian parliament would actually lose
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its

monopoly on passing
relegating

much of its work

Austrians suggest that

(

legislation

due

to that

to the transfer

of competencies to the

EU

level,

of “notary”. (Marchant 2001; Falkner 2001) Some

60-70% of their domestic

legislative

agenda

is

framed

in Brussels.

The Economist 2003) However, the Austrian parliament has responded by specialization

and the creation of specific

EU

Affairs Standing Committees in both chambers. This has

helped mitigate some of the flood of

EU

directive

and policy and

to give the parliament a

greater voice in shaping Austria’s functions and representation in Brussels. (Holl, Poliak,

and Riekmann 2000; The Parliament of Austria 2007)
Decentralization of authority and a greater role of the Lander in Austria politics

has also been one of the major changes of a European Austria.

political opportunity with the

EU membership

looming

The Lander

realized the

process and were able to secure

significant structural reforms to Austria’s federal balance.

The

provincial governors,

Landeshanptleute made accession approval dependent upon such reforms. In October
,

1992, an agreement between the federal and Lcinder governments included a

to redistribute

competences based on

commitment

subsidiarity, a reform of the financial transfer

system, and a reform of the Bundesrat the Federal
,

Chamber and upper house of

Parliament to better represent provincial interests. (Holl, Poliak, and Riekmann 2000;

Falkner 2001)

While many of these proposals were

amendment was proposed and

later

dropped or reduced, a constitutional

later ratified that instituted

some important changes

to the

federal-provincial balance, especially in areas of EU policymaking. Article 23d imposed

new

obligations upon the central government to consult with the provincial governments

regarding

EU

issues of direct relevance to the Lander. (Fitzmaurice 1996; Pelinka 1999;
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Falkner 2001

)

The Lander can

issue a simple qualified opinion (five out of nine

provinces) from which the government

justify

may

its

may

deviate after which the government must

decision within eight weeks. (Holl, Poliak, and

also reach a joint or

the central

unanimous position on an

Riekmann 2000) However they

issue creating a binding opinion that

government must accept. (Fitzmaurice 1996; Pelinka 1999; Falkner 2001)

Additionally, the Austrian provinces have also opened their

own

unlike other subnational governments such as the Lander of

Germany, Autonomous

offices in Brussels not

Communities of Spain, Scotland, Wales, Flanders, and Walloma. The primary goal
be able to effectively lobby Brussels directly, bypassing their perceived weakness

is

to

in the

Austrian federal relationship. (Hooghe and Marks 1996, 2001; Holl, Poliak, and

Riekmann 2000; Borzel 2001

)

Despite the continuing weakness of the provinces, they

have clearly made significant gains
past twenty year in

expanding

2002; Falkner 2001

)

may

in the

process of European integration and over the

their influence

and authority. (Pelinka 1998, 1999; Angerer

This decentralization and Europeanization of power to the provinces

certainly sap monopolistic authority

and legitimacy from the federal government and

the social partnership in Vienna.

In administrative terms, Austria’s

communautaire has been challenging

in

accession and adoption of the acquis

many ways.

First, the legal

and constitutional

adoption process has been extensive and lasting. Austria began adapting

to

EC

law as early as 1987, nearly eight years before

official

ensuring compliance and adaptability to

Potacs 1998) Accession to the

EE A

in

EL

legal

all

new government

law and standards. (Schultz 1992;

1992 required absorption of nearly 1600
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system

membership began This

required a series of guidelines to be adopted that must be applied to

bills

its

EL

While a useful

regulations.

mass

that

test

EU

run for eventual

encompassed the acquis

in

accession,

it

failed to

compare

1994 and 1995 which numbered more than 4,000

regulations and 1,200 directives in almost every policy area. (Holl, Poliak, and

2000; Falkner 2001
over nearly

20%

)

to the

Riekmann

Austria initially had a less than stellar implementation record, with

of directives going unsettled from 1994 through 1996, ranking

union by 1997. However, by 1998

this

last in the

implantation gap had dropped significantly and

Austria ranked in the top half of member states in terms of overall compliance. (Falkner

2001

due

)

The delays were due

to

in part to

parliamentary and judicial backlogs, staff reductions

budget austerity programs, and major reforms of Austrian economic administrative

laws. This has also required greater professionalization of the bureaucracy especially in

terms of EU and foreign language experience. Experience

in

necessity for advancement within the Austrian bureaucracy

member

states.

Brussels

much

is

becoming

like that in

a

many

other

(Falkner 2001; Knill 2001; Paterson 2005) Whereas the Austrian

bureaucracy was once small, subordinated, and more politically temporal, the
bureaucracy of Austria

is

becoming

a larger

and more important power inside the

Austrian political system due almost entirely to the effects of European integration. (Holl,

Poliak,

and Riekmann 2000; Falkner 2001)
In judicial terms, Austria’s

membership

significantly altered the roles and

functions of the domestic court system, especially in areas of trade and commercial law.

The number of requested preliminary
accession Since 1997, the

judges have
legal system

become

better

rulings from the

number has jumped
accustomed

The number of cases has

increased every year since

significantly as the legal system

to the process

also increased,
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ECJ has

and

and the requirements of the

most relating

EU

to the application

of

community law upon

individuals, firms, and actors in Austria. (Holl, Poliak, and

Riekmann 2000) This has important ramifications

for the social partnership

and

policymaking process. As the Austrian legal system was once considerably more flexible

and deferential

to the social partners

judiciary and legal system have

and the

become

institutions

more

far

of the social partnership, the

consistent and procedural. While

previous eras would likely have seen the courts defer or divert decisions to arbitrated or

consensual extra-judicial bodies, the Austrian courts have begun applying a
standard of law, and

The
the

Stability

EU

law, to

on the

cases.

and Growth Pact, adopted by the Commission

European Monetary Union,

restrictions

many such

itself ratified in the

state's ability to

stricter

in

1997 as adjunct to

Maastricht Treaty of 1991, places

independently budget. Marchant argued that Austro-

Keynesianism of the 1970s was killed off by the imposition of the Maastricht
tight fiscal

criteria

of

regimes and austerity budgets of the 1990s (Marchant 2001; Falkner and

Talos 1994) The necessity to bring the Austrian budget deficit from
as to qualify for the European currency arrangement

made

5% to 3% of GDP

negotiation points

so

much more

entrenched amongst the parties and interests. (Sully 1996; Neuhold 1998) Nonetheless,
accords were eventually concluded on economic austerity, tax reform, and
(Muller 2000) Such budget constraints

may

limit the ability

of the Austrian

EMU policies.
state to

absorb shocks to their economy. The only remaining tool tends to be wage controls that
almost always tend
Austria must

downward

now submit

to adjust to crisis.

(Unger 1999) Nonetheless, while

preliminary and finalized budgets to the

EU

for review, Austria

had already committed to greater budget austerity and control of inflation before acceding
to the treaty.

(Thomsen and Hadjimichael 2007; Unger 1999) Overall however,
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the

Euro

and the

Stability

and Growth Pact were quite unpopular

in

Austria in the late 1990s.

(Neuhold 1998) This has moderated as Austria's economy upturned and the Euro
by the mid 2000s.

stabilized

Austria, like

many

other states, has seen a remarkable transference of

competencies from the national to the European

many

the social partners have

)

(Angerer 2002; Schmidt 2006)

national parliaments, well over half the legislative

directives and policies into domestic law.

2001

level.

In

some

impotence

in

become mere

many

cases. But Austria

is

enactment of

is

EU

argue that the Austrian parliament and

“notaries” of laws negotiated in the

states this allows Brussels to be

interest associations quickly

blamed

for

EU. (Marchant

domestic policy failures or

a bit unique in that

most of the major Austrian

and euphorically supported accession and immediately

began operating and thinking
in effect,

Some

work

In

at the

EU-level. (Unger 1998)

The

social partners

became,

Europeanization “brokers”. (Heinisch 2000) Austria had been subject to the

bulk of EU regulatory authority prior to membership both through the European

Economic Area (EEA) Treaty of 1991 and through

member

states.

The demise of the

the peak associations’

its

significant trade

social partnership in Austria

abandonment of Vienna

for greener

may

dependence on

also be a reflection of

European pastures

in Brussels.

Pelinka argues that strong corporatist states like Austria have been eroded by

European integration

The

Italian case,

lacks

to a greater extent than

weaker corporatist systems such

as in Italy.

with a heavily decentralized system of industrial and labor relations,

many of the compulsory,

centralized, and nationalized peak associations and neo-

corporatist structures found in Austria. Pelinka argues that in the

“new

globalized and Europeanized economy, tripartite arrangements must be
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logic” of a

more

specialized,

functional, flexible, and decentralized to be successful.

approach

may

Hence

be more successful than the “top-down” method traditionally used by the

Austrian social partnership. (Pelinka 1999; Falkner 2001

federal

more “bottom-up”

a

Europe would potentially allow new, weaker

more decentralized

level

by being better adapted

)

Pelinka suggests that a more

social partnerships to thrive at a

to the

new

economic environment. Hence, the breakup of the highly

global and European

centralized, synchronized,

and

integrated social partnership between interests, parties, and government at the national

level

may be

the only

way

to salvage the social partnership. (Pelinka 1999)

However,

others see reinvigoration of the Austrian social partnership through the integration

process. Integration itself requires significant policy and institutional reform, and the

Austrian social partners effectively became policy entrepreneurs

2000

in the process.

(Heimsch

)

These developments suggest fundamental ways
the decision

and policymaking process

roles, actors, institutions,

and behavior

in Austria.

in the

do

so.

(Falkner 2001

)

partnership in Austria but also to the

significant “misfit” that existed

and policymaking has been
overall adaptation to the

ways

in

EU may

setting.

states

EU

In

influence

and altered the

other words, the

EU

even without explicit

has brought forth a number of

and policy competencies of the social

which Austrian policy

is

made. The

between European and Austrian models of governance

difficult to

EU

member

Integration into the

significant challenges not only to the latitude

which the

significantly shaped

domestic

has significant “sticky” power that transforms

instruction to

It

in

and

its

overcome. In the early and mid-1990s, Austria’s

structures fared poorly. But since the late 1990s,

there has been considerable adaptation, reform, and development towards a better

377

fit

with

the

EU. (Falkner 2000) This process continues and Austria

new

is

bound

to

continue to face

adpatational pressures from Europeanization. Yet even the once antagonistic

Austrian citizenry has begun to more greatly see

In 1996, just

number

now

is

support,

30%

is

it

of Austrians believed that

nearly

EU membership was

40%. The Economist 2007a) While

as a positive situation.

positive while that

this is hardly

(

overwhelming

progress nonetheless.

The Europeanization of Austrian Labor Law

A

EU membership

number of relevant case

&

Social Policy

studies of the impact of

European integration on

Austrian policymaking are useful in assessing the kinds of impacts Europeanization

is

having on Austria. Falkner and Leiber’s analysis of the impact of Europeanization upon
neo-corporatist governance of labor law in smaller European states including Austria,

Denmark, Luxembourg, and Sweden
changes

in

is

notable as

it

posited that the states structural

response to Europeanization were varied and dependent upon specific

institutional features

of the legal and operational patterns of neo-corporatism. Denmark

exhibited the highest level of impact while the results were

more moderate and mixed

the other cases. (Falkner and Leiber 2004) Interestingly, while there

was

in

a preexisting

expectation of "dramatic change" due to Europeanization given the Streeck and Schmitter
hypothesis, the results were

amongst

EU

states

and

more modest. Compston argued

their utilization

that there

was

variation

on concerted policymaking patterns following the

Single European Act of 1985 yet the general trend had been of

little

significant structural

change. (Compston 1998)
Overall, Falkner and Leiber discovered only “slightly convergent development” in
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labor law amongst their cases of neo-corporatism in Austria,

Sweden. While change was more notable
consistent and decisive. This does not

occur

in other areas

in

mean

Denmark, Luxembourg, and

Denmark, change

in the others

that greater structural

of social partnership competence where the impact of

the overall impact of Europeanization

actors,

is

illustrates that

highly contingent upon the policy area, existing national patterns and

for the continued efficacy

that

can allow considerable space

of social partners and partnership.

In areas of social insurance, Falkner, Treib, Harlapp,

that the social partnership

remained quite dominant

pensions, health insurance,

was primarily due
states

it

on neo-corporatist patterns of governance and

and the prescribed methods of implementation

member

less

change would not

Europeanization might be greater. (Falkner and Leiber 2004) However,

policymaking

was

employment

to the “soft

were able

in that the Schiissel

in its traditional

core areas of

and other aspects of social policy. This

law” approach of the

to transpose

modes of governance and

policy,

and Leiber demonstrated

EU

in areas

of social policy where

and implement reforms through

patterns of policymaking.

government attempted

their existing

The Austrian case has been notable

to unilaterally

impose a more neo-liberal and

smaller model of social insurance by bypassing the social partnership entirely.

The

general strikes that followed and the eventual dilution of the reform package suggest that

this

had

less to

OVP-FPO

do with Europeanization than

the domestic political conditions of the

coalition government's agenda. (Falkner et
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al.

2005; The Economist 2003a)
,

Conclusion: The Future of Social Partnership

The

survival of the Austrian social partnership

is

in

certainly

Austria

open

for debate

and

“the winds of change” have been in the air for nearly a quarter-century. (Karlhofer 1996)

Some have

suggested that the

total dissolution

of the Austrian model

is

possible in the

near future or inevitable. (Gerlich 1992; Karlhofer and Talos 1996; Rose 2000) Others
posit that the

most

likely

outcome

is

the survival of the institutions of social partnership

with a significant decline of salience and authority vis-a-vis parliamentary, judical,
administrative, governmental, and European decision-making institutions. In other words,

the social partnership of Austria

is

merely fading away. (Pelinka 1998; Fitzmaunce 1990;

Marchant 2001 Adams 2002, 2004) Pelinka even suggests
;

Austrian social partnership to survive

is

to

become

that the only

less strong

way

for the

and more decentralized.

(Pelinka 1999)

Others argue that the Austrian model of social partnership will become smaller

and weaker but

will, in

comparative terms, come

to

resemble more moderate models of

social partnership found in other states. (Talos 1996; Lijphart 1999)

partnership will continue on in

others. (Kittel

which

some

areas of efficacy but

2000) Perhaps the Austrian social partnership

will result in recognition that the

falling,

may
is

the social

completely disappear from

even

in a

“midlife crisis”

peak of social partnership has passed, potency

and new opportunities, such as those found Brussels, now look more

(Unger 1999) Pelinka and others argue
space for

it

to continue to

do work

in

that

“corporatism

is

is in a

is

attractive.

not dead” and there

is still

a

an ever-Europeamzing and globalizing Austria.

(Pelinka 1998, 154; Karlhofer 1996; Unger 1999; Heinisch 2000)

Austria

Or

better position than in other countries
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Few have argued

to the institutional.

that

philosophical, and historical experiences of the social partnership and that

it

will

overcome new challenges and continue. (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Gerlich, Grande,
and Muller 1988; Heinisch 2000)

However, as the

political

system has been rapidly decentralizing and

Europeanizing by increasing the number of actors, reducing the centralization of existing

and the increasing autonomy of actors from one another,

actors,

it

is

bound

to

have

important and less predictable implications for Austrian politics. (Lauber 1996; Pelinka
1998; Crepaz 1994)

Some

scholars estimate that too

excluded by the existing social partnership for

it

schisms on the issues of environment, minority

many new

forces and interests are

to continue to maintain legitimacy.

rights, gender, culture,

New

immigration, and

other post-material issues have eclipsed those of traditional left-right socio-economics

upon which the

social partnership

was founded. This has made

the social partnership

seem outmoded. (Crepaz 1994, 1995; Viebrock 2004) Yet some
is little

also conclude that there

alternative to the social partnership given Austria's social, political,

and cultural

development (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986; Heinisch 2000) Despite these self-imposed
limits

of imagination, there are certainly numerous alternatives

to social partnership for

Austrian policymaking.

Corporatism

will likely

remain in the Austrian

challenges and weaknesses. But the likelihood of
efficacy certainly hangs in the balance.

of the

social partnership has already

is

some

now

its

continued broad salience and

power

variable and complex. While there

cases, there

is

wholesale rejection of it

corporatist, pluralist,
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system despite

cases suggest, the influence and

become more

continuity of the social partnership in

others Policymaking in Austria

As many

its

political

and somewhere

in

is

in

between

corporatism and pluralism depending upon the issue. (Crepaz 1994; Kittel 2000; Gerlich,

Grande, and Muller 1988) As Gerlich, Grande, and Muller suggest, while social
partnership once dominated, policymaking

is

may

be more likely done under mere

consultation, or outright party and governmental politics, than in the past. (Gerlich,

Grande, and Muller, 1988)
transition in the role

tradition

of the

state in

much

Germany, has seen

a

economic governance and policymaking from

a

In other

words, Austria,

like

of postwar semi-sovereignty to sovereignty. (Crepaz 1994; Katzenstein 1987)

While Austrians have generally affirmed

that they

want reform of the chambers

system, the will to recast the social partnership seems to be in short supply amongst the

interests.

(Crepaz 1994; Pelinka 1998, 1999; Gerlich 1992; Rose 2000; Marchant 2001;

Viebrock 2004) The types of issues

that the Joint

Commission and other

structures of

Austrian neo-corporatism no longer seem as salient to the dilemmas of the 2T‘ century.

(Crepaz 1994, 1995) The interests themselves have become more fragmented over these
issues. (Karlhofer 1996;

Austria

is

Crepaz 1994, 1995; Kunkel and Pontusson 1998) Perhaps

no longer “an island of the blessed” and

is

losing

its

distinct Austrian “flavor”.

(Pelinka 1999) This de-Austrification includes greater instabilities and uncertainties

culture, politics,

and economics. Austria may have become

less

in its

Austrian and more

European, Western, and perhaps American from numerous exogenous and endogenous
forces including structural

economic change, Europeanization, globalization, and

immigration. (Kittel 2000; Pelinka 1998, 1998a; Bischof and Pelinka 2004; Markovits
1996; Rose 2000)
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This “westernization” or “Americanization” has included the growing importance

of constitutionalism, parliamentary

politics, courts

and judicial

politics, provincial

municipal governments, secularism, social mobility, greater individualism
societal identity,

weaker

political parties

and

in lieu

less party allegiance, a multi-party

and

of sub-

system,

populism, and a more market-oriented and neo-liberal economic order. (Muller 1992;
Gerlich 1992; Crepaz 1994; Pelinka 1998; Pelinka and Bishof 2004) This has also meant

a

move away from Lager, proporz,

identity that helped

postwar

make

era. (Plasser,

nationalized industries, centralized power, and group

the social partnership a viable

and powerful

institution

of the

Ulram, and Grausgruber 1992; Muller 1992; Crepaz 1994, 1995;

Rose 2000)
Decentralization of Austrian politics poses one of the larger challenges to the

future of the social partnership. (Pelinka 1999)

As some

federalism and a stronger separation of powers

may

be incompatible with corporatism.

(Encamacion 1999; Lehmbruch 1979) Others believe
corporatism, with

its

paternalism and hierarchy,

democratic, and pluralist system

1994, 1995)

of Austrian

On

may

is

scholars have suggested,

that an Austria with less neo-

preferable.

A more

decentralized,

be better able to deliver important policy. (Crepaz

the other hand, Pelinka

and others have argued

that the decentralization

politics will benefit the social partnership’s ability to thrive

flexibility, innovation,

and reflection of regional,

political,

by increasing

and social distinctions within

the social partnership, (Gerlich. Grande, and Muller 1988; Pelinka 1999; Kittel 2000;

Heinisch 2000)
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One of the more

intriguing developments of the crisis has been an assessment that

the Austrian social partnership, while once adept at speedily and flexibly reaching

consensus, has become more arthritic and inflexible. (Crepaz 1994, 1995; Viebrock 2004;
Pelinka 2000) This contradicts

many

earlier

assessments of the social partnership and

its

success during the postwar era. (Katzenstein 1984, 1985)

The evidence
partnership

is

to flexibility

much

is,

at best,

mixed.

In

some cases

it

seems clear

not streamlining the policymaking process, rather

and adaptation. And

be operating as

existing system

(Pelinka 1999;

is

it

it

that the social

more often

is

in other cases, the social partnership

was once expected. (Unger 1999;

Kittel

a barrier

appears to very

2000) Reform of the

and one supported by a majority of Austrians.

certainly a possibility,

Unger 1999; Viebrock 2004) These include increasing transparency and

accountability, reforming and better regulating

member communications and

chamber

finances, increasing chamber-

enacting a more formal set of member rights. (Viebrock

2004; Heinisch 2000) Another suggested reform, the scrapping compulsory membership,

is

1

often hailed as the primary

method

995; Viebrock 2004) However, in

remaining

ability

to

democratize the chambers system. (Crepaz 1994,

total,

these reforms might seriously undermine the

of the social partnership

their representative

to operate at the national level

by diminishing

monopolies, weakening their negotiation and bargaining positions,

subordinating the system to parliamentary or government control, eliminate their ability

to collectively

speak for their sector, and otherwise dismembering the existing social

partnership. (Unger 1999; Viebrock 2004) In addition, reform has been slow to

come and

often has to be forced upon the peak associations and structures such as the Joint

Partnership from either above or below.

The slow adaptation of the
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institutional

)

arrangements

environment

to the

new

post-industrial, post-material, European,

illustrates that

and globalized

only extreme shocks generate institutional change. (Unger

1999; Falkner and Leiber 2004)

But

it

is

also the Europeanization of Austria that

entry into the European

Union and

the

It

causing change as well. The

European Monetary Union has fundamentally

changed the environment and rules of Austrian
Talos 1994)

is

politics

and policymaking. (Falkner and

has fundamentally affected the perceptions and activities of the parties,

government, parliament, provinces, social partners, and other
inside,

and outside, the Austrian

to singularly explain continuity

played a significant

role, as

political system.

and change

interest

groups operating

While Europeanization cannot be used

in the Austrian social partnership,

it

has

discussed earlier in this chapter. (Falkner and Leiber 2004;

Heinisch 2000) This will be explored and assessed more fully within the Europeanization

framework

in the

concluding chapter of this research.

Pelinka suggests that a federal or regional European Union

may

very well be the

salvation of corporatism at the supranational and subnational levels. While the Austrian

social partnership has clearly

at the transnational

Hence

it

been diminished

at the

national level,

it

can find

new homes

or regional levels within the framework of the European Union.

has been suggested that the future of the Austrian social partnership

lies in

Brussels. (Pelinka 1998, 1999; Heinisch 2000) Yet, as discussed in pervious chapters,

corporatism has mostly failed to
the

EU

make meaningful

transitions to the supranational level in

or other organizations. (Streeck and Schmitter 1991
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Modem

corporatism had been developed primarily as a national strategy of

economic policymaking and while
corporatism

at the regional or

it

is

impossible to dismiss the potential for

supranational levels, the optimism regarding the viability

in the

EU

institutions such as

Works Councils, and

the

European Social Charter has not been well supported by

of corporatism

developments over the

last

Economic and Social Committee, European

EU

two decades. (Sargent 1985; Pelinka 1999; Streeck and

Schmitter 1991)

Unger suggests
Austria rather than

in

that if the social partnership

Brussels.

scale social partnership.

and

tightly

The

EU

is

be revived,

to

it

must be done

lacks the preconditions and criteria for large-

(Unger 1999; Pelinka 1999) While the monopolist centralism

bound policymaking process of the postwar era has passed,

domestic compromises

to

be made and issues that would

best, or only,

social partnership. Brussels lacks the tripartitism, the repetition

negotiation, status

quo mentality, and consensual

and other social partnership structures possessed
Austria

may

than the

EU

in

be far less the strong case than
that possesses

almost none of the

at

still

solved through

and regularity of

solidarity that the Joint

was

in

there are

Commission

the national level in Vienna. While

fifty

years ago,

criteria for

it

is still

far stronger

an engaged and effective social

partnership. (Unger 1999)

For the social partnership

in Austria, this

must certainly mean change. As many

have suggested, perhaps the social partnership has become a victim of
Austria. (Lijphart 1977; Luther and Muller 1992;

social partnership did

early

seem

to successfully solve

own

success

in

Crepaz 1994, 1995; Pelinka 1998) The

many of the problems of the

Second Republic. But those same structures and

386

its

institutions often

seem

First

and

anachronistic in addressing the issues of affluent, post-industrial, European, and global

The

Austria. (Crepaz 1994, 1995; Pelinka 1999)

facets

Commission and other

Joint

of the postwar social partnership were tremendous successful

war” but may be

less so

it

addressing

all

weakened

or

corporatism

assumption
liberalized

is

resilient

and with

and structures of the paradigmatic case remain

more

limited condition.

last

potential.

in place,

even

Many of

if in a

(Heimsch 2000) As Schmitter and Grote suggest,

a Sisyphus that declines

that social partnership

“winning the

existing and future Austrian schisms.

Yet the social partnership may also remain
the institutions

in

existing

and

rises

on a regular

cannot coexist

in

basis.

(1997) The

an economically and politically

and Europeanized Austria has been disputed. (Pelinka 1999; Heinisch 2000;

Unger 1999)

It is

also argued that tlexibility can

still

be a product of the social

partnership and enhance competitiveness of the Austrian state. (Kittel 2000; Gerlich,

Grande, and Muller 1988; Pelinka 1999) As Heinisch suggests, while

heyday of the 1960s, the
partners to

become “modernization brokers”

the Austrian political

to fully

social partnership's reforms

is

it

far

from

its

of the 1990s have allowed the

retaining

many of the

roles

and economic system. (Heinisch 2000) Austria

is

and functions

in

certainly unlikely

abandon the structures of social partnership, yet the meaning, importance, and

operation of those structures have changed. The Austrian social partnership, the once

paradigmatic case of strong neo-corporatism, has become a far more moderate exemplar
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CHAPTER

7

THE CRISIS OF GERMAN SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP SINCE THE

1980S

Introduction

The

1

979

celebration of the

illustrated that

German model was

short-lived as the second oil shocks of

Modell Deutschland was neither

infallible

nor impenetrable.

(Katzenstein 1987) Since the economic turmoil of the 1970s, the relations between labor

and business

in

industrial order

Germany have

deteriorated and the

first

postwar German

emerged. (Streeck and Hassel 2004) The task of finding compromises

between the social partners, as well as with other

actors, has

2003) Where once there was an “apparently unshakable

and

fissures of the

become more

tripartite

difficult. (Vail

consensus with business

labor”, the ability to get primary interests to act in concert has diminished

significantly

by the early 1980s. (Thelen 1991; Kitschelt and Streeck 2004) Further, the

Kohl. Schroder, and Merkel governments have been more willing to act without the

consent and concert of the social partners more frequently and a range of policy issues
central to the social partners since the 1980s.

As The Economist

suggests, the “clockwork

early 1980s has started to seemingly break

(Gobeyn 1993; Wessels 2000; Vail 2003)

mechanism” of the German model from

down. (2006)

Similar to the fate of Austria since the irud

become more

erratic with sluggish

and growing budget

growth

in the late

deficits.

the

1

970s, the

German economy

has

growth, increased inflation, higher unemployment,

(Hancock 1989; Conradt 2001

1970s and early 1980s, and again

)

The slowing of economic

in the late

1990s and early 2000s,

drove the interests further apart and created additional points of contention. (Harding and
Paterson 2000) De-industrialization, inflation, record high and lasting unemployment
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unwound

forty years

of cooperation rather quickly. Germany’s failure to rebound from

the shocks of the late 1970s and 1980s, as

Deutschland

late

of reunification from

1

German

in the early 1970s,

brought Modell

1990s and 2000s, exacerbated by the tremendously high costs

990, had

GDP growth was

had done

(Hancock 1989; Markovits 1986; Gobeyn 1993; Thelen 1991)

into question.

The recessions of the

it

Germany emerge

less than half the rate

unemployment remained immovably higher

as an

economic laggard through 2004.

of most other European

as well.

Germany

fell

states

while

into an unenviable

position of low growth, declining employment, and high social welfare costs. (Kitschelt

and Streeck 2004)

By

the

mid and

late

1990s Germany seemed

much

less likely to

have the

ability to

address major policy challenges including increasing unemployment, financing pensions

and healthcare, reforming education, integrating the
the workforce. (Wessels 2000)

Much

like the

partnership took part of the blame. Given

process of reform,

to efforts

and

of economic and

efficient

become

many suggested

east,

and increasing the

Austrian case, the

flexibility

of

German model of social

Germany's “painfully slow” and incremental

that the social partnership itself

political reinvigoration rather than a

had become

pathway

a barrier

for consensual

codetermined policymaking. Conflict between the social partners had

intractable

and the willingness

to

compromise and bargain was diminished

(Gobeyn 1993; Kitschelt and Streeck 2004; Vail 2003) The economic and

social

challenges of the recent era have focused, rightfully or wrongfully, on the

German model

as the potential source

of these economic woes. (Harding and Paterson 2000)
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Part

of the system

that has taken

much blame

innovation has been the social partnership.

system of

interest intermediation

the social partners

at the

who

expense of the

It

for the rigidity

and lack of

has been argued that the neo-corporatist

and consensual policymaking has become clogged by

sought to defend their privileged positions and particular interests

state's overall

demands

for

economic reform and

(Streeck 1984; Vitols 2004; Vail 2003) However, there

is

flexibility.

some evidence

to suggest that

of reform was also a product of weak public perception of serious problems.

the lack

Many Germans

reject the suggestion that structural

reform of the welfare

state has

been

necessary or desirable. In a 1997 poll, less than one-third of Germans indicated a desire
for structural

2001

)

change while two-thirds opposed any changes

to the existing system.

This strong bias toward protection of existing structures and entitlements,

(Cox

in the

population, labor, business, and the state, have negatively affected significant reform to

address the sluggish economy, costs of reunification, rising unemployment, reduced
competitiveness, and higher deficit spending. (Kitschelt and Streeck 2004; Vail 2003;

Cox 2001)
While the Kohl government was
partnership,

it

nonetheless support

policymaking processes

in a

less enthusiastic

some attempts

about and dedicated to social

to utilize

some

neo-corporatist

handful of reform and economic decision-making efforts in

the 1990s, especially regarding unification between the East and West.

Reunification restored

some

levels

of tripartite consensus and cooperation between the

major actors through the Solidarity Pact, but
In 1995,

become

IG Metall proposed
the

model

for the

(Gobeyn 1993)

it

was

a national alliance

short-lived. (Streeck

and Hassel 2004)

on employment (which would

later

Schroder government’s Alliance for Jobs) to seek national-
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level contracts

between labor unions, employers’ associations, and the

government was moderately supportive of the idea while
by the

BDA. The

and commercial

it

was

The Kohl

state.

also cautiously

welcomed

plan died due to a lack of support of industry and sectoral associations

interest

groups that preferred a more decentralized system. (Casey and

Gold 2000; Bemdt 2000; Timmons 2000) This ended any attempts

to reestablish a

national level institution of social partnership, similar to Concerted Action, during the

Kohl tenure. (Vail 2003; Streeck and Hassel 2004)
Kohl tended

and expand upon the model used by

to revert to

Helmut Schmidt, and organized
the social partners

proposals.

a

number of Chancellor Rounds

on a range of economic,

(Timmons 2000; Padgett

social,

his predecessor,

to intermediate

between

and unification reform issues and

1999; Goetz 2003) These

showed some

utility

and

effectiveness but like the proposed Alliance, Kohl discovered growing inability to find

consensus and compromise between the partners. After a series of walkout by both labor

and business, the rounds became

became increasingly unpopular
However, the

SPD-Green
spirit

the

coalition

less frequent

as he bypassed the social partners.

utilization

and need

(Timmins 2000)

of social partnership expanded dramatically under the

government of Gerhard Schroder. Schroder revived much of the

and structure of social partnership

major

and Kohl’s economic reform proposals

interest associations.

in seeking

more consensual agreements between

(Wessels 2000; Sturm 2003) Given the economic decline

for significant reform, this fits well into the

German

pattern of social

partnership. With increasing dissent between social partners and an inability to reach

compromise on urgent economic reforms,

the state increased into role in the process

emphasized the institutionalization of social partnership
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at the national level.

Much

and

like

what occurred

1960s and early 1970s with Concerted Action, the Schroder

in the late

government recognized the need
social partnership by the state

for

more

direct intermediation

and created a national

and coordination of the

institution, the Alliance for Jobs, to

persuade, cajole, and moderate the partners to find consensually supported policy

prescriptions to declining

economic

fortunes. (Streeck

and Hassel 2004; Vail 2003;

Wessels 2000; Timmins 2000)

The most important move of the Schroder
institutionalization of social partnership

was

revival of the national

the creation of the Alliance for Jobs,

Training, and Competitiveness or Btindes fur Arbeit, Ausbildung,

Wettbewerbsfahigkeit

in

1998.

important element of the 1998

MetalI proposal.

It

und

(Lehmbruch 2003; Sturm 2003) This has been an

SPD

electoral

campaign and was based on

a 1995

IG

focused on the need to find consensual support for reforms amongst

the key social partners. (Wessels 2000)

The Alliance

permanent

national level that

tripartite

arrangement

at the

government, unions, and employers’ associations

unemployment, vocational education and

to

retraining,

for Jobs established a

new and

would bring together

the

address lasting issues of

and other areas of German economic

competitiveness. (Vail 2003; Streeck and Hassel 2004; Wessels 2000) Clearly, the

Alliance for Jobs has a

1

960s and early

the Alliance

was

1

number of important

parallels to

Concerted Action

970s under grand coalition and subsequent
significantly

more narrowed

in

SPD

in the late

leadership.

However,

terms of agenda and scope than

Concerted Action. (Timmins 2000; Sturm 2003)
Importantly, Schroder also began expanding the

membership and aegis of these

types of structures into areas beyond the traditional scope of the tripartite labor-state-
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capital social partnership.

material issue areas

corporatist

Women's

became

fertile

environment, immigration, and other post-

rights, the

ground

for the

Schroder government’s use of neo-

models of consensual policymaking. The

proliferation

roundtables, and other advisory boards reflected Schroder's

of these councils,

newfound

affinity

towards

the preservation of Germany's traditional postwar system of consensual policymaking.

Some
the

suggested that his zeal for such institutions was a form of “deparliamentization" of

German policymaking

process.

(Lehmbruch 2003; The Economist 2003a; Sturm

2003; Goetz 2003) This was a notable reincarnation of the neo-corporatist model by the

SPD

and Schroder government unseen since the early 1970s.
Yet, the expansion of tripartite or multipartite institutions

well with both the tradition of

SPD

leadership, as

it

the late 1960s through early 1980s, and the typical

turmoil. Schroder promulgated

seems

to correlate quite

did under Brandt and Schmidt from

German response

new commissions on

ethics,

to

economic

municipal finances,

sustainable development, corporate governance, public pensions, nuclear power, labor

market reform, and healthcare. (The Economist 2003a; Streeck and Hassel 2004) While
not

all

reflected purely neo-corporatist organization, almost

all

were intended

to provide

expert and consensus opinion of policy reforms and regulatory options.

Yet,

many of these,

especially those that

w ere more

strictly neo-corporatist in

organization and operation such as the Alliance for Jobs, failed to yield important reforms

and

results

and the Schroder government

relied far

more upon

parliamentary models of policy and decision-making to enact

packages of the

late

strictly unilateral or

its

economic reform

1990s and early 2000s. (Vail 2003; The Economist 2003a) This trend

has continued under the grand coalition of the

CDU/CSU
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and

SPD

led

by Angela Merkel

after the

2005

elections.

A

set

of healthcare and tax reforms was pushed through

parliament in 2006 under the Merkel-led

were enacted despite
associations.

(

little

C'DU/CSU-SPD

coalition government.

These

input by social partners such as the employers’ and healthcare

The Economist 2006a)

While the model of incremental, consensual, and intermediated policymaking was
once considered a

now more

v irtue

of the German system, the “exhausting grind of consensus”

is

often considered a vice. (Kitschelt and Streeck 2004; The Economist 2003;

Vail 2003) Given the fundamental challenges facing the

costs of reunification, continuing high

German

state including lingering

unemployment, decreased international and

European competitiveness, and growing budget

deficits, the

need and demand for

policymaking leadership and innovation has never been higher since 1945. Yet the role of
the social partnership, that

this

was once so respected,

established, and effective at providing

kind of economic and policy governance, has failed to adjust and

The German

social partnership

may

be

in the

act.

midst of a life-threatening

crisis for its

survival in which the results are far from certain and even less optimistic.
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(Streeck 1984)

Economic Transformations and Challenges

As
1950s,

indicated earlier,

economic growth began

West German growth was
Italy, as

falling a bit

below the French

United States

in the

United States.

It

same

rate

period.

was only

1

The

of growth but

Growth

.8% through

the 1970s. During the

of 6.5% of GDP per year, exceeding

at a rate

well as the United States.

France and

weaken by

to

fell to

the

rate fell to

still

4.4% during

of

that

the 1960s,

above the United Kingdom and

2.6%

1970s below France and the

in the

mid 1980s,

a bit higher than France, the

(OECD

1988;

Nonetheless, inflation was relatively moderate for the entire period.

Much

United Kingdom, and Sweden, but below that of the United

States.

Hancock 1989)

Austria,

Germany maintained

inflation well

While Germany averaged 5.9% annual
over 9%.

weaken

(OECD

1988;

below

inflation in the 1970s, the

Hancock 1989) Comparatively,

several years earlier than the Austrian

However,

the initial responses

1980s resulted

in further

partnership’s efficacy.

economy through

OECD averages even

the

into the 1970s.

OECD average

German economy began

to the

to

economic challenges of the

economic decline and greater diminishment of the

early retirement

was

economy. (Casey and Gold 2000)

by the social partners

The neo-corporatist

like

partners responded to

initial

social

downturns

in the

and a lack of fundamental labor market reform.

(Streeck and Hassel 2004; Vail 2003)

Despite a slight economic rebound

in the early

1990s, the late 1990s brought

about the largest slump, in terms of time and growth rates,
since the end of

World War IT

major economy

in the

In the 1990s,

in the

German growth

world, with the exception of Japan.
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Germany economy

trailed virtually

every other

Unemployment reached

a

historic high in 1997,

was

also

1

1.4% and remained above 10% well

becoming more

1999 had been on the

structural as over

rolls for

32%

into 2003.

Unemployment

of all the unemployed between 1995 and

over a year. (Vail 2003)

It

was argued

that

Germany has

exhibited the weakest competitiveness profile amongst the world's five largest economies
since the 1990s while

it

EU member

simultaneously was the lowest ranking

in

terms of

both employment and overall performance by 2000. (Kitschelt and Streeck 2004;

Wiesenthal 2004)

The incremental policy changes of the German
quite appropriate for the 1960s and 1970s

1990s and the

new

international

seemed

social partnership

which were

far less appropriate for the

1980s and

and European context. (Gobeyn 1993; Katzenstein 1987;

Vail 2003) Importantly for the social partnership has been that the area of conventional

manufacturing, where the

tripartite

arrangements of collective bargaining, fulltime and

permanent employment, codetermination, and cooperative policymaking, are precisely
the sectors of low growth, decline, and contraction.

manufacturing power, and while

still

While

still

a

major industrial and

representing a strong share of the economy, these

core sectors of the traditional postwar

German economy and

social partnership are in the

steepest decline. (Kitschelt and Streeck 2004)

The German public “clamored

GDP growth,

rising

for effective policy responses" to the declining

unemployment, and decreasing competitiveness of the German

economy. (Vail 2003) Though some suggest

the

demands were

tended to be rather weak given the lack of willingness to
entrenched benefits or subsidies. (Cox 2001
those in Austria, resulted

in little

)

make

far less

clamorous and

significant cuts to well

Yet these economic challenges, similar to

compromise or action by
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the social partners

who

seemed incapable and unwilling
were needed most. Some argue

to

compromise and reach consensus

that the social partnership in

Germany

dysfunction during times of economic decline necessitating a

by the

role

state as

governments

at the

much

is

very time they

prone

to

stronger and direct

occurred during Concerted Action and under the Schmidt and Kohl

into the 1980s. (Streeck 1984, 1997; Vail

The response of the

late

2003)

Kohl and Schroder governments

fit

this pattern quite well

as both attempted to force the social partners to the bargaining table through an Alliance

for Jobs.

Under Kohl,

the Alliance never even

emerged from

the gate

due

from both employers and unions. Under Schroder, the Alliance became a

was much

rhetorical

and

institutional

optimism

that

consensus on

to intransigence

reality

and there

to address the

fundamental economic and social reforms could be reached between the partners under
the watchful and

now

Sturm 2003) The

results,

German
the

coordinating eye of the

however, were

social partnership

German

state

hangs

state.

(Streeck and Hassel 2004; Vail 2003;

far less than

in the balance.

expected and the future of the

Several important transformations within

have challenged the efficacy and viability of the social partnership to

address fundamental questions of
lack of ability, to find innovative

German

social

and economic policy. The

and consensual policy outputs

to alleviate

these challenges will likely define the future of the social partnership in the

policymaking process.

397

ability,
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Reunification

The suddenness of German

reunification between 1989 and 1990 had tremendous

consequences for the German economy, society, and
process of unification resulted in

little initial

Kohl model of unification seems

to

institutions

society,

structural

economic, monetary,

polity. (Padgett

political,

of the West German system of

and

however, the

and organizational change. The

have been a rather elegant extension of the existing

and structures of the Federal Republic

economy, and

polity. Institutionally

into

and upon the former East German

1999) In less than a year between 1989 and 1990,

social union took place through the wholesale transfer

legal, social,

economic, and

political institutions

upon the

Eastern framework. (Turner 1998; Wiesenthal 2004) The structures and institutions of the
Federal Republic initially remained remarkably unchanged and resilient in the face of
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what was a major

social,

economic, and

political transformation

terms of interest groups and the social partnership,

German

interest

of the German

this pattern held firm as the

state. In

West

group system was quickly adapted and became the model for the unified

Germany, (von Beyme 1993; Wallach and Francisco 1992; Turner 1998; Padgett 1999)

The quickness of unification and

the institutional continuity via the extension of

the existing system of interest representation, intermediation, and organization to the

Eastern states briefly obscured several major stumbling points of the process and

new

its

consequences. (Padgett 1999) Germany's already weakening economic performance was
significantly

worsened by the assumption of the costs of reunification. The eastern

were a tremendous burden upon the economy

in

almost

all

states

terms including social

spending, administration, healthcare, environmental regulation, unemployment,
education, and infrastructure. (Merkl 1993; Wiesenthal 2004)

The hopes

economy and

that Eastern

Germany could be quickly

integrated into the Western

reach near parity in a short period were never met and the reunification

project’s costs to government, business, and the

German taxpayer were enormous. While

no one expected a miracle, the costs of reuimfication clearly appeared

to

have

far

outstripped expected levels of social and economic outlays. This wrecked havoc with

Germany’s regional and global competitiveness

that

was

further diminished by the

incorporation of a large mass of unprofitable and unsustainable Eastern industries that

turn led to increasingly high social expenditures in terms of

vocational retraining costs. (Merkel 1993; Padgett 1999)
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unemployment and

in

While Germany’s economy had been
economic,

enormous

social,

fiscal,

and

political costs

in relative

of trying

decline prior to reunification, the

to integrate the East into the republic led to

monetary, industrial, labor, and social pressures.

In

terms of the social

partnership, unification served to temporarily forestall the decline of tripartite consensus

that

had begun

between

The complexity and

in the 1970s.

major social and

all

political actors

of business, agriculture, and labor were

costs of unification required cooperation

of the federal republic and the social partners

critical in

helping

manage

the difficult process.

The Kohl government, while generally unenthusiastic of social partnership and unions
especially,

was eager

more

radical unions

labor

movement

that

to

and workers of the East

DGB,

initial

more pragmatic and

unified

German

partnership with the Chemical Workers’ Union and others

versus the more problematic IG Metall helped form a more solid tripartite
,

basis to integrate east into west through

1999) In typical

new

into the

in integrating the potentially

had typified the federal republic since the end of World War IT

(Gobeyn 1993) Kohl’s
in the

normalize relations with labor to aid

German

what would become the Solidarity

neo-corporatist fashion. Kohl

was

Pact. (Padgett

able to absorb criticism of his

pro-labor stance from business and employers and crafted strong consensus and

consent on Ins unification programs. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Merkl 1993; Wallach and
Francisco 1992; Turner 1998)
Despite the psychological and geopolitical benefits of reunification of the

German

may have

actually

state, the process,

due

to its

complexity, speed, and institutionalization,

stunted the emergence of major economic and political reforms to address the declining

German growth and employment.
institutions that

seemed

to

It

has been argued that the very continuity of the

guide the unification process were far below the optimal
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)

course for

German economic and

political reforms.

The surprising speed

in

which

unification took place eliminated the ability to experiment, tinker, or significantly reform

many of the

preexisting institutions of the Federal Republic that could have helped pull

Germany more quickly from

its

economic malaise. (Wiesenthal 2004; Kitschelt and

Streeck 2004; Merkl 1993) However, there are

some arguments

that significant structural

and economic reform should have actually been much easier given the scope and
opportunity of unification.

structural reforms

process.

Cox argues

and tended

that the

to overstate the

Kohl government opted

need for continuity

to

avoid difficult

in the unification

(Cox 2001

The

unification process absorbed so

that

once completed, the

and

political

will to continue a

much economic,

political,

and

social capital

major restructuring of the German economic

policymaking process may have been significantly weakened. (Wisenthal

2004) Despite the continuity of institutions and structures, the collapse of the
reunification with the

interest associations.

Germany,

this

came

West under the

federal republic

GDR

meant significant changes

While the system of social partnership was also extended
at a

and

for the

to Eastern

time of significant challenge and tumult for the system. This had

major implications for the system of collective bargaining, policymaking, and the social
partners themselves.

For labor, the end of East Germany signaled the end of the Free German Trade

Union (FDGB),
leader of the

the

FDGB

Communist
was

Party-controlled trade union federation in the east

arrested and later tried on corruption and malfeasance charges.

The unions of Western Germany quickly moved
workers decided

The

in to

to join, nonetheless, higher than the
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fill

the void, but only half of

union density of the west

that

all

had

)

35%

hovered near

for the past

the unions under the

DGB

few decades. The

umbrella went from

total

just

number of workers represented

under 8 million

million by 1992 almost exclusively on the inclusion of

affiliated unions.

new

government

into the

(Turner 1998; Conradt 2001

unions and employers' went into effect

profitability.

1990 to nearly 12

German workers

East

In 1991, the first national level collective bargaining

most workers

in

in

in eastern

in the east despite their overall

arrangements between the

Germany. These boosted wages

for

low levels of productivity and firm

(Wiesenthal 2004) This was closely watched and intermediated by the Kohl
that

hoped

to use the

agreements

to

more deeply

integrate the east into the

processes and structures of the federal republic and to lessen eastern workers' overall

unhappiness with high unemployment

levels.

80%

bargaining were disastrous. Nearly

However, the end

results

of the collective

of eastern enterprises, comprising

eastern workers, either partially or entirely ignored the

60%

of all

wage agreements. (Wiesenthal

2004; Turner 1998; Streeck and Hassel 2004; Padgett 1999)
In

1993 Gesamtmetall, the metal industry employers’ association, refused to

honor the existing collective agreements

in eastern

Germany. These had promised

pay increase for the year. IG Metal responded by calling a
I

strike

a

26%

of affected workers and

labor -capital unrest spread quickly threatening a wider series of strikes and lockouts. In

the end, the strike

was ended and compromise was reached

that generally favored

workers. IG Metall claimed victory. (Turner 1998) However, the negotiations had led to

fundamental changes
level variations

in the collective

bargaining process that allowed firm and regional

from national or industry-wide collective arrangements

the traditional leadership role that

IG Metall has
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in the east.

historically played in both

Given

German

labor

and

in setting the

benchmarks

implications, probably

for collective bargaining, this concession

more than

initially predicted,

upon the

entire

had deep

German

collective

bargaining system. (Casey and Gold 2000; Padgett 1999)

Because of the collapse of the industry-wide collective bargaining agreements
the east, unions

and industry associations began

to tolerate regional

in

and firm specific

agreements known as “opening and hardship clauses”. (Auer 1997; Wiesenthal 2004;
Turner 1998; Bosch 2004) These have developed into a rather complex and differential
system of allowable variances and alterations
bargaining arrangements

at

to industry-wide or national collective

the regional, local, firm, or plant level. (Bosch 2004) These

resulted in negotiated collective bargaining agreements that paid eastern workers

approximately 60-70% of the wages earned by western workers
trades.

While

this

was done

initially to protect

employment

productive and competitive industries in the east,
other sectors such as hospital workers where the

it

in

in similar or identical

and the survival of

less

also extended to service unions and

wage gap seemed

to

make

less sense.

(Conradt 2001; Streeck and Hassel 2004) Additionally, the unions had hoped that wages
in the east

would gradually but quickly reach

the reforms to be of a short-term nature.

to

remain depressed

clauses have

in eastern

parity with those in the west

However,

as

wages and employment continued

Germany, even through today,

become permanent

and believed

the opening

and hardship

features of the collective bargaining process in Eastern

Germany. (Casey and Gold 2000; Turner 1998; Wisensthal 2004; Bosch 2004)
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This has led to both accelerated decentralization of the collective bargaining
process not only in eastern but also in western
labor unions and employers' to

Germany while

become more divided on

and economic restructuring issues along east-west

lines.

a

it

German

has also led

number of wage,

social policy,

(Conradt 2001; Auer 1997;

Bosch 2004) East German businesses and industry differed tremendously from those

numerous ways. The

the west in

corporations.

Many

east lacked resourceful, large,

that survived unification

in

and profitable

were gobbled up by large western

industries

through the Treuhandanstalt regime of privatization and liberalization of former East

German

state assets. (Padgett 1999;

Merkl 1993; Wiesenthal 2004) The BDI,

BDA, and

other western-based employers’ and business associations were accused of biased and
unfair privatization and reorganization plans during the unification process by giving

preference to existing large West

German

firms rather than helping create

new

entrepreneurs and firms in the east. (Conradt 2001; Padgett 1999)

While the process of transferring the
from west

to east initially

seemed

to require

institutions

and structures of governance

no major reform or reorganization, the long-

term institutional and structural consequences of reunification have become more visible

and pronounced. (Jacoby 2005) The Solidarity Pact and other Kohl

and

institutional the structures

vitality

is

uncertain.

institutions

and structure

in the

new

unified and eastern

The imposition of the western models and

governance took place upon

develop

of the west upon the east have not held up well. The

of the federal republic’s

environments

efforts to

a “social

and economic fabric

structures of

that lacked the organizational

prerequisites” to truly adopt and benefit from them. (Wisenethal 2004; Padgett 1999;

Auer 1997)
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This seems quite applicable to the social partnership and the system of collective
bargaining.

The East lacked many of the fundamental building blocks upon which

Federal Republic and

its

social partnership

the

were founded. (Padgett 1999) The perceived

lack of applicability and legitimacy of the western structures of governance have

continued to grow amongst eastern interests, firms, and workers, adding to the economic

and

political crises

of the German

undermined the efficacy,

vitality,

state.

Importantly, this lack of “roots” in the east has

and future

viability

of the social partnership

important issues of reunification and continuing east-west divisions amongst

to address

German

workers, firms, and peoples. (Wiesenthal 2004; Padgett 1999; Glaessner 2005; Wallach

and Francisco 1992; Merkl 1993; Auer 1997) However

in

some

areas, including labor

organization and codetermination, there are signs of both successful transference of the

western model along with significant variation and adaptation to the underlying eastern
conditions. (Fichter 1997; Frege 1999;

Leaman 2002)

Intnguingly, the specific institutionalization of social partnership in eastern

Germany has tended
communist

to follow

states than that

along closer lines of the tripartism found

found

in

western

Germany

in

prior to unification.

other post-

The

lack of the

fundamental social and economic preconditions of the western social partnership has

meant

a very distinct hybrid of

tripartism that

is

generally characterized by weaker economies, weaker social partners,

and shallow social
eastern

level

in the

Germany

West German neo-corporatism and Eastern European

roots.

are far

As Padgett

suggest, the forms of tripartism that have

more numerous, and have been

far

more

emerged

effective, at the

in

meso

between unions, industry, and the new eastern Lander governments. These are often
form of “crisis cartels” between provincial governments, unions, and firms but
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lacking the structural permanence and stability found in the traditional western model of

social partnership.

The

German system

significant space for regional corporatism in the

flourished in the eastern states due to their particular geographical concentrations of

similar firms, a leftover of centrally planned

federalism in which

communist economies, and

Land governments found themselves with

new found

their

significant authority

and

organizational capacity to address economic problems of the unification and privatization

process. (Padgett 1999)

This division along east-west lines exists amongst workers, industry, and polity
continues to weaken and divide

German

interests

and erodes the foundations and

functions of social partnership and consensual policymaking processes

at the

macro

level.

(Padgett 1999) Examples include the Hartz IV reforms designed to shorten and lessen

unemployment

benefits.

workers’ and voters
larger impact

While controversial throughout German labor and

in the east

upon the

were

east with

its

particularly critical of

its

society,

harshness and perceived

significantly higher levels of

unemployment. (The

Economist 2004)
This has had political ramifications for the major interests and parties. Worker

and voter support for the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) increased as

new

into the

and

Left or Links party and significantly increased

local elections.

The

electoral success of the

federal elections, led by former

these

new

German

leftist,

merged

vote share in provincial

new PDS-Links

alliance in the

Oskar Lafontaine, can be traced

2005

directly to

east-west divides over economic and political refonn. The far-right wing

Nationalist Party

Lander and
,

SPD

its

it

(NPD)

has also seen increased eastern support in federal.

local elections since the late

1

990s. In general, unification and
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its

)

consequences have pushed Germany party

politics

towards a more multi-party system

and significantly altered the underlying alignments of the major
Reunification

may have made

interests to address the

1980s.

The

needs for

it

more

political

costs, in fiscal, social,

difficult for

2004)

German policymakers and

and economic reform

economic, and

parties. (Kitschelt

that

political terms,

emerged by

of unification limited

the policymakers' ability to significantly overhaul or change the institutional

of the social partnership and policymaking process since those

the

institutions,

framework

amongst

others of the federal republic, were central to the wholesale integration of the east into the

existing constitutional, legal, economic, social, and political orders.

pressure to maintain existing institutions

was

The speed and

quite high given the costs and scale of the

reunification process. (Merkl 1993; Wisenethal 2004; Kitschelt and Streeck 2004)

However, some have suggested
unpopular structural reforms

that unification

that

was used

as a convenient excuse to avoid

could have been implemented during the unique

opportunity provided to the Kohl government in the early 1990s. (Cox 2001

Nonetheless, even with the problems and issues of unification and eastern

integration, the social partners

still

remain influential actors

monopolistic and powerful as they were

in the east,

in the pre-unification past.

even

if

not as

While union density

continues to decline, they usually remain the unchallenged representatives of fulltime and

permanent workers

in traditional industrial

and manufacturing sectors including

metalworking, construction, and transportation. Public services and other service-based

employees remain highly unified

in their respective

unions as well. (Wiesenthal 2004;

Leaman 2002)

Industry and business association are not quite as successful in the east as

labor. Industry

and employers’ association membership has continued
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to decline

and

shows

little

sign of recovery.

The

decentralization of collective bargaining at the regional

or firm level has significantly limited Eastern enterprises perception of benefits extending

from peak association

affiliation. (Kitschelt

and Streeck 2004) This has been exacerbated

by lasting mistrust of larger Western-based business and industries by those

in the East.

(Wiesenthal 2004) The argument that reunification could potentially increase the decline

and disorganization of social partnership

in the

bargaining processes has borne out by creating

ability

of social partners to represent unified

influence

away from

the

German policymaking and
new

collective

intractable schisms, lessening the

interests,

and decentralizing authority and

peak associations. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Turner 1998)

Economic Liberalization
Liberalization of the

German economy

around streamlining the welfare

state

since the 1980s has primarily revolved

and increasing German competitiveness within the

context of increasing European and global competition.

power arguing
instituted a

for the necessity

number of reforms

The Kohl government came

of major reform or turnabout, Wende. His government

to liberalize the labor market,

reduce public welfare

expenditures, and privatize partially or fully state-owned industries and

the railways and postal service, in the 1980s through 1990s.

of the

CDU/CSU-FDP

tended to

fail

coalition

and resulted

into

government

in greater

to gain consent

(Cox 2001

utilities,

)

The

from the major

such as

initial efforts

interests

marginalization of the social partnership in the

policymaking process.
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While the Kohl government did regularly hold advisory and
and conferences
less

and

to discuss

less likely to

tripartite

and debate reforms, especially over reunification,

meetings

it

became

use such occasions to generate consensual policy outputs. (Hancock

1989; Heimsch 2000; Streeck and Hassel 2004;

Gobeyn 1993) While Hancock,

Katzenstein, and others suggest that the Kohl reforms were not particularly radical and

did not significantly reverse

many of the

social democratic gains

of the

late

1960s

through early 1980s, these reforms did have significant implications for the social
partners and the partnership

itself.

(Cox 2001; Hancock 1989, Katzenstein 1987) The

areas of reform included labor markets, social insurance, and privatization that were

all

within the traditional bailiwick of the social partnership’s policymaking and structural

competencies for the bulk of the postwar
not been entirely

uncommon

CDU Chancellor Adenauer,
current era.

liberalizations

level

While bypassing the

social partnership

had

previous administrations, including those of previous

Kohl certainly

set a

precedent that would continue into the

(Gobeyn 1993; Heimsch 2000; Vail 2003)

In the early

with strong

in

era.

and mid 1980s, Kohl enacted a number of rather moderate

of the labor market and reductions

SPD

in social

spending. (Cox 2001

)

This met

and trade union opposition, notably led by IG MetalL and increased the

of labor-capital conflict

in

Germany. (Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991; Streeck and

Hassel 2004) The dissent was successful

moderating government reforms over the

in

late

1980s and into the early 1990s suggesting continuity of the social partnership model to
punish government that failed to get consent of the social partners and the tendency to
preclude radical policy shifts in favor of incrementalism. (Katzenstein 1987; Smith 1992;

Cox 2001

;

Vail 2003)

What emerged was

a

patchwork of economic reform and
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)

much

liberalization that failed to achieve

structural

precisely to the lack of fundamental consensus

Cox 2001

(Schrim 2002; Vail 2003;

labor.

moderated the Kohl government's

)

slight boost in the

demand

social partners, especially

has also been argued that unification

such policy given

east. (Padgett

its

need for a wider

1999) This was also influenced

western economy during the early 1990s that reduced some of the

for large-scale structural

change

to the

models. However, that growth would not

German economy began
2000

amongst the

ability to enact

consensus on the programs to integrate the

by a

It

economic transformation due

to

more

last,

German economic and policymaking

employment would not rebound, and

rapidly decline by the

the

mid 1990s. (Harding and Paterson

)

Efforts to find consensus

when

on

a

new range of economic and

social reforms failed

neither labor nor business could reach an agreement on forming the national

Alliance for Jobs in 1995. The proposed alliance, based on neo-corporatist organization

and principles similar
issues,

to that

of Concerted Action, though with a smaller mandate of

was an attempt by German labor

to increase its role in the otherwise pro-business

and conservative Kohl policymaking process. Kohl, seeing
failing to reach accord

amongst

alliance to reach consensus on

government

to leverage both

their

own

that the social partners

were

bargaining and negotiation, hoped to use the

more wide-ranging economic reforms and

to use the

unions and business to reach compromise. (Streeck and

Hassel 2004; Heinisch 2000) The failure of the Alliance to get off the ground drove Kohl

towards a more unilateral policymaking approach that put the government
the social partners

from both sides as well as from the

Cox 2001
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at

odds with

political opposition. (Vail

2003;

Starting in 1996, the

economic reform measures

Kohl government began enacting a

series

of deeper

that included cuts to the social insurance system, increases in

retirement ages, liberalization of the labor market, reduction of sick benefits, exemption

of smaller and mid size firms from some regulation, and privatization. The resulting
widespread opposition by German labor, the SPD, and even some business interests
eventually worked to limit

losses of the

CDU/CSU

many of these reforms and

in 1998.

eventually led to the electoral

Again, as typical of the postwar

German model of

consensual policymaking, the failure to gamer the consent of the social partners and the
bold unilateral policy initiatives of the Kohl government resulted
reform’s content or

Hancock 1989)

CDU/CSU

It

its

in the dilution

outright failure to be enacted. (Katzenstein 1987;

additionally increased the electoral opposition to

amongst many moderate Germans who saw the

failure

of the

Smth 1992;

Kohl and the

of the Alliance and

Kohl's subsequent unilateralism was antithetical to the underlying intents of the social

market economy and social partnership

that

had served Germany so well

for so long.

Labor Market Reforms

One of the key
was
for

in

areas of economic liberalization begun under the Kohl government

reform and deregulation of the labor market. This has become the exemplary issue

many

in

explaining the decline in

unemployment, and the
process.

As such

it

significant

German

competitiveness, the growth of

changes taking place

in the

deserves special attention precisely because

German policymaking
it

has

become

the

emblematic case of the function, dysfunction, and marginalization of social partnership
the policymaking and regulatory process.

Much of the

recent scholarship on

German

in

social partnership

and economic liberalization has been dedicated

learning from the

German

critical

to

analyzing and

labor market policy process since the 1980s. But

it

is

also a

area of government, economic, and labor interest due to the continuing structural

unemployment and

reunification in

market issue has emerged as the

Germany

critical

since the late 1970s.

Hence

the labor

case of economic policymaking and the

perceived malfunction of social partnership.

With German unemployment well over the EU-15 average
1990s and early 2000s, reaching an all-time high of

10%

1

.4%

in

much of the

was

to alleviate high

of unemployment. This would have significant benefits not only

employment

to jobless workers, but

system which would
contributions which

in turn

would

in

would also reduce demands on

in turn

would

potentially lower tax burdens for

rates

particular perspective, labor

much

higher

market reforms

significantly address a wide-ranging

to

Unemployment was no longer

Germany had

become

firms

economic growth and decreasing

in the East.

in

to the regional

Hence, when viewed from a

Germany could have

the potential to

number of reunification, economic, and

pressures through a domino-like process.

business cycles and had

German

and making the German economy more competitive

Europe and around the world, leading

Germany with

providing

the social insurance

unemployment. Additionally, unemployment remained strongly linked
disparity in

in

reduce the demands for government revenues and employer

citizens, increasing investment,

with those

late

1997 and hovering near

well into 2004, the primary goal of economic policymaking

levels

and

1

for

(Bemdt 2000;

a short-term

a structural

social

Vail 2003; Vitols 2004)

and cyclical pattern dependent upon

problem by the 1980s. (Bemdt 2000) While

suffered through bouts of increasing
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unemployment

in earlier periods, in

the late 1960s, the late 1970s, and in the early 1980s, the type and longevity of

unemployment had changed. Rather than experiencing

unemployment

short bouts of high

followed by increased employment, unemployment was becoming a lasting feature of the

economy. Those
and

in

that

become unemployed remained unemployed

some cases dropped out of the workforce

altogether.

for

between 1995 and 1999. (Vail 2003) The labor force participation
the 1980s

longer periods

(Bemdt 2000; Vitols 2004)

Nearly a third of all jobless workers remained out of the labor force

many groups from

much

in

excess of a year

rate declined

amongst

onward, including older workers, usually from industrial or

manufacturing sectors, women, and younger less-skilled workers. (Vitols 2004)

However, even

in white-collar

and service

industries,

unemployment was becoming more

frequent and longer lasting. (Vail 2003; Vitols 2004)

One of the most

come down even during times of economic rebound

significantly

early 2000s. This

large

daunting problems was that unemployment numbers failed to

may have been

partially the fault

in the early

of reunification and

number of inefficient and unproductive East German firms

its

absorption of a

that quickly led to

extraordinarily high unemployment. But even in the west and in areas of the

that

seemed

Vail 2003)

to be

It

doing quite well, employment numbers remained

was well argued by many

that the

German

1990s and

soft.

economy

(Bemdt 2000;

labor market policies, which

were highly protective of workers and strongly regulated the labor markets, were
contributing to employers' unwillingness to hire

long-term costs,

More

flexible

in

new

staff

even when necessary. The

terms of benefits, salary, and taxes, to firms dissuaded

new

hiring.

employment, including temporary and part-time work, could have been a
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solution to both employers and the unemployed. Yet

German

labor law

was extremely

discouraging of the use of atypical, temporary’ or part-time, employment. (Vitols 2004)

One of the key

areas of social partnership authority and influence in the postwar

German policymaking system has been
traditional

forms of employment

in

in

employment and labor market

policy.

The

postwar Germany were based on a model of

dependent, full-time, and unlimited employment between a worker and firm. These were
enshrined

in sector-level collective

working conditions

that

agreements on wages, working hours, benefits, and

were negotiated between sector-level unions and employers’

associations. (Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991

)

By

the 1990s, these also included

more

decentralized agreements between firm and plant-level employees’ works councils and

firm/plant

relations,

management. Temporary employment, which lacks
is

limited in tenure, and

atypical of the

German

may

direct firm-worker

often be at less than fulltime has been incredibly

labor market for most of the postwar era. (Vitols 2004; Kitschelt

and Streeck 2004)
Additionally, the social partners had been

endowed with

the primary roles in job

placement, vocation training and worker retraining through the Federal Employment
Office or Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit (BA). The

BA

administered training and job

placement funded through a combination of federal revenues and, primarily, through
contributions from the social partners.

jointly

The regional and

local offices

were operated

by both labor unions and employers' associations and were amongst the most

notable quasi-govemmental roles of the social partnership in postwar Germany. (Vail

2003; Streeck and Hassel 2004) Vocational training was also an area of competency of
the social partners interaction with the education system primarily at the
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Lander and

local

levels.

(Casey and Gold 2000) This system was an extension of the ideal of semi-

sovereignty as

it

required

state intervention

little

social partners to address labor

Changes

in the

and

relied

upon active and engaged

market and training demands. (Vail 2003; Busch 2005)

German economy seemed

temporary or atypical employment.

It

to suggest a greater

demand

for

has been argued that the economic, social, and

technological changes that developed in the transition from an industrial to post-industrial

have necessitated a growing demand by employers and employees for temporary work.

Temporary employment has been strongly linked
economic production and
changes

more
and

activity precisely

in the local, regional,

to

modem

and flexible models of

because they can quickly adapt

to

and

reflect

and global economic cycles. Finns and sectors can respond

effectively to changes in their production and supply chains, increasing efficiency

profits

by marginalizing the need

to

be overstaffed during periods of cyclical decline

or understaffed during periods of growth and expansion. (Vitols 2004) This has also

increased pressure for the decentralization of collective bargaining and other labor-capital

relations to the firm level as well

and will be discussed

in further detail later in this

chapter.

Temporary work could
fronts. First,

it

a

number of

provides them with flexibility so as to increase or decrease

manpower

depending upon cyclical turns

offer several advantages to employers

in

demand

on

as well as to cover short-term leaves by full-

time employees for vacation, family leave, medical leave, or other employment

employees from temporary

interruptions. Second, the costs of hiring

and

employment

and permanent employment. These include not

are far less than in full-time

firing

only wages, but also employer contributions to pension, healthcare, and other social
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temporary employment provides a model of incremental integration of

benefits. Finally,

new workers

into existing industries

and services.

New

employees, possessing higher

uncertainty in terms of adaptation, compatibility, and productivity, can be brought into

full-time

employment

in stages,

mitigating

some of the

costs and risks to the employer.

(Vitols 2004)

Temporary employment may

Germany's

especially given

them with

lasting structural

potentially flexible

cyclical patterns

also have significant benefits for workers as well,

unemployment problems.

employment opportunities

that

may

It

also provides

address seasonal or

of unemployment or under-employment by workers

in service,

agricultural, industrial or other industries that follow regularized patterns or seasons

employment and unemployment. Temporary work may
permanent employment with a

firm.

It is

also a gateway to full-time and

argued that temporary work often provides

unskilled and under-educated workers opportunities to increase their

experience that

work with

the

is

likely to

improve

same or other firms

of work history for workers
ranks.

Over

unemployed

60%

their

work

history and

chances of obtaining full-time and permanent

in the future. In other

who might

of

words,

it

helps create a portfolio

otherwise be excluded from the employment

of all temporary work was taken by those currently unemployed,

for in excess

of a year, or those

who had

never worked. Over

30% of

temporary workers are hired as fulltime and permanent employees following the
completion of their temporary contract. (Vitols 2004) Given the above average rates of
structural

unemployment

in

Germany

near the top of the agenda for

since the

German reform

1

980s, labor market reform

efforts.
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was

clearly

The

lack of a strong temporary labor market in

barrier to reinvigorating the

was

identified

by many as

German economy and reducing unemployment,

since the 1990s. (Vail 2003; Vitols 2004)

a

major

especially

The defense of permanent employment and

compression into national and industry-wide coordination of wage bargaining meant

wages usually remained high and suppressed employment across
the

economy. (Kitschelt and Streeck 2004) Yet very

accomplished from the

late

government pressures. The

little

its

that

virtually every sector

policy change

of

was

1980s through early 2000s despite increasing public and
social partners

seemed unwilling and unable

to reach

consensus on painful, but necessary, labor market and vocational training reforms. (Vail

2003) By 2003, temporary employment

still

comprised only about 1.2% of German

workers. (Vitols 2004) Vocational training institutions were also failing to create
sufficient training places leaving an extraordinary

number of young German workers

without opportunities to gain necessary vocational experience and apprenticeship. (Vail

2003)

The reasons

for lack of reform

were numerous, but

partners and their lack of willingness to

training policies. This

domestic

political

employers

that

was

fell

generally upon the social

compromise on labor market and vocational

especially true for unions

and economic environment

to

who were

being pressured by the

make concessions

to industry

and

would help lead Germany out of its economic malaise (Berndt 2000) But

employers and industries were also divided and unwilling

to increase contributions to

vocational training programs and to allow greater variation from existing labor- firm

relationships. (Vail 2003; Streeck

and Hassel 2004) Regulation of temporary work, job

placement, and vocational training had

all

fallen squarely
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under the social partnership's

aegis for the bulk of the postwar era, and in the midst of economic decline

and innovation were

in highest

demand, the

when reform

social partners failed to act. (Vail 2003;

Vitols 2000)

German

labor

was generally opposed

reasons. First, unions felt that temporary

to

temporary work for a number of obvious

work would undermine

fulltime and

permanent

employment. Temporary employment would place downward pressures on wages,
and working conditions while placing increasing pressures on working hours.

benefits,

Further temporary employment undermined one of the most fundamental policy ideals of
labor and

German

social

democracy, co-determination, resting upon the permanent and

lasting intra-firm relationship

between employers and employees. (Markovits 1986;

Thelen 1991; Vitols 2004; Bosch 2004) The mobility and limited allegiance of temporary

workers to unions, firms, and codetermination would be incompatible with the goals and
ideals

of the postwar German labor movement. Over

contracts were for less than three

56%

of temporary employment

months and temporary workers would

diminish union density since less than

5% of such

also potentially

workers are unionized. (Vitols 2004)

But even industry had been traditionally opposed to temporary employment for

most of the postwar period. Temporary workers have
training,

and tended

to

to increased instances

have longer commutes

to

less experience, less education, less

work than permanent employees leading

of tardiness and more work-related accidents than full-time and

permanent workers.
In addition,

by the nature of their temporality and lack of formal

through co-determination,

many

ties to the

firm

firms felts that temporary workers were less inclined to

adhere to standards of quality, workplace behavior, and commitment to efficiency.
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Hence, for

many

firms and sectors, the perceived overall costs of increased temporary

employment outweighed

the estimated

wage and

flexibility benefits.

(Frege 1999; Vitols

2004)

Under German

labor law, the disinclination towards temporary

well codified and institutionalized. Temporary agency

entirely until the

end of the 1960s due

to the

employment was

employment was prohibited

monopolization of private employment

exchanges under the Federal Employment Office or Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit (BA). This

went unchallenged

until 1967.

A

suit

by a Swiss-based temporary agency was

won

through a ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court and effectively legalized temporary

work. The social partners and the major parties opposed this change and cooperated
enacting the Act on Temporary

2004) This act was quite

agency practices.

and lessened the
the existing

It

Employment Businesses

restrictive

October of 1972. (Vitols

on temporary work and temporary employment

severely limited the ability to

ability

in

in

make

fixed-term or part-time contracts

of employers to dismiss individual workers. This strengthened

hegemony of permanent,

and effectively ended growth

in

full-time

employment

in the

German

labor market

temporary employment for the next twenty years.

(Markovits 1986; Kitschelt and Streeck 2004)

The law was reinforced
Helmut Schmidt. The

in

1982 under the

social partners

by the Schmidt government,

in

SPD-FDP

coalition

government of

had been an integral part of the process, shepherded

enacting the

Work Promotion Law

that established

additional limitations upon the duration and scope of temporary work, including banning

it

from the construction industry altogether. (Vitols 2004) After the departure of Schmidt

and election of Helmut Kohl

later in 1982, the
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new

conservative government did set forth

to

moderately liberalize temporary employment. Under Kohl, restrictions on temporary

employment were incrementally modified by

acts in 1985, 1994,

and 1997. These

included extending periods of postings, loosened the regulations of the synchronization of

work

contracts,

and exempting smaller business from some of the more onerous

restrictions. (Streeck

and Hassel 2004; Vitols 2004; Vail 2003) Many of these changes

reflected similar policy reforms enacted in the Netherlands in the 1980s to address

increased

demands

for flexibility

and

to boost

employment. The Netherlands had

previous encompassed a system that was primarily one of permanent and long-term

employment much

like that in

agreement and other changes
flexibility

Germany. The Dutch reforms including

in the

the the

Wassenaar

1980s liberalized the labor markets and increased

and were often cited as sources of similar

of Dutch-style reform seemed potentially useful

if

efforts in

Germany. The

utilization

also significant limited. (Delsen and de

Jong 1998; Timmins 2000)
Nonetheless, rules limiting temporary employment were only moderately
loosened, and the general legal and economic structure tended to continue to dissuade

employers from

utilizing

temporary employment despite increasing market and cyclical

pressures to do so. (Vitols 2004;

Cox 2001 Nonetheless
)

there

were small and steady

increases in temporary labor utilization from the late 1980s into the 1990s under the

auspices of the Kohl government reforms. (Bemdt 2000; Vitols 2004)
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However, by

the late 1990s

and under the modified conditions enacted by Kohl,

on

the 1972 law remained the primary legal basis

employment
its

in the

efforts to retard

German economy. The

growth of temporary

restricting the

social partnership

was frequently

criticized for

temporary labor market reforms that could decrease unemployment

and increase German firms’ competitiveness. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Vail 2003)

Upon
German

entering office. Chancellor Gerhard Schroder instituted his promised, and

labor supported, tripartite Alliance for Jobs, Training, and Competitiveness in

1998. While temporary

work had not been on

the initial agenda of the alliance,

it

was

quickly added with strong government support. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Vitols 2004;

Timmins 2000) Over

the next three years, the Alliance for Jobs

became

the central locus

of state-intermediated negotiation on labor market reforms between labor, represented by
the

DGB, and

employers' associations represented by the

BD1 and BDA,

as well as by

the specific sector associations that represented temporary agencies, the Federal

Association of Temporary
Dienstleistungen

Employment Agencies

(BZA) and

or

Bundesverband Zeitarbeit Personal-

the Interessengemeinschaft Deutsche/-

Zeitarbeitsunternehmen (IGZ). (Vitols 2004; Vail 2003)

The
one

that

story of labor market reform in the Alliance for Jobs

ends

in

general failure.

The Alliance

from 1998

for Jobs hardly fulfilled

to

2001

is

any of its intended

expectations to achieve meaningful negotiation, bargaining, and compromise over

important economic policymaking. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Vitols 2004) Both the

DGB

and employers' associations eventually stonewalled the proposed agreements

within the Alliance over labor market reform.

The

DGB

rejected

it

on the basis of

changes to the process of collective bargaining while employers were divided between
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large

and small-medium sized firms and could not reach a unified compromise position.

(Vitols 2004)

The

problems and

failures of the social partnership in the

failure

of the Alliance for Jobs has become emblematic of the

German policymaking and

governance system. (Vitols 2004; Streeck and Hassel 2004; Vail 2003) The
peak associations
inability

to

comprehensively unify and represent

and unwillingness of the

social partners to reach

their

inability

membership and

of

the

compromise and agreement on

urgent issues of economic reform have increased pressure to reduce or replace the neo-

corporatist

frameworks

The response by

in the

Gentian system. (Vail 2003; Vitols 2004)

of the German policymaking process

governments

government also

the Schroder

in the 1980s.

that

is

indicative of the transformation

began under the Schmidt and Kohl

The government, given

its

inability to utilize the Alliance for

Jobs as an effective policymaking tool to find consensus amongst the social partners, has

begun

to

assume the

responsibilities of

economic and

reserved for the social partners. (Vail 2003)

social

The willingness

governance
to depart

that

once were

from the dominant

postwar German model of semi-sovereignty, incremental and consensual reform, and
social partnership increased under the

dramatically

commonplace under

Kohl government but has become more

the subsequent Schroder and

Merkel governments.

(Vail 2003; Streeck and Hassel 2004)

With the

failure

Schroder decided

Law

of the Alliance to produce compromise and actionable policy,

to act unilaterally

and passed a reform

act,

known

as the

Job-AQTIV

(Job-Activation, Qualification, Training, Investment, and Placement), that

liberalized temporary

employment

wages and working conditions

for

in

terms of contact durations and guaranteed equitable

temporary workers
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in positions lasting

over twelve

months.

In

many ways,

the Schroder legislation addressed labor

simultaneously, though both sides eventually criticized

it.

and employers’ demands

(Vitols 2004; Vail 2003)

Nonetheless, the important consequence of the act was that the social partners, by failing

compromise and come

to

agreement on labor market reforms were being excluded from

the policymaking process on an issue central to their historical core of postwar

economic

governance. (Vail 2003)

Following the Job-AQTIV

Law

in

2002, there was further political impetus to

enact greater reform in the labor markets due to upcoming elections as well as recent

discoveries of job reporting fraud inside the Federal

Employment

Office, the

BA. (Vail

2003; Streeck and Hassel 2004) The Schroder government, disappointed by the lack of
productivity and consensus in the Alliance for Jobs, gave up on the tripartite institution

and significantly bypassed the social partners by assigning the tasks of labor market
liberalization policy to an independent expert

commission, the Commission on

Service Delivery on the Labor Market which became

it

was

known

as the Hartz

directed by Volkswagen’s Personnel Director, Peter Hartz.

The

a small voice in the commission with only three total seats including

Modem

Commission

social partners

as

had

two union

representatives and only one from the business associations. (Streeck and Hassel 2004;

Vail 2003)

The Hartz Commission

limitations on temporary

work

set

in the

about a major overhaul of the regulations and

German economy. The major

policy ideas were the

creation of the concept of flexicurity, or a combination of flexibility in labor contracts for

employers with greater employee security
conditions.

(Lehmbruch 2003) The plan

workers

more

to

easily gain entry into

in

terms of wages, benefits, and working

also included

numerous incentives

permanent employment through

423

a

for

temporary

system of

.

subsidy to the placement agencies. (Vitols 2004; Streeck and Hassel 2004) These were
further

enhanced by developments

and an overarching

in the labor

effort within the

EU

markets of the Netherlands, Scandinavia,

under the Lisbon agenda

to

improve

competitiveness and reduce unemployment.

The

results

of the Hartz Commission were a complete end

Temporary Employment Business and hence strongly
marketplace. But

it

also provided for collective

and higher levels of protection

more moderate

affiliated

for

unions

to the

1972 Act on

liberalized the temporary labor

wage bargaining

for

temporary workers

such workers. Employers' associations, the

initially

DBG, and

supported the proposed law. Small and mid-

sized businesses of the Mittelstand were less enthusiastic over the increases security

through wages and benefits required despite the overall liberalization of temporary

employment.
firms

felt

In addition, the

violated the “sacrosanct principle of Tarifautonomic” (Vail 2003)

radical unions, such as

felt

law required national collective bargaining that the smaller

IG Metall, were also

gave away too much

to the

by the proposal

that they

employers and would generally place too much downward

pressure on wages and benefits in the

neared, the split within labor

less than satisfied

The more

German workforce. As

became more vocal

as

the parliamentary vote

some unions organized

protests in

opposition to the law. Schroder eventually gained the grudging support from the

and a highly divided

SPD

for the law's approval (Vitols 2004; Streeck

For the social partnership however, the
the

First

and Hassel 2004)

Law on Modem Labor

Labor Market of 2004 had important and perhaps

DGB

lasting implications.

had been debated, created, and passed by bypassing the social partnership,

Services on

While the law
its

implementation rested squarely on the social partners. The Schroder government made
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clear to the unions and employers that the law

wage agreements
traditional

for

would

fail if

temporary workers. Intriguingly, and

in

many ways

reflecting the

postwar social partnership, the law forced the social partners, despite

absence from the policymaking process,

directly. (Vitols

2004)

In a sense, the

lest the state

intervene and regulate

it

Schroder government was forcing the unions and

employers' associations to reestablish social partnership

employment on

their

and

to accept responsibility for regulating

maintaining the temporary employment industry

in the area

of temporary

the threat of future exclusion. (Vail 2003)

The gambit has
interest in

they did not reach collective

actually

somewhat worked. Unions

that

had

little

or no past

temporary workers quickly began organizing within the temporary worker

industry. In an ironic twist, the Hartz reforms, enacted through a marginalization of the

social partners

and representing

in the

German policymaking

era, a

common

a significant overall

diminishment of social partnership

process, actually created, for the

national vehicle for collective bargaining.

temporary work agencies' associations, the 1GZ and

first

time in the postwar

The DGB, BDA, and

BVA, were

the

able to reach accords in

2004. (Vitols 2004) The law and the Hartz Commission were lauded as successes by the

SPD-Green government and temporary employment has been increasing
economy. There has been an upturn

many

in

in the past.

German

temporary employment of unskilled workers

firms and industries, quite dramatic given

employment

in the

Germany's reticence towards

German unemployment has

three years suggesting a possible correlation as well.
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also

begun

in

atypical

to decline in the last

However,
useful

in

terms of the social partnership, the story of labor market reform

example of the currently poor

state

of neo-corporatism

in the

is

a

German

policymaking process. Clearly, despite the attempted reinvigoration of social partnership
through the Alliance for Jobs by the Schroder government, the failure to achieve

meaningful bargaining and compromise suggests a declining efficacy and future viability

of social partnership

in the

continue to maintain roles

German policymaking
in the

process. While the social partners

expert commissions, parliamentary committee work, and

other policymaking avenues, the heyday of strong and national policy concertation and

consensus has been decimated by the lack on consensus and unwillingness to pursue
innovative and tough reforms.

still

relies

upon

As

the results of the Hartz law suggests, the

the social partners to perform

some of their

German

state

traditional roles in collective

bargaining and quasi-regulatory activities. This was actually enhanced by the law as

it

established a unified national bargaining process between peak associations in the area of

temporary employment. (Vitols 2004) However, from the policymaking perspective, the
labor market reforms suggest a significant

having been replaced by a more active,
This was then replicated

in areas

weakened and marginalized

direct,

and aggressive

role

social partnership

of the government.

of vocational training and pension reform by the

Schroder government. (Vail 2003; Busch 2005)

Changes

in the Political Party

System

The increasing importance of and share of votes by
the

FDP, Greens, PDS, and Links may

German democracy

but

it

indicate a

good

the smaller parties including

level

of vitality and health for

also challenges institutions of the social partnership
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(Hancock

1989; Smith 2003)

The increasing share of the

number of interrelated and

electorate by small parties rests on a

reinforcing trends of the past

two decades. The greater

influence of post-material identities and politics has eroded the traditional left-right

schism represented by the

SPD and CDU/CSU. The

immigration, nationalism, European integration,

social

movements has challenged

the

However,

new

absorbing

is

German

and

CDU/CSU

that has

,

the

will not necessarily

Nonetheless,

rights,

and other new

left-right pattern prevalent in

pattern of social, political,

and economic

2004; Inglehart 1977; Dalton 2003)

have not been entirely unsuccessful

at

issues into their manifestos. Environmentalism

been widely adopted by not only the Greens but also by the

SPD, Links CDU/CSU, and even FDP

movements and

new

polity. (Kitschelt

movements and new

social

example

a notable

SPD

the

women's and gay

hegemony of the

Unification with the East has also created a

division within the

greater importance of issues of

parties.

Hence, the mere existence of new social

development of a more post-industrial and post-material electorate

weaken

German

the

parties

dominance of the major two

and

politics has

become

two decades with much greater voter mobility and

a

far

parties into the future.

more competitive

more

pluralistic

in the past

system of interest

alignment. (Conradt 2001; Dalton 2003; Kitschelt 2004; Giaessner 2005)
This has numerous implications for the social partners and their traditional
allegiances to the major parties. Clearly

support for the three parties of the

its

left,

German

the

SPD, Greens, and

predecessor the PDS, have attracted support

Germany

as well as

somewhat

more

labor has been

among union

more divided between

Links.

The Links

The Greens

are

union vote. Nonetheless they have been able
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and

labor and workers in eastern

radicalized workers and leftists in the West.

less successful at getting the

party,

to

gamer support from some
and major western

cities.

the confederation of the

The

DGB

labor leaders and leftists in the primarily urban areas of Berlin

(Dalton 2004; Conradt 2001

DGB

still

)

However, the major unions and

tend to be allied strongly with the SPD.

and sectoral unions remain well entrenched

SPD

in the

party

organization and parliamentary caucus and continue to provide both electoral and
material support to the

2001

)

In 1998 the

SPD and

DGB

its

campaigns. (Markovits 1986; Hancock 1989; Conradt

spent over $6 million to help the

while those amounts have continued to increase

2003)

In recent

2002,

results.

Germany under Schroder was “on

SPD's parliamentary delegation
while former union officials

(

in recent elections.

Schroder campaign
(Conradt 2001; Smith

campaigns, unions strongly supported the Social Democrats, helping

Schroder survive the 2002 electoral
in

SPD and

sit

to the

in

influential force in the

political climate.

SPD due

to the

DGB

important

that

leader Michael

Sommer

the right path”. Further, nearly

lower house

many

The Economist 2002) This has meant

As

is

75%

affiliated with the labor

SPD

suggested

of the

movement

cabinet and sub-cabinet seats.

organized labor

may have become

changed and more competitive

a far

electoral

more

and

That has made the party more susceptible to the demands of German

labor than in the past and perhaps driven elements the party towards less consensual and

moderate positions on economic and social policy. This was certainly demonstrated by
the latter campaigns of the Schroder government. (Conradt 2001, 2004)

However, while Schroder and the

SPD were

able to maintain and even increase

the support of the unions and labor confederation in recent elections, whether the

membership of the union follows

members ignoring

their trade

is

another matter. There

is

increasing evidence of union

union associations' recommendations and endorsements of
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)

the

SPD and

FDP

Social Democratic candidates for those in the Links,

C'DU/CSU, and even

Decreasing party identification and increasing voter mobility has been a

parties.

strong characteristic of the past twenty years and organized labor has been losing

ability to deliver all

its

votes to the

SPD

as

it

once

did. (Padgett. Paterson,

its

and Smith

2003; Conradt 2001; Dalton 2003)

Amongst business
despite

some

interests, the

staunch support for the

defection of employers and firms to the

FDP who

expense of the

CDU/CSU

remains high

have been significantly

CDU/CSU

few

increasing their share of the vote

at the

elections. (Smith 2003; Kitschelt

2004) Nonetheless, the major employers’ and business

organizations are

strongly tied to the

still

remains dominantly tied
Front. In

many ways,

CDU/CSU

to the conservatives

agriculture remains the

maintenance of strong

most stable of the

electorate has allowed the

demands of the Green

Front.

SPD

and

social partners

discussed

dissent,

more

Green
and

their

(Conradt 2001

power of the

The general smallness of agriculture

German economy and

both the

in the

social partners

side of the equation has been the declining

social partners to influence the parties.

for the population

very high levels. Agriculture also

through their connections

ties to the political parties.

The more important

at

in the past

CDU/CSU

to ignore the

However, both labor and employers remain

in the

more extreme
large

segments

and electorate and cannot be summarily ignored or marginalized. Yet,

CDU/CSU

due

have become more autonomous of the labor and industrial

to their declining organizational

later in this chapter.

and

political capacities that are

(Streeck and Hassel 2004)

The

greater decentralization,

and decline of the peak associations has allowed the major parties the

ability to

regularly ignore or marginalize the social partners in the electoral and policymaking
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processes. Chancellors Kohl, Schroder, and Merkel have subsequently relied upon the

organized social partners

in

both policymaking and electoral terms than those

in past eras.

(Streeck and Hassel 2004; Vail 2003)

Despite these challenges for the social partners and their connections to the major
parties, increasingly

Germany

effect in

parties

competitive elections and a multi-party system will likely have less

were always weaker

dominant Austrian

As

than Austria.

interests

grand coalition and proporz

in the

indicated earlier, the linkages between interests and

German model

and parties were

virtually inseparable during long periods

Germany

more

,

in

association-political party relationship.

had

less

than in the Austrian. While the

there has also been a

Hence moderate changes

overarching consequences for the

German

institutions

of

fluidic interest

in the party

system have

and structures of social

partnership than in Austria. Nonetheless, changes in the party system and the weakening

of the links between parties and

interests

have certainly contributed

to the

growing

erosion to the ideals and practices of social partnership.

The emergence of grand
perceived as an opportunity

move

partnership has followed a far

first

coalition

to

government following the 2005 elections while

improve consensus building and resurrect

more party-dominated

social

pattern of development. Unlike the

period of grand coalition from 1966 to 1969, the current period has seen no call for a

re-visitation

coalition

of Concerted Action or other similar

government has been able

institution.

The CDU/CSU-SPD

to use straightforward bipartisan negotiation

and

bargaining to enact policy without significant need of or consent from the social partners.

The

parties,

while

still

close to and having an advisory and representative relationship

with the social partners and

still

often seeking their consent, operate under the premise
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that consent is

no longer a requirement of policymaking as

it

once was. (Katzenstein

1987; Vail 2003) However, the declining share of voters between the

CDU/CSU, which once

garnered nearly

90%

of the electorate,

SPD

and

illustrates that the

continuing improvement of the smaller parties has hurt the two large parties. (Conradt

2001; The Economist 2006; Dalton 2003) The ability of the
their vote share

alignments of

Germany,

would

interests.

this

likely require a

SPD

and

CDU/CSU

to regain

major realignment or renewal of previous

Given the weakening

status of the

major

seems unlikely though certainly not implausible

interest associations in

in the near future.

Challenges to the Organization of German Interests

One of the major challenges
weakness of the peak associations
reflect the

most important and

Germany never possessed
the

and

the

Green Front, DGB, and
affiliated

absolute

its

to the social partnership has

been the increasing

to represent their respective interests as well as to

critical

underlying interests of German society. While

compulsory chambers system found
affiliated unions,

in the

Austria model,

and the BDI, along with the

BDA, DIHT,

employers’ and business associations, had maintained high levels of

members and membership

density over their respective constituencies of

agriculture, labor, and employers' during the postwar era. (Braunthal 1965; Thelen 1991;

Markovits 1986; Conradt 2001; Streeck and Hassel 2004)
But by the

late 1980s,

both industry and labor associations were beginning to lose

their nearly monopolistic positions.

By

the early 2000s,

it

was

clear that a rising

of German industries, firms, and workers were operating under the
neo-corporatism

in

traditional

number

form of

only a very limited manner eschewing the formal peak associations
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more

frequently.

diminishment
the

in

Green Front.

(Bemdt 2000) The only peak association

that has seen

member

member numbers,

In

density, despite a drop in overall

that both

that

even

been

German policymaking

process. (Conradt

Yet, despite the declines in the other major peak associations,

)

a

has been

policymaking terms, agriculture remains strongly unified, well

entrenched, and strongly centralized in the

2001

little

it

should be noted

union and employers' association density remains high by relative standards and
in

union membership, where the decline has been more dramatic, there have

number of counter-trends

that suggest

some continuing union

vitality

and even an

increasing role in representing worker interests and quasi-regulatory roles.

Some

suggest that, paradoxically, the decreasing capacity of unions and

employers’ associations to
deals

at

attract

members may only be overcome by making

the national level through concerted action.

Hence programs

like the Alliance for

Jobs were important efforts to salvage and reinvigorate social partnership

policymaking
partnership

level.

(Wessels 2000) Others suggest

lies in its traditional

that the only

successful

at the

hope for the

national

social

core sectors of industrial and manufacturing

employment. The decline of neo-corporatism

in these traditional sectors are the

ideological and functional leaders of social partnership in other sectors and if these are

lost

no amount of reinvention or reinvigoration can save

temporary labor market might support

this

it.

suggestion since

(Bemdt 2000) The case of the
it

was only through

pressure on the social partners at the national level that the reform package

implemented The

result

was

a greater role

state-led

was

and increased membership opportunities for

both labor and employers' and could be construed as a somewhat successful, though

limited,

example of reinvigoration of the German
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social partnership. (Vitols

2004)

I

However, other scholars suggest
collective bargaining

that the role

between labor and industry

forms of global and European economic activity
adaptability to changing markets.

of the social partnership

is itself

in

a barrier to coping with the

that require greater flexibility

new

and

(Gobeyn 1993) There has been greater pressure on both

labor and business to deviate from or completely bypass the existing national and sectoral

institutions

of collective bargaining and neo-corporatist social partnership

of a

in lieu

system of wage bargaining, codetermination, and

more decentralized and

flexible

policymaking. There

also significant evidence that the organizational capacities of

is

unions and business associations are showing signs of “accelerated decay”. (Kitschelt and
Streeck 2004) This has tremendous implications for the future vitality of the peak
associations and of the social partnership’s ability to

fulfill its

expected roles

in collective

bargaining and the policymaking process.

Unions: Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained?

Even

as early as 1982, the divisions within

weakness began
began

to

become more

to institute a series

embarked upon
(Thelen 1991

)

a

visible. In

for reduction

This campaign

split the

fiscal

of work hours and

DGB,

In the short

its

growing

new Kohl government

and industrial policy, IG Meta/I
full

employment

policies.

as five unions under the leadership of the

chemical workers' union sought early retirement benefits

Metal demands.

labor and

1982 and 1983, as the

of cautious reforms in

campaign

German

in

contradiction of specific

term. Kohl used this division to

weaken

labor

demands from

both and to push through a number of liberalizing reforms. In the long term, this

an

illustration

of the growing divisions within

German
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labor and the

DGB

IG

becme

affiliate

unions

that continue to present. Eventually,

IG Metall prevailed

1984 national

after the

strike

and won a gradual introduction of the 35-hour workweek. Yet the victory may have been
quite limited given

its

concessions on working time flexibility and work-effort

calculations. (Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991; Streeck and Hassel 2004)

Since the 1990s,

German unions have had

to face dramatic

economic challenges

from both reunification and globalization. De-industrialization and deunionization, while
affecting other advanced economies,

was avoided by Germany

1980s. (Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991) Yet

as

for

was only delayed,

it

most of early the

emerged

as these trends

major factors by the 1990s. This weakened the traditional core of occupations and

constituencies of labor that had been firmly rooted in industrial and manufacturing

sectors of the postwar

German economy. The

proportion of unionized workers had

remained approximately stable from the early 1960s through 1980s, hovering near 35-

38%. (Markovits 1986) Reunification had
encompassing a

large

briefly

mass of workers from

the Federal Republic, yet these

propped up union membership by

the former East

Germany

numbers declined immediately

were dissolved and unemployment skyrocketed. By the

as

into the unions

many

late 1990s,

of

Eastern firms

union membership

had dropped to close to 30%. (Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003; Bosch 2004)

By 2000,

the

German

per month as industrial

membership

in a unified

were stronger

were losing between 30,000-40,0000 members

employment shrunk and older workers

Germany was equal

losing almost four million

losses

trade unions

members

to that

in a single

in the east, losses in the

also began to decline dramatically, as

retired.

By 2000 union

of only West Germany

in

1

990,

decade. (Streeck and Hassel 2004) While

west were mounting as well. Union density

membership

434

in

IG Metall alone dropped from

nearly

than

66%

43%

of all workers

by the

in the electrical

Less than

late 1990s.

and metalworking sectors

51%

of Eastern and

covered by industry-level agreements by 1998,

68%

1960s to less

in the

of Western workers were

down from 56% and 72%,

respectively, in

1995. (Wessels 2000; Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003) Overall union density

private sector

fell

from 27.3%

in

in the

1980 (for West Germany) to only 17.3% by 2000.

(Streeck and Hassel 2004)

Worker

dissatisfaction with union administration

and union membership grew

sharply due to higher levels of unemployment, longer periods of layoff, and the
increasing perception of a disconnection between the national and local levels.

are far

more

likely to leave the union

once unemployed and

fail to

Members

return even after

regaining employment. (Bemdt 2000) Younger workers are also far less likely to join the

unions than

in the past

due

to divergent career

and social expectations. (Streeck and

Hassel 2004)

Union employment
economy. While

the

DGB

is

also changing based on the structure of the

German

had once been dominated by industrial unions such as IG

Metall, the increase in the white-collar union

membership

as a share of the

whole has

provided some important internal challenges to the German labor movement. (Bemdt

2000) The largest services trade union, Verdi (also known
reflect the

new

technological focus of the union)

the rankings of the largest

German

is

officially as Ver.di in trying to

beginning to challenge IG Metall

union. Nonetheless, even white-collar union density

has shrunk in the past fifteen years by over 13%. (Streeck and Hassel 2004)

of temporary workers, many

in

in the service industry, also suggests a

The inclusion

fundamental

challenge to the existing internal organization and power relationship inside the
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DGB

)

However, even under the conditions of the 2004 law regulating temporary employment,
the expansion

of other non-traditional, part-time, and informal employment methods are

eroding the collective coverage and authority of unions. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Bosch

2004)

Many

smaller unions have also begun to merge with each other and larger unions

to increase their leverage

down from

unions

and

political

power. The

DGB now only comprises 8 member

16 in 1990 and 17 in the 1960s. (The Economist 2006; Katzenstein

1987; Thelen 1991; Markovits 1986) In 1996, IG Metall absorbed the

textile

workers' and

wood and

much

smaller

furniture workers’ unions. In 1995, the chemical workers'

union absorbed the leather workers' union and then merged with the mining union

in

1997 to create the IG BCE. (Heinisch 2000) These mergers were completed so as

to

combat membership

losses

and pool

their

remaining collective assets. While temporarily

being able to address declining membership and other institutional losses, the overall

merger

activity indicates a

weakening overall picture

for industrial

and blue-collar

unionization in Germany. (Conradt 2001

More

problematic, the unions have begun to

more

regularly contest one another

over disputed economic sectors and employment that does not neatly

union organizations. IG Metall has been involved

BCE

in several

fit

into the existing

disputes with Verdi and IG

over membership jurisdictions for employees in a number of fields that defy simple

categorization. This has been

where new

activities

jurisdictional claims

most remarkable

in the

information technology sectors

and outsourcing of existing IT services has

led to overlapping

by the major unions. (Bosch 2004) This has increased

amongst the remaining unions, further weakening

436

their collective

conflict

power. (Heinisch 2000)

But even white-collar unions are not exempt from such changes. The
sector “mega-union” Ver.di or Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft

is itself

new

service

the 2001

amalgamation of five public sector service unions, including public service and transport

(OTV), commercial, banking, and insurance workers (HBV),
white-collar workers

in the private sector after privatization in the 1990s.

(Berndt 2000; The Economist 2001; Bosch 2004)
to the

unions, almost

all

(DPG),

(DAG), and media and telecom workers (IG Medien) who were

once public employees but are now

competitor

postal workers

DGB

came under

DAG,

the longstanding white-collar

Beyond mergers of

the Verdi umbrella in 2001

of the unions have

all

undergone important

internal reorganizations to

streamline administration, reduce overhead costs, and expand membership opportunities.

(Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003; Heimsch 2000) While the results of the mergers,
reorganizations, and changing internal structures of German labor have been

overall evidence suggests

major dilemmas

for union

power and

mixed

the

vitality.

There have also been a number of internal scandals amongst the largest labor
organizations, especially

to resign

due

IG

to disclosures

Daimler-Benz

in the early

Metall,

whose former

leader, Franz Steinkiihler,

of insider trading while

1990s.

sitting

on the supervisory board of

Bad investments and poor management of union funds

and firms have also been endemic over the past decade. (Conradt 2001

The labor movement has been under increasing
its

criticism

from the

willingness to concede to the government and industry on a

wing

intellectuals allege that the

was forced

DGB

and

its

occasion

;

Heinisch 2000)

left in

recent years for

number of issues.

allies in the

SPD

Left-

are too

conservative, especially in areas of education, civil rights, foreign policy, and criminal

code.
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Membership of DGB

affiliated unions,

This table shows the membership figures of DGB's affiliated unions

and

women

2004—2005

2005, distinguishing between
and comparing membership changes with 2004 data.

Women

Total

Trade union

in

Women

Men

members

as

% of

men

Change

Change

20042005

20032004

(%)

<%)

total

German Metalworkers’ Union
(Industriegewerkschaft Metall, IG

2,376,225

1,943,660 432,565

18.2

-2.0

-4.0

2,359,392

1.943,660 432,565

49.6

-4.3

-5.7

748,849

606,057

142,795

19.0

-2.8

-3.8

391,546

330,405

61,141

15.6

-7.8

-7.9

259,955

205,699

54,256

-3.8

-4.6

251,586

78,885

172,721

68.6

-1.2

-2.4

216,157

130,345

85,812

39.6

-4.1

-4.7

174,928

138,082

36,634

20.9

-3.3

-1.8

6,778,638 4,620,365 2,158,064 31.8

-3.3

-4.8

Metall)

United Services Union (Vereinte
Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft, ver.di)

Mining, Chemicals and Energy
Industrial

Union

(Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau,

Chemie, Energie, IGBCE)

Union

for Building, Forestry,

Agriculture and the Environment (IG

Bauen-Agrar-Umwelt, IG

BAU)

TRANSNET (TRANSNET GdED)
(railworkers)

German Union of Education
(Gewerkschaft Erziehung und

GEW)

Wissenschaft.

Trade Union of Food, Beverages,
Tobacco, Hotel and Catering and
Allied

Workers (Gewerkschaft

Nahrung-Genuss-Gaststatten,

German

NGG)

Police Union (Gewerkschaft

der Polizei,

GdP)

Total Confederation of

German Trade

Unions (DGB)

(Beese 2006)

Table

They

Union Membership

In

Germany

are also criticized for being too allegiant to the status

accommodate business
left

5:

considerably,

interests at the

expense of labor. (Conradt 2001

becoming most notable with

and Links parties that have catered

to

quo and too willing

more

the recent electoral gains

radical

the increasing importance of relatively affluent,
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)

This has

to

split the

by the Greens

and socialist-oriented voters. Adding

w hite-collar

unions within the

DGB

and

labor

movement

Germany

is

generally, despite the mergers and reorganization, organized labor in

becoming

less

organized and more fragmented by ideological, jurisdictional,

and structural disputes.

A

critical

change had been the decentralization of collective bargaining from the

sector level to the firm or plant level. (Casey and

Gold 2000; Kuhlmann 2004; Bosch

2004) Previously, the national unions such as IG Metall had been the primary locus of

power

to negotiate

and bargain sector-based collective wage and benefit packages with

employers. The results of their efforts created a convoy that the other sectoral unions and

employers’ would tend to follow. (Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991; Heinish 2000) Starting
in the 1990s, especially after reunification

in the

metal industry in eastern

been done

at the regional,

Germany

and the collapse of the collective agreements

in 1993,

more bargaining and negotiation has

firm or plant level through works councils.

Streeck and Hassel 2004; Turner 1998; Heinisch 2000;

(Bemdt 2000;

Kuhlmann 2004) Most unions

agreed to “opening and hardship clauses” to provide concessions on wages and working
hours that deviated from sector-wide collective bargaining agreements. Since 1990, the

number of workers under such exceptions went from zero
Economist 2004a) While

initially

hoped

to insulate

to 6.6 million

workers from large-scale layoffs and

to adjust for significant divergences in standards in living

Germany, decentralization has expanded dramatically

between eastern and western

in both eastern

of the economy. Employers and many employees have been pushing
greater

autonomy from national agreements since

by 2004. (The

and western sectors
for,

and getting,

the 1990s as well. (Heinisch 2000;

Streeck and Hassel 2004; Bosch 2004) This has given employers significant leverage in
their relations with

German

labor.
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A

notable example

was

the

Volkswagen “5000 x 5000“ bargaining between 1999

and 2001 The automaker proposed building
.

facility if and

agreements

only

if

which

to

a

new model of minivan

in a

new German

labor costs were reduced below the existing collective bargaining

the firm

was committed. These

labor cost reductions included a

system of pay for fixed output rather than for hours, hence workers could have had to
potentially

work up

40. In addition,

to

48 hours per week for the same base pay they would receive for

no premium would be paid on overtime,

Negotiations were torturous and broke

was signed

in

down on

weekend work.

several occasions.

The

final

agreement

August 2001 and while having some compromise from both sides did

provide that the workers would be earning less than

Germany and would have
work weeks

night, or

to

to

in

other

Volkswagen

meet fixed output and quality standards

enterprises in

that could

extend

42 hours with no additional pay. While some premium would be paid for

overtime and weekend work, none would be paid for night work and

all

would be below

current firm and industry-wide levels. (Bosch 2004)

Another growing sign of labor weakness
workers, mostly from Eastern Europe,

in

is

German

the increased use of seconded foreign

industries. This is best described as a

system of internal outsourcing by which foreign workers are allowed to participate
particular industries usually at lower rates of pay

the

German

in

and benefits. This has been notable

in

construction industry that has traditionally been dominated by high levels of

regulation and strong labor agreements between the social partners. However, since the

1990s, the

German government has concluded agreements with

thirteen central and

eastern European states that establish quotas for and allow seconded workers. While their

base pay should be equal to that of German workers
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in the

same

industry, the agreements

allow

much reduced

entitlements to benefits, sick pay, paid holidays, and other perks.

This has been additionally exacerbated by the growth of

illegal foreign

workers from

Eastern Europe and the Middle East. (Bosch 2004)
Privatization has also increased decentralization of the collective bargaining and

labor-capital relationship since the 1990s. In areas of railways, telecommunications,

utilities,

postal services, transportation, the effects of privatization have been to end the

longstanding relationships between the public sector unions and the state and provincial

governments

that

once provided and monopolized such services. (Bosch 2004) This has

been replaced by relationship with dozens of firms and employers requiring the
expansion of the system of decentralized works councils and increasing the opportunities
for variance

from national industry-wide collective agreements.

The expansion of decentralization of collective bargaining and

the

growing

importance of firm or plant-level agreements was created a new system of workplace-

based Alliances for Employment

at the

firm or regional levels based on works councils.

(Kitschelt and Streeck 2004; Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003) This has reduced the

power of the national unions by permitting greater deviation from national industry-wide
bargaining and standards. The coverage of national sectoral collective agreements had

dropped

to

44%

of all employees by 1999, and continues

firm-level agreements has skyrocketed to

39%

to decline while the

by 2000, up from

27%

number of

in the early 1990s.

(Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003; Streeck and Hassel 2004) The numbers continue to

grow

into the

just the

nnd 2000s. (Bosch 2004) This has weakened

DGB, which had

little

the overall importance of not

authority in the sectoral union-employer level bargaining

process to begin with, but of the eight sectoral unions that traditionally dominated the
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German

collective bargaining system and

were major players

in the institutions

and

processes of social partnership. This has profoundly changed the relationship between
labor and capital, perhaps even ending national corporatism in the area of the collective

bargaining process in

all

but temporary employment.

(Bemdt 2000; Casey and Gold

2000; Heinisch 2000; Kuglmann 2004; Vitols, 2004; Bosch 2004)
This decentralization process has led the unions to undertake numerous efforts to
try

and re-centralize collective bargaining

at

national levels. (Turner 1998)

The 1995 IG

Metall proposal to create the national-level Alliance for Jobs was designed to re-

centralize

some

collective bargaining

power back

into the national

(Bemdt 2000; Timmins 2000; Bosch 2004) Through
unions would have negotiated wage concessions

in

and industry-levels.

the Alliance for Jobs, sectoral

exchange

for

more employment and

an end to planned social insurance cuts by the Kohl government. (Streeck and Hassel

2004; Timmins 2000) While

Kohl government and

this effort failed in

sectoral business

1996 from a lack of support by both the

and industry associations,

reestablished and institutionalized under the Schroder-led

government once

it

took office

has generally failed to do

much

in 1998.

However,

it

would be

SPD-Green

coalition

the Alliance for Jobs, as noted earlier,

in either creating viable

consensus building or

to

reestablish the centrality of the national union organizations. (Vail 2003; Streeck and

Hassel 2004; Bosch 2004)
Additional pressures

come from

the declining importance of the unions in

providing benefits to workers. Under Article

9,

Section 3 of the

German

Constitution,

closed shops are prohibited which means that unions have historically recruited

members by

new

offering access to tangible and concrete benefits packages including
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I

unemployment insurance,
(Conradt 2001)
state as public

By

healthcare, disability and accident insurance, and pensions.

the 1980s,

many of these had been assumed under

the aegis

of the

goods, leaving less for unions to offer prospective members. (Markovits

1986; Conradt 2001)

This trend has increased considerably under the Kohl and Schroder governments
as the state has

begun

and administer, usually through the Lander

to provide, finance,

governments, more social insurance and labor market programs that once

fell

under the

control of the social partners. (Vail 2003) This differs significantly from Austria

closed shops have been the

through the

OGB

or

norm and

where

benefits have remained primarily provided directly

Chamber of Labor. This has pushed German unions

to innovate

work

hours, early

drive for programs such as the thirty-five hour

workweek,

retirement, and greater codetermination rights as a

Additionally, unions have begun seeking

way

more power

flexible

to attract

in

and

retain

and

members.

vocational training and the

administration of social welfare programs to reestablish the salience and efficacy of the

unions to workers. (Conradt 2001) Yet

have been rather unsuccessful

membership since

at

new

recruitment strategies and retention programs

stopping the hemorrhage of workers from union

the 1980s. (Streeck and Hassel 2004)

Yet writing off unions

in

Germany

not warranted at this point.

is

remains significantly more industrial than other European
the

DGB

activity

states,

Germany

including Austria. While

has seen losses through industrial attrition, there has been a resurgence of

and influence by the largest German unions such as IG Metal! and Verdi, the

services trade union.

IG Metal has been

and momentum. (Bosch 2004) Under

its

the

most aggressive

new

in pursuit

of renewed vigor

president as of 2003, Jurgen Peters, the
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union has pursued a

much more

vocal program of labor and social democratic policy

aims and the wish to defeat major labor market and liberalization reforms under the
Schroder and Merkel governments. (The Economist 2003, 2005) While there has been

some

significant shrinkage in unionization, the unions have

moving

drives and

into

new

begun increasing enrollment

areas to attract younger workers. Yet this has also required

unions to become more flexible, as 1G Metall has by allowing company-level exceptions

wage

to industry-wide

deals,

and as Verdi has accepted more merit and performance

based pay schemes for public employees. They have both hoped

more diverse workforce.

vocational training and want to adapt to the less industrial and

Given

that

logical, if

DGB

still

The

membership has been

ineffective.

DGB

for Jobs created

in rapid

decline since the 1990s, such efforts

seem

(The Economist 2006a, 2001a; Bosch 2004)

had hoped

to increase its profile

by Gerhard Schroder

2004) The Alliance provided the

after his

DGB

national policymaking process. This

a role

was

through participation

promotion

it

to

Chancellor

in the

Alliance

in 1998.

(Bosch

otherwise would have lacked in the

especially important given the increasing doubts

of the confederation's efficacy coming from

its

affiliate

Frege 2003) In addition to the Alliance for Jobs, the
labor interests on a

to take a larger role in

members. (Behrens,

DGB

also

was chosen

Fichter,

and

to represent

number of other Schroder-organized ad hoc committees and councils

dealing with a range of economic and social policy questions. Nonetheless, the failure of

the Alliance for Jobs

was

a setback for such ambitions by the

2004; Vail 2003)
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DGB.

(Streeck and Hassel

There have been some gains by German labor since the 1980s. One was the
unions was the expansion of the Works Constitution Act, originally enacted

framework

the primary legal

for labor representation in the

in

1972 and

workplace through

codetermination. The 2001 revision, widely opposed by employers, extended works
council into smaller and mid-size firms, extending labor’s reach into the larger

German

Mittlestand. (Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003; Vail 2003;

Bosch 2004) That

medium and

outside of tripartite negotiations that

Kuhlmann 2004;

small firms of the

German

Mittelstand and
,

would normally have an undeniable voice

decisions only a decade earlier. (Vail 2003; Streeck and Hassel 2004) This

a boost for union

power

Similarly, the

if

of

was passed despite vocal employers and industry

the legislation

opposition, especially from the

tier

in

was

such

certainly

also a concurrent slight of social partnership.

DGB

and German labor were mostly marginalized from the

remainder of Gerhard Schroder’s Agenda 2010 program of reforming pensions,

unemployment

benefits,

and other social insurance benefits. Labor generally balked

perceived severity of the reforms, which eventually
reduction of the period of

aid,

and making benefits

Agenda 2010 was
which were

far

initial

unemployment

flat rate,

recommended and included

benefits, elimination the

at the

a

second phase of

means-tested, and requiring regular re-certification.

primarily designed to reign in the costs of

more generous than

in the

unemployment

benefits,

Netherlands, France, and Sweden, and provide

impetus to unemployed workers to more quickly enter the workforce. The benefits

remaining would

still

the other European

be generous by comparative standards, but

economies with which Germany competes
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much more

for investment

in line

with

and jobs.

DGB

The

and German labor were

influential in

drafting of the laws through their influence in the

SPD

some of the important
in

early

parliament but never had a

formal or official role in drafting or enacting the legislation. The Schroder government

SPD

eventually succeeded in passing the legislation despite a bitterly divided

unhappy German labor movement. (Behrens,

Fichter,

and Frege 2003) This

and an

illustrated the

increasing willingness of the Schroder government to “contravene the preferences of his

traditional political allies”

(Vail 2003)

protests

and even disregard the concerns of the unions more frequently.

The debates and

by labor and the

left

fights over the legislation

became externalized

as a series of

continued into 2004. (The Economist 2004a, 2006b)

Despite decreasing influence and vitality through the social partnership and inside

the

SPD, German labor remains

relatively important

system as a whole. (Conradt 2001

movement

)

and powerful within the

However many argue

that the

German

political

labor

lacks a long-term or strategic plan of remaining vital and resilient given the

pressures of economic globalization, liberalization, and significant restructuring of the

German economy. Many

suggest that

German

important opportunities to expand into
(Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003;

the

DGB

sectors and into

just

have been slow

new

ability to organize in

such an occasion. (Vitols 2004) Further, the

to

types of employment.

Kuhlmann 2004; Bosch 2004) The slowness

and member unions recognized the demand and

workers was

despite

new

labor has failed to evolve and missed

DGB

develop lasting and useful relationships with

numerous shared concerns. While some of the

social

and anti-globalization, none has
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built

temporary

have

movements

staff

resources dedicated to awareness and rhetoric on issues of the environment,

rights, anti-racism,

which

and sectoral unions

new

larger unions

in

and

women’s

any lasting coalition or

partnership with such groups that have

German policymaking process

become more powerful and

active players in the

since the 1960s. (Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003;

Dalton 2003)

The

DGB

efforts to reintegrate itself into the core

of the social partnership’s

policymaking process through the Alliance for Jobs have also largely

Unions are

failed.

facing growing decentralization of collective bargaining, further weakening unions

national level.

local, firm,

The dominant trend

for unions has

been the need

seek more regional,

and plant-level deals since the 1990s. (Turner 1998; Bemdt 2000; Streck and

Hassel 2004)

Some

suggest that the future of German labor

lies at

firm levels, and efforts to Europeanize and revitalize labor must

regional levels

Works

to

at the

first

these intermediate or

come from

the firm and

and foremost. (Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003; Kuhlmann 2004)

councils have

become

the “de facto grass roots union organizations” of German

labor due to the decentralization of collective bargaining and the repositions of labor-

capital relations at the firm

and plant

In conclusion, labor unions

irreplaceable elements of the

levels.

(Bosch 2004; Lee, Lee, and Katz 2004)

remain powerful and

German policymaking

influential,

and perhaps

process both within and outside of

the social partnership. (Markovits 1986; Thelen 1991; Conradt 2001; Frege 1999; Turner

1998) Despite the relative loss of authority and prestige over the past thirty years, and the
challenges the unions continue to face

Maastricht,

German

of influential

political

It

Economist 2006a) Yet

economy, they continue

to possess

some

resiliency.

A

series

February 2006 by service unions, led by Verdi, illustrated their

strikes in

continuing influence.

in the post-unification, post-industrial. post-

was

the largest public sector strike in fourteen years.

strikes could suggest desperate rather than strength
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(

The

depending

upon one’s perspective. Given

new

their existing influence, the range

strategies to reinvigorate the labor

doubt, remains stronger than in

German

Industry

The

&

Employers:

movement,

many advanced

A

the future of organized labor, while in

post-industrial states.

(Kuhlmann 2004)

House Divided or Crumbling?

amongst and centralization of business and employers’

solidarity

also been in steady decline since the 1980s and 1990s.

operated as partners

of potential reforms, and

is

a highly coordinated

While the BDI and

interests has

BDA

once

and powerful network of business and

employers’ associations and firms, the economic challenges of reunification, European
integration, globalization,

and structural economic change have driven wedges between

those in the employers' and business camps. This

when

the

BDI and

BDA

is

a far cry from the 1960 and 1970s

operated in tandem and even shared a

common

president,

Hanns-Martin Schleyer. (Braunthal 1965; Streeck and Hassel 2004)
After a brief period of restored unity amongst business and employers during the
unification process, the business and employers' associations began to

dissent with one another

liberal

on

and confrontational

counterparts in the

more

a range of issues.

tact starting in the

Most notably, BDI took

more
a far

1990s and began challenging

greatly

more neoits

traditionally conservative employers’ association, the

(Streeck and Hassel 2004) This

was exacerbated by growing schisms between

BDA.
the larger

multinational corporations and the Mittelstand of small and medium-sized firms on a

range of issues including social insurance contributions, temporary employment,
healthcare, globalization, vocational training, European integration, immigration,

subsidy, and taxation. (Vail 2003; Streeck and Hassel 2004)
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The

institutionalization

Germany has
and

unity.

of the employers’ and industry associations into eastern

not gone well and further

weakened business and employers

centralization

There have been increasing defections and variances by eastern firms from the

sectoral collective bargaining agreements that

dominated the postwar social partnership

between labor and industry. (Bosch 2004) Eastern enterprises are also reluctant

to join or

continue membership in the employers’ and industry associations. In the metal industry,
the traditional leader in setting the national collective bargaining

standards,

1980 to

membership

35%

in the sectoral

by 1998 and continues

benchmarks and

employers’ association has dropped from

to fall. (Behrens, Fichter,

58%

in

and Frege 2003; The

Economist 2004; Lee, Lee, and Katz 2004)

While much of this decline has been

many

in eastern

Germany, where

after unification

firms refused to join or eventually terminated their membership, there

growing dissent and decline amongst western firms since the

late 1990s.

is

also

(Bemdt 2000)

This has also been met with an increasing number of regional associations and other
sectoral associations terminating or abrogating the

in the sectoral collective

bargaining agreements.

benchmarks and standards established

More

ignoring, evading, or breaching existing industry-level

bargaining

in all sectors.

firms are frequently bypassing,

membership and

collective

(Bemdt 2000; Turner 1998; Heinisch 2000; Lee, Lee, and Katz

2004)

Even amongst western
becoming more

fractious.

more vocally challenge

enterprises, employers'

Small and

medium

and business associations are

sized firms of the Mittelstand have

for the leadership of the employers'

begun

and industry associations

that

have typically been dominantly by Germany's largest firms and producers. (Streeck and
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to

Hassel 2004; Vail 2003) This has led more militant employers' and smaller firms to

eschew both major business peak associations, the

BDA

themselves with smaller opposition parties such as the

and BDI, and

to

even

affiliate

Democrats. (Streeck

liberal Free

and Hassel 2004)

Employers' association have been weakened by these firm and plant level
bargaining structures through a reduction of the solidarity and dependency of individual
firms to sectoral and employers' associations at the national level.

and Hassel 2004) Recent

strikes

(Bemdt 2000; Streeck

of the past two decades have driven many smaller firms

to leave employers' associations and, especially but not exclusively in the east, ignore

industry-wide collective bargaining arrangements. (Streeck and Hassel 2004) Employers

and industry associations have also been pursuing structural and re-organizational
reforms to improve their membership density and collective authority
bargaining process. (Bosch 2004) But
decentralization have

much

like labor, the

made such reforms seem

paradoxically bode poorly for

German unions

continuing forces of

insufficient.

at the

Weak

with industry

(

official put

at

it,

the preference

national sectoral level but

employers’ association

national level for

natural negotiation and bargaining partner and results in even

one IG Metall

would be

in the collective

more

it

removes the

decentralization.

to continue to negotiate

would “go from

As

and bargain

plant to plant” if necessary.

Bemdt 2000)
This illustrates

become

inside the

how

German

interlocked and interdependent the social partners have

social partnership. Declines in either national unions or

employers' and industry associations undermine their overall central authority and
influence in collective bargaining systems.

(Bemdt 2000) Hence, strong
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unified labor

requires strong unified employers’ while weakness in either seems to result in weakness

Both labor and industry have been heavily decentralized

for both.

collective bargaining system since the 1990s and unification.

and negotiation

in the

German

More important bargaining

activities are taking place at the regional, firm,

and plant levels strongly

diverging from the sectoral model that dominated the postwar social partnership

Germany

as well as

in

from the heavily centralized and nationalized Austrian model of

labor-capital relations that continues to maintain representative monopolies, or near-

monopolies, by the five large peak associations. (Heinisch 2000) Disorganization of both

German

business and labor reinforces the erosion of cooperation in both collective

bargaining and the policymaking process and reduces the social partners' abilities to

simultaneously represent specific constituent interests and the public good. (Streeck and
Hassel 2004)
Importantly, the weakness of the social partners also results in a growing role for

the state, political parties, parliament, provincial and local governments, and other

interests to

shape and conduct economic and social policymaking and governance. The

decentralization of labor and industry fundamentally challenges the

model of semi-

sovereignty given that the social partners were critical in the quasi-regulatory governance
patterns of the postwar federal republic. (Schmidt 2006)

authority, importance,

such responsibilities

been the

state or

new

in

As

they have declined in

and organizational capacity, other actors must step
providing economic governance.

interests that

More and more

in

and assume

frequently

it

has

fundamentally challenge the previous neo-corporatist

order. (Vail 2003; Dalton 2003)
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New

Social

Movements and Changing

Starting in the late 1960s,

from the

power,

German

traditional left-right ideological

The growth of new

eras.

Identities in

human

social

rights, foreign

material issues did not neatly

fit

a victim of

Dalton 1989) In

success.

many ways,

By ensuring and providing

relative affluence,

German

citizens

material issues and were free to debate and split over

From

the 1970s onward, the

has emerged as far less stable than

German

in

pluralistic.

(Dalton 1989; von

lobbies, Biirgerinitiativen

,

Beyme

emerged

political

new

political

stable

democracy,

less

divided on class

post-material issues.

system has relied

new

social

less

on

1989)

It

was

in

many

system more participatory and

post-material policy areas from the early

This

were primarily

late 19'

1

’

and early 20

a transformation of priorities

to the post-material

“new

and modeled on the

centuries. (Inglehart 1977; Dalton

from addressing the material “social question"

social questions”, (von

new wave of participation

lh

elite-driven

social,

Beyme

1993)

also challenged the perceived undemocratic

elements of neo-corporatism including elitism, exclusion, and a lack of transparency.

(von

Beyme

and

1993) The proliferation of grass-roots citizen

political institutions that

socio-economic divisions of the

elites

movements of the

1970s onward. (Hancock 1989; Dalton 1989) These challenged the preexisting

economic, and

in

the social partnership had

became

previous decades. The

1960s and 1970s made the German

late

the environment, nuclear

framework became more important

into the left-right

become

economic growth, and

had dominated the pre- and postwar

workers, feminism, education, aging, and other post-

politics. (Inglehart 1977;

own

that

movements concerned with

German

its

Politics

began a gradual decentralization away

politics

schism

German

1993) Arguments that the

German
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social partnership could successful

manage

new

these

social

movements have generally

Austria, the social partnership has generally been

not borne out. (Wilson 1990) In

more successful

at

expanding

its

base

of issues and competence, mostly through the Committee on Social and Economic
Questions, into

partners

many

post-material policy areas. Neither the social partnership nor social

seemed so able

These new
influential

social

Greens and,

German

in the

movements

context.

spawned

also

after unification, the

a

wave of new

PDS (now

parties, including the

Links) that would eventually

upset the traditional two-and-a-half party system between the

SPD, CDU/CSU, and FDP.

(Dalton 1989; Kitschelt 2004) Yet, as noted earlier, the impact on the party system has

had

less

and

interests.

impact

in

Germany because of the

Hence changes

in the party

social partnership to the extent

it

German system of interests and
absorption. Parties were often

has

in

traditionally

weaker

links

between the parties

system have not fundamentally affected the

other states.

politics has

much more

The very

decentralization of the

provided a form of flexibility and shock

the drivers of policy in the

German system

in

areas outside the core of the social partners, unlike in Austria where the social partnership

was more deeply engrained

Beyme

in a

wide range of policies beyond

its

original aegis, (von

1993)

The growing importance of interests not represented and accommodated by the
existing structures, including foreign workers, environmental groups,

organizations,

consumer groups,

sectors, has challenged the

1989; Wilson 1990)

are also creating

The

as well as

German

effects

new schisms

new

women’s

information industries and service

social partnership's legitimacy

and

vitality.

(Dalton

of unification, European integration, and globalization

that divide

German
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firms, interests, and

its

peoples in ways

that the existing

system of social partnership governance was never designed to address,

and may be incapable of addressing, without remarkable
reinvigoration. (Langguth 1999)

peak

interests

bureaucracies

and

The

institutionalized

structural

and hierarchical character of the

their intersection with the state, political parties,

may

reform or

and governing

be a hindrance to increasing the participation and democratization of

the political process.

New

interests

and new social movements often

feel

excluded from

the process and concurrently feel that the privilege granted to older interests

unfair. (Dalton 1989;

German
and

is

Wilson 1990; Conradt 2001) This exclusion also means

policy, as a product of the existing social partnership,

viability in addressing

new

social

and economic problems

would

patently

that

likely lack efficacy

that fall

beyond

their

representative aegis and expertise.

Along with

the challenge from

new

social

movements and new

political parties,

the deterioration of labor-business relations has created a vicious cycle of declining

membership and greater

inter-partner conflict. (Markovits 1986; Conradt 2001

)

Similar to

the fate of Austria, the slowing of economic growth in the late 1970s and early 1980s,

and again

in the late

1990s and early 2000s, drove the interests further apart and created

additional points of contention between and within the social partners. De-

industrialization, inflation, record high

and

lasting

unemployment unwound

forty years

of

cooperation rather quickly. (Conradt 2001; Streeck and Hassel 2004) Labor and industry

sought greater and more radical policy corrections that created an ever-deepening

between the social partners and lessened the
issues.

begun

While amongst the lowest
to

in the

ability to find

compromise and consensus on

advanced world, Germany

has, nonetheless,

experience greater labor-business conflicts more and more extensively.
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rift

However, Austria has seen

a far

more dramatic increase

1980s comparatively. Germany ranked
(see table four in previous chapter).

first in least

in strikes

and lockouts since the

number of days

lost to labor disputes

However, Germany also has an extensive and

complicated legal prohibition against strikes and lockouts except under extraordinary
conditions. (Heinisch 2000) Without such juridification and extensive levels of

codetermination, neither found in Austria,

would be

may

far

it

seems

likely that labor-capital disputes

quite higher. Hence, the scale of the crisis of social partnership in

exceed

that

Germany

of Austria.

Solidarity within and

between groups has diminished

significantly.

The

results

of

increased temporary employment, the relaxing of traditional shop practices, and the
increase in foreign ownership has changed the

model of workplace

tremendously. Firm and plant-level bargaining diminishes the
sectoral

ties

relations

between the firm and

and national levels for both workers and management. Finn-level works

councils, free from sectoral and national-level collective bargaining limitations, are less

likely to

the labor

view themselves as part of a greater or broader labor movement. This weakens

movement’s

overall cohesion and ability to

benefits. For firms free

demand and

obtain collective

from sectoral or industry-wide agreements, the necessity of

remaining dependent upon or allegiant

to

employers' or industry associations has also

diminished. The combination suggests a cyclical reduction of solidarity not only to labor

and industry associations but also
as a whole.

Hence

to the social partnership

capital-labor relations in

away from fundamental

social

and German economic model

Germany may be undergoing

transformation

and economic preconditions of social partnership. (Bemdt

2000; Heinisch 2000)
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Transformation of the Institutions and Structure of Social Partnership

Under

CDU

partnership, the

Chancellor Kohl, despite his lack of affinity for the social

German government

did hope to organize

on a range of economic and welfare reforms
unification.

Kohl did manage

in the early

some form of social consensus

and mid 1990s, notably on

to obtain significant tripartite

agreement upon the terms of

unification with the east in 1990, the so-called Solidarity Pact, so there

optimism

that additional negotiation

was some

and compromise by the social partners would be

possible in addressing the worst economic conditions

Germany had

the war. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Vail 2003; Padgett 1999)

With

faced since the end of

rising

unemployment,

decreasing productivity, sub-par growth, and increasing budgetary pressures. Kohl and

the

CDU-led government sought consensus through compromise and bargaining from

both labor and industry. While labor was fully behind the creation of an Alliance for
Jobs, proposed by

exchange

IG Metall

for higher

would negotiate wage

officials initially, that

employment and reductions

in

constraints in

proposed social insurance cuts by the

Kohl government, both the government and employers’ were divided. (Timmins 2000)

While an agreement was almost reached
FDP-allied members of the

BDI and members of the government

concessions from labor. Labor
attempt

at the alliance.

The

in 1996, the negotiations fell apart as the

left

demanded

greater

the negotiating table effectively ending this brief

failure to get

consensus and the subsequent failure to get

significant consent for his unilateral packages of

unprecedented union upheaval and the
Hassel 2004; Heinisch 2000;

itself

economic and

CDU/CSU

electoral defeat in 1998. (Streeck

Timmins 2000) While

this

operation and structure of the social partnership, there
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social reforms led to

is

may

suggest continuity

and

in the

strong evidence that Kohl's

willingness to bypass and marginalize the social partners

model

for future

became more frequent and

a

governments. Hence the failure of social partnership to manufacture a

consensual policy program of economic reforms was beginning to transform the structure

of the German policymaking process by altering the adherence
and

to the

norms, processes,

had exemplified the postwar German model. (Vail 2003)

institutions that

Chancellor Gerhard Schroder made the Alliance for Jobs, Training, and

Competitiveness a cornerstone of his campaign platform on economic reform and created
the institution

upon

his election to the

Timmins 2000) The

Chancellery in 1998. (Cox 2001; Lehmbruch 2003;

alliance, discussed in detail earlier in this chapter,

was

a significant

attempt to support and reinvigorate the institutions and structural power of social

partnership.

By addressing

the critical issues of the lagging

unemployment, competitiveness, and vocational

DGB,

labor market,

Schroder hoped

training,

generate consensual policy outcomes that would boost the

unemployment

German

and the peak employers’ associations

at

empowering

Germany's economic

The Alliance
labor.

The more

felt that

troubles.

for Jobs

“change

the

the national level. (Streeck

and Hassel 2004; Vail 2003) Klaus Lang of IG Metal/ suggested, audaciously,
alliance could have the potential to create wholesale

only

German economy and reduce

but also revitalize the staggering social partnership, by

affiliate unions,

to not

in politics”

that the

and could solve

(Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003)

was never

radical left of the

SPD,

fully

led

accepted by the

left

and many

by Oskar Lafontaine, and many

in

organized

in the

unions

under the SPD-Green coalition negotiation with industry was unnecessary and

that parliamentary majorities

1980s under

CDU/CSU-FDP

were

sufficient to enact policy,

government. Hence the
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left

much

was

like

Kohl did

less enthusiastic

in the

of

instituting tripartite

arrangements and

employers, industry, or the

CDU/CSU

felt little

need

to

compromise or bargain with

given the electoral and parliamentary majority

enjoyed after 1998. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Timmins 2000; Sturm 2003)

The

Alliance, while organized by the Chancellor's office,

would run

via an

elaborate system of committees overseen by a steering committee chaired by aides and

members

cabinet

The organization suffered operational and

close to Schroder.

organizational difficulties from the start that were never fully solved including

overlapping and competing jurisdictions of committees and internal disarray. Schroder

had used the Alliance concept as an effective campaign slogan but struggled

implement

this

promised

institution.

w ho would

later leave the

other in the

more

SPD

to

)

Additionally, boycotts by Lafontaine,

becoming a founding member of the Links

radical left of the

alliance less effective

(Cox 2001

to

party,

SPD, Greens, and German labor movement made

and representative. Further, the Schroder government had

brining unions to heel on important compromises since the

electoral promises to labor

and the

and

left in

the

difficulty

SPD had made numerous

the 1998 campaign.

The

result

major demands of the unions were granted without commensurate need

was
for

that

most

tough labor

concessions. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Vail 2003)

While the Alliance

for Jobs failed in

most respects,

it

did help shape

some

eventual reforms of the labor market reforms. (Vitols 2004) Nonetheless, the results of

the Alliance

Fichter,

have been generally considered meager or disappointing

and Frege 2003) The alliance failed

to

at best.

(Behrens,

end deadlock between labor and

capital

over important economic and social reforms and provided the Schroder government few
identifiable assets during

its first

term (Timmins 2000) Worse, there had been no
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discemable attempts

at

comprehensive

trilateral

bargaining and negotiation on any of the

major government projects or legislative proposals. Not
collective agreement

was reached

in the first

a single

package deal or

two years of the Alliance. (Streeck and

Hassel 2004)

The second term provided fewer successes from

the Alliance for Jobs as both

unions and employers’ saw a progressive erosion of their organizational capacities and
willingness to compromise from the late 1990s and into the early 2000s.

meetings, held twice a year, became

little

more than “public

ritual''

restraint,

governmental incentives to

beginning

offset. (Streeck

in

tripartite

and an “empty

of photo opportunities for the Chancellor while contributing modestly

of modest union wage

The

to

shell’’

only two years

2000, that even then required significant

and Hassel 2004) From the summer of 2001,

the Alliance took on a purely ceremonial character

and

in

March 2003, Schroder

called

the final meeting of the Alliance for Jobs and dissolved the institution permanently.

failure

of the Alliance to reach compromise of needed reforms led Schroder

that all future

reforms would be done on the government's

own

to

The

announce

accord. (Kitschelt and

Streeck 2004; Vail 2003)

Divergent perspectives over the role and function of the institution by the social
partners contributed to

in finding

its

failure.

(Schrim 2002) Clearly the government was interested

consensual policy prescriptions to address a wide range of issues from labor

markets, unemployment benefits, pensions, and social insurance. Labor, both
confederation level of the

as a

way

capital

DGB

and sector

level including

to resist globalization, reinvigorate national-level

and employers via labor and SPD-led

IG Me tall, viewed

the Alliance

union authority and reign

social partnership.
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at the

But labor was also

in

organizationally divided between the leadership of IG Metall and IG

workers' union, which differed

BCE,

the chemical

and intermediation process as well as

in the negotiation

on the content of wage and employment policy. (Streeck and Hassel 2004)
Employers' associations had a very different vision

for the Alliance that

was

based on improving employment via competitiveness and instituting regulatory changes
that

would

significantly liberalize the labor markets, reduce

employer revenue

contributions, lower taxes, and be a force for global and European integration. (Vitols

2004; Streeck and Hassel 2004) Yet there was

camp

as the

medium

BD1 and

firms

BDA

relationship

little

agreement within the employers’

was poisoned beyond

became increasingly vocal

in their

repair and small and

opposition to the larger firms’ positions.

(Streeck and Hassel 2004)

Employers’ were happy

to

have a seat

orientations towards labor market reform and

find a

common

at the table,

wage

restraints, they

position to either defend or bargain upon.

compromise between labor and employers’ seems
these conditions.

to

were often unable

have been nearly impossible under

and eventually culminated

Constitution Act in 2000 also

weakened

the employers’

had no oversight over these pro-labor policies

was wildly opposed by

that

to

The broader hope of finding

The SPD-Green government’s parliamentary program

significant promises to labor

or employers and

but given their divided

in the

that included

amendment of the Works

commitment

to the Alliance that

passed without the consent of industry

the Mittelstand employers in the

BDI and BDA.

(Streeck and Hassel 2004) With no tripartite or even bipartite bargaining or negotiation

over one of the more important recent changes to

German workplace

relations,

hard to understand business and employer frustrations with the Alliance.
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it

is

not

Given the divergent
preferences,

generated

it

is

attitudes towards the Alliance

not surprising that the Alliance mostly failed to meet expectations and

of the consensus to which

little

and the gap between policy

it

was

also suggests a fundamental lack of willingness

tasked. Yet the failure of the Alliance

and

solidarity over

bargaining, and the core mission of social partnership in the

compromise,

German policymaking

process. Kitschelt and Streeck suggest that the dissolution of the Alliance had

higher costs for

German

labor that

was already facing

could not count on the

as a whole. Since Schroder

DGB and member unions to provide any

compromise and bargaining,
institutions

greater decentralization and decline

SPD and government

of policymaking influence inside the

the

and seek reform via

political dealings with the

government had

little

room

for consensus,

option but to abandon the tripartite

unilateral parliamentary action as well as through

CDU/CSU.

Schroder was aided

much

(Kitschelt and Streeck 2004; Vail 2003)

in this unilateral

approach by the division of German labor

union and employers as well as the scandal over the Federal Employment Office (BA),

one of the cornerstones of German neo-corporatism. As described
during the discussion of labor market reform, the

and employers and was tasked by the
private sector.

falsify job

However,

it

emerged

placement figures so as

state to

in

2002

BA

earlier in this chapter

was jointly run by

the trade unions

connect those seeking work with jobs in the

that

it

had become

to over-represent the

common

practice to

importance and efficacy of the

agency. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Sturm 2003; The Economist 2004; Busch 2005) This

provided Schroder additional cover for his reform packages given the discrediting of the
social partners

by the scandal and the role of public opinion

in supporting

without their consent. (Vail 2003; Vitols 2004; Streeck and Hassel 2004)
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reform even

The scandal gave

the

momentum

Schroder enact elements of his Agenda 2010

program including the Hartz labor market reforms while bypassing

the historically

expected consent process of the social partners. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Vitols 2004)

But the

BA

scandal also increased the role of the state

training policies at the expense of the social partners.

in

job placement and vocational

As noted

earlier, the

BA

and

vocational training were areas of exclusive social partnership governance between labor

unions and employers’

who

BA

primarily funded and operated the regional offices of the

with almost no direct government intervention or management. However,

in light

of the

scandal and the increasing inability of the social partners to find compromise to address
deficits in both

employment and vocational

boldly restructured and reformed the

BA

training,

Schroder took the

and

initiative

and vocational training programs with

little

to

no consent from the social partners. (Vail 2003; Busch 2005)

The
for the role

resulting series of legislation in

of the social partners

The new laws increased

in the

2002 and 2003 had

governance of the

BA

significant implications

and vocational

the financial responsibility of the state to fund the

changed the executive board of the office

to

make

it

directly appointed

accountable to the federal government. Simultaneously, this

new

administrative role allowed the Schroder government to apply

BA.

It

also

by and

financial

new

training.

and

standards to

jobseekers. This included greater pressure on the jobseekers to accept available

“reasonable” employment and

make concerted

efforts to find

work or face

potential

suspension of unemployment benefits. This was a remarkable foray of state intervention
into an institution that

prior. (Vail

had been almost beyond the government's reach only

2003; Busch 2005)
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a

decade

In vocational training, the Schroder

instituting the

JUMP

Unemployment

hire

(Immediate Programme

for the

like the

measures

to

and administrative role

young workers, and job counseling

type of governance was

Germany, and

implemented

vein by

Reducement of Youth

left

reform the BA, the

JUMP

JUMP program

provided a

in training, apprenticeship, subsidies for firms to

services. Again, for

most of the postwar

era, this

exclusively in the hands of the social partners. But with high

youth unemployment, shortages of apprenticeship slots
across

in a similar

or Jugendsofortprogramm) program to boost youth training and

employment. Much
larger financial

government acted

the relevant

BA

vocational training schools

scandal, the Schroder government boldly

and hugely increased the

consent from the social partners.

in the

From 2003

state role in vocational training

the

BA, now subordinated

with

little

to the federal

government, and the Uabor Ministry would jointly manage the vocational training

programs rather than leaving

The

failure

it

in the

hands of the social partners. (Vail 2003)

of the Alliance drove Schroder, perhaps the biggest proponent of high-

level social partnership since

unilateral, parliamentary,

Helmut Schmidt

to

abandon the pact altogether and seek

and inter-party policy prescriptions

negotiation of the peak interest associations.

(

in lieu

of consensual

The Economist 2003a) Schroder himself

discovered that the concerted efforts between labor, the

state,

and industry are too often

confined to defensive coalitions seeking to protect existing privilege and benefits rather
than seeking innovation, reform, and grander national goals. (Bemdt 2000)
Instead, the Chancellor focused his energies in the specialized

panels, such as Hartz, that

became

the

commissions and

backbone of major reform and policy

efforts.

(Streeck and Hassel 2004; Vitols 2004) Given the payoff of actual debate, compromise.
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and eventual policy implementation, the

boded poorly

failure

of the Alliance and success of Hartz

for the social partnership during the

remainder of the Schroder tenure. Not

only was the unilateralism of the policymaking by the Schroder government
revolutionary, but the increasing role, status, and authority of the government in

managing these programs suggested

a

permanent break from the past

in

which the

social

partners retained significant quasi-regulatory and powers of governance. (Busch 2005)

Until

its

electoral loss in 2005, the Schroder

government continued

to

assume

significant

authority and direct operation of labor market responsibilities at the expense of the social

partners. Schroder's lack of confidence in the social partners to negotiate

and find

consensus, and their continued failure to provide innovative and effective governance

German

the labor market led to these remarkable structural reforms of the

partnership. This also created a

government

The CDU/CSU-SPD grand
Merkel since 2005 has continued
But

when

this

continues to

fail to

been increasingly willing to exert
into areas

coalition

to

2003)

government under Chancellor Angela

encourage the social partners

create

its

direct policy

German

state

is

policy, the state has

strongly antithetical to

was content

950s onward. (Vail 2003; Busch 2005) This more complex and
a

undertake reform.

and administration prerogatives

of the social partnership had once dominated. This

the traditional semi-sovereign role that the

is

to

compromise and actionable

own

for the

of labor market, vocational training, and social insurance where the pararpublic

institutions

1

social

more confrontational and exclusionary posture

vis-a-vis the social partners. (Vail

in

to follow

from the

salient role for the state

major departure from inherited patterns of social partnership and the German model.

464

The government has displayed

a degree of interventionism unthinkable only

two decades

ago. (Vail 2003)

Under Merkel
in

the process of marginalization of the social partners has continued

numerous areas including healthcare and

tax reform.

The CDU/CSU-SPD grand

coalition shut out major healthcare, and business interests from the decision-making

process. This

was

difficult for several

members of the parliament who were concurrently

heads of employers' federations and healthcare associations that had to choose between
their parties

and

their

peak associations.

In the end. the

Merkel government was able

push the legislation through with bipartisan coalition support.
This illustrates the more frequent recognition by the

to

The Economist 2006b)

(

German government,

especially

since the failure of the Alliance for Jobs, that social partners can indeed be obstacles to

reform and compromise.

Another area of increasing

Lander

in the

economic and

social

structural challenge has

policymaking process. While the German federal

system had always relied upon a rather

intricate

requiring high levels of consultation and

governments, the accelerated changes
eastern

Germany, and

interests, roles,

2003)

system of cooperative federalism

compromise between

in the

integration into the

remaining holdings

at the

and Lander

the unification with

European Union have met with increasing
in

economic and

some Lander have taken on more

shareholders in major firms

central

German economy,

and intervention by the Lander

In the east,

been the increasing role of the

same time

direct roles

the federal

in the private sector.
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social policy. (Jeffert

by becoming

partial

government was divesting

its

The Lander have

also been at the forefront of changes to

and healthcare policies due
the provincial

to the

governments

unemployment, pension,

impact of these reforms upon the roles and functions of

that often directly

provide such benefits to

(Deeg 1996; Jeffrey 2003) The Lander have also become more active

German
in

citizens.

shaping

EU

policy by both their direct participation in the

German policymaking process

through direct lobbying and representation

Brussels through the regional institutions of

the

in

EU. (Hooghe and Marks 1996, 2001 Jeffery 2003; Dyson 2003) For the
;

partners, this has several potential implications. First,

work

at the

it

but also

social

increases their need to actively

subnational level to implement and intluence policy. While this has typically

been the case due

Lander- level

to the style

relations has

of German federalism, the scope,

grown tremendously since

scale,

and importance of

the 1980s. Secondly,

it

provides an

additional outlet for the social partners to influence policy at the national and

supranational levels. Hence, the Lander are

allies or

now

also

viewed as potentially important

conduits to the policymaking process in both Berlin and Brussels, far more than

they had been in previous eras. (Hooghe and Marks 1996, 2001;

Deeg 1996; Dyson 2003;

Green and Paterson 2005; Borzel 2002, 2002a)

The European Transformation:

The 1980s began
integration

a

major increase

in the

Integration

&

Governance

widening and deepening of European

and governance. For Germany, one of the most ardent supporters of the

European Union and further

integration, this should

have been good news. However,

given the economic and political challenges of structural economic transformation,

unification,

and severe economic recession, there has been evidence
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that

requirements

and limitations of EU membership and integration have compounded many German

economic and

political difficulties.

by significantly challenging the

This has altered Germany’s relationship with the

social partners’ support

EU

of European integration and

governance policies since the 1980s. (Paterson 2005)
Since the Single European Act of 1985 and the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, there

have been increased pressures and schisms within the German economy, society, and
polity over the

meaning and implications of further European

integration.

(Compston

1998; Auer 1997) The nature and impact of European governance and policymaking have

become

far

more

controversial and contested within the

German

(Kitschelt and Streeck 2004; Paterson 2005; Schmidt 2006)

political system.

The new supranational forms

of economic and monetary governance have significantly limited the German government
and

its

industrial, fiscal,

transformation of the

monetary, and social policies

German

polity

and economy due

at a

time of extraordinary

to unification

and post-industrial

transformation. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Merkl 1993; Wallach and Francisco 1992)

This has increased the perception amongst
integration might be bad for

Germany,

many more Germans

a significant break

that the

EU

and

from the dominant pro-

European prerogatives of the 1950 through 1970s.

The adoption of the Euro and

the

new power of the European

Central

Bank

through the European Monetary Union and the subsequent Stability and Growth Pact

have hindered potential German

fiscal

and monetary policies

that

could have otherwise

moderated the impact of both unification and post- industrialism by possibly inspiring

economic growth and mitigate some of nastier

effects of the recent

economic downturns.

(Kitschelt and Streeck 2004; Jeffery and Paterson 2004) But the burdens of
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EMU

and the

EC'B have severely limited the monetary and

new

fiscal options.

rules after Maastricht reigned in state aid to small

(Dyson 2003)

In addition, the

and mid-sized Mittelstand

enterprises that had been traditionally funneled through the provincial and municipal

banks and savings associations, the Landesbanken. (Jeffery and Paterson 2004; Casey

and Gold 2000) Additionally, the

Saxony

to aid

EU

quashed

efforts

by the provincial government of

Volkswagen, again limiting governmental influence

monetary, and

fiscal policies.

policies.

German autonomy

in

policies through the

terms of wages,

fiscal,

EMU

and monetary

(Dyson 2003) Yet European integration may also create new demand

partnership within

member

implement measures

(

economic,

(Schmidt 2006)

The Europeanization of monetary and economic
obviously placed limits on

in the

to

states

by creating the mechanisms by which

meet membership

criteria in a

states

for social

can

consensual and negotiated way.

Wessels 2000) However, the German position on European integration has become

less

consensual and more conflicted since the 1980s on issues of employment, budgeting, and
social policy as well as immigration,

relating to Turkey.

into a fractious

The once

common

foreign policy, and expansion, especially

unified positions on

EU

relations

domestic political atmosphere. (Paterson 2005) The 1980s and early

1990s were an important era for change

in

German economic

pressure to Europeanize markets and concentrate

institutions in Brussels.

decline and increasing

more power

in the

hands of EU

(Auer 1997; Compston 1998) Germany has become so enmeshed

with the institutions of Europe that

its

public officials and

EU

accused of undermining German labor and business interests

programs

and policy have evolved

that could cause both short

and long-term costs
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delegations were often

in

to the

favor of European

German economy. Some

governments and ministers were caught

in the difficult

middle ground, no longer being

able to decide alone to offensively pursue aggressive export and trade policy or

defensively maintain national standards of protectionism and subsidy. (Katzenstein 1987;

Paterson 2005)

Debate and division amongst the social partners over Europe intensified as

European integration and governance began
the

German policymaking and

to eliminate the

collective bargaining process.

“wiggle room” for actors

With

stricter rules

on

in

state

subsidy, large implications from eastern enlargement, controversial immigration policies,

and more limited

fiscal,

monetary, and legal outlets for German policymakers, the once

monopolistic solidarity and consensus amongst social partners on issues of European

Dyson 2003; Paterson 2003,

integration has diminished. (Jeffery and Paterson 2004;

2005)
This has meant greater contestation over Germany's European policy

domestic arena and,

in

some

cases, divisions

the scope, process, and content of

Smith 2003) The gaps between
in labor, industry,

While
still

in

some

strong

EU

elites

amongst and within the

German

social partners over

policy. (Paterson 2003; Padgett, Paterson, and

and rank and

file

members of all peak

and agriculture, have grown dramatically in the

areas, notably

in the

second and

third pillar issues

of

EU

last

associations

twenty years.

competency, there

is

support and solidarity on integration issues, in the economic and

single market pillar there has been less agreement and far less consensus in determining

German

preferences. (Jeffery and Paterson 2004; Paterson 2003) Positions have hardened

and German

interests are

becoming more

government's pro-integration

affinities.

self-interested

(Paterson 2005)
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and willing

to challenge the

German

EU

labor has

becoming more decidedly

policy since the 1980s.

The consensus

split

over European integration and

that existed for

much of the postwar

era

diminished as the pace and scope of European integration increased and German

economic performance decreased over the past twenty-five

As discussed

earlier in this chapter, the

benefits,

2005)

consensus that existed was tenuously rested on

the ability of the state to placate union and

on w ages,

years. (Paterson 2003,

worker uncertainty over integration's

and codetermination rights of German workers. Unions had

objection to European integration given the strong growth patterns of the

effects

little

economy and

increases in workers wages, benefits, and representation rights from the 1950s through

1970s.

However, by the 1980s the environment had changed.
begun

to place

downward

First,

pressures of wages and social insurance.

economic decline had

The Kohl

government, while never seriously considering a reversal of existing codetermination
laws,

was w illing

to

make important

liberalizations

of the German labor market, tax

system, and social insurance systems that increased the dissatisfaction of unions and

workers with both Kohl and the perceived costs of integration. (Katzenstein 1987;

Conradt 2001; Streeck and Hassel 2004) This also meant
likely to continue to subsidize or offset costs

workers

of the

to the full

EU

German

state

was

less

of further integration, exposing German

impact of market expansion. Second, the expansion of the competence

institutions

integration

that the

would be

and of EU membership heightened the uncertainty of labor
positive for both workers and the

German economy

that

as a whole.

While there had been strong belief from the 1950s, by the majority of unions and labor
leaders, that integration

would benefit Germany and subsequently
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benefit

its

workers and

unions, that faith had eroded since the beginning of the

more tumultuous economic

of the 1970s. The accession of Greece, Portugal, and Spain

members with

eras

1980s introduced

in the

significantly lower labor costs, increasing the perceived threat of a fully

integrated European internal market and the inclusion of even poorer and cheaper labor

states

from Southern, and soon Eastern, Europe. (Markovits 1986; Markovits and Otto

1992)

From
the

EU

German

labor has been

more divided on European

integration as

has expanded in authority and membership through the important expansions

under the

The

the 1990s,

DGB

treaties

of Maastricht and Nice and the accessions of 1995, 2004, and 2007.

and member unions have begun

to split

over support or opposition to

continuing integration as well as the types of strategies that should be pursued to address
the

new

challenges of European integration and governance. The

split

has fractured

of the once unified consensus of labor over European integration on several
including those between the

radical

DGB

much

fault lines

and the individual sectoral unions, between

activist-

and conservative-accommodationist unions, and between sectors based on

perceived benefits or losses due to greater market integration. (Markovits and Otto 1992)

The DGB,

as the confederation of unions, has attempted to take the lead on

European integration and EU-relations for German
ability to safeguard

been generally

in

labor.

While concerned with the

working conditions, wages, and codetermination

rights,

it

has also

favor of integration since the 1980s as a "positive and necessary

development”. (Markovits and Otto 1992) To counter these potentially negative trends,
the

DGB,

as well as

some of the

specific sectoral unions, has been

amongst the stronger

supporters of increasing cross-border collaboration and dialogue through European-level
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;

labor and social partnership institutions such as the European Social Dialogue, European

Works Councils, and
1

Interregional Trade

DGB

985) Hence the

Union Committees. (Gorges 1996; Sargent

has attempted to lead

its

underlying unions through

its

vocal

willingness to develop and pursue "political opportunity structures” at the European

level.

(Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003) These include strong participation

European Trade Union Federation (ETUC) where the
represented national labor federations

in the

DGB

is

in the

amongst the most well

European labor movement. (Markovits and

Otto 1992)

The DGB,

as well as

IG Metal and other sector unions, have also increased crossI

border agreements with Dutch, Belgian, French, Swiss, and Austrian unions hoping to

improve interregional and transnational cooperation on a range of labor
have included regular cross-national meetings as well as coordinated

issues.

These

activities at the

national and European levels. These have been supported by the creation of European

Works Councils

that facilitate informal

national frontiers.

and formal connections between unions spanning

(Bemdt 2000; Fitzgerald 2004) As

a former leader of the

DGB

suggested, "the overcoming of national traditions should be the guiding line of our

European
resist”.

strategy, otherwise

we

will

no longer have the power

to influence, let alone

(Bemdt 2000)
While the

DGB

and member unions have begun

to identify the

importance of EU- or transnational-level organization and

activity, the supranational

level has yet to provide tangible results. (Sargent 1985; Schmitter

Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003) There has been

little

growing potential

movement

and Streeck 1991
in

generating Euro-

wide collective bargaining or wage agreements and the effectiveness of the
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EU

institutions

EU-wide

of social partnership have been quite lackluster

labor organization, or

EU-wide

at best.

Without an organized

industry associations with

whom

to negotiate,

the opportunities for action at the national level clearly outweigh those at the

one. While Europe offers the possibility of union renewal in

underdeveloped and
Nonetheless, the

dominantly positive as

is still

rather

position on European integration and governance has been

it

has sought opportunities to increase

authority at both the national and supranational levels

own

it

highly uncertain. (Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003)

still

DGB's

Germany,

European

its

own

by attempting

representative

to institutionalize its

position through the labor and neo-corporatist institutions at European levels.

While the

DGB

remains rather consistently

there has been increasing dissent

in

support of European integration,

amongst Germany’s

sectoral unions over the process

and consequences of deeper and wider European governance. For many unions, the
ideological opposition to European integration and governance stems from strong

antipathy for market-based economic mechanisms and neo-liberal capitalism that are

be consequences of the expanding European market. This

often

felt to

more

activist

is

true

amongst the

and more aggressive unions such as IG Metall and IG Medien, the media

workers' union

now

part of Verdi, that

have been historically more suspicious of neo-

hberalism and have concerns that European integration will weaken social democracy in

Germany and throughout
that integration

the

would create

wages and workers'

EU. The

beliefs of these unions

a race to the

bottom

in

rights such as codetermination.

IG Medien, which could see benefits from

a wider

and

their leaders are that

terms of downward pressure on

As Markovits and Otto

suggest, for

and larger European market, ideology

has tended to trump calculated material gains. For IG Metall, opposition to integration
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has both ideological and material bases in that there has been greater uncertainty over the

impact of the
results

EU

on the metal and automotive

industries. (Markovits

have generally led IG Metall and IG Medien

integration not only via the institutions of the

new

creating ad hoc alliances with

integration groups both within

social

to

German

movements,

and Otto 1992) The

oppose further European

by

social partnership, but also

anti-globalization,

and

Germany and throughout Europe. These have

anti-

also

included other more radical and anti-establishment labor organizations in France,

Italy,

and elsewhere. (Bemdt 2000; Markovits and Otto 1992; Behrens, Fichter, and Frege
2003)

On
German

the other side, there are unions that have generally been

state's affinity

union, IG

BCE, and

the

accommodating

to the

towards further European integration. The chemical workers’

NGG,

the food workers’ union, have been in favor of greater

integration and expansion since the 1990s. Both unions have had longer histories of

commitment

to both the social partnership

industry and the state.

Hence

there

is

and a

less confrontational relationship

with

an institutional explanation for their support. The

chemical industry was expected to see some boost due to further integration, yet the
uncertainty of this growth

the industry

was

competition, the

was

high. For food workers, despite the general agreement that

likely to see both profit

NGG eventually supported both

(Markovits and Otto 1992) The

rather than directly confronting

to intra-European

1992 and other integration

NGG and chemical workers, along with the

have pursued greater participation

that

and job losses due

in the

European

efforts.

DGB,

also

level social partnership institutions

European integration from an outsider strategy such as

by IG Metall. (Markovits and Otto 1992; Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 2003)
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The end

result has

been

that since the late 1980s,

German

become

labor has

decisively divided over the issues of European integration and governance. While the
unity of German labor has always been overestimated, the kind of consensus on

integration that the

The

ability

of the

German

DGB

state

could count on

to marginalize labor’s say in the

a generally pro-integration foreign

German government under

On

German

leaders are being far

BDI and

BDA

much

as well as the decreasing

as they have

their political parties, so they are far

been able

trade.

membership density of firms

state has

to with labor.

have become

The

level

larger firms, with a

in the

employers'

been able to effectively bypass employers

The BDI and

between member firms tending

oppose further integration and European
and

constraints

divided on issues of integration. Given the growing divides between the

significantly divided

relations

pursue

autonomy. (Paterson 2005)

and industry associations, the German
as

more

the other side of the social partnership, industry and employers

just as strongly

to

and domestic policy agenda. However, on issues such

by sizable dissent within the German electorate and
free in terms of

both Schroder and

EU-policymaking process and continue

as immigration and expansion to Turkey,

from

1950s and 1960s has disappeared.

and unified policy preference for German

to put forth a coherent

labor has diminished. This has allowed the

Merkel

in the

BDA have become

to support

and those tending

to

governance of industry and business

more European and global

orientation have

tended to support European integration and expansion efforts as to improve their
competitiveness, market shares, and export opportunities. They have also
greatly involved in EU-level lobbying

and consultation such

Business Dialogue which

in a later section

is

discussed
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become more

as in the Transatlantic

of this chapter. The smaller and

mid-sized firms of the Mittelstand are less secure about their ability to survive

broader European marketplace and have

by the imposition of strict

The only

fiscal

interest that

preferred European policies

the

relatively inconsistent position

some measures of protectionism and subsidy

and anti-subsidy policies from Maastricht and

seems

is

lost

to

in a

have remained rather unified

EMU.

in stating its

Green Front of agriculture. The Green Front has had a

on European integration

maintenance of high subsidies through the

was dominantly favorable towards

the

was promised continuing subsidy by

EU

the

Common

that has rested solely

Agricultural Policy.

and integration

German

in the

state that has

on the

The Green Front

1950s and 1960s as

it

been higher than those

promised through CAP. fJowever, since the 1980s, the Kohl, Schroder, and Merkel

governments have been increasingly

critical

agricultural reform. This has generally been

within the

EU

of CAP and have pushed for some

moderated by the Franco-German pact

and hence German governments have not pushed

hard. Nonetheless, this has shifted

EU

for

such demands very

Green Front support away from the government's

positions on integration. Since the 1980s, they have increased contacts with agricultural

groups

in

other

EU

states including

France and

maintenance of the existing system of subsidy

Italy to collectively

in

opposition to the

lobby for the

German

state's

EU

policy preferences.

Chancellors since the 1990s, including both Schroder and Merkel, have attempted

to

become more prominent

and cajoling the

in

brokering deals on

social partners,

EU

and other relevant

policy between the major interests

actors, to accept

compromises.

(Jeffery and Paterson 2004; Paterson 2005) Yet they are meeting fiercer resistance than in

previous eras and are often forced to bypass the social partners and
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make

deals on Europe

policy across the aisle with opposition parties. This

was

especially true under Gerhard

Schroder who, after abandoning the Alliance for Jobs, sought consensus with the

CDU/CSU

on major domestic and European policy

grand coalition of the

CDU/CSU

In essence, the increased

and

SPD

initiatives.

has continued this trend with success so

made compromise and consensus
issues.

far.

pace and scope of European integration and governance

EU

has dynamically changed the social partners' positions on the

European policy

Angela Merkel, leading a

since the 1980s and has

quite difficult to secure on a range of domestic

Europeanization has been most costly

in

and

dividing the peak

associations internally, between those in favor of greater integration and those opposed.

This has

made policymaking

at the national social

partnership level even less successful

given that peak associations can rarely find internal consensus

compromise with

the interests across the table.

its

the

German

to the

good thing

to just

for

Germany had dropped

below 60%, well above the

while Europeanization

is

to less than

40%

found

certainly dividing

its

and integration has

membership
this

in the

EU

had rebounded

more Germans than
its

in previous eras, there

institutions far greater than

southern neighbor.

There have been a number of investigations into the impact of European
integration

upon elements of the German

social partnership.

These cases

illustrate a

significant variation in the impacts and policy outputs of Europeanization
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was

(The Economist 2007) Hence

remains a rather strong overall support for the project and
has been found in

EU

40%. Yet by 2006

in Austria.

be able to

political system. (Padgett,

Paterson, and Smith 2003; Paterson 2005) In 1996, belief that

a

less

economic challenges and the

commitment

increasing scope and pace of Europeanization,

become more generally contested throughout

Given

much

upon

the

German policymaking system and
significant evidence to help test

social partnership. Nonetheless, these provide

its

and assess the Europeanization framework and

its

theoretical propositions.

The Europeanization of German Procurement Policy
Martin Lodge explored the impact of Europeanization upon the public

procurement process

one

that

in

Germany. The system of public procurement had tended

favored “national champions" and cartels of German firms

and services

to the state. This

became

in

to

be

providing goods

a deeply ingrained tool of the state, through the

Federal Cartel Office, to both subsidize and regulate

German

firms that signed

procurement contracts with the German government. This was strongest
construction and food service industries that

in the

would gain government contracts

for

major

infrastructure projects and food service at public facilities. Europeanization provided both

formal and informal pressure to

would
that

make

likely concurrently reduce

the procurement process

that

government influence over German firms, assuming

more procurement would be done from other European

reduce the de facto subsidies that

more competitive

German

or global firms,

firms, especially those in smaller

and would
and medium

sized industries had long enjoyed. (Lodge 2000)

The German

state

and major

accommodation and harmonization
for quite

some

interests, including

to the

time. In construction,

EU’s

German

legal

both labor and industry, resisted

and informal competition policies

construction firms sought protection from

foreign competition especially low bidding firms from Southern, and later. Eastern

Europe. The construction workers’ unions also opposed change given the greater
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likelihood of non-German firms using

interests

were opposed

to significant reform.

significant indirect pressures to

German

labor.

However and

Hence many domestic

intriguingly.

Lodge uncovered

harmonize government procurement policy including

German bureaucracy and

greater professionalization of the

the

more non-German

courts to defer to and cite

ECJ

rulings

the increasing willingness

on competition policy

in

German

of

cases

despite the lack of explicit legal conditions to do so. (Lodge 2000)

The eventual reforms
process for procurement

in

in

passed

that

Germany and

1998 moderately liberalized the competition

in

illustrated both the

impact of Europeanization

attempting to harmonize or converge domestic procurement policies but also reflected

domestic protectionist interests

from German firms.

EU

legal

in

maintaining some levels of preferential procurement

and bureaucratic terminology were integrated into the new

directives of the procurement system and created greater administrative and legal

oversight of the operations of the cartel office and

its

operations.

However, some

protections for smaller and mid-sized firms remained intact, especially in the construction

industry.

Many

of these compromises were devised due to strong efforts of the trades and

crafts associations related to the legislation.

sources of reform were

level.

The

as, if not

As Lodge

argues, the importance of domestic

more, important than the forces from the supranational

(Lodge 2000)

Transatlantic Business Dialogue and the

Cowles
government

German

asserts that the creation

of a

BDI

distinct

relations has results in significant

European

changes

in the

level

of business-

domestic orientation of

firms in both the policymaking process and in peak industry associations such as
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)

the

BDI and

specific sectoral interest associations.

Business Dialogue

(TABD)

Her study of the Transatlantic

posits that these forms of informal transnational

and EU-

and business alliances are undermining the national and domestic sectoral

level trade

associations by changing the focus of German businesses

European

)

level

away from

the domestic to the

of lobbying and coordination. The increasing role of the

representing the

community

in trade

negotiations with

States, other regional trading blocs such as

GATT,

Mercosur, and

in

the

EU

WTO,

in

the United

other bilateral talks such as

with Japan, China, and India has exacerbated this trend. This dilutes the relevance of

domestic national industry and sectoral associations and creates a reinforcing misfit

between domestic and

TABD,
UNICE,
a range

EU

levels

of interest representation and mediation. (Cowles 2001

unlike the formally recognized peak association of business in the

has demonstrated a

much

closer relationship with the European

of issues but most importantly

in trade

where

European business”. These close linkages between
resulted in

what Cowles terms as

Cowles argues

that

it

as

TABD

“elite pluralism” at the

TABD

emerged

EU,

Commission on

as “the voice of

and the Commission have

EU

level.

(2001

and neo-corporatist patterns found

in the

German

system, specifically the highly centralized BDI, results in a lack of direct lobbying in lieu

of concertation. The decentralization of the BDI and of German industry on a range of
issues, including

European integration and

firm lobbying

both the

from the

at

traditional

EU

and national

German model

in

trade, has led to a pattern

levels.

which

(Cowles 2001

“direct lobbying

)

of greater individual

This diverges strongly

by private firms and the use

of professional lobbyists” was both “uncommon” and raised “suspicions of the
inappropriate political manipulation by capital interests”. (Kohler-Koch 1993, 27)

480

This has led to problems for the

home and

interests at

UNICE. The
far

EU

at the

result has

level

BDI

in effectively

where they had

been an increase

in the

representing

traditionally

BDI involvement

German

business

worked through

in

TABD though

being

from substantial. Major German firms such as BASF, DaimlerChrysler, Hoechst,

Bayer, ThyssenKrupp. and Siemens have demonstrated increasing willingness to bypass

the

BDI and UNICE

for the

EU

TABD and other more informal but more

influential patterns

This had led to increasing willingness of the firms to do the

of lobbying

at

same

domestic level where direct lobbying and pluralist interest representation was

at the

once quite
and

the

Hence Europeanization has had

rare.

institutions

level.

a

number of indirect

effects

on the actors

of the German social partnership by altering the methods and modes of

operation of German firms that were learned and replicated from those

at

the

EU

level.

(Cowles 2001; Schmidt 2006)

The Europeanization of German Transport Policy
The case of the Europeanization of German

transport policy

is

also notable.

extension of

EU

road and

transport after 1985 and 1991 created direct and indirect pressure

rail

directives

and

legislation to include the liberalization

The

of trans-border

on the

German systems of road haulage and

railway governance. Interestingly, there were few

precise or explicit directives from the

EU

significant latitude in addressing

on transport policy, giving member

states

and reforming access and competition within

their

systems. Nonetheless, even the modest additional pressure helped swing the balance of

existing reform efforts.

(Kerwer and Teutsch 2001; Hertier 2001; Teutsch 2001; Hertier

and Knill 2001; Dyson 2003)
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)

The

EU

began addressing competition

in rail

and road haulage sectors

Single European Act of 1985 and Maastricht Treaty of 1991.

The

after the

directives and

overarching trends of liberalization and removal of barriers to transnational economic
activities altered the preexisting political will

transport policy and governance.

The

and coalitions organized around German

existing road haulage and railway systems were

characterized by high levels of state intervention and strong sectoral neo-corporatism

between the major transport

interests.

Despite increasingly uncompetitive trends

including higher transport costs, taxes, fees, and decreasing flexibility, change

slow

in

developing

The

until the late 1980s.

was

quite

(Teutsch 2001

existing road haulage system

was one

that severely limited

and regulated

long-distance and short-distance trucking through restrictive licensing procedures, rate

controls,

and

later

high usage fees. The system tended to be subordinated to the

maintenance of the national
protected the

enterprises.

rail

rail

system through the imposition of taxes and fees

that

system's competitiveness and protected small and mid-sized trucking

While overseen by the Transport Ministry, the system was dominated by the

social partners of the transport sector including the business association of haulers or

Bundesverband des Deutschen Giitenfernverkehr (BDF)
or Bundesverband Giitenfernverkehr

and Logistik

that has
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BGL

since 1997, the drivers' unions, as well

as the national railway and their employee's trade unions that

uncompetitive and closed system of road haulage.

been known as the

all

benefited from a rather

The Transport Ministry was

also staffed by

many former members of the

road

haulage industry and labor unions. This created a very close-knit and nepotistic

policymaking and governance process. The agency responsible

was dominated by
Railways

for oversight, the

BAG,

the haulers association and unions as well.

in

Germany were even more concentrated

within a narrow

policymaking and governance process. The railways, Deutsches Bundesbahn (DBB), and
later

renamed Deutsche Bahn (DB)

after the

merger of the western and eastern railway

systems, had remained one of the few primary nationalized services of the postwar era.

While strongly stressing

German

state

and

its

need of DB

the

to fulfill

citizens, the railways

public service obligations to the

had strong autonomy over

administrative council, responsible for almost

was compromised of railway union

its

all

its

operations.

Its

of the internal decision-making of DB

representatives, industry

and agricultural

associations, provincial governments, and road transport and inland shipping

associations. (Teutsch 2001

)

Hence both road haulage and railways generally

traditional sectoral-based neo-corporatist

Reforms
until the 1990s.

to both road

in

late

1980s but sputtered

Teutsch and others argue that Europeanization was a decisive factor
to liberalization

and reform. This was more so

in

in

road

railways where there was less explicit EU-level pressure to reform.

(Teutsch 2001; Hertier and Knill 2001
transport

model of governance and policymaking.

haulage and railways began in the

overcoming national opposition
haulage than

reflected a

were due

to the ability

)

Nonetheless, the changes

of Europeanization

and change the coalition of domestic actors

in

to refraine the

both areas of

debate over reform

favor of either continuity or change.

(Teutsch 2001; Hertier 2001, Hertier and Knill 2001)
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in

Hence

the impacts were primarily indirect rather than direct as they influenced the

domestic political actors rather than requiring a specific institutional or policy
transposition or act.

In road haulage, the

terms of directives or

threat

Common

Transport Policy of the

new forms of regulation from

of Europeanization and the need

to liberalize

Brussels.

rather

However, the

in favor

change. At the
initially rather

outnumbered

EU

opposed

in the

to

new

and early 1990s, Germany’s position was

road haulage liberalization. However, judging that they were

Council of Ministers, they began

liberalization proposals if

implicit

EU-level provided the impetus to enact

at the

level during the late 1980s

in

of such reform. (Teutsch

2001; Schmidt 2006) The increased economic pressure of integration and
opportunities for pro-liberalization actors

weak

road haulage became a decisive factor

domestic coalitions of political actors

in altering the

EU was

and only

if

to tentatively support

road haulage

they were accompanied by tax and usage fee

harmonization by others members. This was opposed by the Netherlands where lower
taxes and fees on road haulage constituted a comparative advantage over

haulers they did not wish to concede.

There was some limited

fiscal

Germany was only

partially successful in

in

efforts.

favor of liberalization in the Council

of Ministers. Nonetheless, the resulting directives provided significant

German government would implement

latitude in

how

reforms. (Teutsch 2001)

Germany was

able to

more successfully defend

national protectionism and interventionism at the

Italy

its

harmonization on road haulage policy, the best Germany

could achieve given the overwhelming majority

In railway policy,

Germany’s

and France. (Kerwer and Teutsch 2001

)

EU

level

Nonetheless,
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existing

by finding stronger

EU

allies in

legislation, overarching

the

concerns over German railway competitiveness, and abiding by overall
policy led

Germany

to seek significant

even without an explicit
2001

call

from the

reform

EU

to

at the

do

so.

EU

competition

domestic level by the mid 1990s

(Teutsch 2001; Hertier and Knill

)

There had been a number of actors seeking reforms
railways prior to the

by other transport

movements within

interests

governance process

and

the

in

both road haulage and

EU. Yet these were outnumbered or mitigated

their legal or factual vetoes over the

in the transport sector. Notably,

policymaking and

German manufacturers and

industries had been increasingly critical of the high transport costs within

hampered

their regional competitiveness in the

government had been
sufficient consensus

from the vested

that

European markets. While the Kohl

of deregulation and liberalization,

in favor

Germany

it

was unable

to

social partners in the transport associations

gamer

a

and

unions to enact major reforms. These domestic veto points effectively slowed reform
efforts until the

By

mid 1990s. (Teutsch 2001)

the late 1990s however, the

Kohl government was able

to utilize the

changing

circumstances of Europeanization to manufacture sufficient consent for reform of the
system. This was

still

and required significant governmental shepherding, yet as

difficult

Teutsch argues, without the additional pressures of Europeanization the reforms would

have likely remained mere proposals. In road haulage, industrial and manufacturing
associations, blocked

from the

press, with the support

Justice

where

it

rail

and road haulage sectoral governance, were able

to

of the Kohl government, the issue through the European Court of

was expected

that they

would

rule against the existing

system as an

infringement on European competition rules. The explicit threat of an upcoming
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ECJ

)

ruling provided cover for

many

in the

Transport Ministry, parliament, unions, and haulers

associations to accept the need for reform and push forward. Interestingly, the

failed to achieve the ruling as expected, nonetheless,

tipped in favor of reform and liberalization that

by

that

ECJ case

time the scales had already

was enacted

in

1998. (Teutsch 2001;

Dyson 2003)
In railways, the

and the general

reunification

was no overarching
rail

impact of the
state

EU was

of German

directive or impetus

reforms. Nonetheless, there

less

rail

pronounced than the impacts of
and industrial competitiveness. There

from the Council of Ministers or ECJ

was an important

indirect implication

Europeanization that did help built a consensus over national
discussions

The

at the

w hich

and argument was

Ongoing

at the

was eventually going

national level.

to be a directive to

reform the railways and there existed a short “window of opportunity”

to address the

German

that there

from

reform.

EU-level on railway liberalization paralleled those

implicit threat

liberalize or

rail

to enact

in

longstanding problems of the system. The previously formed

Transport Forum, comprised of major enterprises, academics in transport

economics, and other pro-liberalization actors, found a more congenial atmosphere for
their

demands both

to rail reform

DB

in 1993.

in the

became

government and

difficult

Hence while

EU

in the vested rail interests. Outright opposition

and resulted

in the eventual privatization

railway policies did not

initiate

German

and split-up of

reforms, they did

reinforce existing trends by boosting the pro-liberalization interests' agenda and

providing sufficient impetus to enact reforms. (Teutsch 2001
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The new road haulage

rules in

Germany

included (he abolishing of the restrictive

licensing and rate controls, allowed free access to foreign haulers (provided that they

relatively high

EU

and national standards), and a reassignment of the duties once

performed by the neo-corporatist bodies such as

BAG, which was

abolished, to a

government oversight agency. (Teutsch 2001; Hertier and Knill 2001
incorporating

met

new environmental

standards directed by

EU

practices into the road transport industry. (Hertier 2001)

)

new

This also included

requirements for best

The

results

of liberalization of

road haulage potentially marked the end of sectoral corporatism through the loosening of
the private-public relationship

and transformation

to direct state administration

finance of oversight. (Teutsch 2001; Hertier and Knill 2001

made

in the vocational

)

This paralleled the changes

education system discussed in chapter seven that concurrently

reduced the role of the social partners

in lieu

of a larger

state function in administration

and financing. (Vail 2003; Streeck and Hassel 2004) Overall, the developments
haulage

in

and

Germany make

it

less likely that the sectoral interests

in

road

of transport will

continue the privileged access to the policymaking and governance process into the
future. (Teutsch

2001)

In railways, the results

were quite

different.

The railways workers’ unions and

other sectoral interests supported moderate reforms and limited the extent of

liberalization

state role in

and reform. The unions. Lander, and other

interests

ensured a continued

major railway decisions including infrastructure, pensions and healthcare of

existing and retired workers, and the necessity of large offsetting side-payments to unions

and Lander as a

result

of the privatization program. While the railways were privatized

and administration of rail policy switched

to direct state oversight, sectoral interest
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associations were able to shape and regulate the privatization process and limit the levels

of liberalization seen

in

codetermination powers

and pro-liberalization
rates.

road haulage reforms. The unions were able to gain large
in the

interests

newly spun-off private enterprises of

saw an increasing capacity

DB

for flexibility

while industry

and competitive

(Teutsch 2001

The tw o cases of road haulage and railways

illustrate that

not even have identical implications for policy within the

same

specific sectoral institutions and structures of road haulage

Europeanization does

political system.

The

and railways generated

differentiated responses in the policymaking and governance process. Additionally,

Europeanization was not equally as influential
specific types, levels,

in

each policy area dependent upon the

and urgency of directives from the EU. (Teutsch 2001; Hertier and

Knill 2001; Schmidt 2006)

German implementation programs
Italy,

also differed from those in Britain, France,

and the Netherlands, reinforcing the idea of differential responses

to

Europeanization as dependent upon specific national institutional factors. (Teutsch 2001;
Hertier 2001; Knill 2001; Schmidt 2006) While there had been

reform road haulage and railways policies prior
directives, these pro-liberalization forces

and

actors.

camp’s

favor.

to the establishment

of new

to

EU

were checked by existing privileged

The consequences of EU demand

liberalization

some domestic pressure

interests

for reform tipped the balance in the

The system was one

that

had primarily rested upon the

cooperation of public and private actors, typical of German semi-sovereignty.
Nonetheless, there was a higher degree of state intervention and oversight than
other areas of governance, a

common

many

practice in regards to transport policy, especially in
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national

rail

systems. (Teutsch 2001

;

Hertier 2001

government, actors, and social partners strongly
results

)

The

specific responses of the

illustrate the

mixed and contingent

of Europeanization on domestic structures of governance and neo-corporatism.

(Dyson 2003) Importantly, domestic forces of economic transformation,
endogenous pushes

for reform

may have been

and perhaps

more reduced function

a slightly

social partnership

due

to Europeanization

endogenous or exogenous
such as

German

political

is

interest

and

in

in railways reform. Structural

likely to

road haulage

change

in

be exacerbated or mitigated by other

and economic developments within the member

reunification or changes in the Austrian coalition government.

The changing of government and governing
changing

unification,

the primary explanation for structural

change, but Europeanization had an important and perhaps decisive role

states,

German

group

priorities

the pressures of Europeanization

may be
upon

coalitions, domestic

economic changes,

quite important in either limiting or amplifying

and

social partnerships. (Hertier 2001, Falkner

Leiber 2004; Lodge 2000; Hix and Goetz 2000; Dyson 2003) This also supports the

Europeanization hypothesis that the primary determinants of structural change are the
specific institutional characteristics

and patterns of social partnership

at

the national level.

(Hertier 2001)

Conclusion: The Future of Social Partnership

The
Austria.

future of social partnership in

While there has been

Germany seems

less institutional

change

in

Germany

bleak, far

this is

terms of overall structural change,

it

would appear
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that the

in

because the German social

partnership has less institution than the Austrian model. (Casey and

in

more so than

Gold 2000) However,

German model has

suffered

a

more

critical

break from the past and has experienced significant structural dissolution

of the social partnership
part of the overall

almost every

at

German model, has

level.

As some

suggest, the social partnership, as

taken, rightfully or wrongly,

two decades of economic decline and increasing

the past

much of the blame

social conflict. (Harding

for

and

Paterson 2000)
Nonetheless,

and

influential part

many

suggest that the social partnership can and will remain a vital

of the German policymaking and collective bargaining process into

the foreseeable future.

Hancock suggests

that the social partnership

of joint govemment-

employer-labor relations could become more specialized and sector-oriented and
reinvigorate corporatism in

Germany by

(Hancock 1989; Turner 1998)

In

creating a

more dynamic and

many ways German

flexible version.

social partnership, because of

its

decentralization and lack of formal and rigid institutionalization has been far better at

withstanding some of the economic, political, and social pressures that weakened the
Austrian social partnership. The slightly weaker

pluralistic

policy-making framework have made

However, the preexisting

institutions

ties to political parties

it

slightly

more maneuverable.

of social partnership, having been

challenged by the economic, social, and political pressures of the
longer be commensurate to the tasks of reform.

that

now

was

a

major asset provided by the

The very

exogenous conditions

that

made

last thirty years,

“stability

in a

political order. (Kitschelt

of the postwar era

changed global,

and Streeck 2004) The

the social partnership so valuable and effective

1940s through 1970s have changed Since the 1980s, the economic and political
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may no

and incrementalism”

social partnership for the bulk

appears as a barrier to constructive reform and response

European, and German economic and

and the more

from the

environments continue

became

to

transform themselves while Germany’s political institutions

barriers to “productive adjustment”

and innovation. (Kitschelt and Streeck 2004;

Vail 2003) These exogenous shocks, including the oils shocks of the 1970s, the end of

the

Cold War and

unification, increasing globalization of the

economy, and rapid

widening and deepening of European integration have certainly ended the trends
signified the

German economic

Deutschland

is

miracle.

Whether

this implies the

that

end of Modell

another question. (Harding and Paterson 2000)

In terms

of Europeanization however, the German social partnership has probably

faced fewer challenges than that in Austria. This will be discussed in significantly

detail in the next chapter.

The long-term

integration of

1

950s presented a very different dynamic

1

990s.

The mere

size of the

that that

German economy and

European trade has also insulated

it

Germany

into the

EU

since the

which Austria faced by the
its

importance

more

1

980s and

in international

and

from the same types of concerns and dilemmas

that

faced Austrian interests in the 1980s.

As
influential

important

a major center of industry, trade,

and commerce and an important and

member of the EU, Germany and
in

its

political

system remain tremendously

domestic, European, and global politics. Austrians cannot say the same and

viewed integration as an unavoidable necessity and understood
from

a position

recognize that

of weakness. German interests

Germany

has, does,

their integration to

be

in labor, business, or agriculture, all

and will have a large and important national economy

as well as an integrally important European and global

economy. The stakes of national

politics in Berlin are far greater than those in

Vienna leading

the future of the national policymaking level.

Hence while unions,
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to far less resignation over

business, and

agriculture certainly see the policymaking arena as a two-level

strongly federal

Germany

as high. Austrian business

German

An

interests

case of

in the

a multi-level game, the importance of both levels

is

perceived

and labor clearly saw the eclipse of the national system by

Brussels and opted to sacrifice

level.

game, or

some

national authority for a seat at the supranational

chose to continue

to operate strongly at both.

additional possible continuity for the social partnership in

Germany

has been

the central role of the Chancellor in organizing, sustaining, and moderating the

consensus-building process amongst the peak associations. The continuity of Chancellor

Democracy

in the

Federal Republic under both

CDU

and

SPD

leadership has created an

informal, but structural set of expectations, interactions, and coordinated policy debate

that all actors

have come to rely upon. Unlike the Austrian model

the links

between the chambers and major

upon the

political transitions that

upon

German system

have changed the party system and

stable executive leadership. This

likely to

parties, the

that

may make

the system less

was dominated by
is

less

relies

dependent

more heavily

autonomous and more

be shaped by the political and economic leanings of the person seated

in the

Chancellery. However, under subsequent chancellors from Kohl, Schroder, and Merkel
there has been an increasing trend of marginalization of the social partners by the

government. This peaked during the

abandoned almost

all

latter stages

of the Schroder government as he

the structures of social partnership for unilateral policymaking and

a stronger state role in

economic governance previously unseen

in the

semi-sovereign

federal republic. (Vail 2003; Streeck 2005)

The German model of social partnership was never
always dominant model of decision and policymaking
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the monopolistic or even

in all

policy areas of the federal

republic.

It

has coexisted with

more

pluralist, executive-driven,

policymaking processes for much of the postwar
1993; Fuchs and

Koch

era.

and party-oriented

(Casey and Gold 2000; von

Beyme

1991; Fichter 2005) Yet in critical areas of economic governance

including the labor market, vocational training, collective bargaining, and consensual

policymaking the social partnership was nearly supreme. This model seems
fully discredited

to

have been

by the increasing decentralization of collective bargaining and worker-

firm codetermination and the eventual marginalization from the policymaking process by

the Kohl, Schroder,

training,

and Merkel governments

and social insurance that

fell

in areas

of labor market reform, vocational

squarely under the direct governance of the social

partners during the bulk of the postwar era. (Vail 2003; Vitols 2004)

Even worse,

the

quasi-regulatory and administrative roles in operating vocational training and job

placement have been permanently placed

in the

hand of the

state, further

reducing the

efficacy and legitimacy of the social partners in providing services directly to

German

workers, industry, and citizens. (Streeck and Hassel 2004; Vail 2003) Perhaps the most
notably portent of the decline of neo-corporatism and social partnership has been towards

the

weakening of the

direct responsibility

postwar

era.

ideal

of semi -sovereignty as the

and governance

in the

state has taken

German economy

on higher levels of

since the immediate

(Green and Paterson 2005; Busch 2005; Streeck 2005; Katzenstein 2005;

Schmidt 2006)

Some
is

still

“condemned

system was

remain optimism and suggest

to succeed”.

that the

German way of neo-corporatism

(Wessels 2000) Just a decade ago even those

in decline felt that

neo-corporatism would likely remain

in

felt

the

some

circumscribed and salient form for the foreseeable future. (Gobeyn 1993;
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who

Kuhlmann

2004) The general mistrust of the neo-liberal model suggests
distinct

that

Germany

remain

will

from any Anglo-American model, yet the significant decentralization and de-

legitimization of the social partnership and social partners suggests a continuing crisis.

(

Bemdt 2000) Probably

the one area

determination. There has been

little

where the

social partnership

is

most secure

is

co-

attempt to fundamentally alter or reduce worker

representation in firms, quite to the contrary codetermination laws expanded during the

past decade despite increasing opposition from the Mittlestand. Nonetheless, the system

of works councils and codetermination between workers and firms seems quite
(Harding and Sorge 2000; Turner 1997) While
relations in

Germany

it

seems clear

will continue to exhibit their

towards social partnership,

its

future does not

own

stable.

that state-capital-labor

distinct institutional tendencies

seem secure and

is at risk to

wholesale

abandonment. (Fichter 2005)

The poor records of Concerted Action and
social partnership has a future in

institution as

it

remains

Germany

in Austria. (Fichter

it

the Alliance for Jobs suggest that if

will likely not

emerge as

a national-level

2005) The increasing decentralization of

collective bargaining and the disorganization of the peak associations of labor and

business further weaken such potentialities. (Casey and Gold 2000;

increasing

w illingness

Bemdt 2000) The

of governments to bypass or circumvent the social partners and to

enact policy under Kohl, Schroder, and Merkel governments shows

little

sign of

reversing. In fact, given recent reform efforts over the labor market, healthcare, pensions,

and European integration, the evidence suggests an even stronger
social partnership.
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momentum away from

However,

Commission

as the end result of the labor market reform through the Hartz

illustrated, the social partners

were an important part of the implementation

of the policy. (Vitols 2004) Social partnership remains influential

system even under

its

more circumscribed and reduced

Neo-corporatism has maintained some resilience and
bargaining and codetermination even though

it

in the

German

role by the early 21

utility in

political

s1

century.

some areas of collect

has lost significant influence and control

over economic governance of labor markets, vocational training, and social insurance.

Unions and business

interests

remain crucial players

and importance. While

to their size

have perhaps permanently

lost their

German model. The

the postwar

still

in the

influential in the

German

political

system due

policymaking process, they

once guaranteed and integral positions

overall concern that the social partners

common

to

and the social

partnership are failing to address and promote the kind of consensual innovation and

compromise
their decline.

The

made

that

the system so successful in previous eras has been at the heart of

(Casey and Gold 2000)

belief that the social partners are merely defenders of preexisting privilege

and are dedicated

to continued insulation

of their

own

interests alone

undermines the

normative and social underpinnings of the social partnership as a means to achieve a
positive, national solidarity

on economic and social policy. (Bemdt 2000) Some are even

more pessimistic and suggest
adapt and adjust

vitality for the

trap”.

is

that the

German

system, due to the inability to quickly

likely to continue to face a scenario

foreseeable future as interests and parties are trapped in a “joint decision

(Scharpf 1988; Kitschelt and Streeck 2004)

institutions,

of declining economic and social

and structures may be required

New

problem-solving capacities,

to address the issues
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of the post-industrial.

post-unification, post-Maastricht

social partnership can

remain viable

has potentially resulted

reform

ossified

is

actors. (Kitschelt

However,

in the

by the

in

“German

institutional

political

the resilient

and structural power of past success and entrenched

German

coalition as the best

way

and divisions

in

insurance compromise,

German

make any meaningful headway

72%

demands

voters preferred grand

society on urgent policy reforms.

in labor

of the population believed that

(Schrim 2002) Social partnership, for
social

that

and implement meaningful consensus between the major

German

Alliance for Jobs failed to

electorate’s wish to seek

reforms through the promulgation of grand

political

2005 and 2006 suggested
to find

German

will likely be critical to the

(Turner 1998; Fichter 2005)

political system.

elections have generally reflected the

and

unclear whether the

disease” where the search for innovation and

coalition. Polling in

political

is

it

such a changed environment. (Fichter 2005) This

power of institutions and norms

consensus on major economic and

interests

economy, and

and Streeck 2004; The Economist 2006a)

future of social partnership in the

The 2005

German

all its

for consensual

failings

may

it

still

Even

after the

market or social

was “a good

institution”.

reflect the implicit

German

and collective decision-making above other

considerations.
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CHAPTER

8

ASSESSING CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN THE AUSTRIAN AND GERMAN
SOCIAL PARTNERSHIPS WITHIN THE EUROPEANIZATION FRAMEWORK
Introduction

The comparative

analysis in the last four chapters provides

some of the

evidentiary data necessary to utilize and test the applicability of the Europeanization

framework
changes

as well as a general assessment of the development, institutionalization,

in the

German and Austrian

model of Cowles, Caporaso, and
the

German and Austrian

According

social partnerships.

Risse, the institutional

cases are vital in understanding their

endeavors

to

determine

As noted
if,

in the

to the theoretical

and structural variations amongst

of Europeanization, as well as the structural changes that
adaptational pressures.

may

fit

or

or misfit to the impact

may

to

what extent European integration and

governance correlates to or causes domestic change or continuity and

2001

not arise from such

preliminary chapter, the Europeanization literature

how, when, and

variation in such continuity or

and

change from

state to state.

to assess the

(Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse

)

This concluding chapter will accomplish several tasks.

First

it

will assess

how

well the Europeanization framework developed by Cowles, Risse, and Caporaso applies

to the cases

of German and Austrian social partnership. The findings below suggest that

while the framework provides a formalized theoretical model for evaluating

Europeanization that

may have some

utility,

the evidence from the social partnership

illuminates significant deficits and failings. Consequently, this chapter shall also discuss

and suggest,
strategies

in light

of the Austrian and German experiences, future or more appropriate

of analyzing, exploring, and explaining the process and implications of
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Europeanization. Second, this chapter will assess to what extent the social partnerships
Austria and

Germany have been transformed by

pressures emanating from the European

level

of governance and policymaking. Here the findings are also mixed. The

show

that while in

some

in

results

policy areas and sectors, such as monetary, fiscal, and

competition policy, there has been pressure and some subsequent change due to
Europeanization. However, depending upon the issue, the policy and structural outputs

have been so variable and differentiated

to mitigate

complicated by two additional factors. The ability
versus other endogenous and exogenous forces

is

any generalization. This

to quarantine the

is

impacts of Europe

problematic given the interrelated and

interdependent qualities of the multi-level European political model. The lack of a hard

and uniform model of European policymaking and governance also suggests
states

have extraordinary potential

governance

to adapt, reform, or

member

that

continue existing patterns of

to a large extent.

Third, this chapter will conclude with an assessment of the future of the social

partnership and neo-corporatist patterns of governance and policymaking

and European

levels.

Whereas

many

it

cases, especially in Austria, but even in

has

shown remarkable

some

sectors of the

system as well. In some cases, including European Monetary Union

Growth and

Stability Pact,

German

(EMU) and

the

European integration has certainly achiveied significant

limitations on neo-corporatist as well as

policy has also undermined

social partners in a

domestic

the scholarship pessimistically predicted an almost

deterministic decline in neo-corporatism since the 1990s,

resiliency in

at the

many

many of the once

other forms of governance. Competition

tight relationships

number of sectors. This was
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between the

especially true in Austria

state

where

and

significant privatization

later sections

to

part

of the integration process. Yet, as will be discussed

of this chapter, integration has continued

partnership at both the

from 2000,

was

EU

and national

Notable

levels.

to

is

in

allow significant space of social
the Lisbon Strategy, developed

promote employment, social cohesion, and a more competitive knowledge-

based economy. This has stabilized social partnership
providing a potential boost for such structures
a decline throughout

at the

in

EU

many European
level.

While

it

states as well as

has certainly seen

Western Europe, neo-corporatism has not become extinct nor

efficacy in spite of the

numerous challenges

it

has weathered over the

last

lost all

three decades.

Assessing Misfit Between European and Domestic Neo-C’orporatist Governance

There has been

a general

have significantly contributed
decades.

As

argument

that

to the decline

European integration and governance

of neo-corporatism over the past two

Streeck and Schmitter suggested “the resurgence of European integration, as

signified by the Single

European Act and the

internal

market project, was more than just

incidentally related to the demise of national corporatism in the 1980s”. (Streeck and

Schmitter 1991, 144)
Additional integration efforts in the 1990s including Maastricht and
intensify this trend. Streeck

EMU

would

and Schmitter’s works of the early 1990s suggested an

inevitable marginalization of national patterns of neo-corporatist governance linked to the

growing importance and pluralism

at the

supranational level. The governance patterns

in

Brussels emerged as "more pluralist” than neo-corporatist or corporatist leading to both
the eschewing of the few neo-corporatist institutions created at the

European

level as well

as the increasing marginalization of national patterns of social partnership. (Streeck and
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Schmitter 1991; Streeck 1991; Hix and Goetz 2001; Dyson 2003) In terms of neocoiporatist institutions at the

EU

level,

Streeek and Schmitter argued that Euro-

corporatism had “failed” and that the interest representation and policymaking process

was more organizationally fragmented,

“much more

less hierarchical, internally competitive,

pluralist” than national political

and

systems that utilized neo-corporatist

arrangements.

The supranational
corporatist

institutions in Brussels that

and neo-functionalist organization,

and policymaking lacked the

were created

to reflect neo-

interest representation

viability, influence, solidarity

and intermediation,

of members, and veto

authority that social partners found in their national models of neo-corporatism. (Streeck

and Schmitter 1991; Dyson 2003) The European Economic and Social Committee, while
a part of the Treaty of

and policy influence

Rome meant

at the

EU

to generate consistent support

level,

to the

never accomplished meaningful influence and failed

and solidarity amongst the EU-level social partners. The

partners themselves, represented by

commitment

form of neo-corporatist representation

to establish a

ETUC, UNICE, and

others lacked cohesion,

EU-level interest umbrella organizations, and rarely found consensus

and compromise with each

other.

The

overall decline of unions and the increasing

decentralization of business and industry throughout Europe added to their inability to

functionally operate as social partners at the

EU

level.

(Streeck and Schmitter 1991;

Streeck 1991)

In

more

terms of neo-corporatism

optimistic.

at the

national level, Streeck and Schmitter were

The “heyday of corporatism” was

exogenous economic conditions, and

after the
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no

a decidedly “national response” to

1980s those conditions had changed as

Europe was seeking transnational mechanisms of cooperation and governance
issues of integration, global competitiveness,

employment, and monetary policy. National

neo-corporatism was antithetical to European integration,
through the 1970s.

due precisely

By

the 1980s,

to the failure

when

the will for

initially

slowing the process

European integration returned,

governance

that they

it

was

of neo-corporatism to adjust to the changing international

economic environment. The necessity of expanded European integration
to the declining ability

to address

efforts

was due

of social partnerships to provide the kinds of successful economic

had from the 1950s. But European integration meant a transfer of

“effective sovereignty” to the

European

such as monetary policy

level in areas

already reduced versions of the past Keynesian capacities of the

member

that

states.

were

This

“supranational pooling of eroded national sovereignties over economic policy” resulted in
the eventual “devaluation” of domestic political resources of the social partnership.

some

structures

may “remain

viable for

some

time”, neo-corporatism as

While

was known

it

had become “a matter of the past”. (Streeck and Schmitter 1991, 150) Hence one of the
primary and direct explanations for the decline of neo-corporatism was the

European

level

rise

of

governance.

Streeck and Schmitter are effectively arguing that neo-corporatism and European

modes of governance possess

a strong misfit or misalignment.

supranational pooling of sovereignty, a

more

The challenges from

policymaking process, reduced

pluralist

national monetary autonomy, increased roles for subnational governments, reduced

efficacy of EU-level neo-corporatist institutions, and a de-emphasis of social rights and

industrial citizenship all suggested a continual decline

level

and

little

hope of reversing such

tides at the
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EU

of neo-corporatism

level.

at

the national

Streeck and Schmitter did not

place the comprehensive decline of neo-corporatism purely

at the feet

of European

integration, citing increasing post-materialism, post-Fordism, decentralization of interest

associations, and de-industrialization as other important forces. (Streeck and Schmitter

1991, 147) These shortcomings themselves helped create the conditions for increasing

demands

for

European integration during the early 1980s. Nonetheless, the integration

efforts themselves

seem

to be the

at the national level in lieu

primary institutionalization away from neo-corporatism

of more

pluralist

(Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Streeck 1991

integration

were

“at least equal” to those

)

modes of governance

As Streeck

at the

European

level.

suggests, the results of European

of other domestic trends that reduced neo-

corporatist efficacy. (Streeck 1991, 22)

Despite Streeck and Schmitter's assessment of significant misfit between

domestic neo-corporatism and European level pluralism, evidence since the 1990s
contradicts or mitigates the severity of these claims. (Falkner and Leiber 2004;

1998; Falkner 1997, 2000; Hertier 2001; Hertier and Knill 2001;

2006) As noted

in chapter three, while there

may

relative terms.

Dyson 2003; Schmidt

be some misfit between national level

neo-corporatist systems and multi-level governance in the

m

Compston

EU

it

may

actually be

While European and national systems of neo-corporatism do

modest

differ, the

fragmented and diverse policymaking systems of the European Union are predicated on

more

soft

approaches to ensure compliance and allow considerable room for

differentiated national adaptation. (Falkner 2000; Falkner and Leiber 2004; Hix and

Goetz 2000; Hertier and Knill 2001; Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006) The

some

EU

has exhibited

neo-corporatist tendencies both in the policymaking and implementation stages of

governance further enforcing the premise

that the level
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of misfit

is

relatively less than

)

Compston argues

previously argued.

that the

decade-long effects of the 1985 Single

European Act actually caused “no general decline”
during the period.

in national neo-corporatist structures

1998)

(

The disputes of the Streeck and Schmitter hypothesis stem from two
First,

some

scholars suggest that the institutions and processes of neo-corporatism at the

EU-level have been incrementally gaining

more notable
that

have

directions.

far

in the areas

its

European Social

forceful levers of influence than the

mere advisory

2004; Obradovic 2004;

influence and authority. This has been

of the European Social Dialogue and European Works Councils

more binding and

Committee and

new

roles.

Weber 2004;

(Benedictus

et al.

2003; Mangenot and Polet

Fitzgerald 2004)

Additionally, the peak association umbrellas at the

EU

level

have shown some

increasing role and vitality over the past decade. (Dolvik and Visser 2001

Compston 2001; Greenwood 2003, 2003a) This has

;

Berger 2002;

especially been true in the better-

organized and funded business and industry associations, usually organized along
transnational sectoral lines including pharmaceuticals, aviation, and energy. (Schmidt

2006; Greenwood 2003) But rather than neo-corporatism, Cowles suggests that

more

a case of “elite pluralism"

and constitutes

partnership such as that found in

level.

Germany and

a misfit

the

this is

between neo-corporatist social

new modes of governance

at the

EU

(2001

Even with

these modest improvements in organizational capacity and autonomy,

there remains a dearth of centralized

social partnership at the

Commission

level

of the

EU
EU

level.

to

and highly

influential institutions

and practices of

Nonetheless, there has been a growing trend

begin to include more
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civil society

at the

groups and organized

interests in the

policymaking side of the process. This has been intended

to address

complaints of the democratic deficit of the EU, but also to improve in the net efficacy and
acceptance of EU-level policymaking by the major interests

in the

EU.

In this case, the

EU

has often helped establish and even finances the operations of organized interests

the

EU

level including those

underrepresented

at

the

EU

of women's rights and others that have been traditionally

level.

Hence one can claim

that there

is

a nascent neo-

corporatism or “functional representation” model beginning to emerge

it

seeks to find, and

if

its

EU

EU

level as

perceived inclusiveness and democratic credentials.

(Schmidt 2006) One could imagine,
at the

at the

necessary create, license, finance, and otherwise support peak

associations, so as to bolster

influence

at

that

given the large level of business and industrial

level, that the institution

may

be tempted to bolster other non-

business interests such as organized labor, the environment, minority groups, and others
so as to suggest greater parity in the lobbying and policymaking process. If so, the

institution

would be moving towards

policymaking and

a remarkably

more

corporatist

interest intermediation.

The second, and more compelling counterargument
hypothesis

is

the

growing recognition

governance are not nearly so

that

pluralist or

that

EU

and Schmitter

dominant as suggested. While the European

calls semi-pluralist, they also exhibit a

unique combination of models. The

to the Streeck

European modes of policymaking and

Union policymaking process and forms of governance
what Schmidt

model of

are certainly

somewhat

pluralist,

tremendously diverse and perhaps

system of policymaking and governance seems

of a hybrid system. (Falkner 2000; Borzel 1999;

Cram

1997; Sbragia 1992;

Dyson

2003; Schuppert 2006; Hertier 2001; Schmidt 2006) As Falkner and others suggest.
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depending upon the

issue,

European governance exhibits pluralism,

statism, corporatism,

and others unique forms of governance simultaneously. (Falkner 2000; Falkner and
Fieber 2004; Schuppert 2006; Schmidt 2006)

While Streeck and Schmitter and others characterized the

EU

process as

fragmented, and hence analogous to pluralism, Falkner suggests that the fragmentation
has patterns that allows for multiple and concurrent forms of governance that shift

depending upon the policy area, member preferences, and existing patterns of national
governance. (Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Hertier 2001
Feiber 2004; Hertier and

Schmidt suggests

Km

II

Falkner 2000; Falkner and

;

2001)

that while the

policymaking and debate side of the process

decidedly more pluralist, the transposition of such policies
gives

member

is

is

highly differentiated and

states incredible latitude in utilizing statist, corporatist, or other

models of

governance as the tools of implementation and national adaptation. (2006) Hence while

European integration may challenge neo-corporatism
governance,

some

it

in

some

actually might be quite adaptive in others,

areas of policymaking and

and possible even enhanced

specific policy competences. (Falkner 2000; Falkner

in

and Feiber 2004; Schmidt

2006)

As discussed

in chapter two,

European governance may have both negative and

Kmll 2001 Falkner and

positive consequences for social partnerships. (Hertier and

Feiber 2004; Schmidt 2006)

by

member

partners.

states that

may

EU

directives

either

may

;

set explicit

conditions of implementation

enhance or detract from domestic social partnership and

These include a range of options.

use their social partners to implement

new

First directives

may

explicitly call

on

states to

policies and reforms. Second, provisions in the
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directives

new

may encourage member

social partners to

states to use existing social partners or

even create

accomplish implementation. These include a growing number of

directives suggesting that the “best practice” of implementation of directives in

policy areas be through social partnership. Finally,

conditions that require

full

EU

directives

or uniform applicability of new rules that

amongst

national patterns of variation and differentiation

for the

set specific

may

contradict

social partners. (Falkner

Leiber 2004; Hertier and Knill 2001) Hence, Europeanization

and positive implications

may

some

may have

and

both negative

continued efficacy and necessity of social partnership

and social partners.
Falkner has identified

at least

four distinct forms of interest intermediation

patterns in EU-level governance and policymaking based on the stability and degree of

interest

group involvement:

Statist Cluster, Issue

Network, Traditional Policy

Community, and Corporatist Policy Community. The models
interest

group participation and authority

model, public-private interaction
in a

is

in

EU

policymaking. In the

and these tend

mode,

to be

interests

more

groups are

pluralistic in their

significant public-private contact, there

groups. The traditional policy

statist cluster

marginalized or excluded. These tend to be rare and

very limited number of arenas including foreign policy,

the issue network

are an increasing scale of

is

in

justice,

and home

lobbying or consultative relations only

openness and

diversity.

While having

no binding role or permanency

community tends

affairs. In

to

encompass

for interest

a rather stable private-

public network of interest groups in a particular policy area and allows greater

participatory influence in shaping decisions and policies. Finally, there

policy

community

that

is

the corporatist

provides an exclusive and stable group of interest actors that have
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decisive roles in the

making and implementation of policy. (Falkner 2000; Schuppert

2006; Kohler-Koch 1999) Hence the
level but also “multiform”.

EU

policymaking system may not only be multi-

(Schmidt 2006)

Traditional Policy

Issue

Statist

Group
Membership

C’orporatist Policy

Community

Network

Cluster

Community

Interest

Interest

Unstable

Rather Stable

Extremely Stable

Consultative

Participatory

Decisive

Group

Involvement

Insignificant

Table

6:

Four Modes of

Interest Intermediation at the

EU-Level

The implications of these multiform modes of European policymaking upon
domestic structures of interest intermediation and governance are potentially
understanding

domestic

how

level.

EU

Europeanization can potentially undermine neo-corporatism
policy

modes can cause domestic change

will act at both the national

and strategic changes

levels.

and European levels and

in their

2000; Dyson 2003) Second,

between

Hence

behavior and

new norms

interest

groups

at the national. (Hertier

at the

three ways. First, interests

will lead to cognitive, normative,

activities. (Hertier

and Knill 2001

;

Falkner

regarding governance patterns will be transferred

may

learn to look differently at long practiced

accepted national modes. Third, alliances of interests

consequences

critical in

2001

;

at the

EU

level

Hertier and Knill 2001

;

and

may have
Falkner 2000)

This creates a multi-level system of ad hoc alliances and networks capable of
logrolling or cooperative tradeoffs that are

found

in the

common

American Congress and similar

multi-level patterns found in the

EU

to pluralist

institutions.

and the lack of a
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models of governance

However,

the transnational

common policymaking model

and

suggests a rather unique and

new form of interest group

activity.

These closely

parallel

the mediating factors of Europeanization that will be discussed in the next section.

importantly however

the national level.

is

that these

The continued

EU

Most

policy patterns each have differentiated effects at

stability

of the national level structures of

policymaking and governance are highly dependent upon what type of Europeanization
is

it

facing.

As Falkner's hypothesis

suggests, the potential for

fit

or misfit,

is

quite contingent

on the specific policy area as well as the model of European policymaking appropriate
the sector or policy issue. (Falkner 2000;

potential for continuity or conflict

Schmidt 2006) Table

7

to

below suggests the

between different modes of European and national

policymaking patterns.

ELI

Models of Policymaking

Statist

Cluster Network

Statist

Confirm/

Cluster

Reinforce

Corporatist

Traditional

Issue

Policy

Lobbying

Policy

More

Stable/

More

Stable/

Involved

Involved

More

National

Issue

Confirm/

More

Model of

Network

Lobbying

Reinforce

Involved

Involved

Traditional

Less Stable/

Less Stable/

Confirm/

More

Stable/

Stable/

Policymaking
Policy

Corporatist

Policy

Table

7:

Involved

Less Involved Less Involved Reinforce

Less Stable/

Less Stable/

Stable/

Less Stable/

Confirm/

Less Involved Less Involved Less Involved Reinforce

Direction of Domestic Impact of EIJ Policymaking
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Modes

As

this illustrates, there is generally

domestic social partners

in three

more

instability

and

less

involvement of

of the four modes of European governance and

policymaking. This would suggest considerable adaptational pressure on structures of
neo-corporatism

the

at the national level in

competence and efficacy of the

EU member

states.

social partnership

(Schmidt 2006) In

would seem

to

this

way,

be quite limited.

Yet, in practice, while reduced, there has been considerable continuity of the social

some key

partnership in states and in

areas of competence since the 1980s.

Many EU

directives specifically cite the use of national patterns of social partnership as a

institutionalization

Europeanization

means of

and enforcement. (Falkner and Leiber 2004) Hence, while

may

generally contribute to a decline in the efficacy and viability of

neo-corporatist patterns

at

the national level,

significant space within the

EU

it

is

quite differential and there

is still

policymaking and governance modes to allow social

partnership to continue to survive. (Dyson 2003)

As Falkner

suggests, the overall impact of these

governance has been

to

promote “moderate diversity”

EU modes

in

of policymaking and

domestic structures of

policymaking and governance. In other words, the larger gaps between contending
policymaking and governance models are narrowed but not so much as
convergence or isomorphism
interaction

and

to high degrees. Differences in patterns

interest intermediation will continue

(Falkner 2000) In essence, Europeanization leaves
larger extent than Streeck

though

room

in

to

compel

of public-private

more moderated forms.

for national neo-corporatism to a

and Schmitter suggested. (Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Streeck

1991; Falkner 2000; Schmidt 2006) This has been especially true in areas of key social
partnership authority, including labor law and social policy. (Falkner et
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al.

2005; Falkner

and Leiber 2004) The

member

EU

has allowed

states to transpose,

much

greater independent authority

implement, and administer such

(Schmidt 2006) This translates into

less overall misfit

EU

amongst

directives and policies.

between domestic

social

partnerships and supranational governance than has been previous argued. (Falkner 2000;

Knill 2001)

Further, the policymaking process at the

EU

level itself is strongly conditioned

the necessity of high levels of consensus and negotiation.

of 1985 changed the voting system
system, the use of

entrenched

QMV

is

in the

restricted to

seek and maintain unanimity even

when

While the Single European Act

Council from unanimity to a qualified majority

some policy

in others. Further, the general

by

areas while unanimity remains

underlying principle of legislation has been to

it

is

not required.

Hence

states

and national

actors are able to project their preferences, interests, and goals into the legislative process

of the

EU

at

several stages including the Council,

resulting legislation

and national

is

patterns.

far less likely to result in

While

in

some

there has been fare less “wiggle

areas, the

Commission, Parliament, and ECJ. The

highly decisive misfit between the

cases, such as

room”

monetary policy and

for national institutions

EU

anti-trust policy

and actors,

in

most other

policymaking outputs and the methods of transposition, implementation, and

administration have been relatively

soft.

(Schmidt 2006)

Despite the relatively lessened impact that Europeanization has likely produced

upon

social partnership, there

areas, that

have contributed

have been measurable

to the decline

effects, especially in certain policy

of social partnership

in national

policymaking

and governance. As Schmidt suggests, the effects of Europeanization are strongly
divergent from sector to sector. (2006) These will be discussed later in this chapter.
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compared

Yet,

impacts of globalization, structural economic change,

to the

increasing decentralization of the

economy and

social partners,

German

unification,

and

other endogenous and exogenous changes and pressures, the implications of misfit with

Europeanization seems a

bit less significant that

(Streeck and Schmitter 1991

literature

and scholarship

)

this

However, within

Streeck and Schmitter suggested.

the patterns of the Europeanization

more moderate impact

is

rather close to the norm. (Hix

and

Goetz 2000; Hertier and Knill 2001; Teutsch 2001; Borzel and Risse 2003)
There

is

also the issue of differentiated misfit

amongst

models of social partnership. As demonstrated and argued
the Austrian

structurally

in

the

chapters four through seven,

model of social partnership has certainly been more

embedded

in the

German and Austrian

institutionally

policymaking and governance process than

in the

and

German

model. (Heinisch 2000) Falkner suggests that “the EU... impinges most directly on strong

forms of corporatism” versus weaker or mixed models. (Falkner and Leiber 2004) The
Austrian social partnership existed in formal and permanent institutions

level

and had

a relatively

at

the federal

expansive competence over issues not only relating to capital-

labor relations but also social insurance, trade, transportation, prices, the environment,

and education.
In light

of Falkner’s model of the domestic impacts of differential modes of

European governance and policymaking,
larger institutional

would be

logical to

assume

that

and policy competence under neo-corporatist structures

system, Austria's social partnership

that in

it

Germany where

is

facing

much

pluralist

in the

Austrian

stronger adaptational pressures than

the social partnership shared

governance process with

given the

more of the policymaking and

and other patterns. (Falkner 1997; Falkner and Leiber

2004; Teutsch 2001; Paterson 2003; Dyson 2003) Heinisch also contends that Austria
should generally be more vulnerable due to
external

its

smaller economy, larger exposure to

economic pressures, and smaller voice

EU compared

in the

to that

of

neighboring Germany. (2000)
This has been exacerbated by the specific divergent processes of accession to the

EU

by Germany and Austria. As supported by the evidence

seven, Germany’s gradual integration into the

overall dispute as the

that

political

in the early

1950s and has

system ever since. The

and social partnership have been making gradual and incremental

adjustments to integration for over

consensus

chapters four through

EU commenced

been an accepted and indisputable part of the German
social partners

in

fifty years.

Membership was

also not an issue for

Adenauer and successive governments ensured an overarching

European integration was a non-negotiable assumption of postwar German

foreign policy. (Schmidt 2006) Austria and the Austrian model of social partnership have

had a
late

the

far

more compressed adjustment period since

1980s and eventual accession

in

1995.

its

early integration reforms in the

Membership wasn't

seriously considered until

mid 1980s and was then strenuously debated and divisive within

system and amongst

its

interests.

As Heinisch argues

of sorts. (2000) This suggests, and
and below,

that the pressures

stronger on Austria and

its

is

amounted

supported by the evidence

model of social partnership than

in areas

to a

in the

“shock therapy”

previous chapters

of European integration and governance have been

Bulmer, Katzenstein, and others have argued

always rather strong

this

the Austrian political

that

the

German

much

form.

EU-German congruence was

of constitutional order, norms, conventions, policy goals,

and even patterns of meso-level governance. This has meant

that

Germany has been

far

more amenable
their shared

to

and congruent with

EU modes

of governance since the 1950s with

emphasis on federalism, decentralization, sectoral organization, and mixed

policymaking

traditions.

(Buhner 1986, 1997; Katzenstein 1997; Paterson 2003; Dyson

2003) Schmidt suggests that the
architecture of the

German

EU

state”.

has not “significantly altered the traditional

(2006) This does not necessarily

mean

that the

German

model has experienced no pressure from Europeanization.

As Dyson

argues,

Germany's incongruence with

the European

policymaking and governance became more pronounced from the
Sectoral regulation and neo-corporatist governance,

EU

competition laws as well as

the

new and more

which were

German parliamentary

pluralist institutional

environments

modes of

late

1980s onward.

earlier

exempted from

regimes, had difficulty navigating

at the

EU

and domestic

levels.

Hence, despite a longer tenure of membership, the integration developments of the past
twenty years have been quite a challenge to the German model of policymaking and
governance. (Dyson 2003)

As argued throughout
characteristics of the Austrian

existence, scope, scale, and

alone

is

is

in spite

and

structural

and German social partnerships are deterministic of the

methods of domestic

not enough to explain

Dyson 2003) This

this research the particularistic institutional

why change

structural change,

hence misfit or

fit

or continuity ensues. (Hertier and Knill 2001;

of differentiated adaptational pressures between the two

states.

Hence, while

it

has been found that the Austrian model

is

likely facing

stronger challenges from European integration and governance than the

much

German model,

the responses and net structural changes in both systems are, according to Cowles,
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)

Caporaso and Risse, dependent upon

their specific institutional characteristics

within the Europeanization framework that are detailed

Respondinu

Even

if

to

found

following sections. (2001

in the

Adapatational Pressures from Europeanization

adaptational pressures on neo-corporatism are less than those argued by

Streeck and Schmitter, Falkner and others have demonstrated there

still

exists a

moderate

of misfit between European modes of policymaking and governance and domestic

level

social partnerships.

(

Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Falkner 200

Hertier and Knill 2001

;

Schmidt 2006) Hence,

adaptational pressures upon the

German and

this misfit,

1 ;

even

Falkner and Leiber 2004;

if

modest, places some

Austrian models. (Borzel and Risse 2003;

Schmidt 2006)
For actors

at the

national and subnational levels, European integration

may

environment and force them

change the “opportunity structures” of the

political

their existing political strategies”. (Hertier

and Knill 2001; Traxler and Schmitter 1995;

Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006)

This, in addition to the transfer of competence to the

EU-

has implications for the overarching patterns of neo-corporatist policymaking and

level.

its

to “adapt

continued efficacy and viability. But domestic structural change

is

typically not

uniform or isomorphic despite increased adapational pressures. (Lodge 2000; Hertier

2001

;

Hertier and Knill 2001; Knill 2001

)

While the framework assesses how

Europeanization places adaptational pressure on states to converge with European

standards,

it

stresses that state-level responses to pressures are

dependent upon the

presence or absence of particular domestic characteristics. (Borzel and Risse 2003; Knill

2001

)

The adaptational pressures on neo-corporatist systems
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likely results in

some

)

convergence amongst social partnerships of the member

states

of the

EU

but with

continuing “moderate diversity”. (Falkner 2000; Falkner and Leiber 2004; Hertier 2001;
Hertier and Knill 2001)

In part this

EU policy

is

due

to the

and preferences into national

exercise of authority over

EU

amongst the
relies

unique process of transposition and implementation of

and

upon member

its

member

member

states

The

under “continuous negotiation” between and

EU

legislative

to strengthen the capacities

numerable cases. Schmidt argues

nature of the

EU

governance system

institutions. (2006, 20)

national colors”, dependent

characteristics,

is

exerts a

more

“soft

power”

that often

and administrative requirements of the

structures in

and

EU

of domestic actors and national

that this is

due

to the highly

compound

that disperses authority across multi-level authorities

This supports the argument that “domestic adaptation with

upon existing variety

the primary Europeanization

in institutional

mechanism

and structural

for structural

change

in

national neo-corporatist patterns and models. (Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso

200

1 ;

Hertier

200

1

;

Hertier and

Kmll 200

1

;

Borzel and Risse 2003; Knill 200 1

The Mediating; Factors of Structural Change or Continuity

The

variety in institutionalization includes five mediating factors at the state-

level: multiple

its

implementing, administering, and policing European policies

and preferences themselves. The
have actually served

states are

states.

The EU’s jurisdiction and

political systems.

veto points, facilitating formal institutions, organizational and

policymaking cultures, differential empowerment of domestic actors, and learning.
(Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001, 2) For Hix and Goetz, the likelihood of
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domestic change increases when domestic actors,
increased opportunities

at

the

European

institutions, or processes

level in three areas:

new

exit

have

pathways,

new

veto

powers, and gaining informational advantage. (Hix and Goetz 2000, 13)
This section’s primary goal

German and

to assess

is

Austrian social partnerships and

changes or continuity

in the face

differential institutionalization

and analyze the

how

institutional colors

they help explain their structural

of the pressures of Europeanization. Because of the

and structures of social partnership

these states there has also been a

of the

commensurate

at the national level in

differential structural response

systems to the pressures of Europeanization. While

German and

by the

Austrian social

partnerships certainly share pressures of Europeanization, the structural change and
continuity of their systems are exclusively dependent upon their distinct national patterns

of neo-corporatist governance.

Multiple Veto Points

Structural or policy

change stemming from Europeanization can be conceived

in

terms of a "process of overcoming an institutionally defined number of formal and
factual veto points. (Herder 2001, 5)

Vetoes may be formal or

2001; Radaelli 2003) Although actors

may be powerful

can be blocked by public opinion, veto players
corporatist policy styles) or institutional

in the

in the policy

mechanisms

factual. (Herder

and Knill

domestic system, actions

process (as a result of

that prevent action

without an

“oversized political majority”. (Hix and Goetz 2000, 12; Guliani 2003; Dyson 2003) The
existence of multiple veto points has two implications for Europeanization. For actors
currently invested with veto powers, this provides
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them

a

way

to

block potential reforms

)

from European integration and governance or

to significantly

shape them. For those

without veto powers but seeking change or those that want to avoid the domestic veto
gauntlet altogether, Europe

may

provide a

new

exit

pathway. This will be discussed

in

later sections.

The existence of multiple veto
structural adaptation

more

by decentralizing power across the

political

system and allowing

more

actors to have a say in political decision making. Policy adjustment will be

difficult to introduce, enact,

Guliani 2003;

a

points in a given state-level structure impedes

and administer. (Hertier 2001; Borzel and Risse 2003;

Dyson 2003) The more power

domestic coalition

to introduce

is

dispersed, the

more

and implement changes necessary

difficult

to

it

is

to create

reduce the

adaptational pressures of European-level governance. (Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and

Caporaso 2001,
features of the

9) Scharpf, Heritier,

German and

and others have argued

Italian political

that certain decentralized

systems and policymaking process have

slowed or blocked implementation of structural adjustment

to

European-level pressures in

transport policy and governance as well as in other sectors. (Heritier 2001; Scharpf 1985;

Borzel and Risse 2003; Dyson 2003)

Hence, systems

that institutionalize

powerful and multiple veto points might be

particularly susceptible to stalemates that inhibit structural reform. Conversely, states

with fewer veto points

demands

are

may have

“relative institutional ease” in

accommodated. (Hertier 2001
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which European policy

)

The

overall

;

Germany

political

model

is

notable for

many

its

veto points including

neo-corporatist interest associations, national, and provincial levels of government, and a

generally decentralized, semi-sovereign policymaking and governance process. This
constrains the freedom of the government in terms of European policy by forcing

reconciliation with

creates a far

was

distinct veto actors at different levels

more veto-oriented

In the case

points

many

political order.

of governance. This

(Dyson, 2003)

of German road haulage and railways reform, the importance of veto

significant. (Hertier

and Knill 2001; Radaelli 2003; Borzel and Risse 2003)

In

road haulage reform, there were several veto points including the existing structures of

governance

that

were dominated by the sectoral associations, trade unions, and other pro-

protectionist interests in the Transport Ministry, and

the transport sector and the delegation of powers to

the social partners, increased the

SPD. Corporatist arrangements

in

quasi-govemmental agencies run by

government and pro-reform

interests'

needs

to bargain

with and accommodate with the entrenched actors when planning and implementing
reform. (Hertier and Knill 2001

)

These veto points of the representative monopolies of

the peak associations had effectively stymied reform until the late 1990s.

German government was
liberalization side

able to eventually

of the debate

to institute

gamer enough support on

changed the

the pro-

major deregulatory reforms. As Teutsch

argues, the increasing pressure of Europeanization opened

the EU-level and

However, the

strategic options

Hertier and Knill 2001
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new channels of influence

of the domestic

interests.

at

(Teutsch 2001

In the area

of haulage, the German Transport Ministry and the parliamentary

committees with oversight of road haulage were most affected. The net

ended up

result

being a nearly complete marginalization of the preexisting sectoral arrangement

policymaking process followed by a

governance of the

compromise
actors,

sector.

in the face

total

in the

abandonment of the neo-coiporatist model of

The unwillingness of the

social partners to agree to reforms

and

of additional European pressure forced other institutions and

namely industry associations, parliament, and the transport ministry,

to

bypass the

veto points of the social partners altogether and legislate a reform package that

effectively

this case

ended neo-corporatism

in

governance of the

sector. (Teutsch

2001

)

Hence

in

Europeanization was an influential catalyst in circumventing the existing veto

points through a coalition of governmental and private interests using the threat of ECJ
rulings and potential violations of ELI competition policy as justification of significant

liberalization. (Hertier

and Kmll 2001; Teutsch 2001

)

Haulers were able to delay major

liberalization for several years, but in the end, the domestic coalition for liberalization,

spurred on by European-level developments, succeeded

in

enacting significant structural

reform. (Teutsch 2001)

In railways policy, there

were even greater numbers of veto points including the

three railway unions, the administrative board of

ministries, parliament, and, importantly, the

the constitutional

amendments

DB,

the transport

Lander governments

to enact the reforms.

and economics

that

needed

Yet here, there was

to

approve

less pressure

from Europeanization as there were few concrete directives and policies from Brussels
and the actors were
end

result

was

less threatened

a moderate series

by potential EU-level sanction or

of reforms including privatization
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legal action.

that

The

were completed

;

with the overarching and broad consensus of all the relevant actors including the social
partners.

While there was

a net loss

of neo-corporatist governance through the

transference of regulatory duties from the

(EBA), unions,

industry,

DB

board to the

state.

European-level pressure plus additional veto points
state to bear a higher fiscal

Hertier and Knill 2001

)

Federal Railway

and transport sectoral organizations were moderately

by large scale compromise and payoffs by the

and forced the

new

burden

satisfied

Hence, the combination of

made

for the

Agency

less

the changes less far reaching

changes made. (Teutsch 2001

Overall, the social partners exerted strong pressure on the shape

of the reform package due

to their veto positions

and willingness

to participate in the

process. (Teutsch 2001)

In the case of labor

market

liberalization, the social partners

had

initially

been

brought into the Alliance for Jobs by the Schroder government so as to provide a

consensual

set

of reforms to increase German competitiveness. The factual veto powers

of the employers’ associations and

DGB

seemed

relatively strong.

progress and the failure of the social partners to adequately

Employment Office (BA)

led the Schroder

government

to

However, the lack of

manage

the Federal

bypass the Alliance

for the

Hartz Commission. The eventual reforms were passed unilaterally suggesting again that
neo-corporatist veto points can be overcome but usually only

when

there

is

a strong

and

powerful coalition of other governmental and non-governmental actors to press the case.
(Vitols 2004; Kitschelt and Streeck 2004; Streeck and Hassel 2004)

A

similar series of

events led to the reform of the vocational education system well, as the Schroder

government was able

to

bypass the social partners and

institute significant reform. (Vail

2003; Busch 2005) Chancellor Merkel’s recent healthcare reforms followed a similar
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line.

(

The Economist 2006b) However,

have had

a

much lower impact

in all these

policy areas, Europeanization seems to

than domestic political and global economic competitive

pressures.

In the Austrian cases

of Europeanization, there are

fewer veto players and veto

far

points due to the centralization of the social partnership at the federal level.

However,

these are relatively powerful veto players with wider policy competencies than their

German

counterparts.

The case of accession

is

notable due to the strong role of the social

partners in shepherding and implementing the referendum and

their veto positions, they

delegation

in

were able

membership process.

In

to negotiate for a larger voice in the Austrian

Brussels and in Austria’s

EU

some of their wider policy competences

policymaking process. In return they gave up

in price controls, the

and elsewhere. (Heinisch 2000) However,

in areas

environment, education,

of social insurance, labor law, and

other core elements of the social partnership the Joint Commission,

Committee on Social

and Economic Questions, and the peak associations have remained powerful and
entrenched actors.
Privatization did illustrate the declining

especially in organized labor, as the

privatization process

OGB was

power of the

social partnership in Austria,

marginalized from

much of the

and debate. Increasing parliamentary and bureaucratic power has

sapped some of the once expansive authority of the Joint Commission and Committee on
Social and

Economic questions.

partnership,

it

(Kittel

2000) Nonetheless,

in

many

areas of core social

has remained well entrenched. (Heinisch 2000; Falkner

the informal veto

powers of the

social partners

still

remain even

circumscribed from the apex during the 1960s and 1970s.
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if

et al

2005) Hence,

somewhat

In the end, the veto points in Austria

allowed the social partners to become the

brokers of Europeanization, while in Germany, due to their decentralization and sectoral
divisions, are

somewhat more

likely to be

bypassed and marginalized as they were

road haulage. (Teutsch 2001; Hertier 2001; Heinisch 2000)

However

in

both railways and

in

public procurement policy, the existing neo-corporatist veto players remained salient and

involved

in the

reform process. Hence the overall existence of multiple veto points,

especially factual vetoes as found in neo-corporatist systems,

particular outcomes. Hertier

and Knill argue

that there

is

no

seems not

static or

to suggest

mechanistic link

between the number of veto points and the probability of reform. The process

dynamic and

is

quite

is

contingent upon the types of actors, political leadership, and reform

capacity that existed prior

to,

during, and after the impact of Europeanization upon the

reform process. (Hertier and Knill 2001

)

In Austria, the social partners

used their veto

roles in the existing political constellation to maintain the social partnership though in a

reduced form. In Germany, the results have been mixed. In some areas the veto players of
the social partnership

worked

to

encourage and shape reforms and structural change

while in others the neo-corporatist arrangements collapsed altogether.

Differential

Empowerment of Domestic Actors

Because

structural

change

will likely lead to a redistribution

political capabilities in a state system, the relevant actors

empowerment of such
structural

actors

is

also influential

upon

and the

and reorganization of

differential

the direction and intensity of

change or continuity. (Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001,

some have argued

that

European integration has
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led to greater

1

1

)

While

autonomy of national

executives over other domestic actors

lead to a redistribution of

in areas

of European policy, Europeanization can

powers amongst a variety of actors including national

executives, legislatures, courts, bureaucracies, regional governments, interest

Moravcsik 1998; Schmidt 1996; Hertier 2001;

associations, and firms. (Goetz 2000;

Borzel and Risse 2003) Hence Europeanization

between actors and the

state.

may change

the

power

relationship

(Cowles 2001; Kitschelt 1986; Borzel and Risse 2003)

Similar to the rational institutional arguments of Hix and Goetz, actors or groups of

actors

may

seek structural change to increase their net political power

others

who

likely

Groups
success

at the

oppose such reform

that

EU

level.

As Schmidt

when lobbying

in national capitals”.

Hence groups

that

had

little in

the

first

at

the national level

suggests, citizens and interests

as organized interests than

that

expense of

obvious rationale.

were once marginal actors

influence in Brussels

of those

for

at the

may

find greater

may “have more

when

voting or protesting

might be losing measures of national influence,

place, can

move up

to the

EU

level

and gain levels of

influence through these supranational portals. (Schmidt 2006)

In the Austrian system, there has

been some move by women's groups,

environmentalists, and others to take their issues to the EU-level. However, the reforms

to the social partnership in the

1990s have significantly pluralized some elements of the

Austrian policymaking system as the Joint Commission and Committee on Social and

Economic Question reduced
1999; Karlhofer 1996)

this

By

their overall

significantly

competence

in the

withdrawing from

Austrian system (Unger

all

but their core competencies,

has actually helped stabilize the system and reduce criticism of the system due to

once perceived exclusivity. While

this

was

part
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of the

EU

its

accession and implementation

agreement between the government and social partners,

it

should be noted that the

realignment had already begun well prior to membership negotiations as the declines

union and membership density

1

980s.

in the

OGB

and V01 had begun well beforehand

Hence Europeanization may have provided

reform, yet

it

was within

in

in the

a unique opportunity for structural

the context of an already changing environment for the social

partners.

In other areas, there

Lander governments, while

has been more change. The growing influence of the Austrian

still

well below that

in

neighboring Germany, and the

concentration of more negotiating and regulatory authority in the executive and

bureaucracy have certainly occurred but not
also

begun

to

more prominently lobby

Chamber and VOI.

at the

at

extraordinary levels. Austrian firms have

EU

(Pelinka 1998; Falkner 2001

However, the chamber remains
maintains a strong presence

a

compulsory

in the

and national levels outside of the

;

Holl, Poliak, and

institution

Riekmann 2000)

and the Joint Commission

still

core of labor-business-state relations. The most notable

change has been the empowerment of Austrian business

interests that

were once more

checked by both the strong organization of labor and a strongly social democratic system
of nationalized industries and heavy regulation.
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Hence Europeanization has
power across

certainly had an impact in changing the distribution of

the Austrian system, the social partners are in a

limited position than they

were twenty years ago and there

is

more circumscribed and
a pattern of increasing

decentralization and pluralization. (Muller 1992; Gerlieh 1992; Crepaz 1994; Pelinka

1998; Pelinka and Bishof 2004) Europeanization

was

a fundamental impetus to

undertaking significant reform. Yet those reforms have not ended the social partnership

nor

moved
The

Germany

the partners out of their traditional core competencies.

distribution of

due,

in part, to

power both within and amongst

institutions has

changed

in

Europeanization. There has been significant evidence of new

activism from actors including environmentalists and the Lander seeking to upload their

preferences to the

process.

EU

level,

(Dyson 2003) For

changing the balance of power

the social partners, this has

in the

German policymaking

had some implications. Yet

it

has

been highly differentiated and contingent upon specific meso-level and sectoral
arrangements, political conditions, and economic trends rather than an overarching
redistribution of power

amongst the neo-corporatist

actors. (Hertier

The German road haulage and railway reforms

empowerment

in Europeanization. In road haulage,

liberalization interests access

illustrate the

2001

;

Schmidt 2006)

impact of differential

Europeanization provided the pro-

and power they would otherwise not have possessed. The

system of policymaking and governance was rather closed

to the sectoral partners in the

road haulage industry, preventing reform and other actors from direct participation.

However, by using the ECJ and general
to

empower themselves

threat

of EU competition policy, they were able

to an extent unavailable at the purely national level. This

changed

the balance of coalitions in the parliament and transport ministry towards liberalization.

525

))

eventually bypassing the social partners and dissolving the long-lasting sectoral
corporatist system of governance. (Teutsch 2001; Hertier 2001;

railways, there were a broader

number of powerful

would be required

reform and

to instigate

Schmidt 2006)

actors in the

limited the scope of the reforms and liberalization as the unions.

interests

remained powerfully entrenched

in the

bypassed by increasing European pressures
Hertier and

German system

from the European

less pressure

In

level.

Lander and
,

that

This

sectoral

policymaking process and could not be

to reform.

.

(Teutsch 2001; Hertier 2001;

Kmll 2001

In labor

market and vocational education reform, the lack of consensus and action

by the social partners increased the willingness of the
the entrenched system entirely.

parliamentary action, the

social partners

By

utilizing the Hartz

German government was

from the process. This led

state

era. (Vitols

German

firms that

interests to

Commission and

to solutions,

much

like in

direct

that

road haulage that

had dominated the

2004; Streeck and Hassel 2004; Vail 2003) In the

felt

bypass

able to effective disenfranchise the

resembled an absolute collapse of the sectoral corporatism
postwar

and other

TABD,

large

constrained by the sectoral and national industry associations and

the necessity of bargaining both within such associations as well as with labor, sought

lobbying opportunities

large

German

at the

EU

level.

firms a greater voice

This more informal but influential pattern allowed

at the

EU

level

of trade negotiations than

have had through the BDI or sectoral associations within the German

where the strong
as well as

outputs.

interests

German

it

political

would
system

of the Mittelstand of small and mid-sized German enterprises

labor could effectively dilute trade negotiation and

(Cowles 2001
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economic policy

)

Hence Europeanization may provide empowerment
actors

when

when

pressure

and other

new

there

is

is

absent but yet perceived.

It

may

EU

transnational alliances at the

Road haulage

in

level directives

allies

Germany was such

and policies, there

existing entrenched and

)

As

the domestic arena

directives and policies or even

peak associations for unilateral or

(Cowles 2001

level.

autonomy of firms

Schmidt 2006)

;

as case.

However,

is less ability

in

can also

cases of weak or imprecise

for the less

empowered

empowered

interests, as

was seen

strongly affected by the entrance of

empowerment of existing

EU-

to shape policy

This leaves reforms and adjustment in the hands of the

in

German railway

Hertier and Knill suggest, the distribution of power

is

It

and legal and regulatory ammunition within the domestic arena.

level the playing field.

(Teutsch 2001

EU

excluded or weakened

also allow greater

interests to elude their traditional national

provide additional

and

pressure to reform or adjust to

to

new

actors through their activities at the

reform.

amongst actors

in

actors and the

European

level. (Hertier

and Knill 2001

Facilitating

Formal Institutions

The existence of mediating formal
of multiple veto points
at the

domestic

level.

in

may work much

(Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001,
rules,

effective in facilitating and implementing

environment for actors and

may

like the existence

allowing actors to introduce and matriculate structural change

2003) Institutions comprise specific

2003) Institutions

institutions

interests

and

10:

Borzel and Risse

norms, and limits on behavior

change and reform.
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can be

Institutions provide a stable

limit transaction costs. (Hertier

often be broadly defined to

that

2001; Guliani

encompass both formal and informal

patterns and norms. Hence, pressures for Europeanization can be transposed and

conditioned through national level institutions that

structural

changes or attempt

to

minimize and

may

restraint

either facilitate reform

such

States that lack institutions that can introduce and

find adaptation far

efforts.

manage

more problematic. (Schmidt 2006) However,

own momentum and

and

structural

institutions

change may
have

their

context that will shape and color the eventual policy outcomes and

reforms. (Herder 2001

In the

)

German

case, the existing neo-corporatist institutions

road haulage, vocational education, and labor markets failed
barriers to change. Hence, the

government and other

to enact

of

reform and were

interests eventually

bypassed and

marginalized the social partners in these sectors and enacted reform that fundamentally
liberalized road haulage

and temporary employment and reorganized vocational

education, while simultaneously dissolving the preexisting neo-corporatist patterns of

policymaking and governance
creation of a

new

state run

in both

road haulage and vocational education with the

and financed agencies. (Teutsch 2001; Vail 2003; Streeck and

Hassel 2004) In temporary employment, the social partners, while excluded from the

policymaking process, remained important elements of the implementation process by the
government’s insistence

that the

DGB

and employers' and industry associations proceed

with national collective bargaining. Hence, the institutions of social partnership were
actually reinforced by the eventual policy output. (Vitols 2004) In railways policy, the

institutions resolved to

implement reform and the

able to maintain their roles and function, even if

actors, including social partners,

were

somewhat circumscribed, and condition

and shape the eventual policy output. While the new Federal Railway Agency would
accrete

some of the powers once reserved

the

DB
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board and the social partners, industry.

)

unions, and the Lander governments got significant concessions and protections from the

federal

government so as

to

provide some

critical continuity to the existing

(Teutsch 2001; Hertier 2001; Hertier and Knill 2001

)

The

system.

corporatist mediation of

diverse interests allows for considerable adaptational flexibility and adjustment if

properly aligned and motivated to

as in

German

rail

act.

These reforms tend

to

be more incremental, such

reform. (Hertier and Kmll 2001

In Austria, the Joint

Commission and Committee on

Social and

Economic

Questions became the primary mechanism by which the social partners helped shape and
lead the Europeanization process.

The

lack of such an overarching system in

Germany

has meant a sectoral and highly decentralized process of Europeanization with

tremendously divergent

results.

Yet

in Austria, the social partners

marshalling forces in implementing accession and
role in the national

policy and have retained a strong

policymaking process despite a general trend of decentralization and

pluralism. (Heinisch 2000;

Unger 1999; Falkner and Leiber 2004;

and Phelan 2002) Further, they willingness
in the

EU

remained engaged and

Blithe, Copelovitch,

to negotiate a reduction

of their competency

domestic system of policymaking and governance was bargained for access to the

EU-level where, though
unique access

to the

far less than the

hoped, the social partners do have relatively

Austrian delegation and the policymaking and governance process

the European level. (Unger 1999; Karlhofer 1996; Holl, Poliak, and

Falkner 2001)
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Riekmann 2000;

at

Heinisch argues that this

is

precisely

Europeanization process better than the

why

the social partnership have survived the

German model,

the centralization allowed the

neo-corporatist institutions to play a central and pivotal role in the Europeanization

process while

in

Germany,

the very decentralization of the social partnership

made such

coordination impossible. (Heinisch 2000)

would seem

Institutionalization certainly

to matter. In the case

strong and centralized role of the social partners in the Joint

institutions

of Austria, the

Commission and other

allowed them to shepherd and broker the Europeanization process. (Heinisch

2000; Holl, Poliak, and Riekmann 2000; Falkner 2001) While certainly reducing their
overall aegis in the Austrian policymaking system, the offsetting influence at the

level could be considered a

worthwhile trade given their overall declining

and organizational powers.

In

Germany,

some

institutional

the lack of strong national institutionalization of

the social partnership has resulted in a highly differentiated response to

pressures. (Heinisch 2000) In

EU-

European

sectors like railways, social partners respond to and

adapt through reform, privatization, or other structural change while

in areas

such as road

haulage or public procurement the social partners have failed to lead or engage the reform
process.

to

Hence

managed

it

seems

structural

implementation. The

difficult to assert that strong institutionalization will

change or

German

that

weak

always lead

institutionalization will either block or

slow

cases seem to illustrate that the particular domestic political

conditions and coalitions are far more likely to explain change or continuity that the mere
existence or absence of formal institutions. Therefore the role of formal institutions in

quite variable and

may

or

may

not be instrumental

in

adaptation.

It

appears primarily

contingent upon the specific actors and politics of that institution and their adopted role
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;

as either Europeanization brokers or blockers in the policy area. This

would seem

to

suggest that formal institutions while potentially influential in the Europeanization

process cannot be easily generalized.

Organizational and Policymaking Cultures

Political

and organizational cultures

refer to the “prevailing collective

understandings of appropriate behavior” often based upon informal, normative, social,

and

political cultural structures that

Cowles, and Caporaso 2001,

Borzel and Risse 2003; Knill 2001

10;

suggests “culture, which frames

guide and constrain political action. (Risse-Kappen,

all institutions,

as does history”

)

As Schmidt

makes

for “different

ideas infusing actors’ understandings of their actions and interests within institutions”.

(2006) Hence the “prevailing belief system” within the

member

state will help

the direction of reform and the limits of acceptable restructuring. (Hertier

Knill 2001

)

“Political culture

and other informal

determine

and Knill 2001

institutions exist” that will either

be

conductive or restrictive of European-inspired change. (Borzel and Risse 2003; Knill

2001

)

These can be assessed and measured

in the

formal and informal mechanisms of the

policymaking and implementation process. Most notable are the systems of consensual or
cooperative decision-making cultures found in Germany, Austria, Scandinavia, and the
Netherlands, the historically confrontational relationships between the regions and the
central

governments

in

Spain and

Italy, the statist centralization

democratic solidarity of Sweden, the strong church-state

adherence of direct democracy
(Borzel 2002;

in

of France, the social

ties in Ireland, the history

Switzerland, and populist nationalism

Einhom 2002; Katzenstein

in

Poland.

1984; Lijphart 1975; Zeigler 1993)
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and

)

These features of states'

political cultures,

norms, and collective understandings

play an important role in determining the appropriateness of some actions versus others.
(Hertier 2001

Hence, some of the pressures of European integration

)

translated into

change precisely due

to their

may

fail to

be

sharp conflict with existing political and

organizational cultures that consider such reforms, even under strong pressure,

antithetical to national identities

and ideals and beyond what

is

politically acceptable

and

appropriate. (Borzel and Risse 2003; Knill 2001

The system of strong neo-corporatism
and

polity.

is

well entrenched in the Austrian society

For both political cultural and institutional rationale, the Austrian model of

policymaking and decision-making
of democratic corporatism

in

after

World War

II

Western Europe. Despite

emerged
all

as the paradigmatic case

the pluralizing and

decentralization forces of the last thirty years, the Austrian political system

invested in neo-corporatist methods of interest intermediation and

centralization than neighboring states.

While Austria

significant “westernization” or “Americanization”

(Pelinka and Bishof 2004)

provide

critical

Many

it

is

much

is still

higher levels of

clearing going through

is far

highly

some

from thorough and complete.

of the core elements of Austrian corporatism remain and

context to their Europeanization processes and implementation.

This has been most notable

in the utilization

of the social partnership as one of the

primary brokers and shepherds of Europeanization and modernization. (Heinisch 2000)
Despite the decentralizing pressures of the past three decades, the peak associations

remain amongst the most compulsory and have the highest membership density
Europe. There

governance

is

a lasting impact from the neo-corporatist

that will not

be easily overturned

in a single
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in

method of policymaking and

generation. (Pelinka 1999; Kittel

2000) Additionally, the

and implementation standards of EU policy

soft transposition

have allowed the Austrian social partnership a
directives, in the

role,

governance and administration of

sometimes even mandates by the

EU norms

and policies

in the

EU

Austrian

system. (Falkner 2000) In key areas of social insurance and labor-capital relations, the
social partnership remains entrenched

successful

some

not, to

and powerful despite occasional

efforts,

bypass the neo-corporatist institutions. (Falkner

et al.

some

2005;

Unger 1999; Heimsch 2000)
This unique style of administration and policymaking has even been replicated
the

EU

level as

Austrian state

was

stipulated in the accession agreement

in the early 1990s.

Austrian delegation in Brussels

between the social partners and

The representation of the

may

social partners within the

help mitigate the feedback that might otherwise

drive bureaucrats and other Austrian officials with Brussels experience towards

pluralist, statist, or other ideals

Woschnagg

suggested,

making and

in the

it

was

new Europe"

and “participate

rather than remain outside

1995) Austria was going to be deeply affected by Europe no matter.

being a

EU

member and

helping to

make EU

policy

balance of the

Sweden and

EU” and move

it

membership would give Austria

was

Finland,

we

game

EU

(Guttman

seems clear

that

Schussel, then Vice Chancellor,

(Guttman 1995) Hence,

that,

social democratic states, could collectively leverage a

the

it.

are changing the approach and the cultural

in the right direction”.

a chip in the

It

in the decision

better than being forced to deal with

As Wolfgang

policy as an outsider. (Pelinka 1999)

argued, “along with

more

of policymaking. As Austrian Ambassador Gregor

better to “sit in Brussels"

shaping of a

at

along with other corporatist and

more Austrian-flavored

future for

and perhaps preserve some of the distinctly Austrian elements of consensual and
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neo-corporatist policymaking. (Pelinka 1999;

social partners

partnership

Unger 1999; Heimsch 2000)

In essence, the

would become “emissaries” and “modernization brokers” of the

at the

German

EU

and global

level.

(Unger 1999; Heimsch 2000)

administrative style during the postwar era

concept of the semi-sovereign
be strongly amenable to

state. (Knill

EU modes

social

2001

)

was

typically reflected in the

Schmidt suggests

that this style

should

of governance given their shared compound natures.

(Schmidt 2006) The German policymaking model tended

to

be multiform

in its

concurrent use of meso-corporatism, federalism, pluralism, and Chancellor democracy,

(von

Beyme

1993; Schmidt 2006) Yet the

strain since the

to

has undergone tremendous

1980s due to reunification, globalization, economic decline, and

Europeanization. The area where

commitment

German model

much

structural

change has occurred as has been

and maintenance of Germany's neo-corporatist

in the

institutions.

Decentralization of the social partners, especially labor and industry, resulted
primarily from the results of reunification and exceptionally bad

conditions over the past two decades.

division of

Germany,

in political,

the overall unhappiness with

The pressures

German economic

to increase competitiveness, the

economic, and social terms, between east and west, and

German economic growth and

stability led to far

more

disenchantment with the old models of consensus and concertation. In eastern Germany,
those levels

may have never

Auer 1997) This has had

Gennan

existed in the

first

place. (Wiesenthal 2004; Pagdett 1999;

significant repercussions into the sectoral corporatism of the

social partnership.
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)

of the east has effectively begun a process

In collective bargaining, the integration

of significant decentralization of agreements
country. This has consequently

their constituents

and has led

weakened

all

to the firm

and plant levels throughout the

national peak associations in the eyes of

to greater variation

and non-adoption of sector-wide

national standards in both unions and industry. (Auer 1997; Wiesenthal 2004; Turner

1

998; Bosch 2004) This decentralization and growing weakness has been transmitted

through

many

sectors and has resulted in greater willingness to bypass the social partners,

as in road haulage, vocational education, and labor market liberalization. (Teutsch 2001;

Vitols 2004; Vail 2003) In the case of

German

existing actors, especially the unions, to adopt

function of the

part

of the

rail

state

railway reforms, the reforms required

new

behavioral norms over the role and

system. (Teutsch 2001; Hertier and Knill 2001) While intrinsically

and serving a public function, the privatization process required many

actors to re-think the legal, social, and political status of the railways as a

oriented, market-oriented, and quasi-private sector.

The

more

belief that the state

would always

be the final arbiter and guarantor of the railway system was deeply engrained
railway unions, provincial governments, and

DB

board, as well as

client-

in the

much of the

public.

(Teutsch 2001
Overall, the

coqxiratist than

in the

it

German and

was

just

Austrian models have

two decades ago and

it

is

become

increasingly less

also reflected in the growing changes

organizational and policymaking styles that are

becoming more

pluralist or

more

decentralized. Comparatively however, the decentralization and dissolution of the

commitment

German

to

case.

neo-corporatism

in

both theory and practice has been greater in the

While neo-corporatism was never as entrenched and centralized
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in

Germany

as

it

was

in Austria,

it

was nonetheless amongst

the strongest proponents

and

adherents to neo-corporatist patterns and processes. Yet the overall style and form of neocorporatist institutionalization clearly has mattered in both cases

differential responses

and helped explain the

of the German and Austria social partnerships to the challenges of

globalization, structural

economic change, and Europeanization. (Heinisch 2000)

Learning

The

fifth

and

mediating factor for Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso

final

is

learning.

Rather than merely reflecting given empowerment and preferential interests of actors and
institutions ate the

domestic

level,

Europeanization

may

also lead to transformations of

the actors' interests and identities. (Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and

Caporaso 2001,

12;

Borzel and Risse 2003) The effects of Europeanization upon citizenship, identity, and

interests

may

fall far

more

into the social constructivist

international relations but there

is

and social learning

are important implications of such

domestic structures of governance. European integration
social,

rely

and economic

upon

static actor

identities that

and

itself

may

literature

of

change upon

lead to

new

political,

fundamentally alter existing domestic structures that

institutional roles.

(Checkel 2001; Marks and Steenbergen

2004; Risse-Kappen 2001; Borzel and Risse 2003) As Schmidt suggests, one of the
diffuse impacts of Europeanization

may be

institutional “learning,

mimesis, and

imitation” of EL) patterns by national actors. Interest groups are the most notable actor

affected by such changes as their experience at the EU-level of lobbying alters their

domestic outlooks and operations. (Schmidt 2006)
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)

The most notable examples might be

the Europeanization of business interests.

Firms once grounded and co-opted into national economic interests and policymaking
structures,

have become

far

more European

in

outlook, market penetration, foreign

more European

investment, logistics, production, distribution, and have often adopted a

identity in the stead

of a national one. (Coen and Dannreuther 2003; Schmidt 2006)

While these firms pursue and promote an ever more European
interests

and goals towards

freer regional trade, other firms

identity with multinational

and business

interests,

farmers, small businesses, partially state-owned or heavily subsidized firms,

even more protection from competition. European integration

amongst existing
lines.

firms, interests,

and associations along

itself

may

such as

may pursue

cause a

split

and Euroskepticist

integrationist

(Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Cowles 2001)

The European Union may
promote and converge towards
impact from

members,

member

state, as

exert strong normative pressures

EU

policy and practices. Hence, there

well as closely linked

to alter their perceptions

and behavior

Cognitive effects of Europeanization

agenda setting

in

upon member

may

is

also an indirect

non-members and candidate

to the

also result in

European nonn. (Hertier 2001

new methods of framing and

domestic policy contexts. The Europeanization process

desirable, possible,

and

is

policymaking universe

in

alters

what

is

(Dyson 2003)

to be avoided.

The Austrian and German cases

states to

are replete with such changes. Clearly the

both Austria and

Germany

has

become more

pluralist

and more

challenged by European-level governance. Actors, both state and non-state, have learned

how

to operate within a

their

behavior accordingly.

two or multi-level governance environment and have adpisted
In Austria, the social
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partnership itself adjusted to the

new

environment during the negotiation and accession process so as
domestic arena for gains

at the

to leverage losses in the

European. (Unger 1999; Heinisch 2000) Nonetheless,

other acts in the Austria system including parliament, the Lander, firms, unions,

environmentalists, farmers, and others have begun to adjust their behavior, interests, and

strategies to coincide with the

new European and

global environment. While this has

certainly had implications for the social partnership,

Clearly the social partnership has emerged as a

system, nonetheless,

seems

it

remains rather strong

to suggest a learning process but

political cultural, institutional,

In the case

one

that

ties

its

eventual demise.

force in the Austrian

core competencies. This certainly

faces limitations of entrenched

still

and policymaking preferences.

of Germany, learning

may weaken

does not mean

more circumscribed

in its

to adjust to the

environment has also had a significant impact.
lobbying

it

between firms and

Among

new European and

global

business interests, EU-level

their national

peak associations. (Schmidt

2006) As Cowles demonstrates with her study of the German Trans-Atlantic Business
Dialogue (TABD), German firms regularly opted

of the

EU

to

pursue unilateral or sectors lobbying

rather than participate in the national trade

(Cowles 2001

)

Hence German firms are learning

peak associations and formats.

that they

and national business and employers' organizations

at the

can operate beyond sectoral

EU

level

and are then

replicating this behavior at an increasing level in the domestic sphere. This

supported by the declining membership density of the
sectoral associations such as in the metal industry.
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BDA

would be

and BDI and also

in the

;

Yet

this decentralization

has been primary linked to the effects of unification, the

decline of national unions and national employers' associations in the collective

bargaining process, the growth of works councils, globalization, and other endogenous

and exogenous developments not merely Europeanization.

The cases of German railways and road haulage reform
learning of

many

actors in the policymaking process.

reflect the increasing

The primary impacts have been

permanent incorporation of European-level integration and governance forces

a

in the

domestic arena. Despite the absence of strong and compelling directives, German
transport policy began to

accommodate and consider

existing as well as potential

application of EU-level transport and competition law and EC'J rulings on domestic

structural changes. This has also occurred in areas

Knill 2001

)

There have also been

unions to operate

in a

more

collective bargaining has

less successful efforts

multi-level manner.

made

of public procurement. (Teutsch 2001

this

more

by the

DGB

and other trade

The decentralization of German

difficult.

Nonetheless, other actors including the

Lander, environmental groups, and other interests have learned that multi-level

governance. Hence the impact of Europe had become a regular feature condition of

domestic reform and change for

all

German

actors and institutions.

Overall learning to adapt and operate in a multilevel European environment has

had significant implications for the social partnerships in both Austria and Germany.

In

both cases, actors and institutions have altered, to variable extents, the strategies,

interests,

and modes of operation

in a multi-level pattern

governance. This does not mean to suggest that
the old, quite to the contrary, the

new

learning
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this

is

of policymaking and

new knowledge

will entirely replace

often an addition and annex to

modes of policymaking and governance. However,

preexisting

operations

at the

European

level

have been

in

some

cases,

where

increasing likelihood of greater multilevel and multiform behavior of actors. This

help erode

much of the dominance of social

a total dissolution

an

fruitful for particular interests, there is

may

partnerships, but does not necessarily suggest

of existing national patterns,

just a significant

increase in

its

complexity.

New

Exit Pathways

These

last

three factors are predicated

upon domestic actors and

As

willingness and ability to engage in a two-level game.

discussed

chapter two, this

in

highly institutional and rational choice perspective suggests that actors

advantage
goals.

in

interests

who

see an

doing so will see a multi-level game so as to achieve their particularistic

(Putnam 1988; Hertier 2001

new opportunity

)

In short,

European

structure, access points, veto points,

levels of

governance provide a

and informational advantages for

domestic actors. Domestic actors can use Europe as a resource or advantage for their

and economic

political

EU

interests. (Hertier

institutions such as the

Ministers.

success

Groups

at the

EU

that

were once marginal actors

level.

)

This can be through any of the

Commission, Court of Justice, Parliament, or Council of

As Schmidt

national influence, or those that had

and gain

and Knill 2001

at the national level

may

find greater

suggests, groups that might be losing measures of

little in

the

first

place, can

move up

levels of influence through these supranational portals.
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to the

EU

(Schmidt 2006)

level

While derived from Hix and Goetz, these also closely resemble some of the
mediating factors posited by Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse. Hence there

amongst the eight overall mediating

factors

However, Hix and Goetz have focused

far

is

often overlap

of the Europeanization frameworks.

more on

the rational choice

and actor level

than that of Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse whose framework and mediating factors were

far

more

criteria

structural

and

in

some cases

constructivist. Nonetheless, the

Hix and Goetz

deserve some individual exploration.

The

creation of a multi-level

model of governance and policymaking has had

German

strong implications for both the Austrian and

European

level

cases of social partnership.

The

of policymaking and governance provides a conduit for domestic actors to

exit the national pattern

of policymaking. For groups

excluded, or marginalized

at the

that

have been regularly blocked,

national level, the European level

may

ultimately

provide more success. For groups without veto powers, or for those with veto powers but

who

regularly have their efforts quashed by other veto players, the

European

potentially provide an alternate route to influence the policymaking process

the national level

and lobbying or governing

their desired policy

their role in the

outcomes

at the

at the

European

European one.

level, they

would

by bypassing

If interests

may choose

level

can achieve

to exit or

reduce

domestic policy arena. (Hix and Goetz 2000; Borzel and Risse 2003) This

might be especially relevant

in neo-corporatists

systems due

to their reliance

upon

consensual patterns of policymaking and governance and the de jure or de facto veto

powers

that social partners

may have

in the

model. (Hix and Goetz 2000)

This has been most notable amongst multinational firms and enterprises that have

been strong promoters of the single market program and trade liberalization through
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European

amongst

integration. (Hix

the

and Goetz 2000) These large multinationals have been

most effective and active

interests at the

EU

level, far

surpassing that of

organized labor, smaller and medium-sized business, and other interest groups.

(Greenwood 1997, 2003, 2003a; Greenwood, Grote, and Romt 1992; Schmidt 2006;
Cowles 2001 This has given

large firms considerable willingness to bypass or

)

national neo-corporatist policymaking patterns,

and find consensus with organized
of the policymaking structures

where they were forced

labor, the state, environmentalists,

at the

EU

level.

to

abandon

compromise

and others,

in lieu

This can be overstated, most firms would

never fully abandon the national level and would rather likely operate

at

multiple levels,

nonetheless the existence of supranational levels of governance provides exit
opportunities that did not exist during previous eras.

The Austrian case of social partnership should be

potentially

more susceptible

to

the creation of multi-level exit pathways specifically because of its high levels of

compulsory and centralized peak association membership. Compared
and more voluntary German model, Austrian

interests

should have

to the decentralized

much

higher

perceptions of the value of going outside of the existing peak associations and neocorporatist policymaking patterns.

However, the Austria case has actually not exhibited

such trends to an overwhelming degree.

First, the

voluntary reduction of the social

partnership’s competencies and the greater pluralization of the overall Austria

policymaking process has effectively meant
since that

model

is

now more

competence including
Falkner

et al.

from the neo-corporatist model

circumscribed and focused on a few key areas of

social insurance

2005) Second,

less defection

and labor law. (Heimsch 2000; Falkner 2000;

in those areas or

remaining competence, the compulsory and
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monopolistic organization of the chambers and other peak associations has actually been

enforced through effective negotiation and entrenchment

at

both the domestic and

EU

levels.

The Austrian peak associations including

the

OGB

and

VOI remain

despite recent decentralization, in their respective constituencies by

European standards. Hence, unlike

in

Germany where both

all

dominant,

comparative

labor and industry

associations have been easier to pick off due to their decentralization, the Austrian peak

associations have been able to maintain an effective institutional basis of authority and

influence. (Heinisch 2000) Notably, the

defection of larger Austrian firms from

accomplished

this in several

VOI
its

has been rather successful

ranks unlike the

ways. Most notable are

its

and mid-sized Austrian firms from the organization and
Federal Economic Chamber. The
rather divided

enterprises.

still

It

has

on the impact of small

continuing dominating of the

other peak associations were always

between the larger firms and the Mittelstand of small and medium

Hence decentralization has allowed German firms

beyond the BDI. But
hence

German BDI and

German BDI.

limitations

its

at limiting the

in Austria, the

reflects their

VOI remains dominated by

pursue their interests

the largest firms and

primary interests and concerns. Smaller and mid-sized firms,

Austria and elsewhere, have been less successful

influence policy at the

to

EU

level

compared

at

in

finding opportunities to lobby and

to their larger brethren.

(Schmidt 2006;

Greenwood 2003, 2003a)
Austrian collective bargaining and labor law also remain dominantly in the

purview of the

OGB

with only slight decentralization of wage bargaining and social

insurance to the firm or sectoral levels. Hence, the very continuity of centralization has
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EU

provided fewer successful or viable exit pathways to the
institutions

and allowed the social partners

to

level for Austrian actors or

remain key players

in the

Europeanization

and modernization processes. (Heinisch 2000; Pelinkal998; Unger 1999)
For Germany, the existence of new exit pathways

at the

EU

significant effect in firms, provincial governments, social groups,

German
the

EU

had a

level has

and other

interests.

firms are most notable and have been quite adept at entrenching themselves

level.

By 2005, German

the technical committees of the

industry controlled just under

European Committee

30%

at

of the secretariats of

for Standardization

and were large

presences in the EU-level trade and industry associations. (Schmidt 2006) Even the

German

ETUC
likely

trade union federation, the

DGB,

has been the most involved an organized

and other EU-level labor organization. Other national

and

less successful at

organizing and operating

EU. As Schmidt and others suggests, non-business

interests

interests, or small businesses, often

EU

level lobbying

struggle to reach across national frontiers. (Schmidt 2006; Imig and

some notable exceptions including environmental

groups, and others

network

levels.

who

The notable

potential supranational

is

much

like “a

are notable

deficit

more organized
is

in

less

at a transnational level inside the

have problems assessing the possible payoffs and gains from

are

have been

in the

at

and also

Tarrow 2001

interests, linguistic

and

)

There

identity

both grassroots and transnational

organized labor

that,

while having

ETUC

as a

peak association, has lacked a pan-European level of support and

head without a body”. (Schmidt 2006)

The cases of German
created a two-level

aligned with the

game

new

transport policy, discussed below,

for both private

and public

strategic opportunities at the
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actors.

European

fit

Those
level

quite well as they

that

were

were able

in-line or

to leverage

;

them

into a strengthened domestic position.

It

and alliances of interests and actors

coalitions

also assisted in the creation of new

at the

Teutsch 2001; Hertier and Knill 2001) German
firms,

like

have been increasingly attracted

European

level. (Hertier

2001

interests, especially large multinational

to exit opportunities ate the

European

level.

Firms

Siemens, Bayer, and others have begun to pursue more American-style lobbying

efforts in Brussels while simultaneously

as the

BDI

in the

committing

far less to the

peak associations such

domestic realm. (Dyson 2003) For German interest groups,

Europeanization has had tremendous implications, especially for business associations

who have

seen increasing incentive to directly lobby and operate

EU

at the

eschewing the peak association system. (Dyson 2003) This has weakened

level,

their loyalty to

the national patterns of governance while simultaneously increasing their influence

role at the supranational.

The

role

(Dyson 2003)

of the new pathways was significant in German road haulage and public

procurement reform.
instigate serious

In

road haulage, the interests

in the

domestic arena

demands. The

explicit threat

to act

on both sides of the reform

movement by

looming

threat

had

failed to

of Europeanizing the debate and

potentially losing at the EU-level of governance accelerated a

lack of

that

reform through the 1980s and early 1990s used the ECJ and Commission

as outlets for their

coalitions

and

of

EU

even without

testimony of larger

issue.

change

in the

(Kmll 2001; Teutsch 2001

the haulage industry association

)

domestic

In this case, the

and unions was exacerbated by the

action and led the transport ministry and parliamentary committees

their consent.

German

Commission provided

The complaint before

industrial

the

ECJ and

expertise and

and manufacturing enterprises before the

significant pressure

on domestic
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interests to act soon. This

)

heightened awareness stemmed directly from the pressures of Europeanization and the
creation of supranational access points to the policymaking process for the actors that

supported liberalization but had previously been excluded

in the sectoral corporatist

new

system. (Teutseh 2001; Schmidt 2006) Transport users were provided

access to foreign haulers and the

2001

)

EU

policymaking process

In public procurement, the implicit threats

from

EU

itself.

exit options in

(Hertier and Knill

competition policy, led several

excluded actors, including foreign firms and service providers, to pressure the German

government

for change. (Kmill

In railway policy, there

the EU-level and the

2001

was

government and other pro-liberalization

effectively use the

EU

and the potentially future

threat

were

interests

The German Transport Forum was

sidestep the multiple veto players.

from

a similar series of events but with less pressure

less free to

able to

somewhat

of judicial or commission action

through competition policy and liberalization to sway a few votes on the issue. Yet,
Europeanization played a rather small role
the changes

were

less severe.

in

(Teutseh 2001

tipped the scales in favor of reform

was

)

providing exit pathways

in this case,

hence

Nonetheless, the decisive impetus that

a result of general pressures of Europeanization

and the implications of a multi-level system of governance.
Clearly, actors

may

use the

EU

as an exit

pathway from

policymaking patterns and regimes. For neo-corporatist systems

their

domestic

this is

more problematic

given their “closed” or regulated patterns of organization and operation. The exit

pathways

to the

Commission, ECJ, and other EU-level

domestic actors options that were unavailable
environmental

interests,

women’s

institutions

in the past.

and actors allow

Finns, provincial governments,

groups, minority groups, and others once excluded or
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limited by the neo-corporatist patterns of policymaking have been increasingly successful

at the

EU

level through lobbying

likely to exert influence over the

and

legal action.

such pathways are open and

domestic system, they have and will continue to have

German

significant implications for the

When

and, to a lesser extent, Austrian social

partnerships.

New

Veto Powers
Having

lost at the national level, actors

may now

also seek a veto of domestic

EU

policymaking and governance outputs by operating

at the

actors, usually marginalized or heavily constrained

by the existing

conditions, can find

means and

within the

allies

EU

level.

such

tactic.

when

political order or

to help achieve goals that they could

not do so alone at the national level. Seeking redress through the

common

This occurs

While domestic administrative and

ECJ

is

the most

legal institutions

might

limit

such actions, the ECJ and Commission provide venues where domestic “losers” can
fight the issue

and potentially win

at

the supranational levels. (Hix

In the Austrian case, there has

jumping

to the

EU

re-

and Goetz 2000)

been significant evidence of interests and actors

level to seek a reversal

and policy was notorious low through the

of a defeat. Austrian compliance with
late

EU

law

1990s and a plethora of cases, complaints,

and assertions were transmitted from the domestic

to the

European

level during this time

by foreign and domestic firms, farmers, labor groups, environmentalists, women's
organizations, and provincial governments. (Holl, Poliak, and

200

1

)

However, since the

moved towards

late

1

Riekmann 2000; Falkner

990s, compliance complaints decreased and Austria has

the upper half of the

EU

in

terms of compliance, likely helped by the
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)

expansions of 2004 and 2007 as well. (Unger 1999) Nonetheless, the
Austrian accession seem to have been overcome and

member

it

is

initial

problems of

emerging as a more “normal’'

state.

However, compared
activity in the Austrian

alleviated

to

Germany

there has been far less of the level-jumping

model. The reduction of the competence of the social partnership

some such pressures

that could

have developed

after accession, but the

continuing viability of the social partners to find compromise and the ongoing

compulsory and dominant positions of the
limit both the

demand and

OGB, VOI, and chamber

systems tends to

necessity of Europeanizing debates and disputes. However,

there has been a general trend of increasing Europeanization of legal and administrative

policy that suggests an important limitation of the social partnership from

incarnations. (Holl, Poliak, and

EU

level

and

to

far

more willingness of actors

bypass or leapfrog the domestic legal and

German road haulage and

found new potential veto points

explicit threat that the

ECJ would

in the

ECJ and Commission. The

in

and procurement

parliament and the respective ministries to enact

actors in favor or liberalization, in road haulage including large

industry and larger

larger

political institutions. In

rule against the existing road haulage

regimes sparked sufficient movement

The

to seek redress at

public procurement reform, the government and pro-

liberalization interests

reform.

past

Riekmann 2000; Falkner 2001

The German model has exhibited
the

its

German

haulers organized

in the

VKS, and

and foreign construction firms, used European policies

in

German

procurement included

to strategically limit the

domestic policy options and drive the reform process. The perception that the German

government would no longer be able

to stop

reform
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in the

Commission and with

the

down by

onerous legal conditions that could be passed

resign themselves to the necessity of liberalization.

new

the ECJ, caused

The European

level

many

actors to

had become a

area of veto points in the system. (Teutsch 2001; Borzel and Risse 2003)

In

German railway

public employees with far

reform, the railway workers' unions had previously been

more

limited abilities to strike,

which were generally

illegal for

public sector workers, and to collectively bargain with the state. Privatization and reform

allowed the unions to become private sector unions with significant additional rights to
strike, negotiate,

and importantly, representation on the

DB

codetermination laws that would become applicable to the
state

promised

retired

to

governing board through

new

private firm.

Once

the

cover costs of pensions, healthcare, and pay-levels of existing and

employees, the unions readily agreed to the reforms. (Teutsch 2001

Europeanization had been influential

in getting the

unions, Lander, and

agree to reforms. Here the threat was more implicit from the

and government, that without reform,

EU

action or sanction

)

DB

But overall,
board to

German Transport Forum
was

inevitable. This

provided impetus amongst unions, provincial governments, and the board to accept the

need

to reform.

(Teutsch 2001; Schmidt 2006)

The impact of the

TASD

influence and redress at the

their national

level outside

growing

ability

of German firms to seek

of the domestic policymaking process and

peak associations. The increased influence to shape trade policy allows the

firms participating in

contribute to

EU

also reflects the

EU

TASD

to

bypass their national political institutions and potentially

level veto or marginalization

2001) Overall, the

EU

of other domestic considerations. (Cowles

institutions, specifically the

Commission and ECJ, provide new

veto locations in the policymaking process that did not previously exist. The willingness
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of actors

to

Germany

pursue such options has grown tremendously since the 1990s

and, to a lesser extent, Austria.

The divergence between

the

in

two

is

both

a reflection

of their differential forms of social partnership and the particular issue or sector involved.
(Heinsich 2000) Nonetheless, the existence of these

new

veto points

at the

European

level

have certainly increased the complexity and affected the considerations and calculations
of domestic actors and institutions

in the

policymaking and governance process. In

essence, one cannot ignore the potential dimensions and implications European

governance upon the once sovereign domestic realm.

Gaming

Informational Advantage

Actors

may enhance

advantage by operating

their

at the

power and influence by gaining an informational

European

level.

As information and

data are always

valuable commodities in the policymaking process, no matter what level, those with

precise, technical, timely,

and valuable expertise

in a policy area are likely to

be more

successful in gaining access, framing agendas and debates, and shaping final policy than

those interests that cannot produce comparable counterevidence. This asymmetry

may

then be replicated at the national level, as those interests with a privileged and prime
position in Brussels will exert greater influence and advantage at the domestic level given

their ability to predict

prescriptions.

more

Hence

and frame the European consequences of domestic policy

actors that are entrenched at the

influential at the

European

level will likely

become

domestic level given their multi-level expertise. (Hix and Goetz

2000) This has emerged amongst the bureaucratic corps of domestic system between
those that have extensive Brussels experience and those without. (Knill 2001; Mangenot
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2004) But

it

also extends to executive, political parties, parliamentarians,

and subnational

governments. Elites within parties, governments, interest associations, and other political
institutional actors

may

internal challengers.

increase their informational advantage over external as well as

Hence multinational

firms,

due

to their

deep penetration of the EU-

level

governance and policymaking systems are potentially advantaged

level

over environmental or union

structures. (Hix

interests,

national

undermining parity or consensual patterns or

and Goetz 2000; Greenwood 2003; Schmidt 2006)

The Austrian case of social partnership provides
fact that the social partners

state.

EU

representation.

at the

due

European

to the

level

The 1994 Europaabkommen or Agreement on
,

Europe, secured the social partners participation
in Austria's

a remarkable variation

have themselves become entrenched

within the delegation of the Austrian

questions”

at the

in

Hence

“important, relevant, technical

the Austrian delegation

became

the

only mission in Brussels to harbor both government and interest organization
representatives in a single house and extend neo-corporatism to the supranational level.

(Karlhofer 1996) The peak associations of the social partnership and Joint Commission

exchanged a

significant share

policymaking process

Under

this

for these

more

guaranteed advisory seats

system, the social partners could

their interests in Brussels

role in the

of their authority and vested power

limited extent as

hoped yet the

Austrian delegation and

its

The system has developed

activities in

into a close

some key

terms

this

and

has occurred to a

have been relatively important

to the

areas of social policy and labor law.

and cooperative relationship
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representatives of

official negotiating positions

In practical

social partners

Austrian

in Brussels.

become extended

and hopefully shape Austria's

EU. (Unger 1999; Heinisch 2000)

in the

in Brussels

between

the governmental and interest representatives. (Karlhofer 1996)

case, the peak associations

were able

2000; Unger 1999) This has led

to a

more

in the

an informational advantage

to secure

level while simultaneously reinforcing their

Hence

own domestic

parity

amongst

Austrian

EU

at the

institutionalization. (Heinisch

the actors of the social

partnership in terms of informational advantage and has helped stabilize and maintain the
existing system

This was not the case

in

Germany where

the lack of centralization, the long period

of gradual integration, and the lack of direct participation

in the

German

delegation to

EU

has created a more competitive condition with far less parity and far less social

partnership. (Heinisch 2000) Large

the

most notable success

stories

reinforce or increase their

In

German

German

firms and the Lander governments have been

of gaining informational advantages

power

in the

at the

EU

level to

domestic policymaking process. (Schmidt 2006)

railways and road haulage reforms, the roles of the industry

associations played an important role in cajoling other actors towards reform. Their

ability to navigate the

ECJ and Commission provided then

significant leverage inside the

transport ministry and parliament to lobby for reform. Their expertise on the costs of not

reforming the systems, and their perceived specialization
competition law framed the agendas for reform. These
information that linked

relative strength

(Teutsch 2001

German

)

German

interests

w ith

in the application

EU

new European channels of

those in other

member

and influence of the pro-liberalization actors

As

of

in the

states

changed the

domestic arena.

Hertier and Knill suggest the higher “levels of regulatory change in

transport policy can be traced to the mutual reinforcement of national and

European-induced reform pressures.” (2001

)

Domestic reformers were extended support
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)

and increased

their influence

(Hertier and Knill 2001

German

by

their expertise

Most notable here has been

)

firms both access and influence at the

industrial policy.

The

role

challenging in

and legitimacy

the European level.

at

TABD

the role of the

Commission

level

on issues of trade and

(Cowles 2001

of Europe

Germany

in the

than

in

domestic policymaking process has certainly been more

Austria in terms of informational advantage. While the

Austrian social partners were bale to establish themselves

German

Austrian delegation, the

social partners,

due

Brussels through the

in total in

to their decentralization,

successful or uniform at entrenching themselves. (Heinisch 2000) While

has

made

to give large

a successful

jump

this

was done beyond

associations such as the BDI, and even the

situation, unlike Austria,

one of far

is

German

less

industry

the social partnership, peak

German government

less parity

were

and

far

itself.

Hence, the

more competition and perceived

benefits to bypass the social partnership.

Assessing Structural Implications of Europeanization upon Social Partnerships
Austria

Despite the expectations of much of the scholarship from the

late

late

1980s through

1990s that predicted the imminent collapse of the Austrian social partnership, the

system has made a number of critical adaptations that has allowed
viability despite a

more

patterns. (Heinisch

effect”

to retain efficacy

limited role and scope in the policymaking and governance

2000) Falkner and Leiber discovered “no direct Europeanization

on Austrian social partnership

tripartite

it

concertation

was

actually

in the area

of labor law and elsewhere. The

enhanced by Europeanization
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in

many ways by

and

somewhat expanding

the system to Brussels

where the

social partners

special cases, directly represented in the Austrian delegation to the

level, there

was

little

misfit

between

EU

have been,

in

EU. At the domestic

labor law directives and the existing tripartite

order in the Joint Commission and Austrian model of governance precisely because the

peak associations willingly reduced

their overall

competence and remained focus on

their

core areas of social insurance and capital-labor relations. Falkner and Leiber argue that

Europeanization actually stabilized the social partnership
that

swung

the Austrian

government

to the right

and

in light

of the 2000 elections

their greater hostility to policy

concertation. EU-level directives actually required or strongly suggested utilization of the

existing neo-corporatist

modes of governance

OVP-FPO government was

to adapt to

EU

law, hence the Schussel-led

actually limited in their ability to bypass the social partners in

labor and social policy. (Falkner and Leiber 2004)

Nonetheless, there have been significant indirect effects of Europeanization upon
the Austrian patterns of social partnership.

behavior have expanded dramatically
true in areas

More

in the

pluralist patterns

of interest group

Austrian political system. This

of transportation, environment, and education

that

is

especially

were once under the

expansive aegis of neo-corporatist institutions of the Joint Commission and Committee

on Social and Economic Questions. While there has clearly been

a rescaling

of the

authority and influence of social partnership in the Austrian policymaking and

governance system,

it

has not been wholesale.
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In areas

of labor-capital relations, labor law, and social insurance there has been

continued vigor and efficacy of the social partnership. (Falkner

and more of their work

is

et al.

2005) While more

dedicated to administering and implementing

EU

directives,

it

nonetheless provides the social partners roles as Europeanization and modernization
“brokers”. (Heinisch 2000)

For the Austrian case, Europeanization has had some direct implications overall.

The

social partners

became

1995 been leaders in the implementation and

their entry in

certain policy areas.

competency

The primary change has been an

that typified the

strongly, but in a

relations

the primary vehicles in support of accession and have since

and

system

in the

postwar

policymaking process

in

overall reduction of their broad

era.

more narrow range of policy areas

EU

The

social partnership operates

directly relating to labor-capital

social insurance. Additionally privatization,

monetary union, and the

increasing importance of the judiciary in the Austrian political and economic system have

meant an erosion of some of the

liberties

the Austrian brand of social partnership.

indirect as

it

and

flexibility that

were once characteristic of

The impact of Europeanization has been more

has changed the strategies, priorities, and interests of Austria’s major social,

economic, and

political actors,

Europeanization

is

eroding the strong and defined corporatist system.

certainly contributing to these changes, but

it

is

not alone.

Globalization, domestic party politics, social and economic post-industrialism, and other

endogenous and exogenous forces are playing a
of social partnership as well.
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large role in reducing the scale

and scope

Hence, while the evidence suggests some moderate direct impact of
Europeanization upon the Austrian model,
than

many

to the

in the early

1990s suggested

new environment.

it

it

has been less pronounced and less direct

would, and the social partnership has adapted

(Streeck and Schmiiter 1991

)

The

social partners

“novel” strategies, what Sully termed “Byzantine”, to accede and operate

adopted
in the

new

European atmosphere. (Falkner and Leiber 2004; Heinisch 2000; Sully 1996) They
surrendered some policy competence and authority in the domestic arena for a guaranteed
voice

at the

European one, and have maintained

their role

and function over

their core

competencies. More narrow and circumscribed, and certainly more politically contested

and contentious, the Austrian social partnership nonetheless remains rather stable for the
foreseeable future. (Kittel 2000) Austria has

become more moderately

corporatist

and

Europeanization has tangibly contributed to that structural transformation. (Pelinka 1999)

Germany
Germany,

In

the collapse of the social partnership in

extensive and perhaps lasting.

Due

to

its

many

sectors has been

increasing decentralization,

it

has appeared less

capable of addressing the significant issues and challenges of the post- 1980s era and has

been subsequently marginalized and excluded to greater degrees by successive German
governments. (Heinisch 2000; Knill 2001) This decentralization and marginalization

however

is

harder to link directly to the influence of Europeanization.

It

appears that

Europeanization has had some important indirect and magnifying influence on the
decentralization and marginalization of the

German

more modest impact than

terms of inciting structural change

that in Austria in
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social partnership, but has

had a
in the

far

social partnership.

more strongly

to

EU

directive

decentralization of the social partners seems linked

both reunification and the lackluster

rather than strictly

social partners

The increasing

economy of the 990s and 2000s
1

from European integration. As Schmidt argues,

have remained

vital,

in

some

areas, the

involved, and enfranchised in the implementation of

and policy within the German system. (2006) However, the overall

results

are quite mixed.

As Lodge

illustrated in his study

of public procurement, the social partners were

rather reduced from influencing the reform packages.

Only

and labor peak associations able to gamer compromises
protection for

German workers and

firms.

The

very end were industry

at the

that

provided some levels of

overall impact

was

a liberalization of the

procurement process with a greater role of the German legal and bureaucratic system
the expense of the social partners. This illustrates the

growing weakness of the

at

social

partners in general, and the increasing influence of Europeanization in driving policy

changes through non-concerted modes of governance and policymaking. (Lodge 2000)
Unlike the Austrian case, the social partners failed

European Act and post-Maastricht due

to their

to adapt

and lead

in the post-Single

entrenched and lasting inability to

generate compromise. Whereas the social partners and partnership actively

of and an adjunct
there

to the

became

Europeanization process within the Austrian system,

in

part

Germany

was no such development. (Heinisch 2000)
This was also true in

German road haulage reform where

they government was

able to bypass the existing neo-corporatist system in enacting policy but also effectively

ended sectoral corporatism by removing the functional governance roles from the social
partners and placing

it

under direct aegis of the
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state. (Hertier

and Knill 2001; Schmidt

)

2006) Vocational education reform followed an almost identical pattern. However, the
impact of Europeanization was more indirect than direct

in the

case of road haulage and

railways reform. The directives and policies coming from Brussels were rather vague and

granted great leeway

in the

unification, structural

implementation of reforms, especially

in railways.

German

economic change, and declining German competitiveness were

more primarily responsible

for such reforms

even

if

Europeanization provided the

important position of tilting the domestic interest coalitions towards reform. The
necessity of

rail

reform had existed and been progressing since unification and the need

to reorganize the East

2001

)

As Teutsch

and West German

its

networks and systems. (Hertier and Kmll

suggests, in railways reform, European legislation

incentive for reform, and perhaps

but not

rail

was

was an

additional

the final straw that broke the back of continuity,

primary cause. (Teutsch 2001

This also occurs in electricity and banking sectors where the breakdown of the old
corporatist order resulted

from a fractured and divided number of social partners

incapable of finding consensus or

split

over the necessity or scope of proposed reforms.

(Schmidt 2006) The significant decentralization and disorganization of the German social
partners and partnership in

role for the

some

regime

in the

many

sectors provided a limited institutional or foundational

Europeanization process. While Austria was suffering from

similar forces, they were not as severe and the peak associations remained rather

monopolistically entrenched and institutionalized

both

German

at the

national level. Despite efforts by

unions, employers’ and business associations to revitalize their membership

and representative authority, these
system quickly moved

efforts

have

to the sectoral, regional,
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fallen short as the collective bargaining

and firm levels

in the 1990s.

The

decentralization of German labor and the split between the

weakened

the ability of the

peak associations

BDA

and BD1 further

and leading role

to play a decisive

in

Europeanization.

Hence
address the

there has been

new

on some adaptation of the German

issues of Europeanization while the Austrian

fundamental reorganization of the social partnership
adapt to the

new

model pursued

national and

EU

a

levels so as to

post-material, post-Maastricht environment. (Heinisch 2000)

Germany,

In

at the

social partnership to

there has been a rather

mixed assortment of significant

change along with cases of social partnership remaining

intact.

structural

(Dyson 2003) The

system's unique sectoral or meso-corporatism has shown tremendous variation

response to European stimuli. (Schmidt 2006) Importantly,

TABD,

many of the

in

cases, from

railway reform, road haulage, decentralization of collective bargaining, labor

markets, vocational training, and public procurement

show modest

Europeanization. Reunification of east and west and the declining

more strongly linked
European

to the erosion

pressure.

Even

Germany

at

reforms,

in the

was

TABD,

that

a role in

as an adjunct or additional pressure rather than as a primary

the decentralization of industry associations had

increased the decentralization pressures,

the wider context of the

German economy seem

While Europeanization certainly played

the domestic level well before leading to that at the

TABD had certainly

and 2000s

it

from

of social partnership more than any particular

directive, act, or pressure.

many of these

direct influence

German economic,

trade,

was already strongly moving

and global competition challenges.

and

political

in that direction

In essence, while the
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it

EU

level.

begun

in

While the

must be viewed within
environment of the 1990s

due

German

to

domestic political

social partnership has

)

seen far more structural change and significantly more erosion than the Austrian system,

it

is

far less linked to

Europeanization than to other exogenous and endogenous

challenges and forces such as reunification, globalization, and economic decline.

The
The

Utility

overall assessment of the impact of Europeanization on the social

partnerships of Austria and

mixed.

of the Europeanization Framework

Some

Germany, and neo-corporatism

as a whole, has been quite

suggest that the impact of Europe has been towards “light convergence” or

“moderate diversity” of neo-corporatist patterns of governance
the

moving of strong

corporatist systems, such as in

at the national level

Denmark and

and

in

Austria, to the center.

(Falkner and Leiber 2004; Schmidt 2006) Despite these changes, social partnerships

remain
reflect

vital in the

“semi-Europeanized” areas of national social and economic policy

and remain strongly influenced by national prerogatives and

endogenous

political, social,

induced by the

EU

patterns.

that

Other

and economic features may reinforce or mitigate change

or European pressures

endogenous or exogenous pressures

may

as well.

reinforce, mitigate, or alter preexisting

Hence convergence, change, or continuity

primarily depends on “specific internal constellations” within and amongst

member

states

and the EU. (Falkner and Leiber 2004; Borzel and Risse 2003; Knill 2001

The cases of German road haulage and railway reform

illustrate the significant

variance and relativism of the force of Europeanization upon domestic change. In road

haulage,

that

it

was more decisive and probably was responsible

made reform more

likely to succeed. In rail policy,

significant in instigating or

European pressure was

implementing reforms, though
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for creating the conditions

it

was

still

important

less

in

)

creating an atmosphere that

it

would be

made reform imminent and

difficult to say that

at the

Nonetheless, as suggested,

European directives or policy was

the actual content of the changes or reforms.

automatic changes

vital.

domestic level

in

The

EU

)

directly responsible for

has rarely been responsible for

most policy

areas.

These were much more the

products of the domestic institutional and policy environment and the existing political
constellations and conditions.

It

required an alignment of domestic forces and European

forces for reform or change to be successful at the domestic level. (Teutsch 2001

As
is

Hertier and Knill suggest, the most puzzling characteristic of Europeanization

the utterly divergent responses of

member

states to relatively similar or identical

European policy demands and pressures. Depending upon the
constellations arranged towards reform or continuity,

political conditions

European policy may strengthen the

case and process of reform or results in greater opposition to EU-level

the

and

demands Hence

mere existence of mismatch between European and domestic regimes

is

not enough to

explain the specifics of change or continuity, the existing “reform capacity” of the
national system

is

a necessary condition for pressures

of Europeanization to effectively

generate change. (Hertier and Knill 2001; Radaelli 2003; Knill 2001

The

results

of Europeanization are a differentiated picture.

It

seems clear

that

European governance and patterns of policymaking leave a mark on and influence
domestic reforms or continuity, but
domestic constellations of actors,

is

it

is

so primarily contingent upon the existing

interests, institutions,

norms,

styles,

and patterns

that

it

hard to suggest a monolithic or singular role for Europeanization. (Hertier and Knill

2001; Falkner
in different

et al.

2005) European policy

may mean

different things to different actors

domestic environments, even within the same
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member

state.

Schmidt argues

that the

ELPs

sectoral effects vary so greatly that they defy macro-level categorization.

(Schmidt 2006) Hence the scope and direction of domestic change stemming from
Europeanization

is

contingent and dependent upon distinctive regulatory, ideological, and

institutional factors,

making generalization both

difficult

and unwarranted. Herder and

Knill stress that Europeanization “cannot be considered to be the single and decisive

factor in bringing about domestic regulatory

change”

in the cases they

examined. (Herder

and Kmll 2001, 292)

European directives and

legislation tend not to prescribe a specific

domestic adaptation and provide a range of options for the

state to

pursue in the

policymaking and implementation process. (Schmidt 2006) European
or transport,

was vague. The more important impact was

institutional opportunities

changed

legislation, in areas

the indirect alteration of the

and constraints on existing domestic actors and coalitions

the distribution of

and increased

model of

power resources by operating

their access, influence,

interests

multi-levels of governance

and prestige. (Herder and Knill 2001

“change agents” are products of the domestic

change the preferences and

at

political

that

)

These

system but can be mobilized

to

of others due to their Europeanization expertise,

focus, or specialization. (Borzel and Risse 2003)

For most of the Europeanization scholarship incongruence or misfit constitutes a
necessary condition for domestic change. (Borzel and Risse 2003; Cowles, Caporaso, and
Risse 2001; Hix and Goetz 2001

;

Knill 2001

)

But others challenge that assumption

2005) Even

(Herder and Knill 2001; Falkner

et al.

Europeanization as was found in

German railway
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if

systems

policy.

fit,

change may

result

from

Additionally since misfit doesn’t necessarily lead to any specific change or

reform, as

it

remains dependent upon domestic institutional and

begs the question as

to

whether misfit or

Tneb, Harlapp, and Leiber
less than

fit

it

are useful or necessary distinctions. Falkner,

illustrate that in areas

domestic institutions and existing

political structures,

of social policy, misfit or

politics.

(Falkner

et al.

fit

matter far

2005; Schmidt 2006)

Hertier and Knill suggest that the frameworks are less useful than suggested and that

perhaps a more basic approach would be to consider Europeanization as a basic input

in

the domestic political process. (2001)

This author

is

inclined to agree.

Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse

is

far too

The Europeanization framework model of

much of a

one-size

fits all

rubric for an

extraordinarily diverse and contingent constellation of domestic political systems and

forms of governance. The framework's dependence upon measuring
to consider the roles

fit is

far less likely

of policy entrepreneurship, leadership, innovation, changing political

conditions and norms, and other nuances of complex domestic and multi-level

policymaking and governance patterns. (Hertier and Knill 2001

and Risse 2003; Dyson 2003)

In addition, the existing

;

Radaelli 2003; Borzel

framework lacks the

ability to

specify the exact linkages between interests, ideas, institutions, and policy leadership,

weakening

its

Where

overall applicability.

the

(Dyson 2003)

framework achieves

its

best results

is in

the assessment

and influence

of mediating institutional factors. Here, the particular political and institutional
characteristics of national patterns of

governance are illuminated. In these areas, the role

of vetoes, differential empowerment, learning,
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facilitating institutions, organizational

and

policymaking cultures, new

and veto pathways, and informational advantages

exit

all

play important roles in determining the process and outcomes of Europeanization.

However, even here the
of the particular

factors.

result in a particular

results

do not lead

to

The mere existence of any

any generalizations about the impact

particular characteristic does not

outcome. The results of Europeanization are so variable and

differentiated to suggest that an overarching theory or

outcomes

is

framework,

model

that

hopes

to predict

not supported. In using the social partnership as a test of the Europeanization

this research

must conclude

that

The Europeanization approach has

it

is

less than

significant potential for understanding the

comparative dimensions of convergence and divergence
environment. Yet

it

adequate to the task.

in a

post-Maastricht European

has yet to develop into an ever-useful framework due to the misuse

and misconception of the process and forces

at

work. Too

much of the emphasis

on the

is

top-down context of Europeanization. (Borzel and Risse 2003; Cowles, Caporaso, and
Risse 2001

;

Hix and Goetz 2001

variables that

may be more

)

The focus on Europeanization may obscure other

greatly responsible for structural change. There

too large a belief in a monolithic and directive-driven

EU

is

generally

as a source of change rather

than of Europeanization as a process between multiple levels of governance where

differentiation

and diversity are the norm and convergence and isomorphism are

Europeanization

domestic

may

be overused and overemphasized in

political change. (Raedelli

all

rare.

elements of European

2003; Dyson 2003)

This research began with just such a misconception, a suggestion that

Europeanization was broadly and importantly causing structural change
partnerships in

Germany and

Austria. Yet in the end, the results are
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in the social

mixed

at best.

It

seems

clear that Europeanization

the Europeanization

framework

is

a

“two-way

street"

fails to reflect this

between levels of governance, and

complex, dialogic, perpetually

negotiated and re-negotiated policymaking and governance regime. (Dyson 2003)

As Haverland

suggests,

it

is

often difficult, and perhaps impossible, to fully

demonstrate that European integration and governance causes domestic structural change.
(2005) The difficulty

in

globalization, structural

disaggregating Europeanization from other forces such as

economic change, post-materialism, and other exogenous and

endogenous forces poses a significant
(Hix and Goetz 2000)

Many

barrier to assessing the singular impact of the

EU.

studies explicitly indicate such limitations and result in

conclusions that reflect Europeanization as not being the primary source for structural

change. (Haverland 2005) In his critiques of studies assessing the impact of European
integration

upon changes

in

executive power and practices, Goetz concludes that

Europeanization was not a major independent source of change. Schmidt also admits
“forces other than Europeanization have also been

related to globalization

at play,

and internal dynamics related

including external pressures

modernization, devolution,

to

Many

corruption, and even ‘post-industrial’ values”. (2006, 3)

such studies had not

disentangled the European effect from others that had stronger explanatory power in the

case of executive change and tended to operate under the assumption that there was a
significant impact a priori. (Goetz 2000) In

a similar assumptive error. Haverland

many ways

this research

probably began with

and Goetz suggest more rigorous case selection

and disentanglement of potential independent variables. (Haverland 2005; Goetz 2000;

Hix and Goetz 2000) While

this research

concurs and has achieved some measure of

disaggregation of Europeanization from other forces, this goal
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may be

ultimately futile or

)

unproductive given the strong interconnections of globalization, Europeanization,
postindustrialism, and post-materialism. (Hix and Goetz 2000) There are significant

limits to the social sciences

and

ability to de-link variables

its

given the socially

constructed and highly interdependent nature of complex social and political systems.
In this vein, this research will

Europeanization

is

social partnerships. (Falkner 1997;

There are too many additional and
impacting the

It

seems unlikely

that

the sole or unilateral force of transformation and decline of the

German

Austrian and

continue this trend.

critical forces

German and Austrian

polities,

Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006)

taking place that are concurrently

economies, and societies to make a

grandiose assertion on the primacy of Europeanization in instigating structural change.
(Hertier and Knill 2001

)

Studies of structural change amongst European states suggest a

number of alternate primary sources and explanations such
political

and social changes, and other exogenous

forces.

as globalization,

endogenous

(Schmidt 2002; Verdier and

Breen 2001; Goetz 2000; Hix and Goetz 2001; Hertier and Knill 2001; Teutsch 2001

The

threats to national level neo-corporatism originate at national, European,

levels

and are mutually reinforced by and influential of one another. (Falkner 1997;

Hertier and Knill 2001

difficult

;

Knill 2001

)

Hence

fully disaggregating these forces

is

quite

and perhaps ultimately impossible.

However, there

is

differentiation

might be only one of several forces
partnership,

many ways
in the

and global

it

seems

to

that

between the two cases. While Europeanization
have instigated structural change

in the social

have clearly had a larger impact on Austria than Germany. In

this is counterintuitive since there

has actually been far less structural change

Austrian model than the German. However, the structural change that has occurred
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in the

Austrian model appears to have

much

accession, and implementation process of

this

way Europeanization may have

Austrian model by providing a

new

stronger connections to the negotiation,

EU

membership since

the late 1980s. Hence, in

actually helped reinvigorate social partnership in the

area of competency and

new missions

in

shepherding

the integration process inside the Austrian political, economic, and social systems.

(Heinisch 2000; Falkner 1997) This

developments

in

Denmark, Norway,

is

not the only such case as there have been similar

Ireland,

and elsewhere. (Andersen 1995; Traxler

1995; Falkner 1997) Additionally, integration has led

Spam, and

Italy, to

many

states,

including Portugal,

attempt to reinvigorate income and labor market policy concertation.

(Royo 2002; Falkner 1997)
In conclusion, the overall case

shown

of the Europeanization of the social partnership has

the paucity of the existing theories

and bottom-up;

it

is

a dialogic process

and models. Europeanization

between and within multiple

While the Europeanization scholarship of the
into the

last

is

both top-down

levels

of governance.

decade has provided valuable insight

top-down forces of European integration and governance upon domestic

structures,

it

has failed to fully encompasses and

make room

political

for the extraordinarily

complex, constantly negotiated and re-negotiated, highly differentiated, system

that

currently exists. Intriguingly, the element most omitted has been the bottom-up and

national roles in the negotiation, bargaining, and implementation in the European

policymaking process which was the hallmark of the early functionalist, neofunctionalist,

and intergovemmentalist approaches

initially railed against.

that the

Europeanization literature

While these approaches were dominantly concerned with

bargaining, negotiation, and compromise between
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member

states at the level

the

of the EU,

their

weakness was the

failure to consider the structural implications

the national level and to

level.

assume

Europeanization,

at

relatively rational unitary actors at the supranational

Europeanization was an attempt to correct that omission, yet

pendulum has swung too

of such behavior

in retrospect, the

far.

much

like

mtergovemmentalism, has

the totality and complexity of multi-level

likely

encompass

European governance as top-down, bottom-up,

and mutually constituted and reconstituted on a rolling

and mtergovemmentalism should

failed to fully

be used

basis.

in a similar

As

such, Europeanization

manner, as heuristics,

in

understanding the European integration and governance process. What Europeanization
should endeavor to achieve

is

the consideration, weighing, and implications of the

and multi-level governance on particular
structures,

and

states, actors, interests, policies, sectors,

on the European integration process

polities as well as their impact

The framework and theory of Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse
the

EU

fails in this

itself.

regard to virtually

same extent of the intergovernmental approach.

As
value

in

and should continue

a heuristic, Europeanization has

to

demonstrate incredible

understanding the European dimensions of domestic political activity and

behavior. While certainly less formal and definitive than the models and theories of

Europeanization promoted by

much of the

Caporaso, Risse, Hix, and Goetz,

it

scholarship including Schmidt, Cowles,

will likely land

European integration and governance impact,
of policymaking and governance, including

Schmidt included below seems
the

two-way and

like a far

multi-level process.

alter,

that

more

more accurate

how

change, or continue domestic patterns

of neo-corporatism. The figure by

utilitarian

and simplified representation of

The Schmidt framework
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reflections of

illustrated the intertwined

processes of Europeanization and accounts for both top

down and bottom up

This framework suggests some broader heuristic use as a
Europeanization process. While

framework than

that

still

an oversimplification,

7:

it

is

to conceptualize the

provides a far more useful

of Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse by which

multi-level and mutually constituted process that

Figure

way

processes.

to potentially consider the

Europeanization. (Schmidt 2006)

The Europeanization Framework of Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse (2001)
EU

polity

and policymaking

European
(

integration

Member-states

EU

projection of

pressures

preferences on

on

EU

Member-states

adaptation

Europeanization

*
Member-states’ adaptation

Figure

8:

of policy

and

polity

Schmidt’s Framework of European Integration and Europeanization (2006)

The Future of Social Partnership

As noted

earlier in this research, there has

future of neo-corporatism.

in

Multi-Level Europe

been a generally dismal forecast for the

The pressures of supranationalism through European

integration have tended toward the creation of transnational pluralist

models of decision

and policymaking over national modes of neo-corporatist policy concertation. (Streeck

569

and Schmitter 1991; Streeck 1991) National competencies have been transferred
European

level

where neo-corporatist structures are weak and domestic

to the

social partners

had tremendously diluted influence. The policymaking environment of Brussels has been
far

more mixed

in

terms of interest representation and fragmentation. (Hix and Goetz

2001; Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Schmidt 2006) The institutions and structures of neocorporatism that do exist
authority,

at the

EU-level tend to be quite weak

and membership density compared

in

terms of influence,

of social

to those at national levels

partnership. (Sargent 1985; Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Keller and Platzer 2003;

2006) Even while there has been some growth
structures in the last decade, there

partnership practiced

at the

is

in the influence

a significant

and impact of such

chasm between

the forms of social

national and supranational levels in Europe.

Dolvik and Visser 2001, Compston and Greenwood 2001; Benedictus
has

in turn

Nugent

(Weber 2001;

et al.

2003) This

placed pressure upon domestic political structures to adapt to the European

modes of governance. Increasing

global pressures to adopt neo-liberal and pluralist

models of economic policymaking magnifies

this

intra-European trend. In the end,

scholars contend that Europe, at both the supranational and domestic levels

to follow an

is

many

beginning

American-style pattern of pluralism. (Streeck and Schmitter 2001; Hix and

Goetz 2001; Dyson 2003)
Yet there
picture.

is

some evidence

that the

prognoses of collapse are only part of a larger

While there may certainly be a general decline

neo-corporatist structures and patterns

at

in the efficacy

and utilization of

national and supranational levels, there

is

also

some

significant persistence of the preexisting neo-corporatist patterns

of governance as

well.

(Dyson 2003) Plus the form of pluralism being adopted has some

significant
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limitations in terms

of private interest-public concertation and limited the inclusion

small handful of actors. Hence

and national levels
corporatism. (van

is

much of the new

“pluralism” that

is

taking place

to a

at the

EU

mix of elements from both pluralism and neo-

actually a

Waarden and Lehmbruch 2003; Falkner 1997, 2000;

Knill 2006;

Schmidt 2006; Schuppert 2006) As many suggest, the policymaking process inside the

EU

extraordinarily

is

complex given the range of local,

regional, subnational, national,

supranational, global, private, public, semi-public, sectoral, social, economic, political,

intergovernmental, intra-govemmental, non-governmental, quasi-govemmental,
corporate, industrial, commercial, technological, labor, agricultural, and post-material

actors, interests, institutions,

and structures attempting

to

shape and interact within the

system. Labeling the system pluralist seems remarkably reductionist given the evidence

of overlapping, multiple, and new policymaking patterns. (Greenwood 1997, 2003;

Greenwood and Ronit
1996, 2001;

1994; Sbragia 1992; Schmidt 2002, 2006;

Hooghe and Marks

Hooghe 2001; Schuppert 2006)

Europeanization

may

reinvigorate social partnership by providing a

competency and new missions
political systems,

been similar,

much

if limited,

in

like the

new

area of

shepherding the integration process inside the domestic

Austrian case. (Heinisch 2000; Falkner 1997) There have

developments

in

Denmark, Norway,

Ireland,

and elsewhere.

(Andersen 1995; Traxler 1995; Falkner 1997) Additionally, integration has led many
states,

including Portugal, Spain, and

Italy, to

attempt to reinvigorate income and labor

market policy concertation. (Royo 2002; Pelinka 1999; Falkner 1997) The need
administer and enforce

level

EU

policy

between actors and the

may

to

inspire greater social partnership at the national

state as they

work
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to

consensually adopt and enforce

new

EU

and existing

measures. (Guliani 2003; Kohler-Koch 1996) Hence there

potential at both the

of the

ECB

EU

and domestic

levels. (Schmitter

is

growth

and Grote 1997) The pressures

and requirements Stability and Growth Pact have often increased demand by

governments

to find

consensual solutions to budgetary and competitive pressures and

often turn to neo-corporatist patterns of policy creation. (Knill 2001; Falkner 1997, 2000)

Importantly, Europeanization has also potentially affected the institutional actors

of the social partnership by changing the conditions of the domestic neo-corporatist

policymaking process. This can occur through the creation of new or exacerbation of
previously existing schisms within and between social partners and the

integration has

become

a critical

and divisive issue

that splits

state.

European

and weakens unions,

business and employers' associations, agricultural groups, political parties, governments,

and other

state actors.

(Dyson 2003; Schmidt 2006) This has created additional

contestation points and intractable conflicts within the structures and actors of social

partnership.

The

creation of a European level of governance has also changed the

calculations of actors within and

commitment

to national neo-corporatist

policymaking

structures.

This pattern of renewed neo-corporatism does differ from previous domestic

models

in the

primary impetus for the structures. While

it

has been argued that social

partnership developed primarily through demand-side efforts of strongly organized and

engaged

social partners in the

more supply-side
in the

postwar

era,

new modes of neo-corporatism

affairs that are structured to provide a national

edge

in

tend to be

competitiveness

European and global marketplace. While demand-side social partnership exhibited
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strongly integrated peak associations acting through permanent high-level and exclusive

formal institutions or patterns, supply-side

is

focused on a more decentralized, ad hoc,

and intermittent patterns of concertation and policymaking. (Traxler 1995; Falkner 1997;

Crouch 1995; Crepaz 1994; Katzenstein 2003)
If the

EU

is

regarded as

state, its institutions are

remarkably close

consensus model of democracy. (Lijphart 1999, 34; Schmidt 2006)
frequently negotiated in the familiar corporatist

groups—representing

manner among

New

to the

issues are

the relevant interest

teachers, doctors, nurses, retired persons, and environmentalists—

and the government.” (Lijphart 1999, 174) The potential for effective neo-corporatism
the European level

institutions

is

certainly within the realm of possibility.

and patterns of social partnership, while

suggests that as the

EU

still

The

rather

at

creation of explicit

weak and

unfulfilled,

continues to be institutionally and structurally transformed by

enlargement, constitutionalism, and other exogenous and endogenous forces, these

have more functional and effective authority
1999) The institutions of social partnership

have centralized organizations such as the

more representative and

effective.

The

in the future.

at the

EU

(Falkner 1997, 2006; Pelinka

are already there. Social partners

ETUC, UNICE, and C’EEP

institutions

may

that

could become

of the European Social Dialogue,

European Works Councils, and Economic and Social Council could be empowered or

demand
2006)

greater influence. (Pelinka 1999;

In essence, the

Ottaway 2001; Keller and Platzer 2003; Falkner

European policymaking model has not reached

a

system of stasis by

any stretch of the imagination. While the system may currently appear more

which

its is

contestable, with

accurate, the future

weak

structures of social partnership,

modes of European

level

which seems quite

policymaking certainly could
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pluralist,

tilt

towards

the neo-corporatist given optimal social, economic, and political conditions and

opportunities. (Falkner 2006; Schmidt 2006)

There have already been some important efforts
policy concertation at the

and expanded the
efforts

is

fronts.

of social partnership

industrial,

some evidence

inclusion of even

on several

level

institutions

on employment,

2004) There

EU

and

accomplish neo-corporatist

The Maastricht Treaty established

at the

European

level.

Post-Masstricht

fiscal policy are notable, if still limited. (Visser

EU Commission

that

to

President Jacques Delors preferred an

more neo-corporatist elements within

the Maastricht Treaty in areas of

vocational education and training, labor market flexibility, and non-wage labor cost
reduction. While these were eventually rejected by

some

national delegations, there were

notable efforts to provide informal concertation in precisely these areas through the

Council through the mid

be continuing as the
deficit

EU

to late 1990s. (Falkner 1997;

seeks out

and to provide balance

to

new

Compston 2001 This
)

groups underrepresented

in

EU policymaking.

employment, competitive knowledge-based economies, and greater
the Lison process, the

EU

is

to

enhance

actively seeking social partners to aid in the

Of course,

of success and of reaching many of the Lisbon goals suggests the continuing

In addition, the

EU

(Schmidt

social cohesion.

policymaking and implementation process. (Adnett and Hardy 2005)

social partnership at the

may

social partners to reduce the perceived democratic

2006) This has been especially true under the 2000 Lisbon Agenda

Under

trend

the lack

limits to

level as well.

process of integration

actors. (Hertier 2001; Knill 2001;

is itself

a product of the states

and

their

Schuppert 2006) As Dyson convincingly argues

Europeanization consists both of “downloading” of EU-level policies, directives, norms,
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and forces as well as the “uploading” of domestic preferences, demands, and
modela. (Dyson 2003) Hence the
corporatist

EU may become more

modes of policymaking. While Brussels

currently, the future

is

amenable and

certainly

institutional

interested in neo-

seems more

pluralist

not entirely devoid of potential neo-corporatist tendencies.

(Schmitter and Grote 1997, Hix and Goetz 2001

)

“European

effects are soft, not hard. .1

conclude that Europeanization and continued, though constrained, national diversity are
mutually compatible. Corporatism, concertation, conutology, and the community method
are

all

important components of one political process.” (Katzenstein 2003)

even argued

that

others but rather

Europeanization does not change

Some have

empowerment of some groups over

makes them mutually interdependent and increases

the

need

for

cooperative forms of governance so as to enact and implement Europeanization reforms

and changes. (Kohler-Koch 1996; Guliani 2003; Falkner 2006) Schmidt has
demonstrated

that the

EU

is

increasingly interested in nurturing and involving social

partners to increase legitimacy and input in the policymaking process. (2006) In the end,

Europeanization
teleological

multi-level

is

a process not an

end

result.

likely

never be some

end point of convergence or isomorphism. Europeanization

is

a

complex

model of governance stemming from both supranational and national

The success of the German and Austrian
by how well they are able
level.

There may

to

social partnership

may

levels.

very well be determined

upload their particularistic modes and preferences to the

EU

(Dyson 2003)

As many

suggest, the future of European integration and governance

and there may always be

a

dynamic contestation over

the

unwritten

modes of Europeanization.

(Dyson 2003; Schuppert 2006; Lodge 2006; Aalberts 2004; Herder 2001
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is

)

Neo-

corporatism has a “dynastic continuity punctuated by periodic demise and subsequent
resurrection". (Schmitter 1989, 72; Schmitter and Grote 1997) While globalization and

Europeanization
particular in

may

limit

“government capacity

economic

policy, in

macro-economic steering of the economy”, the changed environment may

actually create greater

demand

for

consensus and cooperative policymaking. (Armingeon

1997, 165) Katzenstein uses precisely the
the growth of corporatism, and

Germany

to act effectively in

why

it

same argument

developed

to explain, not the decline but,

in the smaller

European countries and

(Lijphart 1999, 174; Katzenstein 1984, 1985) Katzenstein’s analysis suggests

that the negative influence

of globalization or Europeanization on corporatism

inescapable and that

longer run

in the

it

may

is

not

reverse course. (Lijphart 1999; Katzenstein

1984, 1985, 1987)

Overall, neo-corporatism

generally been exaggerated,

if

clearly in decline but reports of

is

only slightly

2003) Even here, Schmidt suggests
the

weakening

ties in a

that

Germany remains

in

and 1960s.
hills to

(

more limited

1997) There

is

Germany. (Dyson

“primarily corporatist” despite

few where

it

has fully “burst apart".

and even increased efficacy. As Falkner

no “unidirectional decline”

current patterns are

a

as

death have

neo-corporatism has certainly taken place, there are

significant counter-examples of continuity

is

some cases such

number of sectors and even

(2006) While the general decline

suggests, there

in

its

in function

in

neo-corporatist governance even

and scope than during

its

peak

evidence that the corporatist Sisyhus has found

climb, probably steepest

in

Germany.

576

if

in the

the

1950s

many new

Bibliography

Aalberts, Tanja E. 2004.

A

The Future of Sovereignty

in Multilevel

Governance Europe

Constructivist Reading. Journal of Common Market Studies 42,

Adams, Paul

S.

2008. Europe

&

(

1

-

23-46.

):

Globalization: Challenges and Alternatives. In

Globalization: Universal Trends, Regional Implications, ed.

Howard

J.

Wiarda.

Lebanon, NH: Northeastern University Press.

2004. Corporatism

Challenges

in

Latin America

America and Europe: Origins, Developments, and

in Latin

Comparative Perspective. In Authoritarianism and Corporatism

—Revisited

,

ed.

Howard

J.

in

Wiarda. Gainesville: University Press of

Florida.

.

In

2002. Corporatism and Comparative Politics:

New Directions

in

Comparative

A New

Century of Corporatism?

ul

Edition, ed.

Politics , 3

Howard

J.

Wiarda.

Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

.

2002a. Globalization and the Challenges to Corporatism

Europe:

A

Comparative Perspective. Northeastern

Conference, Providence, RI. November

.

2001 Neo-Corporatist Regimes
.

Integration

&

America and

Science Association

8.

in the

Era of Globalization, European

Post-Industrialism: Challenges

&

Study of Switzerland and Austria. Southwestern
Worth, TX. March

Political

in Latin

Opportunities,
Political

A

Comparative Case

Science Association, Forth

16.

Adnett, Nick, and Stephen T. Hardy. 2005. The European Social Model: Modernisation

or Evolution?. Northhampton,

Alexis, Marion

MA: Edward

Elgar.

1983. Neo-Corporatism and Industrial Relations:

German Trade Unions.
Allen, Christopher S. 1990.

IVest

From

West German Economic

European

Politics 6,

( 1 )

The Case of the

(January 1983): 75-92.

Social Market to Meso-Corporatism:

Policy.

German

The

Politics

of

Studies Review 13: 13-25.

Almond, Gabriel A. 1983. Corporatism, Pluralism, and Professional Memory (Review
Article).

World

Politics 35, (2) (January 1983): 245-260.

577

Alter,

Karen

J.

2001 Establishing the Supremacy ofEuropean Law: The Making of an
.

International Rule of Law in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Andersen, Svein

S.

1988. British

and neo-corporatism as
Andersen, Svein

S.,

and

and Norwegian

offshore industrial relations: Pluralism

contexts of strategic adaptation. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Kjell A. Eliassen. 2001.

Making policy

in

Europe. 2nd ed.

London: Sage Publications.

.

1993.

Making policy

in

Europe

:

The Europeification of national policy-making.

London: Sage Publications.
Andersen, T. 1995. Deregulation of the Danish banking industry: The response of
employers' associations and trade unions. In Organized Industrial Relations: What
Future?, eds. Colin Crouch, Franz Traxler. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Andeweg,
2nd

.

and Galen A. Irwin 2005. Governance and politics of the Netherlands.

R. B.,

ed.

New

York: Palgrave Macmillan.

2002. Governance

and politics of the Netherlands. New York: Palgrave

Macmillan.

1993. Dutch government

and politics. New York:

Angerer, Thomas. 2002 Regionalization and globalization
since 1918. In Austria in the

and Michael Gehler.

New

European Union.,

Arndt, Sven

20

W.

(4)

in

Martin's Press.

Austrian foreign policy

Gunter Bischof, Anton Pelinka

Brunswick, USA: Transaction Publishers.

Armingeon, Klaus. 1997. Swiss corporatism
Politics.

eds.

St.

in

comparative perspective. West European

(October 1997): 164-179.

1982. The political

economy of Austria. Washington,

D.C.: American

Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

The Associated Press. 2006.

EU

adds more airlines

Auer, Peter. 1997 Institutional stability pays:
In Negotiating the new’

Turner. Ithaca:

ILR

to blacklist.

German

June 20.

industrial relations underpressure.

Germany: Can social partnership survive?,

Press.

578

ed.

Lowell

Bak,

J.

L. 1983. Cartels, cooperatives,

and corporatism: Getulio Vargas

Rio Grande do

in

Sul on the eve of Brazil's 1930 Revolution. Hispanic American Historical Review
63, (2): 255-75.

Baker, Kendall

L.,

Russell

Political culture

Baldassarri, Mario,

and Industrial

J.

Dalton, and Kai Hildebrandt. 1981.

Germany Transformed:

and the new politics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University

Bruno Chiarini, and Ezio

Tarantelli. 2003. Studies in

Press.

Labour Markets

Relations. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Beck, Stefan, Frank Klobes, and Christoph Scherrer. 2005. Surviving globalization?
Perspectives for the

German economic model.

Dordrecht: Springer.

Beer, Samuel H. 1965. British politics in the collectivist age. 1st ed.

.

1956. Pressure groups and parties in Britain. The

Review 50,

:

American

New

York: Knopf.

Political Science

(1) (March): 1-23.

Beese, Birgit. 2006. Union membership decline slows down. European Industrial
Relations Observatory On-Line, (accessed

May

16, 2006).

http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2006/04/articles/de0604039i.html

Behrens, Martin, Michael Fichter, and Carola M. Frege. 2003. Unions

Regaining the

initiative?

in

European Journal of Industrial Relations

Benedictus, H., R. de Boer, M. van der Meer,

W.

Salverda, and

M.

Zijl.

.

Germany:

9,

(

1

):

25-42.

2003. The

European social dialogue: Development, sectoral variation and prospects.
Doetinchem: Reed.

Bentley, Arthur Fisher. 1908. The process of government; a study of social pressures.

Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Berger, Stefan. 2002.

Germany

in historical perspective:

practice. In Policy Concertation

and Social Partnership

for the 21st Century., eds. Stefan Berger and

Berger, Stefan, and
in

The gap between theory and
in

Western Europe

Lessons

Hugh Compston. New York: Berghahn

Hugh Compston. 2002. Policy Concertation and Social Partnership

Western Europe: Lessons for the 21st Century.

New

York: Berghahn

Berger, Suzanne. 1981. Organizing interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, corporatism,

and the transformation ofpolitics. Cambridge: Cambridge University
579

Press.

Berghahn, V. R. 1988. Corporatism in Germany

in historical perspective. In

Corporate State: Corporatism and the state tradition

Andrew W. Cox and Noel
Bemdt,

Christian. 2000;

The

Western Europe., eds.

in

USA: Edward

O'Sullivan. Brookfield, Vt.,

rescaling of labour regulation in

and regional corporatism

to intrafirm welfare?.

The

Elgar.

Germany: From national

&

Environment

Planning A. 32,

(9)

(September): 1569-1592.

Bhagwati, Jagdish N. 2004. In defense of globalization.

New

York: Oxford University

Press.

Bianchi, Robert. 1989. Unruly corporatism: Associational

New

life in

twentieth-century Egypt.

York: Oxford University Press.

Bischof, Gunter. 1999. Austria in the first cold war, 1945-55: The leverage of the weak.

Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Bischof, Gunter, and Anton Pelinka. 1996. Austro-corporatism: Past, present, future.

Brunswick,

.

.

N.J.:

Transaction Publishers.

1994. The Kreisky era in Austria.

New

Brunswick,

new Europe. New Brunswick,

1993. Austria in the

Transaction Publishers.

N.J.:

N.J.: Transaction Publishers.

Bischof, Gunter, Anton Pelinka, and Michael Gehler. 2006. Austrian foreign policy in
historical context.

.

2002. Austria

New

Brunswick,

in the

European Union.

N.J.:

Transaction Publishers.

New

Brunswick,

N.J.: Transaction

Publishers.

Bischof, Gunter, Anton Pelinka, and Rolf Steimnger. 1995. Austria in the nineteen

New

Brunswick,

N.J.:

Transaction Publishers.

Black, Antony. 2003. Guild
to the

—

.

present

New

1984. Guilds

fifties.

&

State:

Brunswick,

European political thought from
N.J.:

and civil society

century to the present. Ithaca,

N

in

the twelfth century

Transaction Publishers.

European

political thought from the twelfth

Y.: Cornell University Press.

Bleses, Peter, and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser. 2004. The dual transformation

of the German

welfare state Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

580

Bobacka, Roger. 2001 Corporatism and the myth of consensus: Working hours
.

Finland in the 1990s. Aldershot: Ashgate.

legislation in

Borzel, Tanja A. 2002. States

adaptation

—

.

and regions

in the

European Union

:

Institutional

Germany and Spain. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge

in

2001. Europeanization and

territorial institutional

University Press.

change: Toward cooperative

regionalism? In Transforming Europe: Europeanization and domestic change, eds.

Maria Green Cowles, James A. Caporaso and Thomas Risse-Kappen.

Ithaca, N.Y.:

Cornell University Press.

.

1999.

Towards convergence

Europeanization

in

in

Europe?

Institutional adaptation to

Spain. Journal of Common

Germany and

Market Studies

37, (4):

573-96.

Borzel, Tanja A., and

of Europe.

Thomas Risse-Kappen. 2003. Conceptualizing

The politics of Europeanisation., eds. Kevin Featherstone, Claudio M.

In

Radaelli. Oxford:

Oxford University

Press.

Bosch, Gerhard. 2004. The changing nature of collective bargaining

Coordinated decentralization.

and decentralization .,
Ithaca, N.Y.:

the domestic impact

ILR

eds.

In

in

Germany:

The new structure of labor relations: Tripartism

Harry Charles Katz,

Wonduck Lee and Joohee

Lee.

Press.

Bowen, Ralph Henry. 1971. German theories of the corporative state, with special
reference to the period 1870-1919.

.

1947.

German

New

York: Russell

theories of the corporative state.

Branch, Ann, and Justin Greenwood. 2001

,

&

New

Russell

York: Whittlesey House.

European employers; social partners? In

Social partnership in the European Union., eds.

Hugh Compston,

Justin

Greenwood

Houndmills, Basinstoke: Palgrave.

Braunthal, Gerard.

1

978. Socialist labor

and politics

in

Weimar Germany: The general

federation of German trade unions. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books.

.

1977.

The policy function of the German

social democratic party.

Comparative

Politics 9, (2) (January): 127-145.

.1 972.
bills.

The West German legislative process; a case study of two transportation

Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

581

>

—

.

1965. The federation

of German industry

in politics. Ithaca,

N.Y.: Cornell

University Press.

Bruckmiiller, Ernst. 2003. The Austrian Nation

:

and socio-

Cultural consciousness

political processes. Riverside, Calif.: Ariadne Press.

1998.

The development of Austrian

national identity. In Austria 1945-95: Fifty

years of the second republic., eds. Kurt Richard Luther, Peter Pulzer. Aldershot,
Hants,

UK: Ashgate.

Buclet, Nicolas. 2002. Municipal waste

management

in

Europe: European policy

between harmonisation and subsidiarity. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Bulmer,

S.

1997 Shaping the rules: The constitutive politics of the European Union and

German power.

In

Tamed power: Germany

in

Europe., ed. Peter

J.

Katzenstein.

Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

.

1986.

Germany.

The domestic
In

structure of

European community policy-making

in

West

The federal republic of Germany and the European Union., eds.

Bulmer, William E. Paterson. London: Allen

Busch, Andreas. 2005. Shock-absorbers under

&

S.

Unwin.

stress:

Parapublic institutions and the

double challenges of German unification and European integration. In Governance
in

contemporary Germany: The semisovereign state revisited.,

eds.

Simon Green,

William E. Paterson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Biithe,

Tim, Mark Copelovitch, and William Phelan. 2002. The domestic

European integration: Public opinion, referenda, and

Convention of the International Studies Association,

politics

of

EU membership. Annual
New Orleans. March 8.

Button, Kenneth John, Kingsley E. Haynes, and Roger Stough. 1998. Flying into the
future: Air transport policy in the

European Union. Northampton, MA: Edward

Elgar.

Casey. Bernard, and Michael Gold. 2000. Social partnership and economic performance:

The case ofEurope. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Pub.

Cawson, Alan 1986. Corporatism and political theoty. Oxford:
1985 Organized interests and the state: Studies

SAGE

Publications.

582

in

B. Blackwell.

meso-corporatism. London:

Chalmers, Douglas A.

1

985. Corporatism and comparative politics. In

comparative politics.,

Checkel, Jeffrey T. 2001

.

ed.

Howard

J.

New directions

in

Wiarda. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.

The europeanization of citizenship?.

In Transforming Europe:

Europeanization and domestic change., eds. Maria Green Cowles, James A.

Caporaso and Thomas Risse-Kappen.

Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Church, Clive. 1996. The paradoxical Europeanisation of Switzerland. European
Business Journal

8, (2): 9.

Coen, David, and Charles Dannreuther. 2003. Differentiated Europeanization
small firms

in the

EU

:

Large and

policy process. In The politics of Europeanization., eds. Kevin

Featherstone, Claudio M. Radaelli. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ruth Berms, and David

Collier,

Collier. 1979.

Inducements versus constraints:

Disaggregating "corporatism". The American Political Science Review 73, (4)
(Dec.): 967-86.

Compston, Hugh. 2001. Introduction.

Hugh Compston,

.

1998.

European

In Social partnership in the

European Union.,

The end of national policy concertation? Western Europe
act.

eds.

Greenwood. Houndmills, Basinstoke: Palgrave.

Justin

Journal of European Public Policy

5, (3)

since the single

(September): 507-26.

Compston, Hugh, and Justin Greenwood. 2001 Social partnership
.

in the

European

Union. Houndmills. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave.

Conant, Lisa. 2001

among

.

Europeanization and the courts: Variable patterns of adaptation

national judiciaries. In Transforming Europe: Europeanization

change., eds. Maria Green Cowles, James A. Caporaso and

and domestic

Thomas Risse-Kappen.

Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Conradt, David

.

2001

P.

2005. The

The German

German

Polity. 8th ed.

Polity. 7th ed.

Costa, Olivier, and Paul Magnette. 2003.

New

New

York:

York: Pearson/Longman.

Longman

The European Union

as a consociation?

methodological assessment. West European Politics 26, (3) (July): 1-19.

583

A

Cowles, Maria Green. 2001. The transatlantic business dialogue and domestic business-

government

change .,

relations. In

Transforming Europe: Europeanization and domestic

Maria Green Cowles, James A. Caporaso and Thomas Risse-Kappen.

eds.

Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Cowles, Maria Green, James A. Caporaso, and Thomas Risse-Kappen. 2001.
Transforming Europe: Europeanization and domestic change. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press.

Cox, Andrew W. 1988. Neo-corporatism versus the corporate
state

:

Corporatism and the state tradition

in

state. In

The corporate

Western Europe ., eds. Andrew W. Cox,

Noel O'Sullivan. Aldershot, Hants, England: Edward Elgar.
Cox, Andrew W., and Noel O'Sullivan

1

988. The corporate state: Corporatism

state tradition in Western Europe. Aldershot, Hants, England:

Edward

Cox, Robert Henry. 2001 The social construction of an imperative:
.

happened

in

Denmark and

Why

and the

Elgar.

welfare reform

Germany. World Politics

the Netherlands but not in

53,

(April 2001): 463-498.

Cram, Laura.

1

997. Policy-making in the European Union

:

Conceptual lenses and the

integration process. London: Routledge.

Cram, Laura, Desmond Dinan, and
Union.

New

York:

St.

Neill Nugent. 1999.

Developments

in the

European

Martin's Press.

Crepaz, Markus M. L. 1996. Consensus versus majoritarian democracy: Political
institutions

and

Comparative

1995,

An

their

impact on macroeconomic performance and industrial disputes.

Political Studies 29,

1994.

)

(February): 4-26.

18, (4) (October): 64-88.

From semisovereignty

of parliament

I

institutional dinosaur: Austrian corporatism in the post-industrial age.

West European Politics

.

(

in Austria.

to sovereignty:

Comparative

1992. Corporatism in decline:

An

The decline of corporatism and

Politics 27, (1

):

45-65.

empirical analysis of the impact of

corporatism on macroeconomic performance and industrial disputes
industrialized democracies.

Comparative Political Studies 25,

584

(2):

in 18

139-168.

rise

.

Crepaz, Markus M.

and Arend

L.,

Lijphart. 1995. Linking

and integrating corporatism

and consensus democracy: Theory, concepts and evidence, (response

Hans Keman and Paul Pennings
25, (2):

in this issue). British

to article

by

Journal of Political Science

281-288.

Crepaz, Markus M.

L.,

and Ann W. Moser. 2004. The impact of collective and

competitive veto points on public expenditures in the global age. Comparative
Political Studies 37, (3): 259-285.

Crouch, Colin. 1986. The future prospects for trade unions

in

Western Europe. The

Political Quarterly 57,(1): 5-17.

Crouch, Colin, and Wolfgang Streeck. 2006. The diversity> of democracy: Corporatism,
social order

and political

conflict.

Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar.

Crouch, Colin, and Franz Traxler. 1995. Organized industrial relations

in

Europe

:

What

future?. Aldershot, Hants, England: Avebury.

Daalder, Hans. 1987. Party’ systems in Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands,

and Belgium. New York:
Dalton, Russell

J.

St.

Martin’s Press.

2004. Democratic challenges, democratic choices: The erosion of

political support in

advanced industrial democracies.

New

York: Oxford University

Press.

—

.

eds.

2003. Voter choice and electoral politics. In Developments in

German politics

3.,

Stephen Padgett, William E. Paterson and Gordon R Smith. Basingstoke:

Palgrave Macmillan

.

.

1989. Politics in West Germany. Glenview,

1993. Politics in

Germany. 2nd

ed.

New

111.:

Scott,

Foresman

York: HarperCollins College

Publishers.

Dalton, Russell

change

in

J.,

Scott C. Flanagan, Paul Allen Beck, and

advanced

James

E. Alt. 1984. Electoral

industrial democracies: Realignment or dealignment?

Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Dalton, Russell
social

J.,

and Manfred Kuechler. 1990. Challenging the political order:

and political movements

in

Western democracies.

University Press.

585

New

York: Oxford

New

Deeg, Richard.

1

996.

Economic

federalism. Publius 26,

(

globalization and the shifting boundaries of German

(Winter): 27(26).

1 )

Delsen, Lei, and Eelke de Jong. 1998. The

German and Dutch economies

:

Who follows

whom?. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag.
Deutsch, Karl Wolfgang. 1967. France, Germany, and the Western alliance; a study of
elite attitudes

.

on European integration and world politics.

1957. Political community/

and the North

New

York: Scribner.

Atlantic area; international

organization in the light of historical experience. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press.

Diamant, Alfred. 1960. Austrian Catholics and the

and the

.

1

first republic;

democracy, capitalism,

social order, 1918-1934. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

959. Austrian Catholics

and the

social question, 1918-1933. Gainesville:

University of Florida Press.

DiMatteo, Larry A., Kiren Dosanjh, Paul

L. Frantz, Peter

Bowal, and Clyde Stoltenberg.

2003. The doha declaration and beyond: Giving a voice to non-trade concerns within
the

WTO trade regime.

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational

Dinan, Desmond. 1994. Ever closer union?:

An

Law

introduction to the

36,

( 1 ):

95-160.

European

Community. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Dimbacher,

Elfreide. 1993. Austria:

Year

in

review 1993. In Encyclopaedia Britannica

Online, [cited August 28, 2007] http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9 1151 98

Dolvik, Jon Erik, and Jelle Visser 2001.

ETUC

and European social partnership:

turning-point? In Social partnership in the European Union., eds.
Justin

A

.

third

Hugh Compston,

Greenwood. Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Duff, Andrew. 1993. Subsidiarity within the

European Community. London: Federal

Trust for Education and Research

Duncan,

Fraser. 2007.

The end of the Wende? The 2006 Austrian parliamentary

Perspectives on European Politics

and Society’

8,(1):

1

election.

3-30.

Dupont, Cedric, and Pascal Sciarim. 2001. Switzerland and the European integration
process:

Engagement without marriage West European
586

Politics 24, (2): 211.

.

Dyson, Kenneth H.

F.

Developments

in

Gordon

.

German

Politics 3 ., eds. Stephen Padgett,

William E. Paterson and

R. Smith. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

2002. European states

convergence.

.

2003. The Europeanization of German governance. In

New

and the Euro: Europeanization,

and

variation,

York: Oxford University Press.

2000. The politics of the Euro-zone: Stability or breakdown? Oxford: Oxford
>

University Press.

.

—

.

1992. The politics of German regulation. Aldershot: Dartmouth.

1980. The state tradition in Western Europe:

New

A

and

study of an idea

institution.

York: Oxford University Press.

Dyson, Kenneth H.

F.,

and Kevin Featherstone. 1999. The road to Maastricht:

Negotiating economic

Dyson, Kenneth H.

F.,

of the state

F.,

union.

New

York: Oxford University Press.

and Klaus H. Goetz. 2004. Germany, Europe, and the politics of

constraint. Oxford:

Dyson, Kenneth H.

and monetary

Oxford University

Press.

and Stephen Wilks. 1983. Industrial

and industry. New York:

St.

crisis:

A comparative study

Martin's Press.

Eberwein, Wilhelm, Jochen Tholen, and Joachim Schuster. 2002. The Europeanisation of
industrial relations: National

and European processes

in

Germany, UK,

Italy

and

France. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Eckstein, Harry. 1958. The English health service;

it

origins, structure,

and

achievements. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

The Economist. 2007. Four Ds for Europe: Dealing with the Dreaded Democratic Deficit

(A Special Report on the European Union). March
The Economist. 2006.

In a Bind:

make Germany work

better

The Grand Coalition

17.

will

need quite a

(A survey of Germany). February

1

lot

of luck

to

I

The Economist. 2006a. Land of cliques: Corporatism and lack of competition are the
enemies of an

efficient

economy (A survey of Germany). February

587

1

1.

.

.

The Economist. 2006b. Letting go: Germany needs
February

1

or face decline.

-

1

The Economist. 2006c. German Trade Unions: There's Life
February

up

to loosen

in the

Old Dinosaurs Yet.

18.

The Economist. 2006d. German

Political Parties:

The Ultimate Programmes. September

9.

The Economist. 2006e. Europe's Tentative Reformers. September

The Economist. 2006f. Another Grand Coalition? October

The Economist. 2005. Face Value: Germany's Arthur
The Economist. 2004. Germany's welfare

The Economist. 2004a. German

state:

5.

Scargill.

Dropping the

Industrial Relations:

9.

January

pilot.

1.

January 3

Slowly Losing

1

their Chains.

February 21.

The Economist. 2004b.

How

to

Pep up Germany's Economy

Germany (Reforming Germany's Economy). May
The Economist. 2004c.

It's

those people,

all

-

Structural

May

in

8.

over again. August

The Economist. 2003. Meet Wolfgang Thatcher.

Reform

14.

10.

The Economist. 2003a. Snoring While a Superstate Emerges? (Charlemange).

May

10.

The Economist. 2003b. The Exhausting Grind of Consensus: German Reform and

Democracy (Germany's

effort to

impose reform while keeping a consensus). August

30.

The Economist. 2003c. Don't

Sell

Our Family

Silver!

September

6.

The Economist. 2003d. Germany's trade unions: Ever weaker. September

The Economist. 2003e.

The Economist. 2002.

A

6.

long, hard climb. October 18.

Why

so happy? Germany's powerful trade unions.

588

November

30.

.

The Economist. 2001.

New Mammoth:

Germany's

The Economist. 2000. Poker Game. March
The Economist. 2000a. Germany
strike.

Einhom,

June

-

Is

Mammoth

Trade Union. March 24.

4.

Consensus Under Threat? Labor unions threaten

to

3.

Eric S. 2002. Just

enough ("Lagom") Europeanization: The Nordic

states

and

Europe. Scandinavian Studies 74, (3) (Fall): 265-86.

—

.

2002a. Liberalism and social democracy in Western Europe. In Comparative

democracy and democratization.,

ed.

Howard

J.

Wiarda. Fort Worth, Tex.: Harcourt

College Publishers.

Einhom, Eric

S.,

and John Logue. 2004. Can the Scandinavian model adapt

to

globalization? Scandinavian Studies 76, (4) (Winter): 501-34.

—

.

2004a. Scandinavia:

European

integration,

Rowman &
.

2nd

.

2003.
ed.

Still

the

middle way? In Europe today, national politics,

and European

security., ed.

Ronald Tiersky. 2nd

Littlefield.

Modern welfare

states:

Scandinavian politics and policy

in the

1982. Welfare states in hard times: Problems, policy,
ed. Kent, Ohio:

and politics

in

of ideas.

.

New

Denmark

Kent Popular Press.

Elbow, Matthew H. 1966. French corporative theoiy, 1789-1948: a chapter

in the history

York: Octagon Books.

1953. French corporative theoiy,

New

global age.

Westport, Conn.: Praeger.

and Sweden. Rev.

—

ed. Lanharn:

1

789-1948; a chapter

in the history

of ideas.

York: Columbia University Press.

Ehassen, Kjell A., and
liberalisation.

Mant

Sjovaag. 1999. European telecommunications

London: Routledge.

Encamacion, Omar G.

1

999. Federalism and the paradox of corporatism

West European

Politics 22, (2): 90-91

Esping- Andersen, Gosta. 1999. Social foundations ofpostindustrial economies.

York: Oxford University Press.

589

New

.

1996. Welfare states in transition: National adaptations in global economies.

London: Sage.

.

1

993. Changing classes: Stratification

and mobility

1

in post-industrial societies.

London: Sage Publications.
Europe. 1999. Far right makes gains

Fairlamb, David. 2000. Austria:

Is

Austrian elections. November.

in

the

European union fanning right-wing flames?.

BusinessWeek. February 14

Falkner, Gerda. 2006. Collective participation in the European Union:

The 'Euro-

corporatism' debate. In The diversity of democracy: Corporatism, social order
political conflict., eds. Colin Crouch.

and

Wolfgang Streeck. Northampton, MA: Edward

Elgar.

2001 The Europeanisation of Austria: Misfit, adaptation, and controversies.

European Integration Online Papers

5,

(

http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/200 -0 3a.htm
1

.

2000. Policy networks

1

998.

(December

EU social policy in the

1

20).

.

multi-level system:

West European Politics 23,

diversity?.

.

in a

1

3)

1

Convergence towards moderate

(4) (October): 94.

990s: Towards a corporatist policy community

1
.

London: Routledge.

.

1997. Corporatist governance and Europeanisation:

game? European

M

Falkner, Gerda,

1999 j|ie

i

Integration Online Papers 1,(11) (June

Eder, K. Hiller,

ni p ac t

No

Wolfgang C Muller, G.

1

future in the multi-level
7).

Steiner,

of EU membership on policy networks

in Austria:

change beneath the surface. Journal of European Public Policy
Falkner, Gerda, and

Simone

and R. Trattnigg.
Creeping

6, (3):

496-516.

Leiber. 2004. Europeanization of social partnership in

smaller European democracies. European Journal ofIndustrial Relations 10,

(3):

245-266.

Falkner, Gerda, and

Emmerich

West European Politics

Talos. 1994.

The

17, (3): 52-76.

590

role

of the

state within social policy.

M. Harlapp, and Simone

Falkner, Gerda, O. Treib,

EU harmonisation and soft law in

the

Leiber. 2005.

Complying with Europe:

member states. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Famleitner, Johann, and Erich Schmidt. 1982.

economy ofAustria.,

The

social partnership. In

The political

Sven W. Arndt. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise

ed.

Institute for Public Policy Research.

name of Europe.

Featherstone, Kevin. 2003. Introduction: In the

Europeanization., eds. Kevin Featherstone, Claudio

M.

In

The polities of

Radaelli, Oxford:

Oxford

University Press.

Featherstone, Kevin, and Claudio

M.

The politics of Europeanization.

Radaelli. 2003.

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fennell, Rosemary. 1997. The

common

agricultural policy: Continuity

and change.

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fichter, Michael. 2005.

The German way:

Still

treading the path of institutionalized labor

relations? In Surviving globalization? : Perspectives for the

model,

.

eds. Stefan Beck,

1997. Unions in the

Negotiating the
Ithaca:

ILR

AMS

Frank Klobes and Christoph Scherrer Dordrecht: Springer.

new Lander: Evidence

new Germany: Can

for the

urgency of reform.

The syndical and corporative

institutions

of Italian fascism.

New

Press.

1938. The syndical

Columbia University

and corporative

institutions

of Italian fascism.

New

York:

Press.

Fischer, Alex, Sarah Nicolet, and Pascal Sciarini. 2002. Europeanisation of a

country:

In

social partnership survive?, ed Lowell Turner.

Press.

Field, G. Lowell. 1968.

York:

German economic

The case of Swiss immigration

policy.

non-EU

West European Politics 25,

(4):

1

172.

Fitzgerald, Ian,
intellect,

and John

Stirling.

optimism of the

2004. European works councils: Pessimism of the

will?.

London: Routledge.

Fitzmaurice, John, 1996. National parliamentary control of

member

states.

West European Politics

19,

591

(

1

):

88-96,

EU

policy in the three

new

43-

.

1990. Austrian politics

.

and society

New

today: In defence of Austria.

York:

St.

Martin's Press.

Frege, Carola

M.

1999. Social partnership at work: Workplace relations in post-

Germany. London: Routledge.

unification

Friedman, Elisabeth L, Kathryn Hochstetler, and Ann Marie Clark. 2005. Sovereignty,

democracy, and global

civil society: State-society relations at

UN world

conferences Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press.

Friedman, Thomas

L.

2006. The world

updated and expanded.

1st

1

NY

999. The Lexus

Simon

:

&

New

and the

is flat:

A

brief history of the twenty-first century.

York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

olive tree, understanding globalization.

New

York,

Schuster.

Fuchs, G., and A. M. Koch. 1991 Corporatism and
republic of Germany. Environment

'political context' in the federal

and Planning C: Government and Policy

9,

( 1 ):

1-14.

Gardner, Brian. 1996. European agriculture: Policies, production, and trade. London:
Routledge.

Gates, Andrea Margarete. 2006. Promoting unity, preserving diversity? : Member-state

and European

institutions

integration.

Lanham: Lexington Books.

Gerlich, Peter. 1997. Osterreiclis nachbarstaaten: Innen -

und aussenpolitische

perspektiven. Vienna: Signum.

.

1996. "Political culture". In Contemporary Austrian Politics., ed.

Volkmar

Lauber. Boulder, Colo.: WestviewPress.

.

A

1992.

1

992a.

A

farewell to corporatism. West

European

Politics 15, (1

):

132-146.

farewell to corporatism? In Politics in Austria: Still a case

of

consociationalism? ., eds. Kurt Richard Luther, Wolfgang C. Muller. Portland, OR:

Frank Cass

.

& Company

Ltd.

1989. National consciousness and national identity:

political culture

Anton Pelinka,

A

contribution to the

of the Austrian party system In The Austrian party system., eds.
Fritz Plasser. Boulder, Colo.:

592

Westview

Press.

Wolfgang C. Muller. 1988. Corporatism

Gerlich, Peter, Edgar Grande, and
Stability

and change of social partnership

in crisis:

in Austria. Political Studies 36,

(

1

):

209-

223.

—

.

und grenzen des

1985. Sozialpartnerschaft in der krise: Leistungen

neokorporatismus

Vienna: Bohlau.

in osterreich.

Giuliani, Marco. 2003. Europeanization in comparative perspective; institutional

national adaptation. In The politics

of Europeanization.,

eds.

fit

and

Kevin Featherstone,

Claudio M. Radaelli. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Glaessner, Gert-Joachim. 2005.

German Democracy: From post-world war // to

the

present day Oxford: Berg.

—

.

1992. The unification process in

New

York:

St.

Germany: From dictatorship

to

democracy.

Martin's Press.

Gobeyn, Mark James. 1993. Corporatist decline

advanced capitalism. Westport,

in

Conn.: Greenwood Press.

1993. Explaining the decline of macro-corporatist political bargaining structures
in

advanced

capitalist societies.

Goetz, Klaus H. 2003. Government
eds.

Stephen Padgett, William

Governance

at

E.

6,

( 1 ):

the centre. In

3-22.

Developments

in

German politics

3.,

Paterson and Gordon R. Smith. Basingstoke:

Palgrave Macmillan.

.

2000. European integration and national executives:

effect?.

West European Politics 23,

Goetz, Klaus H., and Simon Hix. 2001

.

(4):

A

cause

in

search of an

211.

Europeanised politics?: European integration

and national political systems. London: Frank

Cass.

Goldsmith, Mike. 2003. Variable geometry, multilevel governance: European integration

and subnational government

in the

new millenium.

In

The politics of

Europeanization ., eds. Kevin Featherstone, Claudio M. Radaelli. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.

Goldthorpe, John H. 1984. Order

and conflict

in

Clarendon Press.

593

contemporary capitalism. Oxford:

Gordon, Philip H. 2004. Globalization: Europe's wary embrace. YaleGlobal Online

(November
Gorges, Michael

1).

J.

1996. Euro-corporatism? : Interest intermediation in the

European

Community Lanham, Md.: University Press of America.
>.

Gourevitch, Peter. 1978. The second image reversed: The international sources of

domestic

politics. International

Organization 32, (4) (Autumn): 881-912.

Graham, Edward M. 1996. Global corporations and national governments. Washington,

DC:
Grant,

Institute for International

Wyn.

—

.

1997. The

common

1985. The political

Economics.

agricultural policy.

New

York:

St.

economy of corporatism. New York:

Grayson, George W. 1998. Mexico: From corporatism

Martin's Press.

St.

Martin's Press.

Worth:

to pluralism?. Fort

Harcourt Brace College Publishers.

Green, Simon, and William

E. Paterson.

2005. Governance

in

contemporary Germany

:

The semisovereign state revisited. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

.

2005a. Introduction: Semisovereignty challenged.

contemporary Germany
William

Greenwood,

E. Paterson.

Justin. 2003.

:

In

Governance

in

The semisovereign state revisited., eds. Simon Green,

Cambridge: Cambridge University
The challenge of change

in

Press.

EU business associations. New

York: Palgrave Macmillan.

2003a. Interest representation in the European Union.

New

York: Palgrave

Macmillan.

1997. Representing interests in the

European Union.

New

York:

St.

Martin's

Press.

Greenwood,

Justin,

Interests

Greenwood.
the

and Mark Apinwall. 1998. Collective action

in the

European Union:

and the new politics of assoc i ability. London: Routlege.

Justin,

Jurgen R. Grote, and Karsten Ronit. 1992. Organized interests and

European community. Newbury Park:

594

SAGE

Publications.

)

,

Greenwood,

Justin,

and Karsten Ronit. 1994.

Interest

groups

in the

European

Community: Newly emerging dynamics and forms. West European

Politics

1

7,

(

1

(January 1994): 31-52.

Guttman, Robert

J.

1995. Austria

&

the

EU:

It's

a

new

ballgame. Europe (191)

(December).

Haas, Ernst B. 1964. Beyond the nation-state: Functionalism and international
organization. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

—

1958. The uniting

.

of Europe; political,

social,

and economic forces, 1950-1957.

Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Haberler, Gottfried. 1982. Austria's economic development after the two world wars:

mirror picture of the world economy. In The political

W.

economy ofAustria.,

ed.

A

Sven

Arndt. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy

Research.

Hancock, M. Donald. 1989. West Germany: The politics of democratic corporatism.

Chatham,

N.J.:

Chatham House

Publishers.

Hancock, M. Donald, John Logue, and Bernt
capitalism: Industrial renewal

Western Europe.

New

Schiller. 1991.

Managing modern

and workplace democracy

in the

United States and

York: Greenwood Press.

Harding, Rebecca, and William E. Paterson, eds. 2000. The future of the

economy: An

Harding, Rebecca, and Arndt Sorge. 2000.
future of the

German

end to the miracle?. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

German

German economy: An end to

corporatism:

the miracle?, eds.

Dead

or alive? In The

Rebecca Harding,

William E. Paterson. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Hassel, Anke. 2003.
41, (4)

The

politics

of social pacts. British Journal of Industrial Relations

(December 2003): 707-726.

Haverland, Markus. 2005. Does the

EU

cause domestic developments? The problem of

case selection in Europeanization research. European Integration Online Paper 9,
(2) (January 14, 2005). htlp:///eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2005-002a.htm

—

.

1999. National autonomy,

.

European integration and the politics ofpackaging

waste. Amsterdam: Thela Thesis.

595

Hayward, Jack Ernest Shalom. 1995. Industrial enterprise and European integration:

From

national to international champions in Western Europe.

New

York: Oxford

University Press.

.

1966. Private interests

New

and social council.

and public policy:

York: Barnes

the experience

of the French economic

& Noble.

Hayward, Jack Ernest Shalom, and Edward Page. 1995. Governing the new Europe.

Durham, N.C.: Duke University

Press.

Heclo, Hugh, and Henrik Madsen. 1987. Policy

and politics

in

Sweden: Principled

pragmatism. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Heilbrunn, Jacob. 1997. Heil Harvard. The

New

Republic 217, (9) (September

1

):

15.

Heinisch, Reinhard. 2000. Coping with economic integration: Corporatist strategies

Germany and

.

in

Austria in the 1990s. West European Politics 23, (3): 67-96.

2001. Defying neoliberal convergence: Austria's successful supply-side

corporatism

in the

1990s. Journal of Government

Heisler, Martin O. 1973. Politics in

postindustrial democracies.

Helander, Voitto. 1982.

system

A

and Policy

19, (1

Europe: Structures and processes

New

in

29-44.

some

York: McKay.

liberal-corporatist sub-system in action:

in Finland. In Patterns

):

of corporatist policy-making.,

Lehmbruch, Philippe C. Schmitter. Beverly

Hills, Calif.:

The incomes policy

eds.

Gerhard

Sage Publications.

Henig, Ruth B. 1998. The Weimar Republic, 1919-1933. London: Routledge.

Hennis, Marjoleine. 2001. Europeanization and globalization: The missing

of Common Market

Journal

Common goods: Reinventing European and international
Lanham, Md.. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Heritier, Adrienne. 2002.

governance.

link.

Studies 39, (5) (Dec.): 829.

596

.

200 1 Differential Europe: The European Union impact on national
.

policymaking. Lanham, Md.:

.

Rowman &

Littlefield Publishers.

2001a. Differential Europe: National administrative responses to community

policy. In Transforming

Europe

:

Europeanization and domestic change ., eds. Maria

Green Cowles, James A. Caporaso and Thomas Risse-Kappen.

Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell

University Press.

.

1999. Differential Europe:

The European Union impact on

national

policymaking. In Policy-making and diversity in Europe: Escaping Deadlock ., ed.
>

Adrienne

Heritier.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

1999a. Policy-making

Cambridge University
Heritier, Adrienne,
policies:

A

and diversity

>

in

Europe: Escaping deadlock. Cambridge:

Press.

and Christoph

comparison.

Knill. 2001. Differential responses to

European

Europe: The European Union impact on

In Differential

national policymaking., eds. Adrienne Heritier, Dieter Kerwer, Christoph Knill, Dirk

Lehmkuhl, Michael Teutsch and Anne-Cecile Doublet. Lanham, MD:

Rowman &

Littlefield.

Hemes, Gudmund, and Arne

Selvik. 1981

.

Local corporatism. In Organizing interests in

Western Europe: Pluralism, corporatism, and the transformation ofpolitics., ed.

Suzanne Berger. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Herzog, Todd, and Sander

L.

Press.

Gilman. 2001 A new Germany
.

in

a new Europe.

New

York: Routledge.

Heywood,

Paul, Erik Jones,

and Martin Rhodes. 2002. Developments

politics 2. Houndmills, Basingstoke,

in

West European

Hampshire: Palgrave.

Hicks, Alexander, and Lane Kenworthy. 1998. Cooperation and political economic

performance
(6)

(May

in affluent

democratic capitalism American Journal of Sociology 103,

1998): 1631-1672.

Himmelberg, Robert
Corporatism

F.

in the

1994. Government-business cooperation, 1945-1964:

post-war era.

New

York: Garland.

Hix, Simon. 2005. The political system of European Union 2nd ed.

Macmillan

597

New

York: Palgrave

.

.

1999. The political system of the

European Union.

New

York:

St.

Martin's Press.

Hix, Simon, and Klaus H. Goetz. 2000. Introduction: European integration and national
political systems.

West European Politics 23,

(4): 1.

New

Hix, Simon, and Christopher Lord. 1997. Political parties in the European Union.

York:

St.

Martin's Press.

Hoell, Otmar, Johannes Poliak, and

Somja

P.

Riekmann. 2006. Austria: Structural

domestic change through European integration. Vienna: Austrian

Academy of

Sciences.

Hoffmann-Lange, Ursula. 1991. Social and political structures

in

West Germany:

From

authoritarianism to postindustrial democracy. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

Hooghe, Liesbet. 2001

The European commission and the integration of Europe: Images

of governance Cambridge: Cambridge University

.

1996. Cohesion policy

and European

Press.

integration: Building multi-level

governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. 2001 Multi-level governance and European
.

integration.

.

Lanham, MD:

1996. Europe

w ith

Rowman &

Littlefield Publishers.

regions: Channels of regional representation in the

European

Union. Publius 26, (1) (Winter 1996): 73-91.

Howard, Marc Morje. 2001. Can populism be suppressed

Germany, and

the

in a

democracy 9 Austria,

European Union. East European Politics and Societies 15,(1)

(March): 18-32.

Huntington, Samuel

P.

1968. Political order in changing societies.

New

Haven: Yale

University Press.

Huzzard, Tony, Denis Gregory, and Regan Scott. 2004. Strategic unionism and
partnership: Boxing or dancing?. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave

Macmillan

Ignazi, Piero. 2003.

Extreme right parties

in

Western Europe.

University Press.

598

New

York: Oxford

and Colette Ysmal. 1998. The organization ofpolitical parties

Ignazi, Piero,

in

Southern

Europe. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.

Imig, Doug, and Sidney Tarrow. 2000. Political contention in a Europeanising polity.

West European Politics 23,

The

Inglehart, Ronald. 1977.

(4): 73.

Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Jacoby, Wade. 2005. Institutional transfer:
political

Changing values and political styles

silent revolution:

among Western publics.

Can semisovereignty be

economy of Eastern Germany.

Governance

In

in

transferred?

The

contemporary Germany:

The semisovereign state revisited., eds. Simon Green, William

E. Paterson.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The nearly

Jahn, Detlef, and Ann-Sofie Storsved. 1995. Legitimacy through referendum?

Sweden and

successful domino-strategy of the EU-referendum in Austria, Finland,

Norway. West European

Politics 18,(4): 18-37.

James, Harold, and Jakob Tanner. 2002. Enterprise
Aldershot, Hants,

James, Peter. 1998. Modern

Germany

Jeffery, Charlie. 2003. Federalism

politics 3 ., eds.

in the

period offascism

in

Europe.

UK: Ashgate.
Politics, society'

:

and

and culture. London: Routledge.

territorial politics. In

Stephen Padgett, William

E. Paterson

Developments

in

German

and Gordon R. Smith.

Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Jeffery, Charlie,

shifting

and William

of tectonic

Kitschelt,

E. Paterson.

plates. In

2004.

Germany

Germany and European

Beyond

:

integration:

A

the stable state., eds. Herbert P.

Wolfgang Streeck. London: Frank Cass.

Jessop, Bob. 1979. Corporatism, parliamentarism, and social democracy. In Trends

towards corporatist intermediation., eds. Philippe C. Schmitter, Gerhard

Lehmbruch. London:

Judt,

SAGE

Publications.

Tony. 1999. Disunion: The growth of national populism
Republic.

December

in

Europe. The

13.

Karlhofer, Ferdinand. 1996.

The present and

future state of social partnership. In Austro-

corporatism: Past, present, future., eds. Gunter Bischof, Anton Pelinka.

Brunswick,

N.J.:

New

Transaction Publishers.

599

New

Kamitschnig, Matthew. 2000. Haider's secret weapon: Austria

Inc.

Business Week.

February 28.

Wonduck

Katz, Harry Charles,

relations: Tripartism

Katzenstein, Peter

Governance

J.

in

and decentralization.

.

Ithaca, N.Y.:

2005. Conclusion: Seniisovereignty

new

ILR

in united

structure of labor

Press.

Germany.

In

contemporary' Germany: The semisovereign state revisited., eds.

Simon Green, William

—

Lee, and Joohee Lee. 2004. The

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

E. Paterson.

2003. Small states and small states revisited.

New

Political

Economy

8,

(

1):

9-

30.

.

.

1997.

Tamed power: Germany

1989. Industry

and politics

in

in

Europe. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

West Germany: Toward the third republic. Ithaca,

N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

.

1987. Policy

and politics

state. Philadelphia:

.

in

West Germany: The growth of a semi-sovereign

Temple University

Press.

1985. Small states in world markets: Industrial policy in Europe. Ithaca, N.Y.:

Cornell University Press.

-

.

1984. Corporatism

and change:

Austria, Switzerland,

and the politics of

industry. Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

.

1982.

Commentary.

In

The political economy ofAustria., ed. Sven W. Arndt.

Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise

.

Institute for Public Policy Research.

1980. Capitalism in one country? Switzerland in the international economy.

International Organization 34, (4): 507.

.

1978. Between

power and plenty: Foreign economic policies of advanced

industrial states. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Kell, Georg. 2003.

The global compact: Origins, operations, progress, challenges. The

Journal of Corporate Citizenship (11) (September 22, 2003): 35-49.

600

Keller,

Bemdt, and Hans-Wolfgang

integration: Trans-

Platzer. 2003. Industrial relations

and European

and supranational developments and prospects.

Aldershot:

Ashgate.

Kelly, Dominic, and

Wyn

Grant. 2005. The politics of international trade in the twenty-

first century: Actors, issues

and regional dynamics. Houndmills, England: Palgrave

Macmillan.

Keman, Hans, and Paul Pennings.

Do consensus and

democracies:
Lijphart and

1995.

Managing

political

corporatism matter?

Markus M.L. Crepaz).

British

and

societal conflict in

(Comment on

by Arend

article

Journal of Political Science 25

(2)

(Apr.): 271-281.

Keohane, Robert O., and Stanley Hoffmann. 1991. The new European Community':

Decisionmaking and institutional change. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

Kerwer, Dieter, and Michael Teutsch. 2001. Transport policy in the European Union. In
Differential Europe: The

European Union impact on national policymaking .,

Adrienne

Kerwer, Christoph Knill, Dirk Lehmkuhl, Michael Teutsch

Heritier, Dieter

and Anne-Cecile Douillet. Lanham,

W.

Kindley, Randall

1996.

MD: Rowman &

eds.

Littlefield.

The evolution of Austria's neo-corporatist

institutions. In

Austro-corporatism: Past, present, future., eds. Gunter Bischof, Anton Pelinka.

Brunswick,

N.J.:

New

Transaction Publishers.

Kitschelt. Herbert P. 2004. Political-economic context

German

federal elections, 1990-2002. In

Herbert

P. Kitschelt,

Wolfgang

and partisan strategies

Germany: Beyond the stable

the

in

state., eds.

Streeck. London: Frank Cass.

1986. Political opportunity structures and political protest: Anti-nuclear

movements

in four

democracies. British Journal of Political Science 16,

(

1

)

(Jan.):

57-85.

Kitschelt, Herbert
at

P„ and Wolfgang Streeck. 2004. From

the beginning of the twenty-first century. In

eds. Herbert P Kitschelt,

.

Wolfgang

stability to stagnation:

Germany: Beyond

Germany

the stable state.,

Streeck. London: Frank Cass.

2004. Germany: Beyond the stable state. London; Portland,

601

OR: Frank Cass.

Kittel,

Bernhard. 2000. Deaustrification? The policy-area-specific evolution of Austrian

social partnership.

Kline,

Harvey

F.

West European Politics 23,

( 1 ):

108.

1987. The Coal of El Cerrejon: Dependent bargaining

and Colombian

policy-making. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

—

.

1983. Colombia: Portrait of unity

and diversity.

Boulder, Colo.: Westview

Press.

Kloti, Ulrich.

2001 Consensual government in a heterogeneous polity (Switzerland).
.

West European Politics 24,

(2): 19.

Knight, Robert. 1998. The Renner state government and Austrian sovereignty. In Austria

1945-95: Fifty years of the second republic ., eds. Kurt Richard Luther, Peter Pulzer,
29. Aldershot, Hants,

Knill, Christoph.

institutional

Knill, Christoph,

Change and

2001

.

UK:

Ashgate.

The Europeanisation of national administrations: Patterns of

change and persistence.

New

York: Cambridge University Press.

and Andrea Lenschow. 2001. Adjusting

to

EU

environmental policy:

persistence of domestic administrations. In Transforming Europe:

Europeanization and domestic change ., eds. Maria Green Cowles, James A.

Caporaso and Thomas Risse-Kappen.

.

1998.

Coping with Europe: The impact of British and German administrations

on the implementation of
Policy

Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

5, (4)

EU

environmental policy. Journal of European Public

(December): 595-614.

Kohler-Koch. Beat. 1999. The evolution and transformation of European governance. In
The transformation of governance

in the

European Union .,

eds. Beat

Kohler-Koch,

Rainer Eising. London: Routledge.

Konrad, Helmut. 1991. Support
socially
eds.

for the corporate state

weaker groups, 1934-1938. In Austria

Kenneth Segar, John Warren.

1st ed.

and national socialism

in the thirties:

Culture

in the

and politics.,

Riverside, Calif.: Ariadne Press.

Kourvetaris, George A., and Andreas Moschonas. 1996. The impact of European
integration: Political, sociological,

and economic changes. Westport, Conn.:

Praeger.

602

Kramer, Helmut. 1996. History and international context.
politics ., ed.

Volkmar Lauber. Boulder,

Krasner, Stephen D. 2001

.

Colo.:

In

Contemporary Austrian

Westview

Press.

Sovereignty (History of the Concept). Foreign Policy, (122)

(January 2001): 20

Knesi, Hanspeter. 1982. The structure of the Swiss political system.

In

Patterns of

corporatist policy-making., eds. Gerhard Lehmbruch. Philippe C. Schmitter.

London: Sage Publications.

Kuhlmann, Martin. 2004. Where now

for the

German tango

partners? In Strategic

unionism and partnership: Boxing or dancing?, eds. Tony Huzzard, Denis Gregory

and Regan Scott. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kunkel, Christoph, and Jonas Pontusson. 1998. Corporatism versus social democracy:
Divergent fortunes of the Austrian and Swedish labor movements. West European
Politics 21, (2): 1-31.

Kurzer, Paulette. 200

1

.

Markets and moral regulation: Cultural change

in the

European

Union. Cambridge England: Cambridge University Press.

.

1993. Business

and hanking:

Political

change and economic integration

in

Western Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Kux, Stephan, and Ulf Sverdrup. 2000. Fuzzy borders and adaptive outsiders: Norway,
Switzerland, and the EU. Journal of European Integration 22: 237-270.

Ladika, Susan. 2000. Austria and the EU, what next? Europe, (0191) (April 2000): 22.

Landauer, Carl. 1983. Corporate state ideologies: Historical roots and philosophical
origins Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, University of California,

Berkeley.

Lane, Jan-Erik, and Svante O. Ersson. 1999. Politics

and society'

in

Western Europe. 4th

London: Sage Publications.

ed.

.

1997.

The

institutions

of konkordanz and corporatism:

connected? Swiss Political Science Review 3,(1):
Langguth, Gerd. 1999. Germany
22, (3)

(Summer

in the

1

How

closely are they

-29.

age of globalization The Washington Quarterly

1999): 91.

603

.

Laothamatas, Anek. 1991. Business associations and the new political economy of

From

Thailand:

bureaucratic polity to liberal corporatism. Boulder: Westview

Press.

LaPalombara, Joseph. 1964. Interest groups

in Italian politics. Princeton, N.J.:

Princeton

University Press.

Lauber, Volkmar. 1996. "Economic policy". In Contemporary’ Austrian politics ., ed.

Volkmar Lauber. Boulder,

.

.

Still

Colo.:

Westview

Press.

1996a. Contemporary Austrian politics Boulder, Colo.: WestviewPress.

1992. Changing priorities in Austrian economic policy. In Politics in Austria:

a case of consociationalism? ., eds. Kurt Richard Luther, Wolfgang C. Muller.

Portland,

OR: Frank Cass

Lawson, Neal. 2002.

Why we

&

Company

Ltd.

should bring back corporatism.

New Statesman

131, (4598)

(July 29): 15.

Leaman, Jeremy. 2002. Germany
concertation

and social partnership

century., eds. Stefan Berger,

.

in the 1990s:

1988. The political

in

The impact of reunification.

In Policy

Western Europe: Lessons for the 21st

Hugh Compston. New York: Berghahn Books.

economy of West Germany, 1945-85: An

introduction.

Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Lee, Stephen

Lee,

J.

1998. The

Weimar Republic. London: Routledge.

Wonduck, Joohee Lee, and Harry Charles

Katz. 2004.

Summary: Reconstructing

decentralized collective bargaining and other trends in labor-management-

govemment

interactions. In

The new structure of labor relations: Tripartism and

decentralization ., eds. Harry Charles Katz,

Wonduck Lee and Joohee

Lee. Ithaca,

N.Y.: ILR Press.

Lehmbruch, Gerhard. 2003. Welfare
politics:

The

state

institutional context

adjustment between consensual and adversarial

of reform

in

Germany.

In

Renegotiating the

welfare state: Flexible adjustment through corpora fist concertation ., eds. Frans van

Waarden, Gerhard Lehmbruch London: Routledge.
1993. Consociational democracy and corporatism in Switzerland Publius 23, (2)

March): 43-60.

604

.

(4):

.

1987. Corporatism and political theory.

American

Political Science

Review 81,

1384-1385.

1982. Neo-corporatism in comparative perspective. In Patterns

of corporatist

policy-making ., eds. Gerhard Lehmbruch, Philippe C. Schmitter. London: Sage
Publications.

.

1979. Consociational democracy, class conflict, and the

new

corporatism. In

Trends toward corporatist intermediation ., eds. Philippe C. Schmitter, Gerhard

Lehmbruch. London: Sage Publications.

.

1979a. Liberal corporatism and party government. In Trends toward corporatist

intermediation ., eds. Philippe C. Schmitter, Gerhard Lehmbruch. London: Sage
Publications.

.

1974.

A

non-competitive pattern of conflict management

The case of Switzerland,
Political

accommodation

in liberal

Austria, and Lebanon. In Consociational
in

segmented societies.,

ed.

democracies:

democracy

:

Kenneth D. McRae. Toronto:

McClelland and Stewart

Lehmbruch, Gerhard, and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1982. Patterns of corporatist policymaking. London: Sage Publications.

Lens, Sidney. 1985. Austria's quiet revolution works (Social Partnership). The Nation

(240) (January 12, 1985): 15-16.

Lijphart, Arend. 1999. Patterns of
thirty-six countries.

.

New

democracy: Government forms and performance

Haven: Yale University Press.

1992. Governing from the center: Politics and policy-making in the Netherlands.

West European Politics 15(1): 242(

.

1

.

).

New

and consensus government

Haven: Yale University

ml

rev. ed. Berkeley: University

1969. Politics in Europe; comparisons

N.J.: Prentice-Hall

605

in

Press.

1975. The politics of accommodation : Pluralism

Netherlands. 2

—

1

984. Democracies: patterns of majoritarian

twenty-one countries.

.

in

and democracy

of California

in the

Press.

and interpretations. Englewood

Cliffs,

.

1968. Verzuiling, pacificatie en kentering in de nederlandse politiek.

Amsterdam:
Lijphart, Arend,
in

J.H. de Bussy.

and Markus M.

L. Crepaz. 1991.

Corporatism and consensus democracy

eighteen countries: Conceptual and empirical linkages. British Journal of Political

Science 21,

Linz, Juan

J.,

(2):

235-246.

and Alfred C. Stepan. 1978. The breakdown of democratic regimes.

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lipschutz, Ronnie D., and Judith Mayer. 1996. Global civil society’

environmental governance: The politics of nature from place
State University of

New York

and global

to planet.

Albany:

Press.

Lipschutz, Ronnie D., and James K. Rowe. 2005. Globalization, governmentiality

global politics: Regulation for the rest of us?.

New

York: Routledge.

Lodge, Martin. 2006. The Europeanisation of governance
In

The Europeanisation of governance.,

ed.

and

-

top

down, bottom up or both?

Gunnar Folke Schuppert. Baden-Baden:

Nomos.

.

2000. Isomorphism of national policies? The 'Europeanisation' of German

competition and public procurement law. West European Politics 23,

Logue, John. 1976. Trade unions

in the

(1): 89.

corporate state: The effects of corporatism on

party competition, contract referenda and internationalism in Danish trade unions.

Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg.

Loughlin, John. 1996. Europe of the regions and the federalization of Europe (Federalism

and the European Union). Publius 26,

Lowi, Theodore

2d

ed.

New

J.

1979. The

(4):

141(22).

end of liberalism: The second republic of the United States.

York: Norton.

Lucifora, Claudio, Abigail McKnight, and

employment

in

Europe:

A

Wiemer

Salverda. 2005.

Low-wage

review of the evidence. Socio-Economic Review

3, (2)

(May): 259-92.

Luther, Kurt Richard. 1998.

From accommodation

to competition:

The

'normalization' of

the second republic's party system? In Austria 1945-95: Fifty years

of the second

republic., eds. Kurt Richard Luther, Peter Pulzer. Aldershot, Hants,

UK: Ashgate.

606

,

.

—

.

Still

1992. Consociationalism, parties, and the party system. In Politics in Austria:

a case of consociationalism?., eds. Kurt Richard Luther, Wolfgang

Portland,

OR: Frank Cass

Luther, Kurt Richard, and

of its

own

& Company

C

Muller.

Ltd.

Wolfgang C. Muller. 1992. Austrian consociationalism: Victim

success? In Politics in Austria:

Still

a case of consociationalism? eds.

Kurt Richard Luther, Wolfgang C. Mtiller. Portland, OR: Frank Cass

& Company

Ltd.

.

1992a. Politics in Austria:

Frank Cass

&

Company

Still

a case of consociationalism? Portland. OR:

Ltd.

Luther, Kurt Richard, and Peter Pulzer. 1998. Austria 1945-95: Fifty years of the second
republic. Aldershot, Hants,

Maier, Charles

S.,

UK: Ashgate.

and Gunter Bischof. 1991

German development

The Marshall Plan and Germany: West

.

within the framework of the

European recovery program.

New

York: Berg.

Mair, Peter. 1994. The correlates of consensus democracy and the puzzle of Dutch
politics.

West European Politics

17, (4): 97(27).

Malloy, James M. 1977. Authoritarianism

and corporatism

in

Latin America. Pittsburgh:

University of Pittsburgh Press.

Mangenot, Michel, and Robert

Polet. 2004.

European social dialogue and

services: Europeanisation by the hack door?. Maastricht:

European

the civil

Institute

of

Public Administration.

Marchart, Oliver. 2001

.

The

'fourth

of neo-corporatism. Capital

Marin, Bemd. 1987.

&

way' of the

Class (73) (Spring 2001

From conscoiationalism

a model-generator? In Political stability

integration

ultra right: Austria,

and societal cleavages

in

to

):

Europe, and the end

7-14.

technocorporatism: The Austrian case as

and neo-corporatism: Corporatist

Western Europe., ed.

1
1 j

a Scholten.

London:

Sage Publications.

.

1985. Austria

-

the

paradigm case of liberal corporatism? In The political

economy of corporatism.,

ed.

Wyn

Grant.

607

New

York:

St.

Martin's Press.

Markovits, Andrei

1996. Austrian corporatism in comparative perspective. In Austro-

S.

corporatism: Past, present, future., eds. Gunter Bischof, Anton Pelinka.

Brunswick,

—

.

New

Transaction Publishers.

N.J.:

1986. The politics of the West

interest representation in

German

trade unions: Strategies of class

and

growth and crisis. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

.

1982. The political

economy of West Germany: Modell Deutschland. New York:

Praeger Publishers.

Markovits, Andrei

Comparative

S.,

and Alexander Otto. 1992. German labor and Europe

'92.

Politics 24, (2) (January 1992): 163-180.

Marks, Gary, and Marco R. Steenbergen. 2004. European integration and political
conflict.

Cambridge: Cambridge University

Mayntz, Renate, and

Fritz

Press.

Wilhelm Scharpf. 1975. Policy-making

in the

German federal

bureaucracy. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

McCormick, John. 2005. Understanding

the

European Union: A concise introduction.

Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

.

2004. The European Union: Politics

Westview

.

and policies.

3rd ed. Boulder, Colo.:

Press.

2001. Environmental policy

in the

European Union. Houndmills. Basingstoke,

Hampshire: Palgrave.

McLaughlin, Andrew M., and Justin Greenwood. 1995. The management of interest
representation in the European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies 33,(1)

(March 1995): 143(14).

McNamara, Dennis
McRae, Kenneth

L. 1999.

Corporatism and Korean capitalism. London: Routledge.

D. 1974. Consociational democracy: Political

accommodation

in

segmented societies. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.
Mellahi, Kamel, and Geoff T.

Wood

2004. Variances

sustainable model? International Journal

in social partnership:

of Social Economics

608

Towards

31, (7): 667-683.

a

.

German

Merkl, Peter H., and Gert-Joachim Glaessner. 1993.

unification in the

European

context. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Mitrany, David. 1943.

A working peace system; an argument for

the functional

development of international organization. London: The Royal

Institute

of

International Affairs.

Molina, Oscar, and Martin Rhodes. 2002. Corporatism: The past, present, and future of a
concept. Annua! Review of Political Science

305-33

5:

1

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1998. Centralization or fragmentation? : Europe facing the
challenges of deepening, diversity,

and democracy. New York: Council on Foreign

Relations Press.

.

1998a. The choice for Europe: Social purpose

and state power from Messina

to

Maastricht. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Moreno,

Luis. 1993. Social

exchange and welfare development. Madrid: Consejo

Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, Instituto de Estudios Sociales Avanzados.

Midler, Wolfgang C. 2000.

The Austrian

election of October 1999:

A

shift to the right.

West European Politics 23,(3): 191.

.

1996. Political institutions. In

Contemporary Austrian

Politics ., ed.

Volkmar

Lauber. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

.

1996a. Political parties. In Contemporary Austrian Politics ., ed.

Volkmar

Lauber Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

.

Still

1992. Austrian governmental institutions:

Do

they matter? In Politics in Austria:

a case of consociationalism?., eds. Kurt Richard Luther, Wolfgang C. Midler.

Portland,

OR: Frank Cass

& Company

Ltd.

Nagorski, Andrew. (2000) The politics of guilt: Austria's Bigot, Europe's Burden.

Foreign Affairs (May-June).

Naylor, James. 1993. Workers and the
one. Studies in Political

Economy

state:

(42)

Experiments

(Autumn

609

in

corporatism after world war

1993): 81-111.

Neuhold, Hanspeter. 1998. Austria

between the blocs

second republic.,

to full

in

search of

its

place in a changing world:

From

western integration? In Austria 1945-95: Fifty years of the

eds. Kurt Richard Luther, Peter Pulzer. Aldershot, Hants,

UK:

Ashgate.

Nitsch, Wolfgang, and David Harris. 1974.

Depersonalizing history.

On

Nordlinger, Eric A. 1981.

New German
the

The Brandt

affair

and the SPD:

Critique 3, (Autumn): 93-108.

autonomy of the democratic

state.

Cambridge, Mass.:

Harvard University Press.

-.

1972. Conflict regulation in divided societies. Cambridge, Mass.: Center for

International Affairs, Harvard University.

Nowotny, Ewald. 1992. Sozialdemokratische

wirtschaftspolitik:

Die solidarische

leistungsgesellschaft. Vienna: Locker.

.

1974. Wirtschaftspolitik

und umweltschutz. Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach.

Nowotny, Ewald, and Georg Winckler. 1994. Grundzuge der wirtschaftspolitik
osterreichs. Vienna:

Manz.

Nugent, Neill. 2006. The government and politics of the European Union. 6th

Durham: Duke University

.

ed.

Press.

2001. The European Commission. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire:

Palgrave.

Nyang'oro, Julius Edo, and Timothy M. Shaw. 1989. Corporatism in Africa:

Comparative analysis and practice. Boulder, Colo.: Westview
Obradovic, Damela. 2001

European Union

Hugh Compston,

.

The impact of the

institutions. In Social

Justin

Press.

social dialogue procedure

partnership

in the

on the powers of

European Union.,

eds.

Greenwood. Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

O'Donnell, Guillermo A., Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. 1986.
Transitions from authoritarian rule: Southern Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins

University Press.

610

Offe, Claus. 1984. Societal preconditions

democratic theory. Notre Dame,
Studies, University of Notre

A

Olson, Mancur 1986.
corporatism and

of corporatism and some current dilemmas of
Helen Kellogg

Ind.:

Institute for International

Dame.

theory of the incentives facing political organizations: Neo-

the

hegemonic

state.

International Political Science Review

7, (2)

(April 1986): 165-189.

—

.

1

965. The logic of collective action ; public goods

Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University

and the theory of groups.

Press.

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2006. “Labor

and Indicators.” (accessed September

Statistics, Data,

O'Sullivan, Noel

1988.

The

in

2006). www.oecd.oru

of neo-corporatism.

political theory

Corporatism and the state tradition

12,

In

Western Europe., eds. Andrew

O'Sullivan and Noel O'Sullivan. Aldershot, Hants, England:

Ottaway, Marina. 2001

.

The corporate

Edward

state:

W. Cox, Noel

Elgar.

Corporatism goes global: International organizations,

nongovernmental organization networks, and transnational business. Global

Governance

7, (3) (Jul.-Sep.

Padgett, Stephen. 2003. Political

Developments

Gordon

.

in

2001

):

265.

economy: The German model under

German politics

3.,

eds.

stress

Stephen Padgett, William

In

E. Paterson

and

R. Smith. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

1999. Tripartism without corporatism: Organized interests, the state, and public

policy in post-communist Eastern

Consortium

Germany. Paper presented

for Political Research Joint

Padgett, Stephen, William E. Paterson, and

German politics
Panitch, Leo. 1979.

3.

at

European

Workshops. Mannheim (March 1999).

Gordon

R. Smith 2003.

Developments

in

Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

The development of corporatism

toward corporatist intermediation.,

in liberal

democracies. In Trends

eds. Philippe C. Schmitter,

Gerhard Lehmbruch.

London: Sage Publications.

Parkes, K. Stuart. 1997. Understanding contemporary

Germany. London: Routledge.

The Parliament of Austria. “Standing Committee on
2007]

EU

Affairs.” [accessed August 28,

.

http://www.konvent.gv.at/portal/page? pageid=l 033,658 165& dad=portal& schem

a=PORTAL

.

Paterson, William E. 2005. European policy-making:

Between associated sovereignty and

semisovereignty. In Governance in contemporary Germany: The semisovereign state
revisited., eds.

Simon Green, William

E. Paterson.

Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

.

Germany and Europe.

2003.

In

Developments

Stephen Padgett, William E. Paterson and

Gordon

in

German politics

i.,

eds.

R. Smith. Basingstoke: Palgrave

Macmillan.

Beyond semi-soveriegnty: The new Germany

1996.

in the

new Europe. German

Politics 5, (2) (August): 167-84.

Paxton, RobertO. 1972. Vichy France; old guard and
Barrie

&

new

order, 1940-1944. London:

Jenkins.

Pejovich, Steve. Codetermination in the west: The case of Germany. Washington,

DC:

The Heritage Foundation, 1982.

Bob Rowthom.

Pekkarinen, Jukka, Matti A. Pohjola, and

superior economic system?

Pelinka, Anton. 1999.
social partnership

New

A

York: Oxford University Press.

The (in)compatibility of corporatism and federalism: Austrian
and the EU. West European Politics 22,

1998. Austria: Out

.

.

1992. Social corporatism:

(2):

1

16.

of the shadow of the past. Boulder, Colo.: Westview

1998a. Austrian political culture:

From

Press.

subject to participant orientation. In

Austria 1945-95: Fifty years of the second republic ., eds. Kurt Richard Luther, Peter
Pulzer. Aldershot, Hants,

UK: Ashgate.

Pelinka, Anton, and Fritz Plasser. 1989. The Austrian party system. Boulder, Colo.:

Westview

Press.

Pempel, TJ, and Keiichi Tsunekawa. 1979. Corporatism without labor? the Japanese

anomaly. In Trends toward corporatist intermediation ., eds. Philippe C. Schmitter,

Gerhard Lelunbruch. Beverly

Hills:

Sage Publications.

612

Peterson, John, and Elizabeth E.

Union.

New

York:

Pierson, Paul. 2001

.

St.

Bomberg. 1999. Decision-making

in the

European

Martin's Press.

The new politics of the welfare

state.

Oxford England: Oxford

University Press.

—

.

1996.

The path

to

European

—

.

123(41

(2):

1994. Dismantling the welfare state?:

New

retrenchment.

Pike, Fredrick B.,

A

integration:

Comparative Political Studies 29,

historical institutionalist analysis.

).

Reagan Thatcher, and the politics of
,

York: Cambridge University Press.

and Thomas

Stritch. 1974.

structures in the Iberian world. Notre

Pinder, John. 1998. The building

The new corporatism; social-political

Dame,

Ind.:

University of Notre

of the European Union. 3rd

ed.

Dame

Press.

Oxford: Oxford

University Press.

Plasser, Fritz, Peter A.

mentality' and the

Ulram, and Alfred Grausgruber. 1992. The decline of 'lager

new model of electoral competition

in Austria.

West European

Politics 15, (1): 16(29).

.

1992a.

The decline of 'lager

competition
eds. Kurt

Company

mentality' and the

in Austria. In Politics in

Austria:

Still

new model of electoral
a case of consociationalism?

Richard Luther, Wolfgang C. Muller. Portland, OR: Frank Cass

&

Ltd.

Pontusson, Jonas. 1993. Social corporatism:
Political Science

Review

A

superior economic system? American

87, (4): 1045(2).

Pryce-Jones, David. 2000. Heil, Flaider?. National Review (March 6, 2000).

Pulzer, Peter. 1998.

Between collectivism and

liberalism:

The

political evolution

of

Austria since 1945. In Austria 1945-95: Fifty years of the second republic., eds. Kurt

Richard Luther, Peter Pulzer. Aldershot, Hants,

.

1995. Small earthquake in Austria:

West European Politics

The

national election of 9 October 1994.

18, (2) (April): 429(9).

613

UK: Ashgate,

.

1974. Austria:

Democracy:

The legitimizing

Political

role

accommodation

McRae. Toronto: McClelland and

of political

in

parties. In

segmented societies.,

Consociational
ed.

Kenneth D.

Stewart.

Putnam, Robert D. 1988. Diplomacy and domestic

politics:

The

of two-level games.

logic

International Organization 42, (3) (Summer): 427-60.

Radaelli, Claudio

M. 2003. The Europeanization of public

policy. In

The politics of

Europeanization., eds. Kevin Featherstone, Claudio M. Radaelli, 27-56. Oxford:

Oxford University

Press.

Rhodes, Martin, Paul Heywood, and Vincent Wright. 1997. Developments

European politics.

New

York:

Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 2001.

A

St.

in

West

Martin's Press.

European identity? Europeanization and the evolution of

nation-state identities. In Transforming Europe: Europeanization

change., eds. Maria Green Cowles, James A. Caporaso and

and domestic

Thomas Risse-Kappen.

Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Risse-Kappen, Thomas, Maria Green Cowles, and James A. Caporaso. 2001.
Europeanization and domestic change: Introduction. In Transforming Europe

Europeanization and domestic change., eds.

Caporaso and Thomas Risse-Kappen.

:

Maria Green Cowles. James A.

Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Rogers, Joel, and Wolfgang Streeck. 1995. Works Councils: Consultation,
representation,

Chicago

and cooperation

in industrial relations.

Chicago,

111.:

University of

Press.

Ropp, Steve C. 2004. What about corporatism

and corporatism

in Latin

America

in

Central America? In Authoritarianism

Revisted., ed.

Howard

J.

Wiarda. Gainesville:

University Press of Florida

Ropp, Steve
ed.

C.,

and James A. Morris. 1984. Central America: Crisis and adaptation.

Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.

Rose, Richard 2000 The end of consensus

Democracy

1

1,

in

Austria and Switzerland. Journal of

(2): 26-40.

Rostow, W. W. 1960. The stages of economic growth, a non-communist manifesto.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

614

1st

Royo, Sebastian. 2002. "A new century of corporatism?": Corporatism
Europe, Spain and Portugal

Southern

comparative perspective. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.

in

Moscow,

Ruble, Blair A. 1998. The rise of

in

Inc. (The future

of corporatism, part

2).

The

Wilson Quarterly 22, (2) (March): 81-86.

Saltiel,

David H. 2000. Austria: Crossroads or roadblock

Mediterranean Quarterly

1

1,

(2) (April

1

):

in a

new Europe?

41-58.

Sandholtz, Wayne, and Alec Stone Sweet. 1998. European integration

and supranational

governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sargent, Jane A. 1985. Corporatism and the European community. In The political

economy of corporatism .,
Sarti,

Wyn

and the

Roland. 1971 Fascism
.

the expansion

ed.

Grant.

New

York: St Martin's Press.

industrial leadership in Italy, 1919-1940; a study in

ofprivate power under fascism. Berkeley: University of California

Press.

Sbragia, Alberta

M. 2001

.

Italy

institutional adaptation. In

change .,

eds.

pays for Europe: Political leadership, political choice, and

Transforming Europe

:

Europeanization and domestic

Maria Green Cowles, James A. Caporaso and Thomas Risse-Kappen.

Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

—

.

1992. Euro-politics

:

Institutions

and policymaking

Community. Washington, D.C.: Brookings

in the

"new" European

Institution.

Scharpf, Fritz Wilhelm. 1999. Governing in Europe: Effective

and democratic? New
.

York: Oxford University Press.

.

1996. Negative and positive integration in the political

economy of European

welfare states. In Governance in the European Union., ed. Gary Marks. London:
Sage.

—

.

1993.

to the

—

.

Games

in hierarchies

and networks: Analytical and empirical approaches

study ofgovernance institutions. Frankfurt

1991. Crisis

and choice

in

am

Main:

European social democracy.

University Press.

615

Campus

Verlag.

Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornel!

.

1985. The joint-decision trap: Lessons from

German federalism and European

integration. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin.

Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2003. The EU,
rhetoric.

New

NATO and the

integration of Europe: Rules

and

York: Cambridge University Press.

Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier. 2005. The Europeanization of central

and eastern Europe.

Ithaca,

NY:

Cornell University Press.

Schirm, Stefan A. 2002. The power of institutions and norms
to globalisation:

German economic

in

policy after unification.

shaping national answers

German

Politics 11,(3)

(December 2002): 217-236.
Schmidt, Vivien Ann. 2006. Democracy

in

Europe: The

EG and National Polities.

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

.

.

2002. The futures of European capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

1

996.

From

state to market?:

The transformation of French business and

government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

How to democratize

Schmitter, Philippe C. 2000.

Lanham, Md.: Rowman

.

Johan

in its

member

P. Olsen., eds.

1992.

Littlefield.

states. In

M. Egeberg,

Union upon domestic

Organizing political
P.

institutions:

Essays for

Laegried. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press.

The consolidation of democracy and representation of social groups. The

American Behavioral

.

European union— and why bother?.

1999. Reflections on the impact of the European

democracy

.

&

the

Scientist (1986-1994) 35, (4/5) (Mar-Jun): 422.

1989. Corporatism

is

dead!

Long

live corporatism!.

Government and opposition

24,(1): 54(20).

.

1979.

Still

the century of corporatism. In Trends

toward corporatist

intermediation ., eds. Philippe C. Schmitter, Gerhard Lehmbruch. London: Sage
Publications.

1975. Corporatism

and public policy

in authoritarian Portugal.

Publications.

616

London: Sage

.

—

.

1971. Interest conflict

and political change

in Brazil. Stanford, Calif.:

Stanford

University Press.

Schniitter, Philippe C.,

present

and future.

Schniitter, Philippe C.,

and Grote, Jurgen R. 1997. The corporatist sisyphus: Past,
Florence: European University Institute.

and Terry Lynn Karl. 1991. What democracy

is.

..and

is

not.

Journal of Democracy (Summer 1991): 75-89.

Schniitter, Philippe C.,

and Gerhard Lehmbruch. 1979. Trends toward corporatist

intermediation. London: Sage Publications.

Scholten,

1

ja

1

.

1987. Political stability

and neo-corporatism: Corporatist

integration

and

societal cleavages in Western Europe. London: Sage Publications.

Schultz, D. Mark. 1992. Austria in the international arena: Neutrality, European
integration

.

and consociationalism. West European Politics 15,(1):

1

73(28)

1992a. Austria in the international arena: Neutrality, european integration, and

consociationalism. In Politics in Austria:

Still

a case of consociationalism?., eds.

Kurt Richard Luther, Wolfgang C. Muller. Portland. OR: Frank Cass

& Company

Ltd.

Schuppert. Gunnar Folke. 2006. The Europeanisation of governance Baden-Baden:

Nomos.
Schwartz, Andrew. 2006. The politics of Greed:
central

How privatization structured politics

and eastern Europe. Lanham: Rowman

&

Littlefield.

Sedelmeier, Ulrich. 2001. Comparative politics, policy analysis and governance

European contribution
Politics 24, (3):

1

to the study

in

—A

of the European union? (Review). West European

73.

Segar, Kenneth, and John Warren. 1991 Austria in the thirties: Culture
.

ed. Riverside, Calif.:

and politics.

1

st

Ariadne Press.

Seidel, Hans. 1996. Social partnership
Past, present, future., eds.

and Austro-keynesiamsm In Austro-corporatism:

Gunter Bischof, Anton Pelinka.

Transaction Publishers.

617

New

Brunswick, N.J.:

.

1982.

The Austrian economy: An overview.

Austria ., ed. Sven

W. Arndt Washington,

D.C.:

In

The political economy of

American Enterprise

Institute for

Public Policy Research.

und

Seitenzahl, Rolf. 1974. Einkommenspolitik durch konzertierte aktion

orientierungsdaten. Koln: Bund-Verlag.

Shanahan, William Oswald. 1954. German Protestants face the social question. Notre

Dame,

Ind.:

University of Notre

Shonfield, Andrew. 1966.

Modern

Dame

Press.

capitalism; the changing balance ofpublic

and private

power. London: Oxford University Press.

1958. British economic policy since the war. Harmondsworth, Middlesex:

.

Penguin Books.

Shonfield,

Andrew and Zuzanna

Shonfield. 1984. In defence of the

Oxford Oxfordshire: Oxford University

Shuchman, Abraham. 1957. Codetermination: Labor's middle way
Washington: Public Affairs

Siaroff, Alan. 2000.

The

fate

mixed economy.

Press.

in

Germany.

Press.

of centrifugal democracies: Lessons from consociational

theory and system performance. Comparative Politics 32, (3): 317(16).

.

1999. Corporatism in 24 industrial democracies:

European Journal of Political Research
Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States
Russia,

and social

Meaning and measurement.

36, (2) (October 1999): 175-205.

revolutions:

A comparative

and China. New York: Cambridge University

analysis ofFrance,

Press.

Smith, Gordon R. 2003. The 'new model' party system. In Developments in
politics 3., eds.

German

Stephen Padgett, William E. Paterson and Gordon R. Smith.

Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

.

1992.

Gordon

The nature of the

unified state. In Developments in

R. Smith, William E. Paterson, Peter H.

Durham, N.C.: Duke University

Press.

618

German politics.,

Merkl and Stephen Padgett.

eds.

Smith, Gordon R., Stephen Padgett, and
in

Thomas Poguntke. 2002.

German politics: Beyond the politics of centrality? : A

Continuity

and change

Gordon

festschrift for

Smith. London: Frank Cass.

Smith, Gordon R., William E. Paterson, and Stephen Padgett

German politics

.

Durham, N.C.: Duke University

2.

1992. Developments in

Smith, Mitchell

P.

1996. Developments in

Press.

German politics. Durham: Duke

University Press.

1998. Facing the market: Institutions, strategies, and the fate or

organized labor in

Germany and

&

Britain. Politics

Society’ 26,

(

1

)

(March 1998):

35(33).

Spiro, Herbert

J.

1958. The politics of German codetermination. Cambridge: Harvard

University Press.

Staudinger, Anton. 1991
thirties:

Calif.:

Culture

-

and politics.,

the ideology of Austrofascism". In Austria in the

eds.

Kenneth Segar, John Warren.

European democracies. 5th

1996. Conscience in politics:

New
.

"Austria

1st ed.

Riverside,

Ariadne Press.

Steiner, Jtirg. 2007.

.

.

An

New

ed.

York: Pearson.

empirical investigation of Swiss decision cases.

York: Garland Pub.

1974. Amicable agreement versus majority rule; conflict resolution in
>

Switzerland. Rev. and enl. ed. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Steiner, Jurg,

and Robert H. Dorff. 1980. A theoiy ofpolitical decision modes: Intraparty'

decision making in Switzerland. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Steiner, Kurt. 1987. Sozialpartnerschaft in der krise: Leistungen

neokorporatismus

in osterreich.

Stepan, Alfred C. 1978. The state

American

Political Science

and society: Peru

in

und grenzen des

Review

81

:

295.

comparative perspective.

Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

.

1973. Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, policies,

University Press.

619

and future. New Haven: Yale

.

.

Stone Sweet, Alec. 2004. The judicial construction of Europe. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.

Wayne

Stone Sweet, Alec,

Sandholtz, and Neil Fligstein. 2001. The institutionalization of

Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Streeck, Wolfgang. 2005. Governing interests: Business associations facing

internationalization London: Routledge.

.

1996.

German

Helen Kellogg

—

.

1991.

politics

capitalism:

Does

it

exist?

Can

it

survive? Notre Dame, Ind.: The

Institute for International Studies.

From

national corporatism to transnational pluralism: European interest

and the single market. Notre Dame,

Ind:

Helen Kellogg

Institute for

International Studies.

1

987. The role of the social partners in vocational training

in the federal republic

.

of Germany.

and further

training

Berlin: Cedefop.

1985. Industrial relations in West Germany. 1974-1985:

An

overview. Berlin:

IIM.

.

1984. Industrial relations in West

New
.

Germany: A case study of the car

industiy.

York: St Martin's Press.

1984a. Neo-corporatist industrial relations and the economic crisis in West

Germany.

In

Order and conflict

in

contemporary capitalism .,

ed.

John H.

Goldthorpe. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

1982. Organizational consequences of neo-corporatist co-operation in

German

West

labour unions. In Patterns of corporatist policy-making., eds. Gerhard

Lehmbruch, Philippe C. Schmitter. London: Sage Publications.
Streeck, Wolfgang, and Alike Hassel. 2004.

The crumbling

Germany: Beyond the stable

Herbert

In

state., eds.

pillars

of social partnership.

P. Kitschelt,

Wolfgang

Streeck.

London: Frank Cass.

Streeck, Wolfgang, and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1991

.

From

national corporatism to

transnational pluralism: Organized interests in the single

&

Society 19,

(2):

133(32).

620

European market.

Politics

—

.

Beyond market and state. London: Sage

1985. Private interest government:

Publications.

Ann

Streeck, Wolfgang, and Kathleen

change

Thelen. 2005.

Beyond continuity’:

Institutional

advanced political economies. Oxford: Oxford University

in

Streeck, Wolfgang, and

Kozo Yamamura. 2001 The
.

Germany and Japan

in

origins of nonliberal capitalism:

comparison. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Sturm, Roland. 2003. Policy-making

German politics

Press.

in a

new

political landscape. In

Developments

3 ., eds. Stephen Padgett, William E. Paterson and

Gordon

in

R. Smith.

Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Sully, Melanie A. 1997.

The Haider Phenomenon.

New

York: Columbia University

Press.

.

1996.

The 1995 Austrian

19, (3) (July 1996):

—

.

.

1990.

election:

633(16).

A contemporary

1981. Political parties

history

ofAustria. London: Routledge.

and elections

Talos, Emmerich. 1996. Corporatism
Politics ., ed.

Winter of discontent. West European Politics

-

in Austria.

London: C. Hurst.

the Austrian model. In

Volkmar Lauber. Boulder,

Colo.:

Westview

Contemporary Austrian
Press.

Talos, Emmerich, and Bernhard Kittel. 1996. Roots of Austro-corporatism: Institutional

preconditions and cooperation before 1945. In Austro-corporatism: Past, present,

future ., eds. Gunter Bischof, Anton Pelinka.

New

Brunswick,

N.J.:

Transaction

Publishers.

Tarrow, Sidney. 1995. The Europeanisation of conflict: Reflections from a social

movement
Taylor-Gooby,

perspective. West

Peter. 2004.

New

European

risks,

new

Politics 18, (2): 223(29)

welfare: The transformation of the

welfare state. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

.

.

2001. Welfare states under pressure. London: Sage.

621

European

)

Teutsch, Michael. 2001

.

Regulatory reforms

overcome multiple veto

in the

points. In Differential

on national policymaking .,

eds.

Adrienne

German

transport sector:

to

Europe: The European Union impact

Heritier, Dieter

Kerwer, Christoph Knill,

Dirk Lehmkuhl, Michael Teutsch and Anne-Cecile Douillet. Lanham,

&

How

MD: Rowman

Littlefield.

Thelen, Kathleen Ann. 1994. Beyond corporatism. Toward a
study of labor

in

new framework

for the

advanced capitalism (review essay). Comparative Politics 27,

(

1

(October 1994): 107-124.

.

1993. West European labor

World Politics 46,

( 1

):

in transition:

Sweden and Germany compared.

23(27).

1991. Union ofparts:

Labor politics

in

postwar Germany.

Ithaca: Cornell

University Press.

Therien, Jean-Philippe, and Vincent Pouliot 2006. Global governance; the global

compact: Shifting the politics of international development? Boulder, Colo.: Lynne
.

Rienner Publishers.

Thomas, Clive

S. 1993. First

world

Westport, Conn.: Greenwood

interest groups:

A comparative perspective.

Press.

Thomsen, Poul, and Michael Hadjumichael. 2007. Austria
article

IV consultation. Washington, D.C.:

International

Tiersky, Ronald. 2004. Europe today, national politics,

European

.

security.

2nd

ed.

Lanham: Rowman

&

for jobs:

Monetary Fund.

European

integration,

Rowman &

Labour market policy and

after the 1998 election. In The future of the

and

Littlefield.

2001. Euro-skepticism: A reader. Lanham, Md.:

Timmins, Graham. 2000. Alliance

2007

staff report for the

Littlefield.

industrial relations

German economy: An end to

the

miracle ?, eds. Rebecca Harding, William E. Paterson. Manchester: Manchester
University Press.

Tomandl, Theodor, and Karl Fuerboeck. 1986. Social partnership: The Austrian system
of industrial relations and social insurance.

622

Ithaca,

NY: ILR

Press.

Tosstorff, Reiner. 2005.

The

movement and

international trade-union

international labour organization. Internationa /

the founding of the

Review ofSocial History

50, (3):

399(35).

Trausmuth, Gemot. 1999. Austria

Funke

[cited

democracy

after the elections: Social

in crisis. In

Der

02/09 2001],

http://newvoith.com/archives/westenieurope/austna/austria after the eleetions.html

Traxler, Franz. 1995. Farewell to labor market associations? Organized versus

map

disorganized decentralization as a
industrial relations:

What future?

,

for industrial relations. In

eds. Colin

Organized

Crouch, Franz Traxler. Hants,

Avebury, Aldershot: Ashgate.

—

.

1986. Interessenverhdnde der unternehmer

steuerungskapazitaten, analysiert

am

:

Konstitutionsbedingungen und

beispiel osterreichs. Frankfurt

am

Main:

Campus.
Traxler, Franz, Sabine Blaschke, and Bernhard Kittel. 2001

internationalized markets:

.

National labour relations

in

A comparative study of institutions, change, and

performance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Traxler, Franz, and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1995.

organized

interests.

The emergining

European Journal of Industrial Relations

Truman, David Bicknell. 1951. The governmental process;
opinion.

New

1,(2): 191-218.

political interests

and public

York: Knopf.

power of the European parliament as a conditional agenda
Berkeley, CA: Center for German and European Studies, University of

Tsebelis, George.
setter

euro-polity and

1

992. The

California.

.

1990. Nested games: Rational choice in comparative politics. Berkeley:

University of California Press.

Tsoukalis, Loukas. 1997. The

new European economy

revisited.

Oxford: Oxford

University Press.

Turner, Henry Ashby. 1987. The two Germanies since 1945.
University Press.

623

New

Haven: Yale

.

1992.

Germany from partition

to reunification.

New

Haven: Yale University

Press.

Turner, Lowell. 1998. Fighting for partnership: Labor

and politics

in unified

Germany.

Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

.

ILR

1997. Negotiating the

new Germany: Can

social partnership survive?. Ithaca:

Press.

United States Department of Commerce, U.S. Commercial Service. “The investment
climate in Austria.” 2007 [cited 06/21/2007J.

http://www.buvusa.uov/austna/en investment climate austria.html

Unger,

Brigitte. 1999. Social partnership:

Anything

left?

.

The end of a dinosaur

or just a

midlife crisis? In The Vranitzky era in Austria:, eds. Gunter Bischof, Anton Pelinka

and Ferdinand Karlhofer.

—

.

Brunswick,

N.J.:

Transaction Publishers.

1997. Social partnership challenged. Vienna.

Mark

Vail,

New

I.

2003. Rethinking corporatism and consensus: The dilemmas of German

social-protection reform. West

van Ruysseveldt,

J.,

and

European

Jelle Visser. 1996. Industrial relations in

and transitions. London: Sage

Europe: Traditions

Publications.

1996a Robust corporatism,
relations in Europe: Traditions
Visser.

Politics 26, (3): 41(27).

still?

Industrial relations in

and transitions.,

eds.

J.

Germany.

In Industrial

van Ruysseveldt,

Jelle

London: Sage Publications.

van Waarden. Frans, and Gerhard Lehmbruch. 2003. Renegotiating the welfare

state:

Flexible adjustment through corporatist concertation. London: Routledge.

Veliz, Claudio. 1980

The centralist tradition of Latin America. Princeton,

N.J.: Princeton

University Press.

Verdier, Daniel, and Richard Breen. 2001. Europeanization and globalization: Politics
against markets in the European Union. Comparative Political Studies 34, (3): 227.

Viebrock, Elke. 2004. Coping with corporatism?s legitimacy

reforming the Austrian chamber system Paper presented

Recent attempts

deficit:
at the

American

Science Association Annual Convention. Chicago, IL September

624

2-5.

at

Political

.

Visser, Jelle. 2004. Varieties of industrial relations and Europe's continued quest for

corporatism. Paper presented at

—

.

2002.

Why

membership

in the

1

997.

A Dutch

custom explanation of
(3):

403-30.

Amsterdam University

and

Press.

Reforming the German labour market: The case of temporary

& Change

Klaus. 1993. West

8, (4)

Germany and

1983. Neo-corporatism;

A new

S.

(December 2004): 375-389.

the

expanding pluralism, and new challenges.
comparative perspective., ed. Clive

.

social

miracle: Job growth, welfare reform

Netherlands. Amsterdam:

agency work. Competition

—

A

Journal of Industrial Relations 40,

trends. British

Vitols, Katrin. 2004.

Von Beyme,

Workshops, Uppsala. April 14-18.

fewer workers join unions in Europe:

Visser, Jelle, and A. Hemerijck

corporatism

ECPR

new Germany:

In First

world

Centralization,

interest groups:

A

Thomas. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood

Press.

nut in an old shell 9 International Political

Science Review 4, (2) (April 1983): 173-196.

Wallach, H. G. Peter, and Ronald A. Francisco. 1992. United Germany. The past,
politics prospects. Westport, Conn.:
,

Wallerstein, Michael,

Greenwood

Press.

Miriam Golden, and Peter Lange.

1

997. Unions, employers'

associations, and wage-setting institutions in northern and central Europe, 1950-

1992. Industrial

and Labor Relations Review

Weber, Tina. 2001 The European sectoral
.

partnership

in the

European Union.,

50, (3) (Apr.): 379-401

social dialogue procedure. In Social

eds.

Hugh Compston,

Justin

Greenwood.

Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Weinzierl, Erika

1998.

The

origins of the second republic:

A

retrospective view. In

Austria 1945-95: Fifty years of the second republic., eds. Kurt Richard Luther, Peter
Pulzer. Aldershot, Hants,

Wessels, Bernhard 2000.

Wiarda, Howard

J.

UK:

Ashgate.

Condemned

to co-operate.

2004. Authoritarianism

Mitbestimmung (August): 47-50.

and corporatism

in

Latin America— Revisited

Gainesville: University Press of Florida.

-

.

2002.

New directions

in

comparative politics. 3rd ed Boulder, Colo.: Westview

Press.

625

—

.

1997. Corporatism

NY: M.E.

.

and comparative politics: The other great

"ism".

Armonk,

Sharpe.

1993. Politics in Iberia: The political systems of Spain

and Portugal. New York:

HarperCollins College Publishers.

—

.

1981

.

Corporatism and national development

Westview

—

.

in Latin

America. Boulder, Colo.:

Press.

1968. Dictatorship

and development;

the

methods of control

Dominican Republic. Gainesville: University of Florida
Wiarda, Howard

J.,

and Margaret MacLeish Mott. 2001

flowers: Political systems in Spain

Wiarda, Howard

J.,

.

in Trujillo's

Press.

Catholic roots

and Portugal. Westport, Conn.:

and leda Siqueira Wiarda. 1989. The transition

Spain and Portugal. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise

to

and democratic
Praeger.

democracy

in

Institute for Public

Policy Research.

Wiesen,

S.

Jonathan. 2001

1945-1955. Chapel

.

West German industry and the challenge of the Nazi past,

Hill,

Wiesenthal, Helmut. 2004.

NC:

German

institutional conservatism. In

Kitsehelt,

Wolfgang

Wilensky, Harold

University of North Carolina Press.

unification and 'model Germany':

Germany: Beyond the stable

An

state., eds.

adventure

in

Herbert P

Streeck. London: Frank Cass.

and Lowell Turner. 1987. Democratic corporatism and policy

L.,

linkages: The interdependence

of industrial, labor-market, incomes, and social

policies in eight countries. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of
California.

Williamson, Peter

J.

1989. Corporatism in perspective:

An

introductory guide to

corporatist theory. London: Sage.

.

1985

Varieties

of corporatism

Cambridge University

:

A conceptual discussion. Cambridge:

Press.

Wilson, Frank L. 1990. Neo-corporatism and the

Challenging the political order:
democracies., eds. Russell

J

rise

of new social movements. In

New social and political movements in western
New York: Oxford

Dalton, Manfred Kuechler.

University Press.

626

—

.

1983. Interest groups and politics in Western Europe:

approach (review

Winkler,

J.

.

Comparative Politics

T. 1976. Corporatism.

Wolf, Martin. 2004.

—

article).

16,

(

1

)

The neo-corporatist

(October

European Journal of Sociology

Why globalization

works.

New

17:

983): 105-123.

1

100-136.

Haven: Yale University Press.

1994. The resistible appeal offortress Europe. Washington,

DC: American

Enterprise Institute.

Wolinetz, Steven B. 2001. Modell Nederland: Social partnership and competitive

corporatism

in the

Gina Bermeo.

Netherlands. In Unemployment in the

New

new Europe

.,

ed.

Nancy

York: Cambridge University Press.

Wurzel, Eckhard. Germany: The case for reform.

OECD

Observer (237) (May 2003).

http://www.oecdobserver.oru/news/fullstory. phr)/aid/992/Germanv: The case for

eform.html

Zeigler, L.

.

Harmon. 1993. Switzerland: Domestic corporatism

society. In First

world

interest groups:

Thomas. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood

.

1988. Pluralism, corporatism,

conflict regulation in the

in a

consociational

A comparative perspective

.,

ed. Clive S.

Press.

and Confucianism:

Political association

and

United States, Europe, and Taiwan. Philadelphia: Temple

University Press.

627

r

3474 '

IH

